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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2024-01-09 12:57:46 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2024-01-09 12:57:46 -0800
commit063a7ce32ddc2c4f2404b0dfd29e60e3dbcdffac (patch)
tree9910f131597a3f5c2060c988f5bd65484cfe365b /security
parent9f9310bf87348e36a98ffa09c4e285908c14f592 (diff)
parentf1bb47a31dff6d4b34fb14e99850860ee74bb003 (diff)
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Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull security module updates from Paul Moore: - Add three new syscalls: lsm_list_modules(), lsm_get_self_attr(), and lsm_set_self_attr(). The first syscall simply lists the LSMs enabled, while the second and third get and set the current process' LSM attributes. Yes, these syscalls may provide similar functionality to what can be found under /proc or /sys, but they were designed to support multiple, simultaneaous (stacked) LSMs from the start as opposed to the current /proc based solutions which were created at a time when only one LSM was allowed to be active at a given time. We have spent considerable time discussing ways to extend the existing /proc interfaces to support multiple, simultaneaous LSMs and even our best ideas have been far too ugly to support as a kernel API; after +20 years in the kernel, I felt the LSM layer had established itself enough to justify a handful of syscalls. Support amongst the individual LSM developers has been nearly unanimous, with a single objection coming from Tetsuo (TOMOYO) as he is worried that the LSM_ID_XXX token concept will make it more difficult for out-of-tree LSMs to survive. Several members of the LSM community have demonstrated the ability for out-of-tree LSMs to continue to exist by picking high/unused LSM_ID values as well as pointing out that many kernel APIs rely on integer identifiers, e.g. syscalls (!), but unfortunately Tetsuo's objections remain. My personal opinion is that while I have no interest in penalizing out-of-tree LSMs, I'm not going to penalize in-tree development to support out-of-tree development, and I view this as a necessary step forward to support the push for expanded LSM stacking and reduce our reliance on /proc and /sys which has occassionally been problematic for some container users. Finally, we have included the linux-api folks on (all?) recent revisions of the patchset and addressed all of their concerns. - Add a new security_file_ioctl_compat() LSM hook to handle the 32-bit ioctls on 64-bit systems problem. This patch includes support for all of the existing LSMs which provide ioctl hooks, although it turns out only SELinux actually cares about the individual ioctls. It is worth noting that while Casey (Smack) and Tetsuo (TOMOYO) did not give explicit ACKs to this patch, they did both indicate they are okay with the changes. - Fix a potential memory leak in the CALIPSO code when IPv6 is disabled at boot. While it's good that we are fixing this, I doubt this is something users are seeing in the wild as you need to both disable IPv6 and then attempt to configure IPv6 labeled networking via NetLabel/CALIPSO; that just doesn't make much sense. Normally this would go through netdev, but Jakub asked me to take this patch and of all the trees I maintain, the LSM tree seemed like the best fit. - Update the LSM MAINTAINERS entry with additional information about our process docs, patchwork, bug reporting, etc. I also noticed that the Lockdown LSM is missing a dedicated MAINTAINERS entry so I've added that to the pull request. I've been working with one of the major Lockdown authors/contributors to see if they are willing to step up and assume a Lockdown maintainer role; hopefully that will happen soon, but in the meantime I'll continue to look after it. - Add a handful of mailmap entries for Serge Hallyn and myself. * tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (27 commits) lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook lsm: Add a __counted_by() annotation to lsm_ctx.ctx calipso: fix memory leak in netlbl_calipso_add_pass() selftests: remove the LSM_ID_IMA check in lsm/lsm_list_modules_test MAINTAINERS: add an entry for the lockdown LSM MAINTAINERS: update the LSM entry mailmap: add entries for Serge Hallyn's dead accounts mailmap: update/replace my old email addresses lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static lsm: convert security_setselfattr() to use memdup_user() lsm: align based on pointer length in lsm_fill_user_ctx() lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx() lsm: correct error codes in security_getselfattr() lsm: cleanup the size counters in security_getselfattr() lsm: don't yet account for IMA in LSM_CONFIG_COUNT calculation lsm: drop LSM_ID_IMA LSM: selftests for Linux Security Module syscalls SELinux: Add selfattr hooks AppArmor: Add selfattr hooks Smack: implement setselfattr and getselfattr hooks ...
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/procattr.h2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c90
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/procattr.c10
-rw-r--r--security/bpf/hooks.c9
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c8
-rw-r--r--security/landlock/cred.c2
-rw-r--r--security/landlock/fs.c2
-rw-r--r--security/landlock/net.c2
-rw-r--r--security/landlock/ptrace.c2
-rw-r--r--security/landlock/setup.c6
-rw-r--r--security/landlock/setup.h1
-rw-r--r--security/loadpin/loadpin.c9
-rw-r--r--security/lockdown/lockdown.c8
-rw-r--r--security/lsm_syscalls.c120
-rw-r--r--security/safesetid/lsm.c9
-rw-r--r--security/security.c273
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c173
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c93
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c10
-rw-r--r--security/yama/yama_lsm.c8
21 files changed, 769 insertions, 69 deletions
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index 18121f8f85cd..59f238490665 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS) += keys/
# always enable default capabilities
obj-y += commoncap.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += lsm_syscalls.o
obj-$(CONFIG_MMU) += min_addr.o
# Object file lists
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
index 31689437e0e1..03dbfdb2f2c0 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
#ifndef __AA_PROCATTR_H
#define __AA_PROCATTR_H
-int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string);
+int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline);
int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int flags);
#endif /* __AA_PROCATTR_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 4981bdf02993..e490a7000408 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <linux/zstd.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
#include "include/apparmor.h"
#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
@@ -775,6 +776,46 @@ static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path,
return error;
}
+static int apparmor_getselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *lx,
+ size_t *size, u32 flags)
+{
+ int error = -ENOENT;
+ struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current);
+ struct aa_label *label = NULL;
+ char *value;
+
+ switch (attr) {
+ case LSM_ATTR_CURRENT:
+ label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(current_cred()));
+ break;
+ case LSM_ATTR_PREV:
+ if (ctx->previous)
+ label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
+ break;
+ case LSM_ATTR_EXEC:
+ if (ctx->onexec)
+ label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec);
+ break;
+ default:
+ error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (label) {
+ error = aa_getprocattr(label, &value, false);
+ if (error > 0)
+ error = lsm_fill_user_ctx(lx, size, value, error,
+ LSM_ID_APPARMOR, 0);
+ kfree(value);
+ }
+
+ aa_put_label(label);
+
+ if (error < 0)
+ return error;
+ return 1;
+}
+
static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, const char *name,
char **value)
{
@@ -794,7 +835,7 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, const char *name,
error = -EINVAL;
if (label)
- error = aa_getprocattr(label, value);
+ error = aa_getprocattr(label, value, true);
aa_put_label(label);
put_cred(cred);
@@ -802,8 +843,7 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, const char *name,
return error;
}
-static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
- size_t size)
+static int do_setattr(u64 attr, void *value, size_t size)
{
char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value;
size_t arg_size;
@@ -834,7 +874,7 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
goto out;
arg_size = size - (args - (largs ? largs : (char *) value));
- if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
+ if (attr == LSM_ATTR_CURRENT) {
if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS);
@@ -849,7 +889,7 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_STACK);
} else
goto fail;
- } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
+ } else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_EXEC) {
if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC);
else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0)
@@ -869,13 +909,42 @@ out:
fail:
ad.subj_label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
- ad.info = name;
+ if (attr == LSM_ATTR_CURRENT)
+ ad.info = "current";
+ else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_EXEC)
+ ad.info = "exec";
+ else
+ ad.info = "invalid";
ad.error = error = -EINVAL;
aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &ad, NULL);
end_current_label_crit_section(ad.subj_label);
goto out;
}
+static int apparmor_setselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx *ctx,
+ size_t size, u32 flags)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if (attr != LSM_ATTR_CURRENT && attr != LSM_ATTR_EXEC)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ rc = do_setattr(attr, ctx->ctx, ctx->ctx_len);
+ if (rc > 0)
+ return 0;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
+ size_t size)
+{
+ int attr = lsm_name_to_attr(name);
+
+ if (attr)
+ return do_setattr(attr, value, size);
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
/**
* apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds
* @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
@@ -1385,6 +1454,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
.lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx),
};
+static const struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid = {
+ .name = "apparmor",
+ .id = LSM_ID_APPARMOR,
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -1418,6 +1492,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_truncate, apparmor_file_truncate),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(getselfattr, apparmor_getselfattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(setselfattr, apparmor_setselfattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
@@ -2202,7 +2278,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
goto buffers_out;
}
security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
- "apparmor");
+ &apparmor_lsmid);
/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
apparmor_initialized = 1;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/procattr.c b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
index 197d41f9c32b..e3857e3d7c6c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/procattr.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
* aa_getprocattr - Return the label information for @label
* @label: the label to print label info about (NOT NULL)
* @string: Returns - string containing the label info (NOT NULL)
+ * @newline: indicates that a newline should be added
*
* Requires: label != NULL && string != NULL
*
@@ -27,7 +28,7 @@
*
* Returns: size of string placed in @string else error code on failure
*/
-int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)
+int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string, bool newline)
{
struct aa_ns *ns = labels_ns(label);
struct aa_ns *current_ns = aa_get_current_ns();
@@ -57,11 +58,12 @@ int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)
return len;
}
- (*string)[len] = '\n';
- (*string)[len + 1] = 0;
+ if (newline)
+ (*string)[len++] = '\n';
+ (*string)[len] = 0;
aa_put_ns(current_ns);
- return len + 1;
+ return len;
}
/**
diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c
index cfaf1d0e6a5f..57b9ffd53c98 100644
--- a/security/bpf/hooks.c
+++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <linux/bpf_lsm.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
@@ -15,9 +16,15 @@ static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, bpf_task_storage_free),
};
+static const struct lsm_id bpf_lsmid = {
+ .name = "bpf",
+ .id = LSM_ID_BPF,
+};
+
static int __init bpf_lsm_init(void)
{
- security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks), "bpf");
+ security_add_hooks(bpf_lsm_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks),
+ &bpf_lsmid);
pr_info("LSM support for eBPF active\n");
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 8e8c630ce204..162d96b3a676 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
/*
* If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
@@ -1440,6 +1441,11 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+static const struct lsm_id capability_lsmid = {
+ .name = "capability",
+ .id = LSM_ID_CAPABILITY,
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
@@ -1464,7 +1470,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
static int __init capability_init(void)
{
security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks),
- "capability");
+ &capability_lsmid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/cred.c b/security/landlock/cred.c
index 13dff2a31545..786af18c4a1c 100644
--- a/security/landlock/cred.c
+++ b/security/landlock/cred.c
@@ -42,5 +42,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
__init void landlock_add_cred_hooks(void)
{
security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
- LANDLOCK_NAME);
+ &landlock_lsmid);
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index bc7c126deea2..490655d09b43 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -1223,5 +1223,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
__init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void)
{
security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
- LANDLOCK_NAME);
+ &landlock_lsmid);
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
index aaa92c2b1f08..efa1b644a4af 100644
--- a/security/landlock/net.c
+++ b/security/landlock/net.c
@@ -196,5 +196,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void)
{
security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
- LANDLOCK_NAME);
+ &landlock_lsmid);
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/ptrace.c b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
index 8a06d6c492bf..2bfc533d36e4 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ptrace.c
+++ b/security/landlock/ptrace.c
@@ -116,5 +116,5 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
__init void landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(void)
{
security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
- LANDLOCK_NAME);
+ &landlock_lsmid);
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
index 3e11d303542f..f6dd33143b7f 100644
--- a/security/landlock/setup.c
+++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
#include "common.h"
#include "cred.h"
@@ -25,6 +26,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct landlock_superblock_security),
};
+const struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid = {
+ .name = LANDLOCK_NAME,
+ .id = LSM_ID_LANDLOCK,
+};
+
static int __init landlock_init(void)
{
landlock_add_cred_hooks();
diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.h b/security/landlock/setup.h
index 1daffab1ab4b..c4252d46d49d 100644
--- a/security/landlock/setup.h
+++ b/security/landlock/setup.h
@@ -14,5 +14,6 @@
extern bool landlock_initialized;
extern struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes;
+extern const struct lsm_id landlock_lsmid;
#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_SETUP_H */
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index a9d40456a064..8e93cda130f1 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <linux/string_helpers.h>
#include <linux/dm-verity-loadpin.h>
#include <uapi/linux/loadpin.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
#define VERITY_DIGEST_FILE_HEADER "# LOADPIN_TRUSTED_VERITY_ROOT_DIGESTS"
@@ -208,6 +209,11 @@ static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
return loadpin_check(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id);
}
+static const struct lsm_id loadpin_lsmid = {
+ .name = "loadpin",
+ .id = LSM_ID_LOADPIN,
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
@@ -259,7 +265,8 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void)
if (!register_sysctl("kernel/loadpin", loadpin_sysctl_table))
pr_notice("sysctl registration failed!\n");
#endif
- security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
+ security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks),
+ &loadpin_lsmid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
index 68d19632aeb7..cd84d8ea1dfb 100644
--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
static enum lockdown_reason kernel_locked_down;
@@ -75,6 +76,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down),
};
+const struct lsm_id lockdown_lsmid = {
+ .name = "lockdown",
+ .id = LSM_ID_LOCKDOWN,
+};
+
static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY)
@@ -83,7 +89,7 @@ static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)
lock_kernel_down("Kernel configuration", LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
#endif
security_add_hooks(lockdown_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_hooks),
- "lockdown");
+ &lockdown_lsmid);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/lsm_syscalls.c b/security/lsm_syscalls.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5d391b1f7e69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/lsm_syscalls.c
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * System calls implementing the Linux Security Module API.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Intel Corporation
+ */
+
+#include <asm/current.h>
+#include <linux/compiler_types.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
+
+/**
+ * lsm_name_to_attr - map an LSM attribute name to its ID
+ * @name: name of the attribute
+ *
+ * Returns the LSM attribute value associated with @name, or 0 if
+ * there is no mapping.
+ */
+u64 lsm_name_to_attr(const char *name)
+{
+ if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
+ return LSM_ATTR_CURRENT;
+ if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
+ return LSM_ATTR_EXEC;
+ if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
+ return LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE;
+ if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
+ return LSM_ATTR_KEYCREATE;
+ if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
+ return LSM_ATTR_PREV;
+ if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
+ return LSM_ATTR_SOCKCREATE;
+ return LSM_ATTR_UNDEF;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sys_lsm_set_self_attr - Set current task's security module attribute
+ * @attr: which attribute to set
+ * @ctx: the LSM contexts
+ * @size: size of @ctx
+ * @flags: reserved for future use
+ *
+ * Sets the calling task's LSM context. On success this function
+ * returns 0. If the attribute specified cannot be set a negative
+ * value indicating the reason for the error is returned.
+ */
+SYSCALL_DEFINE4(lsm_set_self_attr, unsigned int, attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *,
+ ctx, size_t, size, u32, flags)
+{
+ return security_setselfattr(attr, ctx, size, flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sys_lsm_get_self_attr - Return current task's security module attributes
+ * @attr: which attribute to return
+ * @ctx: the user-space destination for the information, or NULL
+ * @size: pointer to the size of space available to receive the data
+ * @flags: special handling options. LSM_FLAG_SINGLE indicates that only
+ * attributes associated with the LSM identified in the passed @ctx be
+ * reported.
+ *
+ * Returns the calling task's LSM contexts. On success this
+ * function returns the number of @ctx array elements. This value
+ * may be zero if there are no LSM contexts assigned. If @size is
+ * insufficient to contain the return data -E2BIG is returned and
+ * @size is set to the minimum required size. In all other cases
+ * a negative value indicating the error is returned.
+ */
+SYSCALL_DEFINE4(lsm_get_self_attr, unsigned int, attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *,
+ ctx, size_t __user *, size, u32, flags)
+{
+ return security_getselfattr(attr, ctx, size, flags);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sys_lsm_list_modules - Return a list of the active security modules
+ * @ids: the LSM module ids
+ * @size: pointer to size of @ids, updated on return
+ * @flags: reserved for future use, must be zero
+ *
+ * Returns a list of the active LSM ids. On success this function
+ * returns the number of @ids array elements. This value may be zero
+ * if there are no LSMs active. If @size is insufficient to contain
+ * the return data -E2BIG is returned and @size is set to the minimum
+ * required size. In all other cases a negative value indicating the
+ * error is returned.
+ */
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(lsm_list_modules, u64 __user *, ids, size_t __user *, size,
+ u32, flags)
+{
+ size_t total_size = lsm_active_cnt * sizeof(*ids);
+ size_t usize;
+ int i;
+
+ if (flags)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (get_user(usize, size))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (put_user(total_size, size) != 0)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (usize < total_size)
+ return -E2BIG;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < lsm_active_cnt; i++)
+ if (put_user(lsm_idlist[i]->id, ids++))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ return lsm_active_cnt;
+}
diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
index 5be5894aa0ea..1ba564f097f5 100644
--- a/security/safesetid/lsm.c
+++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
#include "lsm.h"
/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
@@ -261,6 +262,11 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old
return 0;
}
+static const struct lsm_id safesetid_lsmid = {
+ .name = "safesetid",
+ .id = LSM_ID_SAFESETID,
+};
+
static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setgid, safesetid_task_fix_setgid),
@@ -271,7 +277,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
{
security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
- ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");
+ ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks),
+ &safesetid_lsmid);
/* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
safesetid_initialized = 1;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 2a7fc7881cbc..8b55ef346a62 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -35,6 +35,24 @@
#define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info)
/*
+ * How many LSMs are built into the kernel as determined at
+ * build time. Used to determine fixed array sizes.
+ * The capability module is accounted for by CONFIG_SECURITY
+ */
+#define LSM_CONFIG_COUNT ( \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0))
+
+/*
* These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the
* security_locked_down() LSM hook. Placing this array here allows
* all security modules to use the same descriptions for auditing
@@ -245,6 +263,12 @@ static void __init initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm)
}
}
+/*
+ * Current index to use while initializing the lsm id list.
+ */
+u32 lsm_active_cnt __ro_after_init;
+const struct lsm_id *lsm_idlist[LSM_CONFIG_COUNT];
+
/* Populate ordered LSMs list from comma-separated LSM name list. */
static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
{
@@ -513,17 +537,29 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)
* security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists.
* @hooks: the hooks to add
* @count: the number of hooks to add
- * @lsm: the name of the security module
+ * @lsmid: the identification information for the security module
*
* Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure.
*/
void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
- const char *lsm)
+ const struct lsm_id *lsmid)
{
int i;
+ /*
+ * A security module may call security_add_hooks() more
+ * than once during initialization, and LSM initialization
+ * is serialized. Landlock is one such case.
+ * Look at the previous entry, if there is one, for duplication.
+ */
+ if (lsm_active_cnt == 0 || lsm_idlist[lsm_active_cnt - 1] != lsmid) {
+ if (lsm_active_cnt >= LSM_CONFIG_COUNT)
+ panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
+ lsm_idlist[lsm_active_cnt++] = lsmid;
+ }
+
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
- hooks[i].lsm = lsm;
+ hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid;
hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
}
@@ -532,7 +568,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
* and fix this up afterwards.
*/
if (slab_is_available()) {
- if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0)
+ if (lsm_append(lsmid->name, &lsm_names) < 0)
panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__);
}
}
@@ -734,6 +770,54 @@ static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * lsm_fill_user_ctx - Fill a user space lsm_ctx structure
+ * @uctx: a userspace LSM context to be filled
+ * @uctx_len: available uctx size (input), used uctx size (output)
+ * @val: the new LSM context value
+ * @val_len: the size of the new LSM context value
+ * @id: LSM id
+ * @flags: LSM defined flags
+ *
+ * Fill all of the fields in a userspace lsm_ctx structure.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -E2BIG if userspace buffer is not large enough,
+ * -EFAULT on a copyout error, -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated.
+ */
+int lsm_fill_user_ctx(struct lsm_ctx __user *uctx, size_t *uctx_len,
+ void *val, size_t val_len,
+ u64 id, u64 flags)
+{
+ struct lsm_ctx *nctx = NULL;
+ size_t nctx_len;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ nctx_len = ALIGN(struct_size(nctx, ctx, val_len), sizeof(void *));
+ if (nctx_len > *uctx_len) {
+ rc = -E2BIG;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ nctx = kzalloc(nctx_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (nctx == NULL) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ nctx->id = id;
+ nctx->flags = flags;
+ nctx->len = nctx_len;
+ nctx->ctx_len = val_len;
+ memcpy(nctx->ctx, val, val_len);
+
+ if (copy_to_user(uctx, nctx, nctx_len))
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+
+out:
+ kfree(nctx);
+ *uctx_len = nctx_len;
+ return rc;
+}
+
/*
* The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and
* can be accessed with:
@@ -2642,6 +2726,24 @@ int security_file_ioctl(struct file