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authorLukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>2024-09-10 16:30:24 +0200
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2025-01-09 13:31:41 +0100
commit4b6beff3c073b3bd0dcb4cb16822408fc51e5df1 (patch)
tree7e7dff53e55f9ba227931317abba3d87a3d93944 /crypto
parentec64889179410e67d1b2aa7b047cafaa2d0c3f43 (diff)
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crypto: ecdsa - Avoid signed integer overflow on signature decoding
[ Upstream commit 3b0565c703503f832d6cd7ba805aafa3b330cb9d ] When extracting a signature component r or s from an ASN.1-encoded integer, ecdsa_get_signature_rs() subtracts the expected length "bufsize" from the ASN.1 length "vlen" (both of unsigned type size_t) and stores the result in "diff" (of signed type ssize_t). This results in a signed integer overflow if vlen > SSIZE_MAX + bufsize. The kernel is compiled with -fno-strict-overflow, which implies -fwrapv, meaning signed integer overflow is not undefined behavior. And the function does check for overflow: if (-diff >= bufsize) return -EINVAL; So the code is fine in principle but not very obvious. In the future it might trigger a false-positive with CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP=y. Avoid by comparing the two unsigned variables directly and erroring out if "vlen" is too large. Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r--crypto/ecdsa.c19
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa.c b/crypto/ecdsa.c
index 28441311af36..da04df3c8ecf 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdsa.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdsa.c
@@ -36,29 +36,24 @@ static int ecdsa_get_signature_rs(u64 *dest, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen, unsigned int ndigits)
{
size_t bufsize = ndigits * sizeof(u64);
- ssize_t diff = vlen - bufsize;
const char *d = value;
- if (!value || !vlen)
+ if (!value || !vlen || vlen > bufsize + 1)
return -EINVAL;
- /* diff = 0: 'value' has exacly the right size
- * diff > 0: 'value' has too many bytes; one leading zero is allowed that
- * makes the value a positive integer; error on more
- * diff < 0: 'value' is missing leading zeros
+ /*
+ * vlen may be 1 byte larger than bufsize due to a leading zero byte
+ * (necessary if the most significant bit of the integer is set).
*/
- if (diff > 0) {
+ if (vlen > bufsize) {
/* skip over leading zeros that make 'value' a positive int */
if (*d == 0) {
vlen -= 1;
- diff--;
d++;
- }
- if (diff)
+ } else {
return -EINVAL;
+ }
}
- if (-diff >= bufsize)
- return -EINVAL;
ecc_digits_from_bytes(d, vlen, dest, ndigits);