diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'net/bluetooth/smp.c')
-rw-r--r-- | net/bluetooth/smp.c | 180 |
1 files changed, 136 insertions, 44 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index f06068072bdd..f886bcae1b7e 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -124,6 +124,24 @@ bool smp_irk_matches(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 irk[16], return !memcmp(bdaddr->b, hash, 3); } +int smp_generate_rpa(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa) +{ + int err; + + get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3); + + rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */ + rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */ + + err = smp_ah(tfm, irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b); + if (err < 0) + return err; + + BT_DBG("RPA %pMR", rpa); + + return 0; +} + static int smp_c1(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 k[16], u8 r[16], u8 preq[7], u8 pres[7], u8 _iat, bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16]) @@ -265,6 +283,9 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, if (test_bit(HCI_RPA_RESOLVING, &hdev->dev_flags)) remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; + if (test_bit(HCI_PRIVACY, &hdev->dev_flags)) + local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; + if (rsp == NULL) { req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability; req->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT; @@ -424,14 +445,9 @@ static void confirm_work(struct work_struct *work) /* Prevent mutual access to hdev->tfm_aes */ hci_dev_lock(hdev); - if (conn->hcon->out) - ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, - conn->hcon->src_type, &conn->hcon->src, - conn->hcon->dst_type, &conn->hcon->dst, res); - else - ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, - conn->hcon->dst_type, &conn->hcon->dst, - conn->hcon->src_type, &conn->hcon->src, res); + ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, + conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr, + conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr, res); hci_dev_unlock(hdev); @@ -471,14 +487,9 @@ static void random_work(struct work_struct *work) /* Prevent mutual access to hdev->tfm_aes */ hci_dev_lock(hdev); - if (hcon->out) - ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, - hcon->src_type, &hcon->src, - hcon->dst_type, &hcon->dst, res); - else - ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, - hcon->dst_type, &hcon->dst, - hcon->src_type, &hcon->src, res); + ret = smp_c1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp, + hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr, + hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, res); hci_dev_unlock(hdev); @@ -496,11 +507,9 @@ static void random_work(struct work_struct *work) } if (hcon->out) { - u8 stk[16], rand[8]; - __le16 ediv; - - memset(rand, 0, sizeof(rand)); - ediv = 0; + u8 stk[16]; + __le64 rand = 0; + __le16 ediv = 0; smp_s1(tfm, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, key); swap128(key, stk); @@ -516,11 +525,9 @@ static void random_work(struct work_struct *work) hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ediv, rand, stk); hcon->enc_key_size = smp->enc_key_size; } else { - u8 stk[16], r[16], rand[8]; - __le16 ediv; - - memset(rand, 0, sizeof(rand)); - ediv = 0; + u8 stk[16], r[16]; + __le64 rand = 0; + __le16 ediv = 0; swap128(smp->prnd, r); smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(r), r); @@ -542,6 +549,20 @@ error: smp_failure(conn, reason); } +static void smp_reencrypt(struct work_struct *work) +{ + struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan, + reencrypt.work); + struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn; + struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; + struct smp_ltk *ltk = smp->ltk; + + BT_DBG(""); + + hci_le_start_enc(hcon, ltk->ediv, ltk->rand, ltk->val); + hcon->enc_key_size = ltk->enc_size; +} + static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn) { struct smp_chan *smp; @@ -552,6 +573,7 @@ static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn) INIT_WORK(&smp->confirm, confirm_work); INIT_WORK(&smp->random, random_work); + INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->reencrypt, smp_reencrypt); smp->conn = conn; conn->smp_chan = smp; @@ -569,9 +591,29 @@ void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn) BUG_ON(!smp); + cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->reencrypt); + complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->smp_flags); mgmt_smp_complete(conn->hcon, complete); + /* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */ + if (!complete) { + if (smp->ltk) { + list_del(&smp->ltk->list); + kfree(smp->ltk); + } + + if (smp->slave_ltk) { + list_del(&smp->slave_ltk->list); + kfree(smp->slave_ltk); + } + + if (smp->remote_irk) { + list_del(&smp->remote_irk->list); + kfree(smp->remote_irk); + } + } + kfree(smp); conn->smp_chan = NULL; conn->hcon->smp_conn = NULL; @@ -927,6 +969,9 @@ static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY)) return 0; + /* Mark the information as received */ + smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY; + skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); hci_dev_lock(hdev); @@ -936,7 +981,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) rp->ediv, rp->rand); smp->ltk = ltk; if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)) - smp_distribute_keys(conn, 1); + smp_distribute_keys(conn); hci_dev_unlock(hdev); return 0; @@ -980,8 +1025,24 @@ static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)) return 0; + /* Mark the information as received */ + smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY; + skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info)); + /* Strictly speaking the Core Specification (4.1) allows sending + * an empty address which would force us to rely on just the IRK + * as "identity information". However, since such + * implementations are not known of and in order to not over + * complicate our implementation, simply pretend that we never + * received an IRK for such a device. + */ + if (!bacmp(&info->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY)) { + BT_ERR("Ignoring IRK with no identity address"); + smp_distribute_keys(conn); + return 0; + } + bacpy(&smp->id_addr, &info->bdaddr); smp->id_addr_type = info->addr_type; @@ -999,7 +1060,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, l2cap_conn_update_id_addr(hcon); - smp_distribute_keys(conn, 1); + smp_distribute_keys(conn); return 0; } @@ -1128,26 +1189,29 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn) } } -int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 force) +int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn) { struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp; struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan; + struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; + struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev; + bool ltk_encrypt; __u8 *keydist; - BT_DBG("conn %p force %d", conn, force); + BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); - if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags)) + if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags)) return 0; rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1]; /* The responder sends its keys first */ - if (!force && conn->hcon->out && (rsp->resp_key_dist & 0x07)) + if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & 0x07)) return 0; req = (void *) &smp->preq[1]; - if (conn->hcon->out) { + if (hcon->out) { keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist; *keydist &= req->init_key_dist; } else { @@ -1160,24 +1224,25 @@ int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 force) if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) { struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc; struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident; - struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; struct smp_ltk *ltk; u8 authenticated; __le16 ediv; + __le64 rand; get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, sizeof(enc.ltk)); get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv)); - get_random_bytes(ident.rand, sizeof(ident.rand)); + get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand)); smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc); authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH; - ltk = hci_add_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, + ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type, HCI_SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk, - smp->enc_key_size, ediv, ident.rand); + smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand); smp->slave_ltk = ltk; ident.ediv = ediv; + ident.rand = rand; smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident); @@ -1188,14 +1253,18 @@ int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 force) struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo; struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo; - /* Send a dummy key */ - get_random_bytes(idinfo.irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk)); + memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk)); smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo); - /* Just public address */ - memset(&addrinfo, 0, sizeof(addrinfo)); - bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &conn->hcon->src); + /* The hci_conn contains the local identity address + * after the connection has been established. + * + * This is true even when the connection has been + * established using a resolvable random address. + */ + bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src); + addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type; smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo), &addrinfo); @@ -1214,8 +1283,31 @@ int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 force) *keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN; } - if (conn->hcon->out || force || !(rsp->init_key_dist & 0x07)) { - clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags); + /* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */ + if ((smp->remote_key_dist & 0x07)) + return 0; + + /* Check if we should try to re-encrypt the link with the LTK. + * SMP_FLAG_LTK_ENCRYPT flag is used to track whether we've + * already tried this (in which case we shouldn't try again). + * + * The request will trigger an encryption key refresh event + * which will cause a call to auth_cfm and eventually lead to + * l2cap_core.c calling this smp_distribute_keys function again + * and thereby completing the process. + */ + if (smp->ltk) + ltk_encrypt = !test_and_set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LTK_ENCRYPT, + &smp->smp_flags); + else + ltk_encrypt = false; + + /* Re-encrypt the link with LTK if possible */ + if (ltk_encrypt && hcon->out) { + queue_delayed_work(hdev->req_workqueue, &smp->reencrypt, + SMP_REENCRYPT_TIMEOUT); + } else { + clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags); cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer); set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->smp_flags); smp_notify_keys(conn); |