Merge tag 'mm-stable-2025-04-02-22-07' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm

Pull more MM updates from Andrew Morton:

 - The series "mm: fixes for fallouts from mem_init() cleanup" from Mike
   Rapoport fixes a couple of issues with the just-merged "arch, mm:
   reduce code duplication in mem_init()" series

 - The series "MAINTAINERS: add my isub-entries to MM part." from Mike
   Rapoport does some maintenance on MAINTAINERS

 - The series "remove tlb_remove_page_ptdesc()" from Qi Zheng does some
   cleanup work to the page mapping code

 - The series "mseal system mappings" from Jeff Xu permits sealing of
   "system mappings", such as vdso, vvar, vvar_vclock, vectors (arm
   compat-mode), sigpage (arm compat-mode)

 - Plus the usual shower of singleton patches

* tag 'mm-stable-2025-04-02-22-07' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (31 commits)
  mseal sysmap: add arch-support txt
  mseal sysmap: enable s390
  selftest: test system mappings are sealed
  mseal sysmap: update mseal.rst
  mseal sysmap: uprobe mapping
  mseal sysmap: enable arm64
  mseal sysmap: enable x86-64
  mseal sysmap: generic vdso vvar mapping
  selftests: x86: test_mremap_vdso: skip if vdso is msealed
  mseal sysmap: kernel config and header change
  mm: pgtable: remove tlb_remove_page_ptdesc()
  x86: pgtable: convert to use tlb_remove_ptdesc()
  riscv: pgtable: unconditionally use tlb_remove_ptdesc()
  mm: pgtable: convert some architectures to use tlb_remove_ptdesc()
  mm: pgtable: change pt parameter of tlb_remove_ptdesc() to struct ptdesc*
  mm: pgtable: make generic tlb_remove_table() use struct ptdesc
  microblaze/mm: put mm_cmdline_setup() in .init.text section
  mm/memory_hotplug: fix call folio_test_large with tail page in do_migrate_range
  MAINTAINERS: mm: add entry for secretmem
  MAINTAINERS: mm: add entry for numa memblocks and numa emulation
  ...

1 files changed, 21 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
index 41102f74c5e2..1dabfc29be0d 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst
@@ -130,6 +130,27 @@ Use cases
 
 - Chrome browser: protect some security sensitive data structures.
 
+- System mappings:
+  The system mappings are created by the kernel and includes vdso, vvar,
+  vvar_vclock, vectors (arm compat-mode), sigpage (arm compat-mode), uprobes.
+
+  Those system mappings are readonly only or execute only, memory sealing can
+  protect them from ever changing to writable or unmmap/remapped as different
+  attributes. This is useful to mitigate memory corruption issues where a
+  corrupted pointer is passed to a memory management system.
+
+  If supported by an architecture (CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS),
+  the CONFIG_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS seals all system mappings of this
+  architecture.
+
+  The following architectures currently support this feature: x86-64, arm64,
+  and s390.
+
+  WARNING: This feature breaks programs which rely on relocating
+  or unmapping system mappings. Known broken software at the time
+  of writing includes CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, UML, gVisor, rr. Therefore
+  this config can't be enabled universally.
+
 When not to use mseal
 =====================
 Applications can apply sealing to any virtual memory region from userspace,