<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux.git/virt, branch v4.14.124</title>
<subtitle>Clone of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>KVM: s390: Do not report unusabled IDs via KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID</title>
<updated>2019-06-09T07:18:16+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Thomas Huth</name>
<email>thuth@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-23T16:43:08+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=527919d0cc5188c98b89f8357f7f7b36085c1a2c'/>
<id>527919d0cc5188c98b89f8357f7f7b36085c1a2c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a86cb413f4bf273a9d341a3ab2c2ca44e12eb317 upstream.

KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID is currently always reporting KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID on all
architectures. However, on s390x, the amount of usable CPUs is determined
during runtime - it is depending on the features of the machine the code
is running on. Since we are using the vcpu_id as an index into the SCA
structures that are defined by the hardware (see e.g. the sca_add_vcpu()
function), it is not only the amount of CPUs that is limited by the hard-
ware, but also the range of IDs that we can use.
Thus KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID must be determined during runtime on s390x, too.
So the handling of KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID has to be moved from the common
code into the architecture specific code, and on s390x we have to return
the same value here as for KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS.
This problem has been discovered with the kvm_create_max_vcpus selftest.
With this change applied, the selftest now passes on s390x, too.

Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones &lt;drjones@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck &lt;cohuck@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth &lt;thuth@redhat.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20190523164309.13345-9-thuth@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger &lt;borntraeger@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit a86cb413f4bf273a9d341a3ab2c2ca44e12eb317 upstream.

KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID is currently always reporting KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID on all
architectures. However, on s390x, the amount of usable CPUs is determined
during runtime - it is depending on the features of the machine the code
is running on. Since we are using the vcpu_id as an index into the SCA
structures that are defined by the hardware (see e.g. the sca_add_vcpu()
function), it is not only the amount of CPUs that is limited by the hard-
ware, but also the range of IDs that we can use.
Thus KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID must be determined during runtime on s390x, too.
So the handling of KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID has to be moved from the common
code into the architecture specific code, and on s390x we have to return
the same value here as for KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS.
This problem has been discovered with the kvm_create_max_vcpus selftest.
With this change applied, the selftest now passes on s390x, too.

Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones &lt;drjones@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck &lt;cohuck@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand &lt;david@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth &lt;thuth@redhat.com&gt;
Message-Id: &lt;20190523164309.13345-9-thuth@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger &lt;borntraeger@de.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;


</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: arm/arm64: Ensure vcpu target is unset on reset failure</title>
<updated>2019-05-25T16:25:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Andrew Jones</name>
<email>drjones@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-04T17:42:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=ec6035a3a50433458b3358801d68d8e4c1772c7f'/>
<id>ec6035a3a50433458b3358801d68d8e4c1772c7f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 811328fc3222f7b55846de0cd0404339e2e1e6d7 ]

A failed KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT should not set the vcpu target,
as the vcpu target is used by kvm_vcpu_initialized() to
determine if other vcpu ioctls may proceed. We need to set
the target before calling kvm_reset_vcpu(), but if that call
fails, we should then unset it and clear the feature bitmap
while we're at it.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones &lt;drjones@redhat.com&gt;
[maz: Simplified patch, completed commit message]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 811328fc3222f7b55846de0cd0404339e2e1e6d7 ]

A failed KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT should not set the vcpu target,
as the vcpu target is used by kvm_vcpu_initialized() to
determine if other vcpu ioctls may proceed. We need to set
the target before calling kvm_reset_vcpu(), but if that call
fails, we should then unset it and clear the feature bitmap
while we're at it.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones &lt;drjones@redhat.com&gt;
[maz: Simplified patch, completed commit message]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: arm/arm64: Ensure only THP is candidate for adjustment</title>
<updated>2019-05-16T17:42:26+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Punit Agrawal</name>
<email>punit.agrawal@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-01T15:54:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=363b93186ff4a4450d1e913281d2a8c5e7259f30'/>
<id>363b93186ff4a4450d1e913281d2a8c5e7259f30</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fd2ef358282c849c193aa36dadbf4f07f7dcd29b ]

PageTransCompoundMap() returns true for hugetlbfs and THP
hugepages. This behaviour incorrectly leads to stage 2 faults for
unsupported hugepage sizes (e.g., 64K hugepage with 4K pages) to be
treated as THP faults.

Tighten the check to filter out hugetlbfs pages. This also leads to
consistently mapping all unsupported hugepage sizes as PTE level
entries at stage 2.

Signed-off-by: Punit Agrawal &lt;punit.agrawal@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Suzuki Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Christoffer Dall &lt;christoffer.dall@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit fd2ef358282c849c193aa36dadbf4f07f7dcd29b ]

PageTransCompoundMap() returns true for hugetlbfs and THP
hugepages. This behaviour incorrectly leads to stage 2 faults for
unsupported hugepage sizes (e.g., 64K hugepage with 4K pages) to be
treated as THP faults.

Tighten the check to filter out hugetlbfs pages. This also leads to
consistently mapping all unsupported hugepage sizes as PTE level
entries at stage 2.

Signed-off-by: Punit Agrawal &lt;punit.agrawal@arm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Suzuki Poulose &lt;suzuki.poulose@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Christoffer Dall &lt;christoffer.dall@arm.com&gt;
Cc: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: fix spectrev1 gadgets</title>
<updated>2019-05-16T17:42:22+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Paolo Bonzini</name>
<email>pbonzini@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-11T09:16:47+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=559e2696d2f47a3575e9550f101a7e59e30b1b38'/>
<id>559e2696d2f47a3575e9550f101a7e59e30b1b38</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 1d487e9bf8ba66a7174c56a0029c54b1eca8f99c ]

These were found with smatch, and then generalized when applicable.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 1d487e9bf8ba66a7174c56a0029c54b1eca8f99c ]

These were found with smatch, and then generalized when applicable.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: arm/arm64: vgic-its: Take the srcu lock when parsing the memslots</title>
<updated>2019-05-04T07:15:19+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Marc Zyngier</name>
<email>marc.zyngier@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-19T12:56:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=423ad0b9b095a23e3cde27f2e79e6835e134968e'/>
<id>423ad0b9b095a23e3cde27f2e79e6835e134968e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7494cec6cb3ba7385a6a223b81906384f15aae34 ]

Calling kvm_is_visible_gfn() implies that we're parsing the memslots,
and doing this without the srcu lock is frown upon:

[12704.164532] =============================
[12704.164544] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
[12704.164560] 5.1.0-rc1-00008-g600025238f51-dirty #16 Tainted: G        W
[12704.164573] -----------------------------
[12704.164589] ./include/linux/kvm_host.h:605 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
[12704.164602] other info that might help us debug this:
[12704.164616] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
[12704.164631] 6 locks held by qemu-system-aar/13968:
[12704.164644]  #0: 000000007ebdae4f (&amp;kvm-&gt;lock){+.+.}, at: vgic_its_set_attr+0x244/0x3a0
[12704.164691]  #1: 000000007d751022 (&amp;its-&gt;its_lock){+.+.}, at: vgic_its_set_attr+0x250/0x3a0
[12704.164726]  #2: 00000000219d2706 (&amp;vcpu-&gt;mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0
[12704.164761]  #3: 00000000a760aecd (&amp;vcpu-&gt;mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0
[12704.164794]  #4: 000000000ef8e31d (&amp;vcpu-&gt;mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0
[12704.164827]  #5: 000000007a872093 (&amp;vcpu-&gt;mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0
[12704.164861] stack backtrace:
[12704.164878] CPU: 2 PID: 13968 Comm: qemu-system-aar Tainted: G        W         5.1.0-rc1-00008-g600025238f51-dirty #16
[12704.164887] Hardware name: rockchip evb_rk3399/evb_rk3399, BIOS 2019.04-rc3-00124-g2feec69fb1 03/15/2019
[12704.164896] Call trace:
[12704.164910]  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x138
[12704.164920]  show_stack+0x24/0x30
[12704.164934]  dump_stack+0xbc/0x104
[12704.164946]  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xcc/0x110
[12704.164958]  gfn_to_memslot+0x174/0x190
[12704.164969]  kvm_is_visible_gfn+0x28/0x70
[12704.164980]  vgic_its_check_id.isra.0+0xec/0x1e8
[12704.164991]  vgic_its_save_tables_v0+0x1ac/0x330
[12704.165001]  vgic_its_set_attr+0x298/0x3a0
[12704.165012]  kvm_device_ioctl_attr+0x9c/0xd8
[12704.165022]  kvm_device_ioctl+0x8c/0xf8
[12704.165035]  do_vfs_ioctl+0xc8/0x960
[12704.165045]  ksys_ioctl+0x8c/0xa0
[12704.165055]  __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x28/0x38
[12704.165067]  el0_svc_common+0xd8/0x138
[12704.165078]  el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78
[12704.165089]  el0_svc+0x8/0xc

Make sure the lock is taken when doing this.

Fixes: bf308242ab98 ("KVM: arm/arm64: VGIC/ITS: protect kvm_read_guest() calls with SRCU lock")
Reviewed-by: Eric Auger &lt;eric.auger@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin (Microsoft) &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 7494cec6cb3ba7385a6a223b81906384f15aae34 ]

Calling kvm_is_visible_gfn() implies that we're parsing the memslots,
and doing this without the srcu lock is frown upon:

[12704.164532] =============================
[12704.164544] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
[12704.164560] 5.1.0-rc1-00008-g600025238f51-dirty #16 Tainted: G        W
[12704.164573] -----------------------------
[12704.164589] ./include/linux/kvm_host.h:605 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
[12704.164602] other info that might help us debug this:
[12704.164616] rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
[12704.164631] 6 locks held by qemu-system-aar/13968:
[12704.164644]  #0: 000000007ebdae4f (&amp;kvm-&gt;lock){+.+.}, at: vgic_its_set_attr+0x244/0x3a0
[12704.164691]  #1: 000000007d751022 (&amp;its-&gt;its_lock){+.+.}, at: vgic_its_set_attr+0x250/0x3a0
[12704.164726]  #2: 00000000219d2706 (&amp;vcpu-&gt;mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0
[12704.164761]  #3: 00000000a760aecd (&amp;vcpu-&gt;mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0
[12704.164794]  #4: 000000000ef8e31d (&amp;vcpu-&gt;mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0
[12704.164827]  #5: 000000007a872093 (&amp;vcpu-&gt;mutex){+.+.}, at: lock_all_vcpus+0x64/0xd0
[12704.164861] stack backtrace:
[12704.164878] CPU: 2 PID: 13968 Comm: qemu-system-aar Tainted: G        W         5.1.0-rc1-00008-g600025238f51-dirty #16
[12704.164887] Hardware name: rockchip evb_rk3399/evb_rk3399, BIOS 2019.04-rc3-00124-g2feec69fb1 03/15/2019
[12704.164896] Call trace:
[12704.164910]  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x138
[12704.164920]  show_stack+0x24/0x30
[12704.164934]  dump_stack+0xbc/0x104
[12704.164946]  lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xcc/0x110
[12704.164958]  gfn_to_memslot+0x174/0x190
[12704.164969]  kvm_is_visible_gfn+0x28/0x70
[12704.164980]  vgic_its_check_id.isra.0+0xec/0x1e8
[12704.164991]  vgic_its_save_tables_v0+0x1ac/0x330
[12704.165001]  vgic_its_set_attr+0x298/0x3a0
[12704.165012]  kvm_device_ioctl_attr+0x9c/0xd8
[12704.165022]  kvm_device_ioctl+0x8c/0xf8
[12704.165035]  do_vfs_ioctl+0xc8/0x960
[12704.165045]  ksys_ioctl+0x8c/0xa0
[12704.165055]  __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x28/0x38
[12704.165067]  el0_svc_common+0xd8/0x138
[12704.165078]  el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78
[12704.165089]  el0_svc+0x8/0xc

Make sure the lock is taken when doing this.

Fixes: bf308242ab98 ("KVM: arm/arm64: VGIC/ITS: protect kvm_read_guest() calls with SRCU lock")
Reviewed-by: Eric Auger &lt;eric.auger@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin (Microsoft) &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: Reject device ioctls from processes other than the VM's creator</title>
<updated>2019-04-03T04:25:20+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Christopherson</name>
<email>sean.j.christopherson@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-15T20:48:39+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=9badc8549fa75b3f1b5d74eea9d22c60a525b242'/>
<id>9badc8549fa75b3f1b5d74eea9d22c60a525b242</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ddba91801aeb5c160b660caed1800eb3aef403f8 upstream.

KVM's API requires thats ioctls must be issued from the same process
that created the VM.  In other words, userspace can play games with a
VM's file descriptors, e.g. fork(), SCM_RIGHTS, etc..., but only the
creator can do anything useful.  Explicitly reject device ioctls that
are issued by a process other than the VM's creator, and update KVM's
API documentation to extend its requirements to device ioctls.

Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit ddba91801aeb5c160b660caed1800eb3aef403f8 upstream.

KVM's API requires thats ioctls must be issued from the same process
that created the VM.  In other words, userspace can play games with a
VM's file descriptors, e.g. fork(), SCM_RIGHTS, etc..., but only the
creator can do anything useful.  Explicitly reject device ioctls that
are issued by a process other than the VM's creator, and update KVM's
API documentation to extend its requirements to device ioctls.

Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KVM: Call kvm_arch_memslots_updated() before updating memslots</title>
<updated>2019-03-23T13:35:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sean Christopherson</name>
<email>sean.j.christopherson@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-05T20:54:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=89dce6e457a14aa53fc0a83ec8f4206748a5c87a'/>
<id>89dce6e457a14aa53fc0a83ec8f4206748a5c87a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 152482580a1b0accb60676063a1ac57b2d12daf6 upstream.

kvm_arch_memslots_updated() is at this point in time an x86-specific
hook for handling MMIO generation wraparound.  x86 stashes 19 bits of
the memslots generation number in its MMIO sptes in order to avoid
full page fault walks for repeat faults on emulated MMIO addresses.
Because only 19 bits are used, wrapping the MMIO generation number is
possible, if unlikely.  kvm_arch_memslots_updated() alerts x86 that
the generation has changed so that it can invalidate all MMIO sptes in
case the effective MMIO generation has wrapped so as to avoid using a
stale spte, e.g. a (very) old spte that was created with generation==0.

Given that the purpose of kvm_arch_memslots_updated() is to prevent
consuming stale entries, it needs to be called before the new generation
is propagated to memslots.  Invalidating the MMIO sptes after updating
memslots means that there is a window where a vCPU could dereference
the new memslots generation, e.g. 0, and incorrectly reuse an old MMIO
spte that was created with (pre-wrap) generation==0.

Fixes: e59dbe09f8e6 ("KVM: Introduce kvm_arch_memslots_updated()")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit 152482580a1b0accb60676063a1ac57b2d12daf6 upstream.

kvm_arch_memslots_updated() is at this point in time an x86-specific
hook for handling MMIO generation wraparound.  x86 stashes 19 bits of
the memslots generation number in its MMIO sptes in order to avoid
full page fault walks for repeat faults on emulated MMIO addresses.
Because only 19 bits are used, wrapping the MMIO generation number is
possible, if unlikely.  kvm_arch_memslots_updated() alerts x86 that
the generation has changed so that it can invalidate all MMIO sptes in
case the effective MMIO generation has wrapped so as to avoid using a
stale spte, e.g. a (very) old spte that was created with generation==0.

Given that the purpose of kvm_arch_memslots_updated() is to prevent
consuming stale entries, it needs to be called before the new generation
is propagated to memslots.  Invalidating the MMIO sptes after updating
memslots means that there is a window where a vCPU could dereference
the new memslots generation, e.g. 0, and incorrectly reuse an old MMIO
spte that was created with (pre-wrap) generation==0.

Fixes: e59dbe09f8e6 ("KVM: Introduce kvm_arch_memslots_updated()")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kvm: fix kvm_ioctl_create_device() reference counting (CVE-2019-6974)</title>
<updated>2019-02-12T18:46:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-01-26T00:54:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=8c1b11bc3555b5d1207b0e179cbdd8b945e71e69'/>
<id>8c1b11bc3555b5d1207b0e179cbdd8b945e71e69</id>
<content type='text'>
commit cfa39381173d5f969daf43582c95ad679189cbc9 upstream.

kvm_ioctl_create_device() does the following:

1. creates a device that holds a reference to the VM object (with a borrowed
   reference, the VM's refcount has not been bumped yet)
2. initializes the device
3. transfers the reference to the device to the caller's file descriptor table
4. calls kvm_get_kvm() to turn the borrowed reference to the VM into a real
   reference

The ownership transfer in step 3 must not happen before the reference to the VM
becomes a proper, non-borrowed reference, which only happens in step 4.
After step 3, an attacker can close the file descriptor and drop the borrowed
reference, which can cause the refcount of the kvm object to drop to zero.

This means that we need to grab a reference for the device before
anon_inode_getfd(), otherwise the VM can disappear from under us.

Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
commit cfa39381173d5f969daf43582c95ad679189cbc9 upstream.

kvm_ioctl_create_device() does the following:

1. creates a device that holds a reference to the VM object (with a borrowed
   reference, the VM's refcount has not been bumped yet)
2. initializes the device
3. transfers the reference to the device to the caller's file descriptor table
4. calls kvm_get_kvm() to turn the borrowed reference to the VM into a real
   reference

The ownership transfer in step 3 must not happen before the reference to the VM
becomes a proper, non-borrowed reference, which only happens in step 4.
After step 3, an attacker can close the file descriptor and drop the borrowed
reference, which can cause the refcount of the kvm object to drop to zero.

This means that we need to grab a reference for the device before
anon_inode_getfd(), otherwise the VM can disappear from under us.

Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini &lt;pbonzini@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kvm: Change offset in kvm_write_guest_offset_cached to unsigned</title>
<updated>2019-02-12T18:46:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jim Mattson</name>
<email>jmattson@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-14T22:34:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=f70123c6d3accc024445eca6b9ee01c1fe2b80d8'/>
<id>f70123c6d3accc024445eca6b9ee01c1fe2b80d8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7a86dab8cf2f0fdf508f3555dddfc236623bff60 ]

Since the offset is added directly to the hva from the
gfn_to_hva_cache, a negative offset could result in an out of bounds
write. The existing BUG_ON only checks for addresses beyond the end of
the gfn_to_hva_cache, not for addresses before the start of the
gfn_to_hva_cache.

Note that all current call sites have non-negative offsets.

Fixes: 4ec6e8636256 ("kvm: Introduce kvm_write_guest_offset_cached()")
Reported-by: Cfir Cohen &lt;cfir@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson &lt;jmattson@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cfir Cohen &lt;cfir@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Peter Shier &lt;pshier@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan &lt;krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 7a86dab8cf2f0fdf508f3555dddfc236623bff60 ]

Since the offset is added directly to the hva from the
gfn_to_hva_cache, a negative offset could result in an out of bounds
write. The existing BUG_ON only checks for addresses beyond the end of
the gfn_to_hva_cache, not for addresses before the start of the
gfn_to_hva_cache.

Note that all current call sites have non-negative offsets.

Fixes: 4ec6e8636256 ("kvm: Introduce kvm_write_guest_offset_cached()")
Reported-by: Cfir Cohen &lt;cfir@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson &lt;jmattson@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Cfir Cohen &lt;cfir@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Peter Shier &lt;pshier@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan &lt;krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson &lt;sean.j.christopherson@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář &lt;rkrcmar@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>arm64: KVM: Skip MMIO insn after emulation</title>
<updated>2019-02-12T18:46:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Rutland</name>
<email>mark.rutland@arm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-11-09T15:07:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/linux.git/commit/?id=65575cf1c800be3e3f6d6860fc10603be9552456'/>
<id>65575cf1c800be3e3f6d6860fc10603be9552456</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0d640732dbebed0f10f18526de21652931f0b2f2 ]

When we emulate an MMIO instruction, we advance the CPU state within
decode_hsr(), before emulating the instruction effects.

Having this logic in decode_hsr() is opaque, and advancing the state
before emulation is problematic. It gets in the way of applying
consistent single-step logic, and it prevents us from being able to fail
an MMIO instruction with a synchronous exception.

Clean this up by only advancing the CPU state *after* the effects of the
instruction are emulated.

Cc: Peter Maydell &lt;peter.maydell@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée &lt;alex.bennee@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall &lt;christoffer.dall@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
[ Upstream commit 0d640732dbebed0f10f18526de21652931f0b2f2 ]

When we emulate an MMIO instruction, we advance the CPU state within
decode_hsr(), before emulating the instruction effects.

Having this logic in decode_hsr() is opaque, and advancing the state
before emulation is problematic. It gets in the way of applying
consistent single-step logic, and it prevents us from being able to fail
an MMIO instruction with a synchronous exception.

Clean this up by only advancing the CPU state *after* the effects of the
instruction are emulated.

Cc: Peter Maydell &lt;peter.maydell@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée &lt;alex.bennee@linaro.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall &lt;christoffer.dall@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland &lt;mark.rutland@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier &lt;marc.zyngier@arm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
