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authorEric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>2025-08-09 10:19:39 -0700
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2025-10-19 16:33:51 +0200
commitec230e7ac6a9fda479b582878d1f00ae87c7faf6 (patch)
treece3e5163692efec72898710c83089abc69f9b2bf /security
parent19b45c84bd9fd42fa97ff80c6350d604cb871c75 (diff)
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KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Compare HMAC values in constant time
commit eed0e3d305530066b4fc5370107cff8ef1a0d229 upstream. To prevent timing attacks, HMAC value comparison needs to be constant time. Replace the memcmp() with the correct function, crypto_memneq(). [For the Fixes commit I used the commit that introduced the memcmp(). It predates the introduction of crypto_memneq(), but it was still a bug at the time even though a helper function didn't exist yet.] Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c7
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index 89c9798d1800..e73f2c6c817a 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
*/
#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+#include <crypto/utils.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/parser.h>
@@ -241,7 +242,7 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+ if (crypto_memneq(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
ret = -EINVAL;
out:
kfree_sensitive(sdesc);
@@ -334,7 +335,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag1, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- if (memcmp(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
+ if (crypto_memneq(testhmac1, authdata1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
@@ -343,7 +344,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,
TPM_NONCE_SIZE, ononce, 1, continueflag2, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+ if (crypto_memneq(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
ret = -EINVAL;
out:
kfree_sensitive(sdesc);