netfilter: xt_u32: validate user space input

commit 69c5d284f67089b4750d28ff6ac6f52ec224b330 upstream.

The xt_u32 module doesn't validate the fields in the xt_u32 structure.
An attacker may take advantage of this to trigger an OOB read by setting
the size fields with a value beyond the arrays boundaries.

Add a checkentry function to validate the structure.

This was originally reported by the ZDI project (ZDI-CAN-18408).

Fixes: 1b50b8a371e9 ("[NETFILTER]: Add u32 match")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 21 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c
index a95b50342dbb..58ba402bc0b0 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c
@@ -95,11 +95,32 @@ static bool u32_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)
 	return ret ^ data->invert;
 }
 
+static int u32_mt_checkentry(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par)
+{
+	const struct xt_u32 *data = par->matchinfo;
+	const struct xt_u32_test *ct;
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	if (data->ntests > ARRAY_SIZE(data->tests))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < data->ntests; ++i) {
+		ct = &data->tests[i];
+
+		if (ct->nnums > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->location) ||
+		    ct->nvalues > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->value))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static struct xt_match xt_u32_mt_reg __read_mostly = {
 	.name       = "u32",
 	.revision   = 0,
 	.family     = NFPROTO_UNSPEC,
 	.match      = u32_mt,
+	.checkentry = u32_mt_checkentry,
 	.matchsize  = sizeof(struct xt_u32),
 	.me         = THIS_MODULE,
 };