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author | Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> | 2024-11-27 12:45:02 +0100 |
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committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2024-12-05 14:02:50 +0100 |
commit | 13111945c2420c2e352867ec96bb70c13ef37df9 (patch) | |
tree | e22e0c1e6629fb7e6098c92ab033b33ce42320ab /fs/binfmt_misc.c | |
parent | 3d6a8b8595dd7c4f56783ef65cb7f13fab6b315f (diff) | |
download | linux-13111945c2420c2e352867ec96bb70c13ef37df9.tar.gz linux-13111945c2420c2e352867ec96bb70c13ef37df9.tar.bz2 linux-13111945c2420c2e352867ec96bb70c13ef37df9.zip |
Revert "fs: don't block i_writecount during exec"
commit 3b832035387ff508fdcf0fba66701afc78f79e3d upstream.
This reverts commit 2a010c41285345da60cece35575b4e0af7e7bf44.
Rui Ueyama <rui314@gmail.com> writes:
> I'm the creator and the maintainer of the mold linker
> (https://github.com/rui314/mold). Recently, we discovered that mold
> started causing process crashes in certain situations due to a change
> in the Linux kernel. Here are the details:
>
> - In general, overwriting an existing file is much faster than
> creating an empty file and writing to it on Linux, so mold attempts to
> reuse an existing executable file if it exists.
>
> - If a program is running, opening the executable file for writing
> previously failed with ETXTBSY. If that happens, mold falls back to
> creating a new file.
>
> - However, the Linux kernel recently changed the behavior so that
> writing to an executable file is now always permitted
> (https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=2a010c412853).
>
> That caused mold to write to an executable file even if there's a
> process running that file. Since changes to mmap'ed files are
> immediately visible to other processes, any processes running that
> file would almost certainly crash in a very mysterious way.
> Identifying the cause of these random crashes took us a few days.
>
> Rejecting writes to an executable file that is currently running is a
> well-known behavior, and Linux had operated that way for a very long
> time. So, I don’t believe relying on this behavior was our mistake;
> rather, I see this as a regression in the Linux kernel.
Quoting myself from commit 2a010c412853 ("fs: don't block i_writecount during exec")
> Yes, someone in userspace could potentially be relying on this. It's not
> completely out of the realm of possibility but let's find out if that's
> actually the case and not guess.
It seems we found out that someone is relying on this obscure behavior.
So revert the change.
Link: https://github.com/rui314/mold/issues/1361
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4a2bc207-76be-4715-8e12-7fc45a76a125@leemhuis.info
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/binfmt_misc.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/binfmt_misc.c | 7 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/fs/binfmt_misc.c b/fs/binfmt_misc.c index 31660d8cc2c6..6a3a16f91051 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_misc.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_misc.c @@ -247,10 +247,13 @@ static int load_misc_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (retval < 0) goto ret; - if (fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE) + if (fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE) { interp_file = file_clone_open(fmt->interp_file); - else + if (!IS_ERR(interp_file)) + deny_write_access(interp_file); + } else { interp_file = open_exec(fmt->interpreter); + } retval = PTR_ERR(interp_file); if (IS_ERR(interp_file)) goto ret; |