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authorliqiong <liqiong@nfschina.com>2021-10-09 18:38:21 +0800
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2024-05-25 16:19:06 +0200
commiteb15243bc98b3f220f8575159135babef1dd6627 (patch)
treee9c8ac501372ee5234852421da797768472d41ab /security
parentdb7aa45c71914340568d492af38d4e391a051e7a (diff)
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ima: fix deadlock when traversing "ima_default_rules".
commit eb0782bbdfd0d7c4786216659277c3fd585afc0e upstream. The current IMA ruleset is identified by the variable "ima_rules" that default to "&ima_default_rules". When loading a custom policy for the first time, the variable is updated to "&ima_policy_rules" instead. That update isn't RCU-safe, and deadlocks are possible. Indeed, some functions like ima_match_policy() may loop indefinitely when traversing "ima_default_rules" with list_for_each_entry_rcu(). When iterating over the default ruleset back to head, if the list head is "ima_default_rules", and "ima_rules" have been updated to "&ima_policy_rules", the loop condition (&entry->list != ima_rules) stays always true, traversing won't terminate, causing a soft lockup and RCU stalls. Introduce a temporary value for "ima_rules" when iterating over the ruleset to avoid the deadlocks. Signed-off-by: liqiong <liqiong@nfschina.com> Reviewed-by: THOBY Simon <Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr> Fixes: 38d859f991f3 ("IMA: policy can now be updated multiple times") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> (Fix sparse: incompatible types in comparison expression.) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c29
1 files changed, 20 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 1c403e8a8044..4f5d44037081 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *arch_policy_entry __ro_after_init;
static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);
static LIST_HEAD(ima_temp_rules);
-static struct list_head *ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
+static struct list_head __rcu *ima_rules = (struct list_head __rcu *)(&ima_default_rules);
static int ima_policy __initdata;
@@ -648,12 +648,14 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
{
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
+ struct list_head *ima_rules_tmp;
if (template_desc)
*template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
rcu_read_lock();
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
+ ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ima_rules);
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) {
if (!(entry->action & actmask))
continue;
@@ -701,11 +703,15 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
void ima_update_policy_flag(void)
{
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
+ struct list_head *ima_rules_tmp;
- list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) {
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ima_rules);
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) {
if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
ima_policy_flag |= entry->action;
}
+ rcu_read_unlock();
ima_appraise |= (build_ima_appraise | temp_ima_appraise);
if (!ima_appraise)
@@ -898,10 +904,10 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)
list_splice_tail_init_rcu(&ima_temp_rules, policy, synchronize_rcu);
- if (ima_rules != policy) {
+ if (ima_rules != (struct list_head __rcu *)policy) {
ima_policy_flag = 0;
- ima_rules = policy;
+ rcu_assign_pointer(ima_rules, policy);
/*
* IMA architecture specific policy rules are specified
* as strings and converted to an array of ima_entry_rules
@@ -989,7 +995,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
- if (ima_rules == &ima_default_rules) {
+ if (ima_rules == (struct list_head __rcu *)(&ima_default_rules)) {
kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = NULL;
result = -EINVAL;
@@ -1598,9 +1604,11 @@ void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
loff_t l = *pos;
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
+ struct list_head *ima_rules_tmp;
rcu_read_lock();
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
+ ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ima_rules);
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) {
if (!l--) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return entry;
@@ -1619,7 +1627,8 @@ void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
rcu_read_unlock();
(*pos)++;
- return (&entry->list == ima_rules) ? NULL : entry;
+ return (&entry->list == &ima_default_rules ||
+ &entry->list == &ima_policy_rules) ? NULL : entry;
}
void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
@@ -1823,6 +1832,7 @@ bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
bool found = false;
enum ima_hooks func;
+ struct list_head *ima_rules_tmp;
if (id >= READING_MAX_ID)
return false;
@@ -1834,7 +1844,8 @@ bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
func = read_idmap[id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
rcu_read_lock();
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {
+ ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ima_rules);
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) {
if (entry->action != APPRAISE)
continue;