commit 62cd5d480b9762ce70d720a81fa5b373052ae05f upstream.

'tpm2_load_cmd' allocates a tempoary blob indirectly via 'tpm2_key_decode'
but it is not freed in the failure paths. Address this by wrapping the blob
into with a cleanup helper.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+
Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 738c9738e690f5cea24a3ad6fd2d9a323cf614f6 ]

In ima_match_rules(), if ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ENOENT due to
the rule being NULL, the function incorrectly skips the 'if (!rc)' check
and sets 'result = true'. The LSM rule is considered a match, causing
extra files to be measured by IMA.

This issue can be reproduced in the following scenario:
After unloading the SELinux policy module via 'semodule -d', if an IMA
measurement is triggered before ima_lsm_rules is updated,
in ima_match_rules(), the first call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns
-ESTALE. This causes the code to enter the 'if (rc == -ESTALE &&
!rule_reinitialized)' block, perform ima_lsm_copy_rule() and retry. In
ima_lsm_copy_rule(), since the SELinux module has been removed, the rule
becomes NULL, and the second call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns
-ENOENT. This bypasses the 'if (!rc)' check and results in a false match.

Call trace:
  selinux_audit_rule_match+0x310/0x3b8
  security_audit_rule_match+0x60/0xa0
  ima_match_rules+0x2e4/0x4a0
  ima_match_policy+0x9c/0x1e8
  ima_get_action+0x48/0x60
  process_measurement+0xf8/0xa98
  ima_bprm_check+0x98/0xd8
  security_bprm_check+0x5c/0x78
  search_binary_handler+0x6c/0x318
  exec_binprm+0x58/0x1b8
  bprm_execve+0xb8/0x130
  do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x1a8/0x258
  __arm64_sys_execve+0x48/0x68
  invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128
  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0
  do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
  el0_svc+0x44/0x200
  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x130
  el0t_64_sync+0x3c8/0x3d0

Fix this by changing 'if (!rc)' to 'if (rc <= 0)' to ensure that error
codes like -ENOENT do not bypass the check and accidentally result in a
successful match.

Fixes: 4af4662fa4a9d ("integrity: IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Zhao Yipeng <zhaoyipeng5@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit c147e13ea7fe9f118f8c9ba5e96cbd644b00d6b3 ]

If an unprivileged task is allowed to relabel itself
(/smack/relabel-self is not empty),
it can freely create new labels by writing their
names into own /proc/PID/attr/smack/current

This occurs because do_setattr() imports
the provided label in advance,
before checking "relabel-self" list.

This change ensures that the "relabel-self" list
is checked before importing the label.

Fixes: 38416e53936e ("Smack: limited capability for changing process label")
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 88b4cbcf6b041ae0f2fc8a34554a5b6a83a2b7cd ]

Currently when both IMA and EVM are in fix mode, the IMA signature will
be reset to IMA hash if a program first stores IMA signature in
security.ima and then writes/removes some other security xattr for the
file.

For example, on Fedora, after booting the kernel with "ima_appraise=fix
evm=fix ima_policy=appraise_tcb" and installing rpm-plugin-ima,
installing/reinstalling a package will not make good reference IMA
signature generated. Instead IMA hash is generated,

    # getfattr -m - -d -e hex /usr/bin/bash
    # file: usr/bin/bash
    security.ima=0x0404...

This happens because when setting security.selinux, the IMA_DIGSIG flag
that had been set early was cleared. As a result, IMA hash is generated
when the file is closed.

Similarly, IMA signature can be cleared on file close after removing
security xattr like security.evm or setting/removing ACL.

Prevent replacing the IMA file signature with a file hash, by preventing
the IMA_DIGSIG flag from being reset.

Here's a minimal C reproducer which sets security.selinux as the last
step which can also replaced by removing security.evm or setting ACL,

    #include <stdio.h>
    #include <sys/xattr.h>
    #include <fcntl.h>
    #include <unistd.h>
    #include <string.h>
    #include <stdlib.h>

    int main() {
        const char* file_path = "/usr/sbin/test_binary";
        const char* hex_string = "030204d33204490066306402304";
        int length = strlen(hex_string);
        char* ima_attr_value;
        int fd;

        fd = open(file_path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0644);
        if (fd == -1) {
            perror("Error opening file");
            return 1;
        }

        ima_attr_value = (char*)malloc(length / 2 );
        for (int i = 0, j = 0; i < length; i += 2, j++) {
            sscanf(hex_string + i, "%2hhx", &ima_attr_value[j]);
        }

        if (fsetxattr(fd, "security.ima", ima_attr_value, length/2, 0) == -1) {
            perror("Error setting extended attribute");
            close(fd);
            return 1;
        }

        const char* selinux_value= "system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0";
        if (fsetxattr(fd, "security.selinux", selinux_value, strlen(selinux_value), 0) == -1) {
            perror("Error setting extended attribute");
            close(fd);
            return 1;
        }

        close(fd);

        return 0;
    }

Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

commit eed0e3d305530066b4fc5370107cff8ef1a0d229 upstream.

To prevent timing attacks, HMAC value comparison needs to be constant
time.  Replace the memcmp() with the correct function, crypto_memneq().

[For the Fixes commit I used the commit that introduced the memcmp().
It predates the introduction of crypto_memneq(), but it was still a bug
at the time even though a helper function didn't exist yet.]

Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit a414016218ca97140171aa3bb926b02e1f68c2cc ]

Each time a file in policy, that is already opened for read, is opened
for write, a Time-of-Measure-Time-of-Use (ToMToU) integrity violation
audit message is emitted and a violation record is added to the IMA
measurement list.  This occurs even if a ToMToU violation has already
been recorded.

Limit the number of ToMToU integrity violations per file open for read.

Note: The IMA_MAY_EMIT_TOMTOU atomic flag must be set from the reader
side based on policy.  This may result in a per file open for read
ToMToU violation.

Since IMA_MUST_MEASURE is only used for violations, rename the atomic
IMA_MUST_MEASURE flag to IMA_MAY_EMIT_TOMTOU.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # applies cleanly up to linux-6.6
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Tested-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
[ adapted IMA flag definitions location from ima.h to integrity.h ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

[ Upstream commit 67e370aa7f968f6a4f3573ed61a77b36d1b26475 ]

This follows the established practice and fixes a build failure for me:
security/apparmor/file.c: In function ‘__file_sock_perm’:
security/apparmor/file.c:544:24: error: unused variable ‘sock’ [-Werror=unused-variable]
  544 |         struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data;
      |                        ^~~~

Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit c5bf96d20fd787e4909b755de4705d52f3458836 ]

When using AppArmor profiles inside an unprivileged container,
the link operation observes an unshifted ouid.
(tested with LXD and Incus)

For example, root inside container and uid 1000000 outside, with
`owner /root/link l,` profile entry for ln:

/root$ touch chain && ln chain link
==> dmesg
apparmor="DENIED" operation="link" class="file"
namespace="root//lxd-feet_<var-snap-lxd-common-lxd>" profile="linkit"
name="/root/link" pid=1655 comm="ln" requested_mask="l" denied_mask="l"
fsuid=1000000 ouid=0 [<== should be 1000000] target="/root/chain"

Fix by mapping inode uid of old_dentry in aa_path_link() rather than
using it directly, similarly to how it's mapped in __file_path_perm()
later in the file.

Signed-off-by: Gabriel Totev <gabriel.totev@zetier.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit 27cd1bf1240d482e4f02ca4f9812e748f3106e4f ]

incidentally, securityfs_recursive_remove() is broken without that -
it leaks dentries, since simple_recursive_removal() does not expect
anything of that sort.  It could be worked around by dput() in
remove_one() callback, but it's easier to just drop that double-get
stuff.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit a88db916b8c77552f49f7d9f8744095ea01a268f ]

Conflicting attachment resolution is based on the number of states
traversed to reach an accepting state in the attachment DFA, accounting
for DFA loops traversed during the matching process. However, the loop
counting logic had multiple bugs:

 - The inc_wb_pos macro increments both position and length, but length
   is supposed to saturate upon hitting buffer capacity, instead of
   wrapping around.
 - If no revisited state is found when traversing the history, is_loop
   would still return true, as if there was a loop found the length of
   the history buffer, instead of returning false and signalling that
   no loop was found. As a result, the adjustment step of
   aa_dfa_leftmatch would sometimes produce negative counts with loop-
   free DFAs that traversed enough states.
 - The iteration in the is_loop for loop is supposed to stop before
   i = wb->len, so the conditional should be < instead of <=.

This patch fixes the above bugs as well as the following nits:
 - The count and size fields in struct match_workbuf were not used,
   so they can be removed.
 - The history buffer in match_workbuf semantically stores aa_state_t
   and not unsigned ints, even if aa_state_t is currently unsigned int.
 - The local variables in is_loop are counters, and thus should be
   unsigned ints instead of aa_state_t's.

Fixes: 21f606610502 ("apparmor: improve overlapping domain attachment resolution")

Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Co-developed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>