<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/security/integrity/Makefile, branch v6.6.131</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine</title>
<updated>2022-03-08T11:55:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Snowberg</name>
<email>eric.snowberg@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-01-26T02:58:28+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=d19967764ba876f5c82dabaa28f983b21eb642a2'/>
<id>d19967764ba876f5c82dabaa28f983b21eb642a2</id>
<content type='text'>
Many UEFI Linux distributions boot using shim.  The UEFI shim provides
what is called Machine Owner Keys (MOK). Shim uses both the UEFI Secure
Boot DB and MOK keys to validate the next step in the boot chain.  The
MOK facility can be used to import user generated keys.  These keys can
be used to sign an end-users development kernel build.  When Linux
boots, both UEFI Secure Boot DB and MOK keys get loaded in the Linux
.platform keyring.

Define a new Linux keyring called machine.  This keyring shall contain just
MOK keys and not the remaining keys in the platform keyring. This new
machine keyring will be used in follow on patches.  Unlike keys in the
platform keyring, keys contained in the machine keyring will be trusted
within the kernel if the end-user has chosen to do so.

Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg &lt;eric.snowberg@oracle.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Many UEFI Linux distributions boot using shim.  The UEFI shim provides
what is called Machine Owner Keys (MOK). Shim uses both the UEFI Secure
Boot DB and MOK keys to validate the next step in the boot chain.  The
MOK facility can be used to import user generated keys.  These keys can
be used to sign an end-users development kernel build.  When Linux
boots, both UEFI Secure Boot DB and MOK keys get loaded in the Linux
.platform keyring.

Define a new Linux keyring called machine.  This keyring shall contain just
MOK keys and not the remaining keys in the platform keyring. This new
machine keyring will be used in follow on patches.  Unlike keys in the
platform keyring, keys contained in the machine keyring will be trusted
within the kernel if the end-user has chosen to do so.

Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg &lt;eric.snowberg@oracle.com&gt;
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc: Load firmware trusted keys/hashes into kernel keyring</title>
<updated>2019-11-12T13:33:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nayna Jain</name>
<email>nayna@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-11T03:10:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=8220e22d11a05049aab9693839ab82e5e177ccde'/>
<id>8220e22d11a05049aab9693839ab82e5e177ccde</id>
<content type='text'>
The keys used to verify the Host OS kernel are managed by firmware as
secure variables. This patch loads the verification keys into the
.platform keyring and revocation hashes into .blacklist keyring. This
enables verification and loading of the kernels signed by the boot
time keys which are trusted by firmware.

Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter &lt;erichte@linux.ibm.com&gt;
[mpe: Search by compatible in load_powerpc_certs(), not using format]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573441836-3632-5-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The keys used to verify the Host OS kernel are managed by firmware as
secure variables. This patch loads the verification keys into the
.platform keyring and revocation hashes into .blacklist keyring. This
enables verification and loading of the kernels signed by the boot
time keys which are trusted by firmware.

Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter &lt;erichte@linux.ibm.com&gt;
[mpe: Search by compatible in load_powerpc_certs(), not using format]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573441836-3632-5-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new file</title>
<updated>2019-11-12T13:33:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nayna Jain</name>
<email>nayna@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-11T03:10:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=ad723674d6758478829ee766e3f1a2a24d56236f'/>
<id>ad723674d6758478829ee766e3f1a2a24d56236f</id>
<content type='text'>
The handlers to add the keys to the .platform keyring and blacklisted
hashes to the .blacklist keyring is common for both the uefi and powerpc
mechanisms of loading the keys/hashes from the firmware.

This patch moves the common code from load_uefi.c to keyring_handler.c

Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter &lt;erichte@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573441836-3632-4-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The handlers to add the keys to the .platform keyring and blacklisted
hashes to the .blacklist keyring is common for both the uefi and powerpc
mechanisms of loading the keys/hashes from the firmware.

This patch moves the common code from load_uefi.c to keyring_handler.c

Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter &lt;erichte@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573441836-3632-4-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: remove pointless subdir-$(CONFIG_...)</title>
<updated>2019-10-05T06:29:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Masahiro Yamada</name>
<email>yamada.masahiro@socionext.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-26T02:10:55+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=7a8beb7ad51551babd17331f3c0f58af25916f67'/>
<id>7a8beb7ad51551babd17331f3c0f58af25916f67</id>
<content type='text'>
The ima/ and evm/ sub-directories contain built-in objects, so
obj-$(CONFIG_...) is the correct way to descend into them.

subdir-$(CONFIG_...) is redundant.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The ima/ and evm/ sub-directories contain built-in objects, so
obj-$(CONFIG_...) is the correct way to descend into them.

subdir-$(CONFIG_...) is redundant.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: remove unneeded, broken attempt to add -fshort-wchar</title>
<updated>2019-10-05T06:29:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Masahiro Yamada</name>
<email>yamada.masahiro@socionext.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-26T02:10:54+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=6b190d3ce0a693750517256ba67011a9fa04a12a'/>
<id>6b190d3ce0a693750517256ba67011a9fa04a12a</id>
<content type='text'>
I guess commit 15ea0e1e3e18 ("efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure
Boot") attempted to add -fshort-wchar for building load_uefi.o, but it
has never worked as intended.

load_uefi.o is created in the platform_certs/ sub-directory. If you
really want to add -fshort-wchar, the correct code is:

  $(obj)/platform_certs/load_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar

But, you do not need to fix it.

Commit 8c97023cf051 ("Kbuild: use -fshort-wchar globally") had already
added -fshort-wchar globally. This code was unneeded in the first place.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
I guess commit 15ea0e1e3e18 ("efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure
Boot") attempted to add -fshort-wchar for building load_uefi.o, but it
has never worked as intended.

load_uefi.o is created in the platform_certs/ sub-directory. If you
really want to add -fshort-wchar, the correct code is:

  $(obj)/platform_certs/load_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar

But, you do not need to fix it.

Commit 8c97023cf051 ("Kbuild: use -fshort-wchar globally") had already
added -fshort-wchar globally. This code was unneeded in the first place.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/ipl: read IPL report at early boot</title>
<updated>2019-04-26T10:34:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Martin Schwidefsky</name>
<email>schwidefsky@de.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-21T13:23:04+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=9641b8cc733f70a5400aa7e6831de4542c46a94c'/>
<id>9641b8cc733f70a5400aa7e6831de4542c46a94c</id>
<content type='text'>
Read the IPL Report block provided by secure-boot, add the entries
of the certificate list to the system key ring and print the list
of components.

PR: Adjust to Vasilys bootdata_preserved patch set. Preserve ipl_cert_list
for later use in kexec_file.

Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Philipp Rudo &lt;prudo@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Read the IPL Report block provided by secure-boot, add the entries
of the certificate list to the system key ring and print the list
of components.

PR: Adjust to Vasilys bootdata_preserved patch set. Preserve ipl_cert_list
for later use in kexec_file.

Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Philipp Rudo &lt;prudo@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky &lt;schwidefsky@de.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot</title>
<updated>2018-12-13T03:04:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Josh Boyer</name>
<email>jwboyer@fedoraproject.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-12T20:07:56+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=15ea0e1e3e185040bed6119f815096f2e4326242'/>
<id>15ea0e1e3e185040bed6119f815096f2e4326242</id>
<content type='text'>
Secure Boot stores a list of allowed certificates in the 'db' variable.
This patch imports those certificates into the platform keyring. The shim
UEFI bootloader has a similar certificate list stored in the 'MokListRT'
variable. We import those as well.

Secure Boot also maintains a list of disallowed certificates in the 'dbx'
variable. We load those certificates into the system blacklist keyring
and forbid any kernel signed with those from loading.

[zohar@linux.ibm.com: dropped Josh's original patch description]
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer &lt;jwboyer@fedoraproject.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Secure Boot stores a list of allowed certificates in the 'db' variable.
This patch imports those certificates into the platform keyring. The shim
UEFI bootloader has a similar certificate list stored in the 'MokListRT'
variable. We import those as well.

Secure Boot also maintains a list of disallowed certificates in the 'dbx'
variable. We load those certificates into the system blacklist keyring
and forbid any kernel signed with those from loading.

[zohar@linux.ibm.com: dropped Josh's original patch description]
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer &lt;jwboyer@fedoraproject.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser</title>
<updated>2018-12-13T03:04:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dave Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-08T20:27:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=0bc9ae395b3f3b6557f0c5f0a0b0cd2fd5c00a04'/>
<id>0bc9ae395b3f3b6557f0c5f0a0b0cd2fd5c00a04</id>
<content type='text'>
Add a function to parse an EFI signature blob looking for elements of
interest. A list is made up of a series of sublists, where all the
elements in a sublist are of the same type, but sublists can be of
different types.

For each sublist encountered, the function pointed to by the
get_handler_for_guid argument is called with the type specifier GUID and
returns either a pointer to a function to handle elements of that type or
NULL if the type is not of interest.

If the sublist is of interest, each element is passed to the handler
function in turn.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Add a function to parse an EFI signature blob looking for elements of
interest. A list is made up of a series of sublists, where all the
elements in a sublist are of the same type, but sublists can be of
different types.

For each sublist encountered, the function pointed to by the
get_handler_for_guid argument is called with the type specifier GUID and
returns either a pointer to a function to handle elements of that type or
NULL if the type is not of interest.

If the sublist is of interest, each element is passed to the handler
function in turn.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring</title>
<updated>2018-12-13T03:02:28+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nayna Jain</name>
<email>nayna@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-08T20:26:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=9dc92c45177ab70e20ae94baa2f2e558da63a9c7'/>
<id>9dc92c45177ab70e20ae94baa2f2e558da63a9c7</id>
<content type='text'>
On secure boot enabled systems, a verified kernel may need to kexec
additional kernels. For example, it may be used as a bootloader needing
to kexec a target kernel or it may need to kexec a crashdump kernel. In
such cases, it may want to verify the signature of the next kernel
image.

It is further possible that the kernel image is signed with third party
keys which are stored as platform or firmware keys in the 'db' variable.
The kernel, however, can not directly verify these platform keys, and an
administrator may therefore not want to trust them for arbitrary usage.
In order to differentiate platform keys from other keys and provide the
necessary separation of trust, the kernel needs an additional keyring to
store platform keys.

This patch creates the new keyring called ".platform" to isolate keys
provided by platform from keys by kernel. These keys are used to
facilitate signature verification during kexec. Since the scope of this
keyring is only the platform/firmware keys, it cannot be updated from
userspace.

This keyring can be enabled by setting CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING.

Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann &lt;bauerman@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
On secure boot enabled systems, a verified kernel may need to kexec
additional kernels. For example, it may be used as a bootloader needing
to kexec a target kernel or it may need to kexec a crashdump kernel. In
such cases, it may want to verify the signature of the next kernel
image.

It is further possible that the kernel image is signed with third party
keys which are stored as platform or firmware keys in the 'db' variable.
The kernel, however, can not directly verify these platform keys, and an
administrator may therefore not want to trust them for arbitrary usage.
In order to differentiate platform keys from other keys and provide the
necessary separation of trust, the kernel needs an additional keyring to
store platform keys.

This patch creates the new keyring called ".platform" to isolate keys
provided by platform from keys by kernel. These keys are used to
facilitate signature verification during kexec. Since the scope of this
keyring is only the platform/firmware keys, it cannot be updated from
userspace.

This keyring can be enabled by setting CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING.

Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann &lt;bauerman@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license</title>
<updated>2017-11-02T10:10:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Greg Kroah-Hartman</name>
<email>gregkh@linuxfoundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-01T14:07:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=b24413180f5600bcb3bb70fbed5cf186b60864bd'/>
<id>b24413180f5600bcb3bb70fbed5cf186b60864bd</id>
<content type='text'>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode &amp; Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained &gt;5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if &lt;5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart &lt;kstewart@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne &lt;pombredanne@nexb.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode &amp; Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained &gt;5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if &lt;5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart &lt;kstewart@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne &lt;pombredanne@nexb.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner &lt;tglx@linutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
