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| author | Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> | 2025-09-18 18:00:25 +0900 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2025-10-02 13:44:09 +0200 |
| commit | def814b4ba31b563584061d6895d5ff447d5bc14 (patch) | |
| tree | d512f626941209ffa216a423db09d08df4057e76 /drivers | |
| parent | b26cccd87dcddc47b450a40f3b1ac3fe346efcff (diff) | |
| download | linux-def814b4ba31b563584061d6895d5ff447d5bc14.tar.gz linux-def814b4ba31b563584061d6895d5ff447d5bc14.tar.bz2 linux-def814b4ba31b563584061d6895d5ff447d5bc14.zip | |
can: hi311x: populate ndo_change_mtu() to prevent buffer overflow
[ Upstream commit ac1c7656fa717f29fac3ea073af63f0b9919ec9a ]
Sending an PF_PACKET allows to bypass the CAN framework logic and to
directly reach the xmit() function of a CAN driver. The only check
which is performed by the PF_PACKET framework is to make sure that
skb->len fits the interface's MTU.
Unfortunately, because the sun4i_can driver does not populate its
net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu(), it is possible for an attacker to
configure an invalid MTU by doing, for example:
$ ip link set can0 mtu 9999
After doing so, the attacker could open a PF_PACKET socket using the
ETH_P_CANXL protocol:
socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_CANXL))
to inject a malicious CAN XL frames. For example:
struct canxl_frame frame = {
.flags = 0xff,
.len = 2048,
};
The CAN drivers' xmit() function are calling can_dev_dropped_skb() to
check that the skb is valid, unfortunately under above conditions, the
malicious packet is able to go through can_dev_dropped_skb() checks:
1. the skb->protocol is set to ETH_P_CANXL which is valid (the
function does not check the actual device capabilities).
2. the length is a valid CAN XL length.
And so, hi3110_hard_start_xmit() receives a CAN XL frame which it is
not able to correctly handle and will thus misinterpret it as a CAN
frame. The driver will consume frame->len as-is with no further
checks.
This can result in a buffer overflow later on in hi3110_hw_tx() on
this line:
memcpy(buf + HI3110_FIFO_EXT_DATA_OFF,
frame->data, frame->len);
Here, frame->len corresponds to the flags field of the CAN XL frame.
In our previous example, we set canxl_frame->flags to 0xff. Because
the maximum expected length is 8, a buffer overflow of 247 bytes
occurs!
Populate net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu() to ensure that the
interface's MTU can not be set to anything bigger than CAN_MTU. By
fixing the root cause, this prevents the buffer overflow.
Fixes: 57e83fb9b746 ("can: hi311x: Add Holt HI-311x CAN driver")
Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250918-can-fix-mtu-v1-2-0d1cada9393b@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/can/spi/hi311x.c | 1 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/can/spi/hi311x.c b/drivers/net/can/spi/hi311x.c index 1b9501ee10de..ff39afc77d7d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/spi/hi311x.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/spi/hi311x.c @@ -813,6 +813,7 @@ static const struct net_device_ops hi3110_netdev_ops = { .ndo_open = hi3110_open, .ndo_stop = hi3110_stop, .ndo_start_xmit = hi3110_hard_start_xmit, + .ndo_change_mtu = can_change_mtu, }; static const struct ethtool_ops hi3110_ethtool_ops = { |
