diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/mm')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 36 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/init.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c | 12 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 2 |
10 files changed, 68 insertions, 15 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c index 7316a8224259..e91500a80963 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include <asm/fixmap.h> #include <asm/desc.h> #include <asm/kasan.h> +#include <asm/setup.h> static DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct entry_stack_page, entry_stack_storage); @@ -29,6 +30,12 @@ static __init void init_cea_offsets(void) unsigned int max_cea; unsigned int i, j; + if (!kaslr_enabled()) { + for_each_possible_cpu(i) + per_cpu(_cea_offset, i) = i; + return; + } + max_cea = (CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE) / CPU_ENTRY_AREA_SIZE; /* O(sodding terrible) */ diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c b/arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c index 092ea436c7e6..b43301cb2a80 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c @@ -71,6 +71,5 @@ static void __exit pt_dump_debug_exit(void) module_init(pt_dump_debug_init); module_exit(pt_dump_debug_exit); -MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); MODULE_AUTHOR("Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>"); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Kernel debugging helper that dumps pagetables"); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index a498ae1fbe66..e4399983c50c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include <linux/uaccess.h> /* faulthandler_disabled() */ #include <linux/efi.h> /* efi_crash_gracefully_on_page_fault()*/ #include <linux/mm_types.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> /* find_and_lock_vma() */ #include <asm/cpufeature.h> /* boot_cpu_has, ... */ #include <asm/traps.h> /* dotraplinkage, ... */ @@ -1333,6 +1334,38 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK + if (!(flags & FAULT_FLAG_USER)) + goto lock_mmap; + + vma = lock_vma_under_rcu(mm, address); + if (!vma) + goto lock_mmap; + + if (unlikely(access_error(error_code, vma))) { + vma_end_read(vma); + goto lock_mmap; + } + fault = handle_mm_fault(vma, address, flags | FAULT_FLAG_VMA_LOCK, regs); + vma_end_read(vma); + + if (!(fault & VM_FAULT_RETRY)) { + count_vm_vma_lock_event(VMA_LOCK_SUCCESS); + goto done; + } + count_vm_vma_lock_event(VMA_LOCK_RETRY); + + /* Quick path to respond to signals */ + if (fault_signal_pending(fault, regs)) { + if (!user_mode(regs)) + kernelmode_fixup_or_oops(regs, error_code, address, + SIGBUS, BUS_ADRERR, + ARCH_DEFAULT_PKEY); + return; + } +lock_mmap: +#endif /* CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK */ + /* * Kernel-mode access to the user address space should only occur * on well-defined single instructions listed in the exception @@ -1433,6 +1466,9 @@ good_area: } mmap_read_unlock(mm); +#ifdef CONFIG_PER_VMA_LOCK +done: +#endif if (likely(!(fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR))) return; diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init.c b/arch/x86/mm/init.c index 659b6c0f7910..3cdac0f0055d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c @@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ void __init poking_init(void) BUG_ON(!poking_mm); /* Xen PV guests need the PGD to be pinned. */ - paravirt_arch_dup_mmap(NULL, poking_mm); + paravirt_enter_mmap(poking_mm); /* * Randomize the poking address, but make sure that the following page diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c index 6453fbaedb08..aa7d279321ea 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c @@ -116,6 +116,11 @@ static void __ioremap_check_other(resource_size_t addr, struct ioremap_desc *des if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) return; + if (x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio(addr)) { + desc->flags |= IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED; + return; + } + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI)) return; diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c index 9c4d8dbcb129..e0b51c09109f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c @@ -513,10 +513,14 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) npages = (vaddr_end - vaddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT; /* - * The unused memory range was mapped decrypted, change the encryption - * attribute from decrypted to encrypted before freeing it. + * If the unused memory range was mapped decrypted, change the encryption + * attribute from decrypted to encrypted before freeing it. Base the + * re-encryption on the same condition used for the decryption in + * sme_postprocess_startup(). Higher level abstractions, such as + * CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT, aren't necessarily equivalent in a Hyper-V VM + * using vTOM, where sme_me_mask is always zero. */ - if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { + if (sme_me_mask) { r = set_memory_encrypted(vaddr, npages); if (r) { pr_warn("failed to free unused decrypted pages\n"); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c index 88cccd65029d..c6efcf559d88 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c @@ -600,7 +600,8 @@ void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) cmdline_ptr = (const char *)((u64)bp->hdr.cmd_line_ptr | ((u64)bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32)); - cmdline_find_option(cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg, buffer, sizeof(buffer)); + if (cmdline_find_option(cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < 0) + return; if (!strncmp(buffer, cmdline_on, sizeof(buffer))) sme_me_mask = me_mask; diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c index 46a00aa858b6..de10800cd4dd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c @@ -1073,11 +1073,15 @@ void untrack_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long pfn, } /* - * untrack_pfn_moved is called, while mremapping a pfnmap for a new region, - * with the old vma after its pfnmap page table has been removed. The new - * vma has a new pfnmap to the same pfn & cache type with VM_PAT set. + * untrack_pfn_clear is called if the following situation fits: + * + * 1) while mremapping a pfnmap for a new region, with the old vma after + * its pfnmap page table has been removed. The new vma has a new pfnmap + * to the same pfn & cache type with VM_PAT set. + * 2) while duplicating vm area, the new vma fails to copy the pgtable from + * old vma. */ -void untrack_pfn_moved(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +void untrack_pfn_clear(struct vm_area_struct *vma) { vm_flags_clear(vma, VM_PAT); } diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c index 356758b7d4b4..7159cf787613 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c @@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ within_inclusive(unsigned long addr, unsigned long start, unsigned long end) * take full advantage of the the limited (s32) immediate addressing range (2G) * of x86_64. * - * See Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.rst for more detail. + * See Documentation/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.rst for more detail. */ static inline unsigned long highmap_start_pfn(void) @@ -2175,9 +2175,6 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc) static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc) { - if (hv_is_isolation_supported()) - return hv_set_mem_host_visibility(addr, numpages, !enc); - if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) return __set_memory_enc_pgtable(addr, numpages, enc); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c index 724f98d0e10f..267acf27480a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c @@ -944,7 +944,7 @@ void flush_tlb_multi(const struct cpumask *cpumask, } /* - * See Documentation/x86/tlb.rst for details. We choose 33 + * See Documentation/arch/x86/tlb.rst for details. We choose 33 * because it is large enough to cover the vast majority (at * least 95%) of allocations, and is small enough that we are * confident it will not cause too much overhead. Each single |