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authorChristian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>2024-11-27 12:45:02 +0100
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2024-12-05 14:02:50 +0100
commit13111945c2420c2e352867ec96bb70c13ef37df9 (patch)
treee22e0c1e6629fb7e6098c92ab033b33ce42320ab /fs/binfmt_misc.c
parent3d6a8b8595dd7c4f56783ef65cb7f13fab6b315f (diff)
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Revert "fs: don't block i_writecount during exec"
commit 3b832035387ff508fdcf0fba66701afc78f79e3d upstream. This reverts commit 2a010c41285345da60cece35575b4e0af7e7bf44. Rui Ueyama <rui314@gmail.com> writes: > I'm the creator and the maintainer of the mold linker > (https://github.com/rui314/mold). Recently, we discovered that mold > started causing process crashes in certain situations due to a change > in the Linux kernel. Here are the details: > > - In general, overwriting an existing file is much faster than > creating an empty file and writing to it on Linux, so mold attempts to > reuse an existing executable file if it exists. > > - If a program is running, opening the executable file for writing > previously failed with ETXTBSY. If that happens, mold falls back to > creating a new file. > > - However, the Linux kernel recently changed the behavior so that > writing to an executable file is now always permitted > (https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=2a010c412853). > > That caused mold to write to an executable file even if there's a > process running that file. Since changes to mmap'ed files are > immediately visible to other processes, any processes running that > file would almost certainly crash in a very mysterious way. > Identifying the cause of these random crashes took us a few days. > > Rejecting writes to an executable file that is currently running is a > well-known behavior, and Linux had operated that way for a very long > time. So, I don’t believe relying on this behavior was our mistake; > rather, I see this as a regression in the Linux kernel. Quoting myself from commit 2a010c412853 ("fs: don't block i_writecount during exec") > Yes, someone in userspace could potentially be relying on this. It's not > completely out of the realm of possibility but let's find out if that's > actually the case and not guess. It seems we found out that someone is relying on this obscure behavior. So revert the change. Link: https://github.com/rui314/mold/issues/1361 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4a2bc207-76be-4715-8e12-7fc45a76a125@leemhuis.info Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/binfmt_misc.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/binfmt_misc.c7
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_misc.c b/fs/binfmt_misc.c
index 31660d8cc2c6..6a3a16f91051 100644
--- a/fs/binfmt_misc.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_misc.c
@@ -247,10 +247,13 @@ static int load_misc_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (retval < 0)
goto ret;
- if (fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE)
+ if (fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE) {
interp_file = file_clone_open(fmt->interp_file);
- else
+ if (!IS_ERR(interp_file))
+ deny_write_access(interp_file);
+ } else {
interp_file = open_exec(fmt->interpreter);
+ }
retval = PTR_ERR(interp_file);
if (IS_ERR(interp_file))
goto ret;