<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/net, branch v5.4.148</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>ip_gre: validate csum_start only on pull</title>
<updated>2021-09-22T10:26:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Willem de Bruijn</name>
<email>willemb@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-05T15:21:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=3d32ce5472bb2ca720bef84089b85f76a705fd1a'/>
<id>3d32ce5472bb2ca720bef84089b85f76a705fd1a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 8a0ed250f911da31a2aef52101bc707846a800ff ]

The GRE tunnel device can pull existing outer headers in ipge_xmit.
This is a rare path, apparently unique to this device. The below
commit ensured that pulling does not move skb-&gt;data beyond csum_start.

But it has a false positive if ip_summed is not CHECKSUM_PARTIAL and
thus csum_start is irrelevant.

Refine to exclude this. At the same time simplify and strengthen the
test.

Simplify, by moving the check next to the offending pull, making it
more self documenting and removing an unnecessary branch from other
code paths.

Strengthen, by also ensuring that the transport header is correct and
therefore the inner headers will be after skb_reset_inner_headers.
The transport header is set to csum_start in skb_partial_csum_set.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/YS+h%2FtqCJJiQei+W@shredder/
Fixes: 1d011c4803c7 ("ip_gre: add validation for csum_start")
Reported-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@idosch.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Alexander Duyck &lt;alexander.duyck@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexander Duyck &lt;alexanderduyck@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 8a0ed250f911da31a2aef52101bc707846a800ff ]

The GRE tunnel device can pull existing outer headers in ipge_xmit.
This is a rare path, apparently unique to this device. The below
commit ensured that pulling does not move skb-&gt;data beyond csum_start.

But it has a false positive if ip_summed is not CHECKSUM_PARTIAL and
thus csum_start is irrelevant.

Refine to exclude this. At the same time simplify and strengthen the
test.

Simplify, by moving the check next to the offending pull, making it
more self documenting and removing an unnecessary branch from other
code paths.

Strengthen, by also ensuring that the transport header is correct and
therefore the inner headers will be after skb_reset_inner_headers.
The transport header is set to csum_start in skb_partial_csum_set.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/YS+h%2FtqCJJiQei+W@shredder/
Fixes: 1d011c4803c7 ("ip_gre: add validation for csum_start")
Reported-by: Ido Schimmel &lt;idosch@idosch.org&gt;
Suggested-by: Alexander Duyck &lt;alexander.duyck@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn &lt;willemb@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alexander Duyck &lt;alexanderduyck@fb.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fq_codel: reject silly quantum parameters</title>
<updated>2021-09-22T10:26:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-03T22:03:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=93f54354ccc8cffd4daea2837f7b95b6da0966a9'/>
<id>93f54354ccc8cffd4daea2837f7b95b6da0966a9</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c7c5e6ff533fe1f9afef7d2fa46678987a1335a7 ]

syzbot found that forcing a big quantum attribute would crash hosts fast,
essentially using this:

tc qd replace dev eth0 root fq_codel quantum 4294967295

This is because fq_codel_dequeue() would have to loop
~2^31 times in :

	if (flow-&gt;deficit &lt;= 0) {
		flow-&gt;deficit += q-&gt;quantum;
		list_move_tail(&amp;flow-&gt;flowchain, &amp;q-&gt;old_flows);
		goto begin;
	}

SFQ max quantum is 2^19 (half a megabyte)
Lets adopt a max quantum of one megabyte for FQ_CODEL.

Fixes: 4b549a2ef4be ("fq_codel: Fair Queue Codel AQM")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit c7c5e6ff533fe1f9afef7d2fa46678987a1335a7 ]

syzbot found that forcing a big quantum attribute would crash hosts fast,
essentially using this:

tc qd replace dev eth0 root fq_codel quantum 4294967295

This is because fq_codel_dequeue() would have to loop
~2^31 times in :

	if (flow-&gt;deficit &lt;= 0) {
		flow-&gt;deficit += q-&gt;quantum;
		list_move_tail(&amp;flow-&gt;flowchain, &amp;q-&gt;old_flows);
		goto begin;
	}

SFQ max quantum is 2^19 (half a megabyte)
Lets adopt a max quantum of one megabyte for FQ_CODEL.

Fixes: 4b549a2ef4be ("fq_codel: Fair Queue Codel AQM")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzkaller@googlegroups.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>netfilter: socket: icmp6: fix use-after-scope</title>
<updated>2021-09-22T10:26:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Benjamin Hesmans</name>
<email>benjamin.hesmans@tessares.net</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-03T13:23:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=d448b240b17501b2f9a168e9d3689446413ca29a'/>
<id>d448b240b17501b2f9a168e9d3689446413ca29a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 730affed24bffcd1eebd5903171960f5ff9f1f22 ]

Bug reported by KASAN:

BUG: KASAN: use-after-scope in inet6_ehashfn (net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c:40)
Call Trace:
(...)
inet6_ehashfn (net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c:40)
(...)
nf_sk_lookup_slow_v6 (net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_socket_ipv6.c:91
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_socket_ipv6.c:146)

It seems that this bug has already been fixed by Eric Dumazet in the
past in:
commit 78296c97ca1f ("netfilter: xt_socket: fix a stack corruption bug")

But a variant of the same issue has been introduced in
commit d64d80a2cde9 ("netfilter: x_tables: don't extract flow keys on early demuxed sks in socket match")

`daddr` and `saddr` potentially hold a reference to ipv6_var that is no
longer in scope when the call to `nf_socket_get_sock_v6` is made.

Fixes: d64d80a2cde9 ("netfilter: x_tables: don't extract flow keys on early demuxed sks in socket match")
Acked-by: Matthieu Baerts &lt;matthieu.baerts@tessares.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Hesmans &lt;benjamin.hesmans@tessares.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 730affed24bffcd1eebd5903171960f5ff9f1f22 ]

Bug reported by KASAN:

BUG: KASAN: use-after-scope in inet6_ehashfn (net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c:40)
Call Trace:
(...)
inet6_ehashfn (net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c:40)
(...)
nf_sk_lookup_slow_v6 (net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_socket_ipv6.c:91
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_socket_ipv6.c:146)

It seems that this bug has already been fixed by Eric Dumazet in the
past in:
commit 78296c97ca1f ("netfilter: xt_socket: fix a stack corruption bug")

But a variant of the same issue has been introduced in
commit d64d80a2cde9 ("netfilter: x_tables: don't extract flow keys on early demuxed sks in socket match")

`daddr` and `saddr` potentially hold a reference to ipv6_var that is no
longer in scope when the call to `nf_socket_get_sock_v6` is made.

Fixes: d64d80a2cde9 ("netfilter: x_tables: don't extract flow keys on early demuxed sks in socket match")
Acked-by: Matthieu Baerts &lt;matthieu.baerts@tessares.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Hesmans &lt;benjamin.hesmans@tessares.net&gt;
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal &lt;fw@strlen.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso &lt;pablo@netfilter.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Set fc_nlinfo in nh_create_ipv4, nh_create_ipv6</title>
<updated>2021-09-22T10:26:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ryoga Saito</name>
<email>contact@proelbtn.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-02T05:20:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=79b584d85912e4c51aa9de42853d5b46efaa7498'/>
<id>79b584d85912e4c51aa9de42853d5b46efaa7498</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 9aca491e0dccf8a9d84a5b478e5eee3c6ea7803b ]

This patch fixes kernel NULL pointer dereference when creating nexthop
which is bound with SRv6 decapsulation. In the creation of nexthop,
__seg6_end_dt_vrf_build is called. __seg6_end_dt_vrf_build expects
fc_lninfo in fib6_config is set correctly, but it isn't set in
nh_create_ipv6, which causes kernel crash.

Here is steps to reproduce kernel crash:

1. modprobe vrf
2. ip -6 nexthop add encap seg6local action End.DT4 vrftable 1 dev eth0

We got the following message:

[  901.370336] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000ba0
[  901.371658] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[  901.372672] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[  901.373672] PGD 0 P4D 0
[  901.374248] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[  901.374944] CPU: 0 PID: 8593 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.14-051400-generic #202108310811-Ubuntu
[  901.376404] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module_el8.2.0+320+13f867d7 04/01/2014
[  901.377907] RIP: 0010:vrf_ifindex_lookup_by_table_id+0x19/0x90 [vrf]
[  901.379182] Code: c1 e9 72 ff ff ff e8 96 49 01 c2 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 56 41 55 41 89 f5 41 54 53 8b 05 47 4c 00 00 &lt;48&gt; 8b 97 a0 0b 00 00 48 8b 1c c2 e8 57 27 53 c1 4c 8d a3 88 00 00
[  901.382652] RSP: 0018:ffffbf2d02043590 EFLAGS: 00010282
[  901.383746] RAX: 000000000000000b RBX: ffff990808255e70 RCX: ffffbf2d02043aa8
[  901.385436] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000
[  901.386924] RBP: ffffbf2d020435b0 R08: 00000000000000c0 R09: ffff990808255e40
[  901.388537] R10: ffffffff83b08c90 R11: 0000000000000009 R12: 0000000000000000
[  901.389937] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000000000000000b
[  901.391226] FS:  00007fe49381f740(0000) GS:ffff99087dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  901.392737] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  901.393803] CR2: 0000000000000ba0 CR3: 000000000e3e8003 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[  901.395122] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  901.396496] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  901.397833] PKRU: 55555554
[  901.398578] Call Trace:
[  901.399144]  l3mdev_ifindex_lookup_by_table_id+0x3b/0x70
[  901.400179]  __seg6_end_dt_vrf_build+0x34/0xd0
[  901.401067]  seg6_end_dt4_build+0x16/0x20
[  901.401904]  seg6_local_build_state+0x271/0x430
[  901.402797]  lwtunnel_build_state+0x81/0x130
[  901.403645]  fib_nh_common_init+0x82/0x100
[  901.404465]  ? sock_def_readable+0x4b/0x80
[  901.405285]  fib6_nh_init+0x115/0x7c0
[  901.406033]  nh_create_ipv6.isra.0+0xe1/0x140
[  901.406932]  rtm_new_nexthop+0x3b7/0xeb0
[  901.407828]  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x152/0x3a0
[  901.408663]  ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x130/0x130
[  901.409535]  netlink_rcv_skb+0x55/0x100
[  901.410319]  rtnetlink_rcv+0x15/0x20
[  901.411026]  netlink_unicast+0x1a8/0x250
[  901.411813]  netlink_sendmsg+0x238/0x470
[  901.412602]  ? _copy_from_user+0x2b/0x60
[  901.413394]  sock_sendmsg+0x65/0x70
[  901.414112]  ____sys_sendmsg+0x218/0x290
[  901.414929]  ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x5c/0x90
[  901.415814]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x81/0xc0
[  901.416559]  ? fsnotify_destroy_marks+0x27/0xf0
[  901.417447]  ? call_rcu+0xa4/0x230
[  901.418153]  ? kmem_cache_free+0x23f/0x410
[  901.418972]  ? dentry_free+0x37/0x70
[  901.419705]  ? mntput_no_expire+0x4c/0x260
[  901.420574]  __sys_sendmsg+0x62/0xb0
[  901.421297]  __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1f/0x30
[  901.422057]  do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xc0
[  901.422756]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x50
[  901.423675]  ? __x64_sys_close+0x12/0x40
[  901.424462]  ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0
[  901.425219]  ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x9/0x20
[  901.426149]  ? irqentry_exit+0x19/0x30
[  901.426901]  ? exc_page_fault+0x89/0x160
[  901.427709]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30
[  901.428536]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[  901.429514] RIP: 0033:0x7fe493945747
[  901.430248] Code: 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb bb 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10
[  901.433549] RSP: 002b:00007ffe9932cf68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
[  901.434981] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fe493945747
[  901.436303] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffe9932cfe0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[  901.437607] RBP: 00000000613053f7 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffe9932d07c
[  901.438990] R10: 000055f4a903a010 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
[  901.440340] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 000055f4a802b163 R15: 000055f4a8042020
[  901.441630] Modules linked in: vrf nls_utf8 isofs nls_iso8859_1 dm_multipath scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common isst_if_mbox_msr isst_if_common nfit rapl input_leds joydev serio_raw qemu_fw_cfg mac_hid sch_fq_codel drm virtio_rng ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic zstd_compress raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel crypto_simd virtio_net net_failover cryptd psmouse virtio_blk failover i2c_piix4 pata_acpi floppy
[  901.450808] CR2: 0000000000000ba0
[  901.451514] ---[ end trace c27b934b99ade304 ]---
[  901.452403] RIP: 0010:vrf_ifindex_lookup_by_table_id+0x19/0x90 [vrf]
[  901.453626] Code: c1 e9 72 ff ff ff e8 96 49 01 c2 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 56 41 55 41 89 f5 41 54 53 8b 05 47 4c 00 00 &lt;48&gt; 8b 97 a0 0b 00 00 48 8b 1c c2 e8 57 27 53 c1 4c 8d a3 88 00 00
[  901.456910] RSP: 0018:ffffbf2d02043590 EFLAGS: 00010282
[  901.457912] RAX: 000000000000000b RBX: ffff990808255e70 RCX: ffffbf2d02043aa8
[  901.459238] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000
[  901.460552] RBP: ffffbf2d020435b0 R08: 00000000000000c0 R09: ffff990808255e40
[  901.461882] R10: ffffffff83b08c90 R11: 0000000000000009 R12: 0000000000000000
[  901.463208] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000000000000000b
[  901.464529] FS:  00007fe49381f740(0000) GS:ffff99087dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  901.466058] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  901.467189] CR2: 0000000000000ba0 CR3: 000000000e3e8003 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[  901.468515] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  901.469858] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  901.471139] PKRU: 55555554

Signed-off-by: Ryoga Saito &lt;contact@proelbtn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 9aca491e0dccf8a9d84a5b478e5eee3c6ea7803b ]

This patch fixes kernel NULL pointer dereference when creating nexthop
which is bound with SRv6 decapsulation. In the creation of nexthop,
__seg6_end_dt_vrf_build is called. __seg6_end_dt_vrf_build expects
fc_lninfo in fib6_config is set correctly, but it isn't set in
nh_create_ipv6, which causes kernel crash.

Here is steps to reproduce kernel crash:

1. modprobe vrf
2. ip -6 nexthop add encap seg6local action End.DT4 vrftable 1 dev eth0

We got the following message:

[  901.370336] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000ba0
[  901.371658] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[  901.372672] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[  901.373672] PGD 0 P4D 0
[  901.374248] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[  901.374944] CPU: 0 PID: 8593 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.14-051400-generic #202108310811-Ubuntu
[  901.376404] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module_el8.2.0+320+13f867d7 04/01/2014
[  901.377907] RIP: 0010:vrf_ifindex_lookup_by_table_id+0x19/0x90 [vrf]
[  901.379182] Code: c1 e9 72 ff ff ff e8 96 49 01 c2 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 56 41 55 41 89 f5 41 54 53 8b 05 47 4c 00 00 &lt;48&gt; 8b 97 a0 0b 00 00 48 8b 1c c2 e8 57 27 53 c1 4c 8d a3 88 00 00
[  901.382652] RSP: 0018:ffffbf2d02043590 EFLAGS: 00010282
[  901.383746] RAX: 000000000000000b RBX: ffff990808255e70 RCX: ffffbf2d02043aa8
[  901.385436] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000
[  901.386924] RBP: ffffbf2d020435b0 R08: 00000000000000c0 R09: ffff990808255e40
[  901.388537] R10: ffffffff83b08c90 R11: 0000000000000009 R12: 0000000000000000
[  901.389937] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000000000000000b
[  901.391226] FS:  00007fe49381f740(0000) GS:ffff99087dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  901.392737] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  901.393803] CR2: 0000000000000ba0 CR3: 000000000e3e8003 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[  901.395122] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  901.396496] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  901.397833] PKRU: 55555554
[  901.398578] Call Trace:
[  901.399144]  l3mdev_ifindex_lookup_by_table_id+0x3b/0x70
[  901.400179]  __seg6_end_dt_vrf_build+0x34/0xd0
[  901.401067]  seg6_end_dt4_build+0x16/0x20
[  901.401904]  seg6_local_build_state+0x271/0x430
[  901.402797]  lwtunnel_build_state+0x81/0x130
[  901.403645]  fib_nh_common_init+0x82/0x100
[  901.404465]  ? sock_def_readable+0x4b/0x80
[  901.405285]  fib6_nh_init+0x115/0x7c0
[  901.406033]  nh_create_ipv6.isra.0+0xe1/0x140
[  901.406932]  rtm_new_nexthop+0x3b7/0xeb0
[  901.407828]  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x152/0x3a0
[  901.408663]  ? rtnl_calcit.isra.0+0x130/0x130
[  901.409535]  netlink_rcv_skb+0x55/0x100
[  901.410319]  rtnetlink_rcv+0x15/0x20
[  901.411026]  netlink_unicast+0x1a8/0x250
[  901.411813]  netlink_sendmsg+0x238/0x470
[  901.412602]  ? _copy_from_user+0x2b/0x60
[  901.413394]  sock_sendmsg+0x65/0x70
[  901.414112]  ____sys_sendmsg+0x218/0x290
[  901.414929]  ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x5c/0x90
[  901.415814]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x81/0xc0
[  901.416559]  ? fsnotify_destroy_marks+0x27/0xf0
[  901.417447]  ? call_rcu+0xa4/0x230
[  901.418153]  ? kmem_cache_free+0x23f/0x410
[  901.418972]  ? dentry_free+0x37/0x70
[  901.419705]  ? mntput_no_expire+0x4c/0x260
[  901.420574]  __sys_sendmsg+0x62/0xb0
[  901.421297]  __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1f/0x30
[  901.422057]  do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xc0
[  901.422756]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x50
[  901.423675]  ? __x64_sys_close+0x12/0x40
[  901.424462]  ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0
[  901.425219]  ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x9/0x20
[  901.426149]  ? irqentry_exit+0x19/0x30
[  901.426901]  ? exc_page_fault+0x89/0x160
[  901.427709]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30
[  901.428536]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[  901.429514] RIP: 0033:0x7fe493945747
[  901.430248] Code: 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb bb 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 &lt;48&gt; 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10
[  901.433549] RSP: 002b:00007ffe9932cf68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
[  901.434981] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fe493945747
[  901.436303] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffe9932cfe0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[  901.437607] RBP: 00000000613053f7 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffe9932d07c
[  901.438990] R10: 000055f4a903a010 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
[  901.440340] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 000055f4a802b163 R15: 000055f4a8042020
[  901.441630] Modules linked in: vrf nls_utf8 isofs nls_iso8859_1 dm_multipath scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common isst_if_mbox_msr isst_if_common nfit rapl input_leds joydev serio_raw qemu_fw_cfg mac_hid sch_fq_codel drm virtio_rng ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic zstd_compress raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel crypto_simd virtio_net net_failover cryptd psmouse virtio_blk failover i2c_piix4 pata_acpi floppy
[  901.450808] CR2: 0000000000000ba0
[  901.451514] ---[ end trace c27b934b99ade304 ]---
[  901.452403] RIP: 0010:vrf_ifindex_lookup_by_table_id+0x19/0x90 [vrf]
[  901.453626] Code: c1 e9 72 ff ff ff e8 96 49 01 c2 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 56 41 55 41 89 f5 41 54 53 8b 05 47 4c 00 00 &lt;48&gt; 8b 97 a0 0b 00 00 48 8b 1c c2 e8 57 27 53 c1 4c 8d a3 88 00 00
[  901.456910] RSP: 0018:ffffbf2d02043590 EFLAGS: 00010282
[  901.457912] RAX: 000000000000000b RBX: ffff990808255e70 RCX: ffffbf2d02043aa8
[  901.459238] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000
[  901.460552] RBP: ffffbf2d020435b0 R08: 00000000000000c0 R09: ffff990808255e40
[  901.461882] R10: ffffffff83b08c90 R11: 0000000000000009 R12: 0000000000000000
[  901.463208] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 000000000000000b
[  901.464529] FS:  00007fe49381f740(0000) GS:ffff99087dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  901.466058] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  901.467189] CR2: 0000000000000ba0 CR3: 000000000e3e8003 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[  901.468515] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  901.469858] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  901.471139] PKRU: 55555554

Signed-off-by: Ryoga Saito &lt;contact@proelbtn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tcp: fix tp-&gt;undo_retrans accounting in tcp_sacktag_one()</title>
<updated>2021-09-22T10:26:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>zhenggy</name>
<email>zhenggy@chinatelecom.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-14T01:51:15+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=9ebbb8b964f5201d901b26741046ea1505320bf3'/>
<id>9ebbb8b964f5201d901b26741046ea1505320bf3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4f884f3962767877d7aabbc1ec124d2c307a4257 upstream.

Commit 10d3be569243 ("tcp-tso: do not split TSO packets at retransmit
time") may directly retrans a multiple segments TSO/GSO packet without
split, Since this commit, we can no longer assume that a retransmitted
packet is a single segment.

This patch fixes the tp-&gt;undo_retrans accounting in tcp_sacktag_one()
that use the actual segments(pcount) of the retransmitted packet.

Before that commit (10d3be569243), the assumption underlying the
tp-&gt;undo_retrans-- seems correct.

Fixes: 10d3be569243 ("tcp-tso: do not split TSO packets at retransmit time")
Signed-off-by: zhenggy &lt;zhenggy@chinatelecom.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 4f884f3962767877d7aabbc1ec124d2c307a4257 upstream.

Commit 10d3be569243 ("tcp-tso: do not split TSO packets at retransmit
time") may directly retrans a multiple segments TSO/GSO packet without
split, Since this commit, we can no longer assume that a retransmitted
packet is a single segment.

This patch fixes the tp-&gt;undo_retrans accounting in tcp_sacktag_one()
that use the actual segments(pcount) of the retransmitted packet.

Before that commit (10d3be569243), the assumption underlying the
tp-&gt;undo_retrans-- seems correct.

Fixes: 10d3be569243 ("tcp-tso: do not split TSO packets at retransmit time")
Signed-off-by: zhenggy &lt;zhenggy@chinatelecom.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng &lt;ycheng@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell &lt;ncardwell@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net: dsa: destroy the phylink instance on any error in dsa_slave_phy_setup</title>
<updated>2021-09-22T10:26:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vladimir Oltean</name>
<email>vladimir.oltean@nxp.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-14T13:43:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=baf450477143360570bf6581c226912da2862f54'/>
<id>baf450477143360570bf6581c226912da2862f54</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 6a52e73368038f47f6618623d75061dc263b26ae upstream.

DSA supports connecting to a phy-handle, and has a fallback to a non-OF
based method of connecting to an internal PHY on the switch's own MDIO
bus, if no phy-handle and no fixed-link nodes were present.

The -ENODEV error code from the first attempt (phylink_of_phy_connect)
is what triggers the second attempt (phylink_connect_phy).

However, when the first attempt returns a different error code than
-ENODEV, this results in an unbalance of calls to phylink_create and
phylink_destroy by the time we exit the function. The phylink instance
has leaked.

There are many other error codes that can be returned by
phylink_of_phy_connect. For example, phylink_validate returns -EINVAL.
So this is a practical issue too.

Fixes: aab9c4067d23 ("net: dsa: Plug in PHYLINK support")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean &lt;vladimir.oltean@nxp.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli &lt;f.fainelli@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) &lt;rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210914134331.2303380-1-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 6a52e73368038f47f6618623d75061dc263b26ae upstream.

DSA supports connecting to a phy-handle, and has a fallback to a non-OF
based method of connecting to an internal PHY on the switch's own MDIO
bus, if no phy-handle and no fixed-link nodes were present.

The -ENODEV error code from the first attempt (phylink_of_phy_connect)
is what triggers the second attempt (phylink_connect_phy).

However, when the first attempt returns a different error code than
-ENODEV, this results in an unbalance of calls to phylink_create and
phylink_destroy by the time we exit the function. The phylink instance
has leaked.

There are many other error codes that can be returned by
phylink_of_phy_connect. For example, phylink_validate returns -EINVAL.
So this is a practical issue too.

Fixes: aab9c4067d23 ("net: dsa: Plug in PHYLINK support")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean &lt;vladimir.oltean@nxp.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli &lt;f.fainelli@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) &lt;rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210914134331.2303380-1-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski &lt;kuba@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/af_unix: fix a data-race in unix_dgram_poll</title>
<updated>2021-09-22T10:26:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Dumazet</name>
<email>edumazet@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-09T00:00:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=498e765b8595a50b8128109185eaba20142a4395'/>
<id>498e765b8595a50b8128109185eaba20142a4395</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 04f08eb44b5011493d77b602fdec29ff0f5c6cd5 upstream.

syzbot reported another data-race in af_unix [1]

Lets change __skb_insert() to use WRITE_ONCE() when changing
skb head qlen.

Also, change unix_dgram_poll() to use lockless version
of unix_recvq_full()

It is verry possible we can switch all/most unix_recvq_full()
to the lockless version, this will be done in a future kernel version.

[1] HEAD commit: 8596e589b787732c8346f0482919e83cc9362db1

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in skb_queue_tail / unix_dgram_poll

write to 0xffff88814eeb24e0 of 4 bytes by task 25815 on cpu 0:
 __skb_insert include/linux/skbuff.h:1938 [inline]
 __skb_queue_before include/linux/skbuff.h:2043 [inline]
 __skb_queue_tail include/linux/skbuff.h:2076 [inline]
 skb_queue_tail+0x80/0xa0 net/core/skbuff.c:3264
 unix_dgram_sendmsg+0xff2/0x1600 net/unix/af_unix.c:1850
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:703 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:723 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2392
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2446 [inline]
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x315/0x4b0 net/socket.c:2532
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2561 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2558 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2558
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff88814eeb24e0 of 4 bytes by task 25834 on cpu 1:
 skb_queue_len include/linux/skbuff.h:1869 [inline]
 unix_recvq_full net/unix/af_unix.c:194 [inline]
 unix_dgram_poll+0x2bc/0x3e0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2777
 sock_poll+0x23e/0x260 net/socket.c:1288
 vfs_poll include/linux/poll.h:90 [inline]
 ep_item_poll fs/eventpoll.c:846 [inline]
 ep_send_events fs/eventpoll.c:1683 [inline]
 ep_poll fs/eventpoll.c:1798 [inline]
 do_epoll_wait+0x6ad/0xf00 fs/eventpoll.c:2226
 __do_sys_epoll_wait fs/eventpoll.c:2238 [inline]
 __se_sys_epoll_wait fs/eventpoll.c:2233 [inline]
 __x64_sys_epoll_wait+0xf6/0x120 fs/eventpoll.c:2233
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0x0000001b -&gt; 0x00000001

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 25834 Comm: syz-executor.1 Tainted: G        W         5.14.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Fixes: 86b18aaa2b5b ("skbuff: fix a data race in skb_queue_len()")
Cc: Qian Cai &lt;cai@lca.pw&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 04f08eb44b5011493d77b602fdec29ff0f5c6cd5 upstream.

syzbot reported another data-race in af_unix [1]

Lets change __skb_insert() to use WRITE_ONCE() when changing
skb head qlen.

Also, change unix_dgram_poll() to use lockless version
of unix_recvq_full()

It is verry possible we can switch all/most unix_recvq_full()
to the lockless version, this will be done in a future kernel version.

[1] HEAD commit: 8596e589b787732c8346f0482919e83cc9362db1

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in skb_queue_tail / unix_dgram_poll

write to 0xffff88814eeb24e0 of 4 bytes by task 25815 on cpu 0:
 __skb_insert include/linux/skbuff.h:1938 [inline]
 __skb_queue_before include/linux/skbuff.h:2043 [inline]
 __skb_queue_tail include/linux/skbuff.h:2076 [inline]
 skb_queue_tail+0x80/0xa0 net/core/skbuff.c:3264
 unix_dgram_sendmsg+0xff2/0x1600 net/unix/af_unix.c:1850
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:703 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:723 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2392
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2446 [inline]
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x315/0x4b0 net/socket.c:2532
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2561 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2558 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2558
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

read to 0xffff88814eeb24e0 of 4 bytes by task 25834 on cpu 1:
 skb_queue_len include/linux/skbuff.h:1869 [inline]
 unix_recvq_full net/unix/af_unix.c:194 [inline]
 unix_dgram_poll+0x2bc/0x3e0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2777
 sock_poll+0x23e/0x260 net/socket.c:1288
 vfs_poll include/linux/poll.h:90 [inline]
 ep_item_poll fs/eventpoll.c:846 [inline]
 ep_send_events fs/eventpoll.c:1683 [inline]
 ep_poll fs/eventpoll.c:1798 [inline]
 do_epoll_wait+0x6ad/0xf00 fs/eventpoll.c:2226
 __do_sys_epoll_wait fs/eventpoll.c:2238 [inline]
 __se_sys_epoll_wait fs/eventpoll.c:2233 [inline]
 __x64_sys_epoll_wait+0xf6/0x120 fs/eventpoll.c:2233
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

value changed: 0x0000001b -&gt; 0x00000001

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 25834 Comm: syz-executor.1 Tainted: G        W         5.14.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011

Fixes: 86b18aaa2b5b ("skbuff: fix a data race in skb_queue_len()")
Cc: Qian Cai &lt;cai@lca.pw&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet &lt;edumazet@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>tipc: increase timeout in tipc_sk_enqueue()</title>
<updated>2021-09-22T10:26:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hoang Le</name>
<email>hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-13T09:28:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=6808e70a77e9cd4fb564118069a2e573d67d8f74'/>
<id>6808e70a77e9cd4fb564118069a2e573d67d8f74</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f4bb62e64c88c93060c051195d3bbba804e56945 upstream.

In tipc_sk_enqueue() we use hardcoded 2 jiffies to extract
socket buffer from generic queue to particular socket.
The 2 jiffies is too short in case there are other high priority
tasks get CPU cycles for multiple jiffies update. As result, no
buffer could be enqueued to particular socket.

To solve this, we switch to use constant timeout 20msecs.
Then, the function will be expired between 2 jiffies (CONFIG_100HZ)
and 20 jiffies (CONFIG_1000HZ).

Fixes: c637c1035534 ("tipc: resolve race problem at unicast message reception")
Acked-by: Jon Maloy &lt;jmaloy@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hoang Le &lt;hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit f4bb62e64c88c93060c051195d3bbba804e56945 upstream.

In tipc_sk_enqueue() we use hardcoded 2 jiffies to extract
socket buffer from generic queue to particular socket.
The 2 jiffies is too short in case there are other high priority
tasks get CPU cycles for multiple jiffies update. As result, no
buffer could be enqueued to particular socket.

To solve this, we switch to use constant timeout 20msecs.
Then, the function will be expired between 2 jiffies (CONFIG_100HZ)
and 20 jiffies (CONFIG_1000HZ).

Fixes: c637c1035534 ("tipc: resolve race problem at unicast message reception")
Acked-by: Jon Maloy &lt;jmaloy@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hoang Le &lt;hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net/l2tp: Fix reference count leak in l2tp_udp_recv_core</title>
<updated>2021-09-22T10:26:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Xiyu Yang</name>
<email>xiyuyang19@fudan.edu.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-09T04:32:00+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=efe35db94897613438168b3e9cc3aaa3dcd6bedd'/>
<id>efe35db94897613438168b3e9cc3aaa3dcd6bedd</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 9b6ff7eb666415e1558f1ba8a742f5db6a9954de upstream.

The reference count leak issue may take place in an error handling
path. If both conditions of tunnel-&gt;version == L2TP_HDR_VER_3 and the
return value of l2tp_v3_ensure_opt_in_linear is nonzero, the function
would directly jump to label invalid, without decrementing the reference
count of the l2tp_session object session increased earlier by
l2tp_tunnel_get_session(). This may result in refcount leaks.

Fix this issue by decrease the reference count before jumping to the
label invalid.

Fixes: 4522a70db7aa ("l2tp: fix reading optional fields of L2TPv3")
Signed-off-by: Xiyu Yang &lt;xiyuyang19@fudan.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Xin Xiong &lt;xiongx18@fudan.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Xin Tan &lt;tanxin.ctf@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 9b6ff7eb666415e1558f1ba8a742f5db6a9954de upstream.

The reference count leak issue may take place in an error handling
path. If both conditions of tunnel-&gt;version == L2TP_HDR_VER_3 and the
return value of l2tp_v3_ensure_opt_in_linear is nonzero, the function
would directly jump to label invalid, without decrementing the reference
count of the l2tp_session object session increased earlier by
l2tp_tunnel_get_session(). This may result in refcount leaks.

Fix this issue by decrease the reference count before jumping to the
label invalid.

Fixes: 4522a70db7aa ("l2tp: fix reading optional fields of L2TPv3")
Signed-off-by: Xiyu Yang &lt;xiyuyang19@fudan.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Xin Xiong &lt;xiongx18@fudan.edu.cn&gt;
Signed-off-by: Xin Tan &lt;tanxin.ctf@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dccp: don't duplicate ccid when cloning dccp sock</title>
<updated>2021-09-22T10:26:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Lin, Zhenpeng</name>
<email>zplin@psu.edu</email>
</author>
<published>2021-09-08T03:40:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=5ab04a4ffed02f66e8e6310ba8261a43d1572343'/>
<id>5ab04a4ffed02f66e8e6310ba8261a43d1572343</id>
<content type='text'>
commit d9ea761fdd197351890418acd462c51f241014a7 upstream.

Commit 2677d2067731 ("dccp: don't free ccid2_hc_tx_sock ...") fixed
a UAF but reintroduced CVE-2017-6074.

When the sock is cloned, two dccps_hc_tx_ccid will reference to the
same ccid. So one can free the ccid object twice from two socks after
cloning.

This issue was found by "Hadar Manor" as well and assigned with
CVE-2020-16119, which was fixed in Ubuntu's kernel. So here I port
the patch from Ubuntu to fix it.

The patch prevents cloned socks from referencing the same ccid.

Fixes: 2677d2067731410 ("dccp: don't free ccid2_hc_tx_sock ...")
Signed-off-by: Zhenpeng Lin &lt;zplin@psu.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit d9ea761fdd197351890418acd462c51f241014a7 upstream.

Commit 2677d2067731 ("dccp: don't free ccid2_hc_tx_sock ...") fixed
a UAF but reintroduced CVE-2017-6074.

When the sock is cloned, two dccps_hc_tx_ccid will reference to the
same ccid. So one can free the ccid object twice from two socks after
cloning.

This issue was found by "Hadar Manor" as well and assigned with
CVE-2020-16119, which was fixed in Ubuntu's kernel. So here I port
the patch from Ubuntu to fix it.

The patch prevents cloned socks from referencing the same ccid.

Fixes: 2677d2067731410 ("dccp: don't free ccid2_hc_tx_sock ...")
Signed-off-by: Zhenpeng Lin &lt;zplin@psu.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
