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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2024-01-09 13:24:06 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2024-01-09 13:24:06 -0800 |
| commit | 6c1dd1fe5d8a1d43ed96e2e0ed44a88c73c5c039 (patch) | |
| tree | 08cf4521df75e4b7699f1abeb695985ce6ee26d9 /security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | |
| parent | e9b4c5890858015bfe2089b7573319bcf4a92907 (diff) | |
| parent | c00f94b3a5be428837868c0f2cdaa3fa5b4b1995 (diff) | |
| download | linux-6c1dd1fe5d8a1d43ed96e2e0ed44a88c73c5c039.tar.gz linux-6c1dd1fe5d8a1d43ed96e2e0ed44a88c73c5c039.tar.bz2 linux-6c1dd1fe5d8a1d43ed96e2e0ed44a88c73c5c039.zip | |
Merge tag 'integrity-v6.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
- Add a new IMA/EVM maintainer and reviewer
- Disable EVM on overlayfs
The EVM HMAC and the original file signatures contain filesystem
specific metadata (e.g. i_ino, i_generation and s_uuid), preventing
the security.evm xattr from directly being copied up to the overlay.
Further before calculating and writing out the overlay file's EVM
HMAC, EVM must first verify the existing backing file's
'security.evm' value.
For now until a solution is developed, disable EVM on overlayfs.
- One bug fix and two cleanups
* tag 'integrity-v6.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
overlay: disable EVM
evm: add support to disable EVM on unsupported filesystems
evm: don't copy up 'security.evm' xattr
MAINTAINERS: Add Eric Snowberg as a reviewer to IMA
MAINTAINERS: Add Roberto Sassu as co-maintainer to IMA and EVM
KEYS: encrypted: Add check for strsep
ima: Remove EXPERIMENTAL from Kconfig
ima: Reword IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 42 |
1 files changed, 41 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 894570fe39bc..cc7956d7878b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -151,6 +151,17 @@ static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry) return count; } +static int is_unsupported_fs(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); + + if (inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_EVM_UNSUPPORTED) { + pr_info_once("%s not supported\n", inode->i_sb->s_type->name); + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + /* * evm_verify_hmac - calculate and compare the HMAC with the EVM xattr * @@ -181,6 +192,9 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE)) return iint->evm_status; + if (is_unsupported_fs(dentry)) + return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + /* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */ /* first need to know the sig type */ @@ -408,6 +422,9 @@ enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + if (is_unsupported_fs(dentry)) + return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; + if (!iint) { iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry)); if (!iint) @@ -491,15 +508,21 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) { if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; + if (is_unsupported_fs(dentry)) + return -EPERM; } else if (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) { if (!posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name)) return 0; + if (is_unsupported_fs(dentry)) + return 0; + evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) || (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS)) return 0; goto out; - } + } else if (is_unsupported_fs(dentry)) + return 0; evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) { @@ -750,6 +773,9 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) return; + if (is_unsupported_fs(dentry)) + return; + evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); } @@ -814,8 +840,12 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) return 0; + if (is_unsupported_fs(dentry)) + return 0; + if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))) return 0; + evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); /* * Writing attrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable signatures @@ -859,10 +889,20 @@ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) return; + if (is_unsupported_fs(dentry)) + return; + if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)) evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0); } +int evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) +{ + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) + return 1; /* Discard */ + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + /* * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm HMAC value */ |
