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| author | Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> | 2025-06-30 09:06:37 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> | 2025-07-04 10:18:53 -0700 |
| commit | b86ced882b8e667758afddffd8d6354197842110 (patch) | |
| tree | c2b980acaf7178d2b104502930a091c057de8285 /drivers/char | |
| parent | 6fa4b292204b15e0e269a9fd33bc99b5e36b6883 (diff) | |
| download | linux-b86ced882b8e667758afddffd8d6354197842110.tar.gz linux-b86ced882b8e667758afddffd8d6354197842110.tar.bz2 linux-b86ced882b8e667758afddffd8d6354197842110.zip | |
lib/crypto: sha256: Make library API use strongly-typed contexts
Currently the SHA-224 and SHA-256 library functions can be mixed
arbitrarily, even in ways that are incorrect, for example using
sha224_init() and sha256_final(). This is because they operate on the
same structure, sha256_state.
Introduce stronger typing, as I did for SHA-384 and SHA-512.
Also as I did for SHA-384 and SHA-512, use the names *_ctx instead of
*_state. The *_ctx names have the following small benefits:
- They're shorter.
- They avoid an ambiguity with the compression function state.
- They're consistent with the well-known OpenSSL API.
- Users usually name the variable 'sctx' anyway, which suggests that
*_ctx would be the more natural name for the actual struct.
Therefore: update the SHA-224 and SHA-256 APIs, implementation, and
calling code accordingly.
In the new structs, also strongly-type the compression function state.
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250630160645.3198-7-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 12 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c index 7b5049b3d476..bdb119453dfb 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ static int tpm2_create_primary(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 hierarchy, * on every operation, so we weld the hmac init and final functions in * here to give it the same usage characteristics as a regular hash */ -static void tpm2_hmac_init(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *key, u32 key_len) +static void tpm2_hmac_init(struct sha256_ctx *sctx, u8 *key, u32 key_len) { u8 pad[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE]; int i; @@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ static void tpm2_hmac_init(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *key, u32 key_len) sha256_update(sctx, pad, sizeof(pad)); } -static void tpm2_hmac_final(struct sha256_state *sctx, u8 *key, u32 key_len, +static void tpm2_hmac_final(struct sha256_ctx *sctx, u8 *key, u32 key_len, u8 *out) { u8 pad[SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE]; @@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ static void tpm2_KDFa(u8 *key, u32 key_len, const char *label, u8 *u, const __be32 bits = cpu_to_be32(bytes * 8); while (bytes > 0) { - struct sha256_state sctx; + struct sha256_ctx sctx; __be32 c = cpu_to_be32(counter); tpm2_hmac_init(&sctx, key, key_len); @@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ static void tpm2_KDFa(u8 *key, u32 key_len, const char *label, u8 *u, static void tpm2_KDFe(u8 z[EC_PT_SZ], const char *str, u8 *pt_u, u8 *pt_v, u8 *out) { - struct sha256_state sctx; + struct sha256_ctx sctx; /* * this should be an iterative counter, but because we know * we're only taking 32 bytes for the point using a sha256 @@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ void tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf) u8 *hmac = NULL; u32 attrs; u8 cphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; - struct sha256_state sctx; + struct sha256_ctx sctx; if (!auth) return; @@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t offset_s, offset_p; u8 rphash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]; u32 attrs, cc; - struct sha256_state sctx; + struct sha256_ctx sctx; u16 tag = be16_to_cpu(head->tag); int parm_len, len, i, handles; |
