commit c087c6e7b551b7f208c0b852304f044954cf2bb3 upstream.
Elf{32,64}_Rela::r_addend is of type: Elf{32,64}_Sword, that means
that our reloc::addend needs to be long or face tuncation issues when
we do elf_rebuild_reloc_section():
- 107: 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 movabs $0x0,%rax 109: R_X86_64_64 level4_kernel_pgt+0x80000067
+ 107: 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 movabs $0x0,%rax 109: R_X86_64_64 level4_kernel_pgt-0x7fffff99
Fixes: 627fce14809b ("objtool: Add ORC unwind table generation")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220419203807.596871927@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Pull x86 core updates from Borislav Petkov: - Get rid of all the .fixup sections because this generates misleading/wrong stacktraces and confuse RELIABLE_STACKTRACE and LIVEPATCH as the backtrace misses the function which is being fixed up. - Add Straight Line Speculation mitigation support which uses a new compiler switch -mharden-sls= which sticks an INT3 after a RET or an indirect branch in order to block speculation after them. Reportedly, CPUs do speculate behind such insns. - The usual set of cleanups and improvements * tag 'x86_core_for_v5.17_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (32 commits) x86/entry_32: Fix segment exceptions objtool: Remove .fixup handling x86: Remove .fixup section x86/word-at-a-time: Remove .fixup usage x86/usercopy: Remove .fixup usage x86/usercopy_32: Simplify __copy_user_intel_nocache() x86/sgx: Remove .fixup usage x86/checksum_32: Remove .fixup usage x86/vmx: Remove .fixup usage x86/kvm: Remove .fixup usage x86/segment: Remove .fixup usage x86/fpu: Remove .fixup usage x86/xen: Remove .fixup usage x86/uaccess: Remove .fixup usage x86/futex: Remove .fixup usage x86/msr: Remove .fixup usage x86/extable: Extend extable functionality x86/entry_32: Remove .fixup usage x86/entry_64: Remove .fixup usage x86/copy_mc_64: Remove .fixup usage ...
Teach objtool to turn instrumentation required for memory barrier modeling into nops in noinstr text. The __tsan_func_entry/exit calls are still emitted by compilers even with the __no_sanitize_thread attribute. The memory barrier instrumentation will be inserted explicitly (without compiler help), and thus needs to also explicitly be removed. Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Teach objtool to validate the straight-line-speculation constraints: - speculation trap after indirect calls - speculation trap after RET Notable: when an instruction is annotated RETPOLINE_SAFE, indicating speculation isn't a problem, also don't care about sls for that instruction. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211204134908.023037659@infradead.org
Instead of writing complete alternatives, simply provide a list of all the retpoline thunk calls. Then the kernel is free to do with them as it pleases. Simpler code all-round. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120309.850007165@infradead.org
Any one instruction can only ever call a single function, therefore insn->mcount_loc_node is superfluous and can use insn->call_node. This shrinks struct instruction, which is by far the most numerous structure objtool creates. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120309.785456706@infradead.org
In order to avoid calling str*cmp() on symbol names, over and over, do them all once upfront and store the result. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Tested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026120309.658539311@infradead.org
Fixup conflicts. # Conflicts: # tools/objtool/check.c
The section structure already contains sh_size, so just remove the extra 'len' member that requires extra mirroring and potential confusion. Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210822225037.54620-3-joe.lawrence@redhat.com Cc: Andy Lavr <andy.lavr@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Normally objtool will now follow indirect calls; there is no need.
However, this becomes a problem with noinstr validation; if there's an
indirect call from noinstr code, we very much need to know it is to
another noinstr function. Luckily there aren't many indirect calls in
entry code with the obvious exception of paravirt. As such, noinstr
validation didn't work with paravirt kernels.
In order to track pv_ops[] call targets, objtool reads the static
pv_ops[] tables as well as direct assignments to the pv_ops[] array,
provided the compiler makes them a single instruction like:
bf87: 48 c7 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 movq $0x0,0x0(%rip)
bf92 <xen_init_spinlocks+0x5f>
bf8a: R_X86_64_PC32 pv_ops+0x268
There are, as of yet, no warnings for when this goes wrong :/
Using the functions found with the above means, all pv_ops[] calls are
now subject to noinstr validation.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210624095149.118815755@infradead.org