<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/net, branch v5.15.185</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>net_sched: hfsc: Address reentrant enqueue adding class to eltree twice</title>
<updated>2025-06-04T12:38:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Pedro Tammela</name>
<email>pctammela@mojatatu.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-22T18:14:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=2c928b3a0b04a431ffcd6c8b7d88a267124a3a28'/>
<id>2c928b3a0b04a431ffcd6c8b7d88a267124a3a28</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ac9fe7dd8e730a103ae4481147395cc73492d786 upstream.

Savino says:
    "We are writing to report that this recent patch
    (141d34391abbb315d68556b7c67ad97885407547) [1]
    can be bypassed, and a UAF can still occur when HFSC is utilized with
    NETEM.

    The patch only checks the cl-&gt;cl_nactive field to determine whether
    it is the first insertion or not [2], but this field is only
    incremented by init_vf [3].

    By using HFSC_RSC (which uses init_ed) [4], it is possible to bypass the
    check and insert the class twice in the eltree.
    Under normal conditions, this would lead to an infinite loop in
    hfsc_dequeue for the reasons we already explained in this report [5].

    However, if TBF is added as root qdisc and it is configured with a
    very low rate,
    it can be utilized to prevent packets from being dequeued.
    This behavior can be exploited to perform subsequent insertions in the
    HFSC eltree and cause a UAF."

To fix both the UAF and the infinite loop, with netem as an hfsc child,
check explicitly in hfsc_enqueue whether the class is already in the eltree
whenever the HFSC_RSC flag is set.

[1] https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=141d34391abbb315d68556b7c67ad97885407547
[2] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.15-rc5/source/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c#L1572
[3] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.15-rc5/source/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c#L677
[4] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.15-rc5/source/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c#L1574
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/8DuRWwfqjoRDLDmBMlIfbrsZg9Gx50DHJc1ilxsEBNe2D6NMoigR_eIRIG0LOjMc3r10nUUZtArXx4oZBIdUfZQrwjcQhdinnMis_0G7VEk=@willsroot.io/T/#u

Fixes: 37d9cf1a3ce3 ("sched: Fix detection of empty queues in child qdiscs")
Reported-by: Savino Dicanosa &lt;savy@syst3mfailure.io&gt;
Reported-by: William Liu &lt;will@willsroot.io&gt;
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim &lt;jhs@mojatatu.com&gt;
Tested-by: Victor Nogueira &lt;victor@mojatatu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela &lt;pctammela@mojatatu.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250522181448.1439717-2-pctammela@mojatatu.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ac9fe7dd8e730a103ae4481147395cc73492d786 upstream.

Savino says:
    "We are writing to report that this recent patch
    (141d34391abbb315d68556b7c67ad97885407547) [1]
    can be bypassed, and a UAF can still occur when HFSC is utilized with
    NETEM.

    The patch only checks the cl-&gt;cl_nactive field to determine whether
    it is the first insertion or not [2], but this field is only
    incremented by init_vf [3].

    By using HFSC_RSC (which uses init_ed) [4], it is possible to bypass the
    check and insert the class twice in the eltree.
    Under normal conditions, this would lead to an infinite loop in
    hfsc_dequeue for the reasons we already explained in this report [5].

    However, if TBF is added as root qdisc and it is configured with a
    very low rate,
    it can be utilized to prevent packets from being dequeued.
    This behavior can be exploited to perform subsequent insertions in the
    HFSC eltree and cause a UAF."

To fix both the UAF and the infinite loop, with netem as an hfsc child,
check explicitly in hfsc_enqueue whether the class is already in the eltree
whenever the HFSC_RSC flag is set.

[1] https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=141d34391abbb315d68556b7c67ad97885407547
[2] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.15-rc5/source/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c#L1572
[3] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.15-rc5/source/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c#L677
[4] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.15-rc5/source/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c#L1574
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/8DuRWwfqjoRDLDmBMlIfbrsZg9Gx50DHJc1ilxsEBNe2D6NMoigR_eIRIG0LOjMc3r10nUUZtArXx4oZBIdUfZQrwjcQhdinnMis_0G7VEk=@willsroot.io/T/#u

Fixes: 37d9cf1a3ce3 ("sched: Fix detection of empty queues in child qdiscs")
Reported-by: Savino Dicanosa &lt;savy@syst3mfailure.io&gt;
Reported-by: William Liu &lt;will@willsroot.io&gt;
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim &lt;jhs@mojatatu.com&gt;
Tested-by: Victor Nogueira &lt;victor@mojatatu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela &lt;pctammela@mojatatu.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250522181448.1439717-2-pctammela@mojatatu.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>llc: fix data loss when reading from a socket in llc_ui_recvmsg()</title>
<updated>2025-06-04T12:38:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ilia Gavrilov</name>
<email>Ilia.Gavrilov@infotecs.ru</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-15T12:20:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=0f5d93ee3f8b769b5da16cfb83647cb81a53e293'/>
<id>0f5d93ee3f8b769b5da16cfb83647cb81a53e293</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 239af1970bcb039a1551d2c438d113df0010c149 upstream.

For SOCK_STREAM sockets, if user buffer size (len) is less
than skb size (skb-&gt;len), the remaining data from skb
will be lost after calling kfree_skb().

To fix this, move the statement for partial reading
above skb deletion.

Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org)

Fixes: 30a584d944fb ("[LLX]: SOCK_DGRAM interface fixes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilia Gavrilov &lt;Ilia.Gavrilov@infotecs.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 239af1970bcb039a1551d2c438d113df0010c149 upstream.

For SOCK_STREAM sockets, if user buffer size (len) is less
than skb size (skb-&gt;len), the remaining data from skb
will be lost after calling kfree_skb().

To fix this, move the statement for partial reading
above skb deletion.

Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org)

Fixes: 30a584d944fb ("[LLX]: SOCK_DGRAM interface fixes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilia Gavrilov &lt;Ilia.Gavrilov@infotecs.ru&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>can: bcm: add missing rcu read protection for procfs content</title>
<updated>2025-06-04T12:38:06+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oliver Hartkopp</name>
<email>socketcan@hartkopp.net</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-19T12:50:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=0622846db728a5332b917c797c733e202c4620ae'/>
<id>0622846db728a5332b917c797c733e202c4620ae</id>
<content type='text'>
commit dac5e6249159ac255dad9781793dbe5908ac9ddb upstream.

When the procfs content is generated for a bcm_op which is in the process
to be removed the procfs output might show unreliable data (UAF).

As the removal of bcm_op's is already implemented with rcu handling this
patch adds the missing rcu_read_lock() and makes sure the list entries
are properly removed under rcu protection.

Fixes: f1b4e32aca08 ("can: bcm: use call_rcu() instead of costly synchronize_rcu()")
Reported-by: Anderson Nascimento &lt;anderson@allelesecurity.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Anderson Nascimento &lt;anderson@allelesecurity.com&gt;
Tested-by: Anderson Nascimento &lt;anderson@allelesecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250519125027.11900-2-socketcan@hartkopp.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # &gt;= 5.4
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit dac5e6249159ac255dad9781793dbe5908ac9ddb upstream.

When the procfs content is generated for a bcm_op which is in the process
to be removed the procfs output might show unreliable data (UAF).

As the removal of bcm_op's is already implemented with rcu handling this
patch adds the missing rcu_read_lock() and makes sure the list entries
are properly removed under rcu protection.

Fixes: f1b4e32aca08 ("can: bcm: use call_rcu() instead of costly synchronize_rcu()")
Reported-by: Anderson Nascimento &lt;anderson@allelesecurity.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Anderson Nascimento &lt;anderson@allelesecurity.com&gt;
Tested-by: Anderson Nascimento &lt;anderson@allelesecurity.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250519125027.11900-2-socketcan@hartkopp.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # &gt;= 5.4
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>can: bcm: add locking for bcm_op runtime updates</title>
<updated>2025-06-04T12:38:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Oliver Hartkopp</name>
<email>socketcan@hartkopp.net</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-19T12:50:26+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=fbd8fdc2b218e979cfe422b139b8f74c12419d1f'/>
<id>fbd8fdc2b218e979cfe422b139b8f74c12419d1f</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c2aba69d0c36a496ab4f2e81e9c2b271f2693fd7 upstream.

The CAN broadcast manager (CAN BCM) can send a sequence of CAN frames via
hrtimer. The content and also the length of the sequence can be changed
resp reduced at runtime where the 'currframe' counter is then set to zero.

Although this appeared to be a safe operation the updates of 'currframe'
can be triggered from user space and hrtimer context in bcm_can_tx().
Anderson Nascimento created a proof of concept that triggered a KASAN
slab-out-of-bounds read access which can be prevented with a spin_lock_bh.

At the rework of bcm_can_tx() the 'count' variable has been moved into
the protected section as this variable can be modified from both contexts
too.

Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol")
Reported-by: Anderson Nascimento &lt;anderson@allelesecurity.com&gt;
Tested-by: Anderson Nascimento &lt;anderson@allelesecurity.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250519125027.11900-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit c2aba69d0c36a496ab4f2e81e9c2b271f2693fd7 upstream.

The CAN broadcast manager (CAN BCM) can send a sequence of CAN frames via
hrtimer. The content and also the length of the sequence can be changed
resp reduced at runtime where the 'currframe' counter is then set to zero.

Although this appeared to be a safe operation the updates of 'currframe'
can be triggered from user space and hrtimer context in bcm_can_tx().
Anderson Nascimento created a proof of concept that triggered a KASAN
slab-out-of-bounds read access which can be prevented with a spin_lock_bh.

At the rework of bcm_can_tx() the 'count' variable has been moved into
the protected section as this variable can be modified from both contexts
too.

Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol")
Reported-by: Anderson Nascimento &lt;anderson@allelesecurity.com&gt;
Tested-by: Anderson Nascimento &lt;anderson@allelesecurity.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp &lt;socketcan@hartkopp.net&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250519125027.11900-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde &lt;mkl@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_encrypt_done</title>
<updated>2025-06-04T12:38:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Wang Liang</name>
<email>wangliang74@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-20T10:14:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=f5c2c4eaaa5a8e7e0685ec031d480e588e263e59'/>
<id>f5c2c4eaaa5a8e7e0685ec031d480e588e263e59</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e279024617134c94fd3e37470156534d5f2b3472 ]

Syzbot reported a slab-use-after-free with the following call trace:

  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tipc_aead_encrypt_done+0x4bd/0x510 net/tipc/crypto.c:840
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807a733000 by task kworker/1:0/25

  Call Trace:
   kasan_report+0xd9/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:601
   tipc_aead_encrypt_done+0x4bd/0x510 net/tipc/crypto.c:840
   crypto_request_complete include/crypto/algapi.h:266
   aead_request_complete include/crypto/internal/aead.h:85
   cryptd_aead_crypt+0x3b8/0x750 crypto/cryptd.c:772
   crypto_request_complete include/crypto/algapi.h:266
   cryptd_queue_worker+0x131/0x200 crypto/cryptd.c:181
   process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231

  Allocated by task 8355:
   kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:778
   tipc_crypto_start+0xcc/0x9e0 net/tipc/crypto.c:1466
   tipc_init_net+0x2dd/0x430 net/tipc/core.c:72
   ops_init+0xb9/0x650 net/core/net_namespace.c:139
   setup_net+0x435/0xb40 net/core/net_namespace.c:343
   copy_net_ns+0x2f0/0x670 net/core/net_namespace.c:508
   create_new_namespaces+0x3ea/0xb10 kernel/nsproxy.c:110
   unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc0/0x1f0 kernel/nsproxy.c:228
   ksys_unshare+0x419/0x970 kernel/fork.c:3323
   __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3394

  Freed by task 63:
   kfree+0x12a/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:4557
   tipc_crypto_stop+0x23c/0x500 net/tipc/crypto.c:1539
   tipc_exit_net+0x8c/0x110 net/tipc/core.c:119
   ops_exit_list+0xb0/0x180 net/core/net_namespace.c:173
   cleanup_net+0x5b7/0xbf0 net/core/net_namespace.c:640
   process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231

After freed the tipc_crypto tx by delete namespace, tipc_aead_encrypt_done
may still visit it in cryptd_queue_worker workqueue.

I reproduce this issue by:
  ip netns add ns1
  ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2
  ip link set veth1 netns ns1
  ip netns exec ns1 tipc bearer enable media eth dev veth1
  ip netns exec ns1 tipc node set key this_is_a_master_key master
  ip netns exec ns1 tipc bearer disable media eth dev veth1
  ip netns del ns1

The key of reproduction is that, simd_aead_encrypt is interrupted, leading
to crypto_simd_usable() return false. Thus, the cryptd_queue_worker is
triggered, and the tipc_crypto tx will be visited.

  tipc_disc_timeout
    tipc_bearer_xmit_skb
      tipc_crypto_xmit
        tipc_aead_encrypt
          crypto_aead_encrypt
            // encrypt()
            simd_aead_encrypt
              // crypto_simd_usable() is false
              child = &amp;ctx-&gt;cryptd_tfm-&gt;base;

  simd_aead_encrypt
    crypto_aead_encrypt
      // encrypt()
      cryptd_aead_encrypt_enqueue
        cryptd_aead_enqueue
          cryptd_enqueue_request
            // trigger cryptd_queue_worker
            queue_work_on(smp_processor_id(), cryptd_wq, &amp;cpu_queue-&gt;work)

Fix this by holding net reference count before encrypt.

Reported-by: syzbot+55c12726619ff85ce1f6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c12726619ff85ce1f6
Fixes: fc1b6d6de220 ("tipc: introduce TIPC encryption &amp; authentication")
Signed-off-by: Wang Liang &lt;wangliang74@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250520101404.1341730-1-wangliang74@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit e279024617134c94fd3e37470156534d5f2b3472 ]

Syzbot reported a slab-use-after-free with the following call trace:

  ==================================================================
  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tipc_aead_encrypt_done+0x4bd/0x510 net/tipc/crypto.c:840
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807a733000 by task kworker/1:0/25

  Call Trace:
   kasan_report+0xd9/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:601
   tipc_aead_encrypt_done+0x4bd/0x510 net/tipc/crypto.c:840
   crypto_request_complete include/crypto/algapi.h:266
   aead_request_complete include/crypto/internal/aead.h:85
   cryptd_aead_crypt+0x3b8/0x750 crypto/cryptd.c:772
   crypto_request_complete include/crypto/algapi.h:266
   cryptd_queue_worker+0x131/0x200 crypto/cryptd.c:181
   process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231

  Allocated by task 8355:
   kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:778
   tipc_crypto_start+0xcc/0x9e0 net/tipc/crypto.c:1466
   tipc_init_net+0x2dd/0x430 net/tipc/core.c:72
   ops_init+0xb9/0x650 net/core/net_namespace.c:139
   setup_net+0x435/0xb40 net/core/net_namespace.c:343
   copy_net_ns+0x2f0/0x670 net/core/net_namespace.c:508
   create_new_namespaces+0x3ea/0xb10 kernel/nsproxy.c:110
   unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc0/0x1f0 kernel/nsproxy.c:228
   ksys_unshare+0x419/0x970 kernel/fork.c:3323
   __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3394

  Freed by task 63:
   kfree+0x12a/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:4557
   tipc_crypto_stop+0x23c/0x500 net/tipc/crypto.c:1539
   tipc_exit_net+0x8c/0x110 net/tipc/core.c:119
   ops_exit_list+0xb0/0x180 net/core/net_namespace.c:173
   cleanup_net+0x5b7/0xbf0 net/core/net_namespace.c:640
   process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231

After freed the tipc_crypto tx by delete namespace, tipc_aead_encrypt_done
may still visit it in cryptd_queue_worker workqueue.

I reproduce this issue by:
  ip netns add ns1
  ip link add veth1 type veth peer name veth2
  ip link set veth1 netns ns1
  ip netns exec ns1 tipc bearer enable media eth dev veth1
  ip netns exec ns1 tipc node set key this_is_a_master_key master
  ip netns exec ns1 tipc bearer disable media eth dev veth1
  ip netns del ns1

The key of reproduction is that, simd_aead_encrypt is interrupted, leading
to crypto_simd_usable() return false. Thus, the cryptd_queue_worker is
triggered, and the tipc_crypto tx will be visited.

  tipc_disc_timeout
    tipc_bearer_xmit_skb
      tipc_crypto_xmit
        tipc_aead_encrypt
          crypto_aead_encrypt
            // encrypt()
            simd_aead_encrypt
              // crypto_simd_usable() is false
              child = &amp;ctx-&gt;cryptd_tfm-&gt;base;

  simd_aead_encrypt
    crypto_aead_encrypt
      // encrypt()
      cryptd_aead_encrypt_enqueue
        cryptd_aead_enqueue
          cryptd_enqueue_request
            // trigger cryptd_queue_worker
            queue_work_on(smp_processor_id(), cryptd_wq, &amp;cpu_queue-&gt;work)

Fix this by holding net reference count before encrypt.

Reported-by: syzbot+55c12726619ff85ce1f6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=55c12726619ff85ce1f6
Fixes: fc1b6d6de220 ("tipc: introduce TIPC encryption &amp; authentication")
Signed-off-by: Wang Liang &lt;wangliang74@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250520101404.1341730-1-wangliang74@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sch_hfsc: Fix qlen accounting bug when using peek in hfsc_enqueue()</title>
<updated>2025-06-04T12:38:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Cong Wang</name>
<email>xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-18T22:20:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=89c301e929a0db14ebd94b4d97764ce1d6981653'/>
<id>89c301e929a0db14ebd94b4d97764ce1d6981653</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3f981138109f63232a5fb7165938d4c945cc1b9d ]

When enqueuing the first packet to an HFSC class, hfsc_enqueue() calls the
child qdisc's peek() operation before incrementing sch-&gt;q.qlen and
sch-&gt;qstats.backlog. If the child qdisc uses qdisc_peek_dequeued(), this may
trigger an immediate dequeue and potential packet drop. In such cases,
qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() is called, but the HFSC qdisc's qlen and backlog
have not yet been updated, leading to inconsistent queue accounting. This
can leave an empty HFSC class in the active list, causing further
consequences like use-after-free.

This patch fixes the bug by moving the increment of sch-&gt;q.qlen and
sch-&gt;qstats.backlog before the call to the child qdisc's peek() operation.
This ensures that queue length and backlog are always accurate when packet
drops or dequeues are triggered during the peek.

Fixes: 12d0ad3be9c3 ("net/sched/sch_hfsc.c: handle corner cases where head may change invalidating calculated deadline")
Reported-by: Mingi Cho &lt;mincho@theori.io&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250518222038.58538-2-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim &lt;jhs@mojatatu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 3f981138109f63232a5fb7165938d4c945cc1b9d ]

When enqueuing the first packet to an HFSC class, hfsc_enqueue() calls the
child qdisc's peek() operation before incrementing sch-&gt;q.qlen and
sch-&gt;qstats.backlog. If the child qdisc uses qdisc_peek_dequeued(), this may
trigger an immediate dequeue and potential packet drop. In such cases,
qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() is called, but the HFSC qdisc's qlen and backlog
have not yet been updated, leading to inconsistent queue accounting. This
can leave an empty HFSC class in the active list, causing further
consequences like use-after-free.

This patch fixes the bug by moving the increment of sch-&gt;q.qlen and
sch-&gt;qstats.backlog before the call to the child qdisc's peek() operation.
This ensures that queue length and backlog are always accurate when packet
drops or dequeues are triggered during the peek.

Fixes: 12d0ad3be9c3 ("net/sched/sch_hfsc.c: handle corner cases where head may change invalidating calculated deadline")
Reported-by: Mingi Cho &lt;mincho@theori.io&gt;
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang &lt;xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman &lt;horms@kernel.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250518222038.58538-2-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim &lt;jhs@mojatatu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni &lt;pabeni@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>bridge: netfilter: Fix forwarding of fragmented packets</title>
<updated>2025-06-04T12:38:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ido Schimmel</name>
<email>idosch@nvidia.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-15T08:48:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=ec180b03245985ad2c539bed6853cf1af6195cf0'/>
<id>ec180b03245985ad2c539bed6853cf1af6195cf0</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 91b6dbced0ef1d680afdd69b14fc83d50ebafaf3 ]

When netfilter defrag hooks are loaded (due to the presence of conntrack
rules, for example), fragmented packets entering the bridge will be
defragged by the bridge's pre-routing hook (br_nf_pre_routing() -&gt;
ipv4_conntrack_defrag()).

Later on, in the bridge's post-routing hook, the defragged packet will
be fragmented again. If the size of the largest fragment is larger than
what the kernel has determined as the destination MTU (using
ip_skb_dst_mtu()), the defragged packet will be dropped.

Before commit ac6627a28dbf ("net: ipv4: Consolidate ipv4_mtu and
ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward"), ip_skb_dst_mtu() would return dst_mtu() as
the destination MTU. Assuming the dst entry attached to the packet is
the bridge's fake rtable one, this would simply be the bridge's MTU (see
fake_mtu()).

However, after above mentioned commit, ip_skb_dst_mtu() ends up
returning the route's MTU stored in the dst entry's metrics. Ideally, in
case the dst entry is the bridge's fake rtable one, this should be the
bridge's MTU as the bridge takes care of updating this metric when its
MTU changes (see br_change_mtu()).

Unfortunately, the last operation is a no-op given the metrics attached
to the fake rtable entry are marked as read-only. Therefore,
ip_skb_dst_mtu() ends up returning 1500 (the initial MTU value) and
defragged packets are dropped during fragmentation when dealing with
large fragments and high MTU (e.g., 9k).

Fix by moving the fake rtable entry's metrics to be per-bridge (in a
similar fashion to the fake rtable entry itself) and marking them as
writable, thereby allowing MTU changes to be reflected.

Fixes: 62fa8a846d7d ("net: Implement read-only protection and COW'ing of metrics.")
Fixes: 33eb9873a283 ("bridge: initialize fake_rtable metrics")
Reported-by: Venkat Venkatsubra &lt;venkat.x.venkatsubra@oracle.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/PH0PR10MB4504888284FF4CBA648197D0ACB82@PH0PR10MB4504.namprd10.prod.outlook.com/
Tested-by: Venkat Venkatsubra &lt;venkat.x.venkatsubra@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov &lt;razor@blackwall.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250515084848.727706-1-idosch@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 91b6dbced0ef1d680afdd69b14fc83d50ebafaf3 ]

When netfilter defrag hooks are loaded (due to the presence of conntrack
rules, for example), fragmented packets entering the bridge will be
defragged by the bridge's pre-routing hook (br_nf_pre_routing() -&gt;
ipv4_conntrack_defrag()).

Later on, in the bridge's post-routing hook, the defragged packet will
be fragmented again. If the size of the largest fragment is larger than
what the kernel has determined as the destination MTU (using
ip_skb_dst_mtu()), the defragged packet will be dropped.

Before commit ac6627a28dbf ("net: ipv4: Consolidate ipv4_mtu and
ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward"), ip_skb_dst_mtu() would return dst_mtu() as
the destination MTU. Assuming the dst entry attached to the packet is
the bridge's fake rtable one, this would simply be the bridge's MTU (see
fake_mtu()).

However, after above mentioned commit, ip_skb_dst_mtu() ends up
returning the route's MTU stored in the dst entry's metrics. Ideally, in
case the dst entry is the bridge's fake rtable one, this should be the
bridge's MTU as the bridge takes care of updating this metric when its
MTU changes (see br_change_mtu()).

Unfortunately, the last operation is a no-op given the metrics attached
to the fake rtable entry are marked as read-only. Therefore,
ip_skb_dst_mtu() ends up returning 1500 (the initial MTU value) and
defragged packets are dropped during fragmentation when dealing with
large fragments and high MTU (e.g., 9k).

Fix by moving the fake rtable entry's metrics to be per-bridge (in a
similar fashion to the fake rtable entry itself) and marking them as
writable, thereby allowing MTU changes to be reflected.

Fixes: 62fa8a846d7d ("net: Implement read-only protection and COW'ing of metrics.")
Fixes: 33eb9873a283 ("bridge: initialize fake_rtable metrics")
Reported-by: Venkat Venkatsubra &lt;venkat.x.venkatsubra@oracle.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/PH0PR10MB4504888284FF4CBA648197D0ACB82@PH0PR10MB4504.namprd10.prod.outlook.com/
Tested-by: Venkat Venkatsubra &lt;venkat.x.venkatsubra@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov &lt;razor@blackwall.org&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250515084848.727706-1-idosch@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix not checking l2cap_chan security level</title>
<updated>2025-06-04T12:38:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Luiz Augusto von Dentz</name>
<email>luiz.von.dentz@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-07T19:00:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=069cbc318de5d6b4cf39aa601291707a9ae992ca'/>
<id>069cbc318de5d6b4cf39aa601291707a9ae992ca</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7af8479d9eb4319b4ba7b47a8c4d2c55af1c31e1 ]

l2cap_check_enc_key_size shall check the security level of the
l2cap_chan rather than the hci_conn since for incoming connection
request that may be different as hci_conn may already been
encrypted using a different security level.

Fixes: 522e9ed157e3 ("Bluetooth: l2cap: Check encryption key size on incoming connection")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 7af8479d9eb4319b4ba7b47a8c4d2c55af1c31e1 ]

l2cap_check_enc_key_size shall check the security level of the
l2cap_chan rather than the hci_conn since for incoming connection
request that may be different as hci_conn may already been
encrypted using a different security level.

Fixes: 522e9ed157e3 ("Bluetooth: l2cap: Check encryption key size on incoming connection")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz &lt;luiz.von.dentz@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfrm: Sanitize marks before insert</title>
<updated>2025-06-04T12:38:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Chaignon</name>
<email>paul.chaignon@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-05-07T11:31:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=0995986ffd5e783dcf67cfb03ade850a93d2787d'/>
<id>0995986ffd5e783dcf67cfb03ade850a93d2787d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0b91fda3a1f044141e1e615456ff62508c32b202 ]

Prior to this patch, the mark is sanitized (applying the state's mask to
the state's value) only on inserts when checking if a conflicting XFRM
state or policy exists.

We discovered in Cilium that this same sanitization does not occur
in the hot-path __xfrm_state_lookup. In the hot-path, the sk_buff's mark
is simply compared to the state's value:

    if ((mark &amp; x-&gt;mark.m) != x-&gt;mark.v)
        continue;

Therefore, users can define unsanitized marks (ex. 0xf42/0xf00) which will
never match any packet.

This commit updates __xfrm_state_insert and xfrm_policy_insert to store
the sanitized marks, thus removing this footgun.

This has the side effect of changing the ip output, as the
returned mark will have the mask applied to it when printed.

Fixes: 3d6acfa7641f ("xfrm: SA lookups with mark")
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon &lt;paul.chaignon@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Louis DeLosSantos &lt;louis.delos.devel@gmail.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Louis DeLosSantos &lt;louis.delos.devel@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 0b91fda3a1f044141e1e615456ff62508c32b202 ]

Prior to this patch, the mark is sanitized (applying the state's mask to
the state's value) only on inserts when checking if a conflicting XFRM
state or policy exists.

We discovered in Cilium that this same sanitization does not occur
in the hot-path __xfrm_state_lookup. In the hot-path, the sk_buff's mark
is simply compared to the state's value:

    if ((mark &amp; x-&gt;mark.m) != x-&gt;mark.v)
        continue;

Therefore, users can define unsanitized marks (ex. 0xf42/0xf00) which will
never match any packet.

This commit updates __xfrm_state_insert and xfrm_policy_insert to store
the sanitized marks, thus removing this footgun.

This has the side effect of changing the ip output, as the
returned mark will have the mask applied to it when printed.

Fixes: 3d6acfa7641f ("xfrm: SA lookups with mark")
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon &lt;paul.chaignon@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Louis DeLosSantos &lt;louis.delos.devel@gmail.com&gt;
Co-developed-by: Louis DeLosSantos &lt;louis.delos.devel@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ip: fib_rules: Fetch net from fib_rule in fib[46]_rule_configure().</title>
<updated>2025-06-04T12:38:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Kuniyuki Iwashima</name>
<email>kuniyu@amazon.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-02-07T07:24:58+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=14298c88e2dda0099d5c8c68e78f643ebe32671d'/>
<id>14298c88e2dda0099d5c8c68e78f643ebe32671d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5a1ccffd30a08f5a2428cd5fbb3ab03e8eb6c66d ]

The following patch will not set skb-&gt;sk from VRF path.

Let's fetch net from fib_rule-&gt;fr_net instead of sock_net(skb-&gt;sk)
in fib[46]_rule_configure().

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Tested-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250207072502.87775-5-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 5a1ccffd30a08f5a2428cd5fbb3ab03e8eb6c66d ]

The following patch will not set skb-&gt;sk from VRF path.

Let's fetch net from fib_rule-&gt;fr_net instead of sock_net(skb-&gt;sk)
in fib[46]_rule_configure().

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima &lt;kuniyu@amazon.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Tested-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@nvidia.com&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250207072502.87775-5-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
