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2023-08-31Merge tag 'x86_shstk_for_6.6-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+8
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 shadow stack support from Dave Hansen: "This is the long awaited x86 shadow stack support, part of Intel's Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET). CET consists of two related security features: shadow stacks and indirect branch tracking. This series implements just the shadow stack part of this feature, and just for userspace. The main use case for shadow stack is providing protection against return oriented programming attacks. It works by maintaining a secondary (shadow) stack using a special memory type that has protections against modification. When executing a CALL instruction, the processor pushes the return address to both the normal stack and to the special permission shadow stack. Upon RET, the processor pops the shadow stack copy and compares it to the normal stack copy. For more information, refer to the links below for the earlier versions of this patch set" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220130211838.8382-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230613001108.3040476-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/ * tag 'x86_shstk_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (47 commits) x86/shstk: Change order of __user in type x86/ibt: Convert IBT selftest to asm x86/shstk: Don't retry vm_munmap() on -EINTR x86/kbuild: Fix Documentation/ reference x86/shstk: Move arch detail comment out of core mm x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall x86/shstk: Check that signal frame is shadow stack mem x86/shstk: Check that SSP is aligned on sigreturn x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support ...
2023-08-29Merge tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2023-08-28-22-48' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-14/+3
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Pull non-MM updates from Andrew Morton: - An extensive rework of kexec and crash Kconfig from Eric DeVolder ("refactor Kconfig to consolidate KEXEC and CRASH options") - kernel.h slimming work from Andy Shevchenko ("kernel.h: Split out a couple of macros to args.h") - gdb feature work from Kuan-Ying Lee ("Add GDB memory helper commands") - vsprintf inclusion rationalization from Andy Shevchenko ("lib/vsprintf: Rework header inclusions") - Switch the handling of kdump from a udev scheme to in-kernel handling, by Eric DeVolder ("crash: Kernel handling of CPU and memory hot un/plug") - Many singleton patches to various parts of the tree * tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2023-08-28-22-48' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (81 commits) document while_each_thread(), change first_tid() to use for_each_thread() drivers/char/mem.c: shrink character device's devlist[] array x86/crash: optimize CPU changes crash: change crash_prepare_elf64_headers() to for_each_possible_cpu() crash: hotplug support for kexec_load() x86/crash: add x86 crash hotplug support crash: memory and CPU hotplug sysfs attributes kexec: exclude elfcorehdr from the segment digest crash: add generic infrastructure for crash hotplug support crash: move a few code bits to setup support of crash hotplug kstrtox: consistently use _tolower() kill do_each_thread() nilfs2: fix WARNING in mark_buffer_dirty due to discarded buffer reuse scripts/bloat-o-meter: count weak symbol sizes treewide: drop CONFIG_EMBEDDED lockdep: fix static memory detection even more lib/vsprintf: declare no_hash_pointers in sprintf.h lib/vsprintf: split out sprintf() and friends kernel/fork: stop playing lockless games for exe_file replacement adfs: delete unused "union adfs_dirtail" definition ...
2023-08-18arch: enable HAS_LTO_CLANG with KASAN and KCOVJakob Koschel1-1/+3
Both KASAN and KCOV had issues with LTO_CLANG if DEBUG_INFO is enabled. With LTO inlinable function calls are required to have debug info if they are inlined into a function that has debug info. Starting with LLVM 17 this will be fixed ([1],[2]) and enabling LTO with KASAN/KCOV and DEBUG_INFO doesn't cause linker errors anymore. Link: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/913f7e93dac67ecff47bade862ba42f27cb68ca9 Link: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/4a8b1249306ff11f229320abdeadf0c215a00400 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230717-enable-kasan-lto1-v3-1-650e1efc19d1@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakob Koschel <jkl820.git@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-08-18kexec: consolidate kexec and crash options into kernel/Kconfig.kexecEric DeVolder1-13/+0
Patch series "refactor Kconfig to consolidate KEXEC and CRASH options", v6. The Kconfig is refactored to consolidate KEXEC and CRASH options from various arch/<arch>/Kconfig files into new file kernel/Kconfig.kexec. The Kconfig.kexec is now a submenu titled "Kexec and crash features" located under "General Setup". The following options are impacted: - KEXEC - KEXEC_FILE - KEXEC_SIG - KEXEC_SIG_FORCE - KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG - KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG - KEXEC_JUMP - CRASH_DUMP Over time, these options have been copied between Kconfig files and are very similar to one another, but with slight differences. The following architectures are impacted by the refactor (because of use of one or more KEXEC/CRASH options): - arm - arm64 - ia64 - loongarch - m68k - mips - parisc - powerpc - riscv - s390 - sh - x86 More information: In the patch series "crash: Kernel handling of CPU and memory hot un/plug" https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230503224145.7405-1-eric.devolder@oracle.com/ the new kernel feature introduces the config option CRASH_HOTPLUG. In reviewing, Thomas Gleixner requested that the new config option not be placed in x86 Kconfig. Rather the option needs a generic/common home. To Thomas' point, the KEXEC and CRASH options have largely been duplicated in the various arch/<arch>/Kconfig files, with minor differences. This kind of proliferation is to be avoid/stopped. https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/875y91yv63.ffs@tglx/ To that end, I have refactored the arch Kconfigs so as to consolidate the various KEXEC and CRASH options. Generally speaking, this work has the following themes: - KEXEC and CRASH options are moved into new file kernel/Kconfig.kexec - These items from arch/Kconfig: CRASH_CORE KEXEC_CORE KEXEC_ELF HAVE_IMA_KEXEC - These items from arch/x86/Kconfig form the common options: KEXEC KEXEC_FILE KEXEC_SIG KEXEC_SIG_FORCE KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG KEXEC_JUMP CRASH_DUMP - These items from arch/arm64/Kconfig form the common options: KEXEC_IMAGE_VERIFY_SIG - The crash hotplug series appends CRASH_HOTPLUG to Kconfig.kexec - The Kconfig.kexec is now a submenu titled "Kexec and crash features" and is now listed in "General Setup" submenu from init/Kconfig. - To control the common options, each has a new ARCH_SUPPORTS_<option> option. These gateway options determine whether the common options options are valid for the architecture. - To account for the slight differences in the original architecture coding of the common options, each now has a corresponding ARCH_SELECTS_<option> which are used to elicit the same side effects as the original arch/<arch>/Kconfig files for KEXEC and CRASH options. An example, 'make menuconfig' illustrating the submenu: > General setup > Kexec and crash features [*] Enable kexec system call [*] Enable kexec file based system call [*] Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall [ ] Require a valid signature in kexec_file_load() syscall [ ] Enable bzImage signature verification support [*] kexec jump [*] kernel crash dumps [*] Update the crash elfcorehdr on system configuration changes In the process of consolidating the common options, I encountered slight differences in the coding of these options in several of the architectures. As a result, I settled on the following solution: - Each of the common options has a 'depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_<option>' statement. For example, the KEXEC_FILE option has a 'depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_FILE' statement. This approach is needed on all common options so as to prevent options from appearing for architectures which previously did not allow/enable them. For example, arm supports KEXEC but not KEXEC_FILE. The arch/arm/Kconfig does not provide ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_FILE and so KEXEC_FILE and related options are not available to arm. - The boolean ARCH_SUPPORTS_<option> in effect allows the arch to determine when the feature is allowed. Archs which don't have the feature simply do not provide the corresponding ARCH_SUPPORTS_<option>. For each arch, where there previously were KEXEC and/or CRASH options, these have been replaced with the corresponding boolean ARCH_SUPPORTS_<option>, and an appropriate def_bool statement. For example, if the arch supports KEXEC_FILE, then the ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_FILE simply has a 'def_bool y'. This permits the KEXEC_FILE option to be available. If the arch has a 'depends on' statement in its original coding of the option, then that expression becomes part of the def_bool expression. For example, arm64 had: config KEXEC depends on PM_SLEEP_SMP and in this solution, this converts to: config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC def_bool PM_SLEEP_SMP - In order to account for the architecture differences in the coding for the common options, the ARCH_SELECTS_<option> in the arch/<arch>/Kconfig is used. This option has a 'depends on <option>' statement to couple it to the main option, and from there can insert the differences from the common option and the arch original coding of that option. For example, a few archs enable CRYPTO and CRYTPO_SHA256 for KEXEC_FILE. These require a ARCH_SELECTS_KEXEC_FILE and 'select CRYPTO' and 'select CRYPTO_SHA256' statements. Illustrating the option relationships: For each of the common KEXEC and CRASH options: ARCH_SUPPORTS_<option> <- <option> <- ARCH_SELECTS_<option> <option> # in Kconfig.kexec ARCH_SUPPORTS_<option> # in arch/<arch>/Kconfig, as needed ARCH_SELECTS_<option> # in arch/<arch>/Kconfig, as needed For example, KEXEC: ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC <- KEXEC <- ARCH_SELECTS_KEXEC KEXEC # in Kconfig.kexec ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC # in arch/<arch>/Kconfig, as needed ARCH_SELECTS_KEXEC # in arch/<arch>/Kconfig, as needed To summarize, the ARCH_SUPPORTS_<option> permits the <option> to be enabled, and the ARCH_SELECTS_<option> handles side effects (ie. select statements). Examples: A few examples to show the new strategy in action: ===== x86 (minus the help section) ===== Original: config KEXEC bool "kexec system call" select KEXEC_CORE config KEXEC_FILE bool "kexec file based system call" select KEXEC_CORE select HAVE_IMA_KEXEC if IMA depends on X86_64 depends on CRYPTO=y depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY def_bool KEXEC_FILE config KEXEC_SIG bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall" depends on KEXEC_FILE config KEXEC_SIG_FORCE bool "Require a valid signature in kexec_file_load() syscall" depends on KEXEC_SIG config KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG bool "Enable bzImage signature verification support" depends on KEXEC_SIG depends on SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING config CRASH_DUMP bool "kernel crash dumps" depends on X86_64 || (X86_32 && HIGHMEM) config KEXEC_JUMP bool "kexec jump" depends on KEXEC && HIBERNATION help becomes... New: config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC def_bool y config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_FILE def_bool X86_64 && CRYPTO && CRYPTO_SHA256 config ARCH_SELECTS_KEXEC_FILE def_bool y depends on KEXEC_FILE select HAVE_IMA_KEXEC if IMA config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_PURGATORY def_bool KEXEC_FILE config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_SIG def_bool y config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_SIG_FORCE def_bool y config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG def_bool y config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_JUMP def_bool y config ARCH_SUPPORTS_CRASH_DUMP def_bool X86_64 || (X86_32 && HIGHMEM) ===== powerpc (minus the help section) ===== Original: config KEXEC bool "kexec system call" depends on PPC_BOOK3S || PPC_E500 || (44x && !SMP) select KEXEC_CORE config KEXEC_FILE bool "kexec file based system call" select KEXEC_CORE select HAVE_IMA_KEXEC if IMA select KEXEC_ELF depends on PPC64 depends on CRYPTO=y depends on CRYPTO_SHA256=y config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY def_bool KEXEC_FILE config CRASH_DUMP bool "Build a dump capture kernel" depends on PPC64 || PPC_BOOK3S_32 || PPC_85xx || (44x && !SMP) select RELOCATABLE if PPC64 || 44x || PPC_85xx becomes... New: config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC def_bool PPC_BOOK3S || PPC_E500 || (44x && !SMP) config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_FILE def_bool PPC64 && CRYPTO=y && CRYPTO_SHA256=y config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC_PURGATORY def_bool KEXEC_FILE config ARCH_SELECTS_KEXEC_FILE def_bool y depends on KEXEC_FILE select KEXEC_ELF select HAVE_IMA_KEXEC if IMA config ARCH_SUPPORTS_CRASH_DUMP def_bool PPC64 || PPC_BOOK3S_32 || PPC_85xx || (44x && !SMP) config ARCH_SELECTS_CRASH_DUMP def_bool y depends on CRASH_DUMP select RELOCATABLE if PPC64 || 44x || PPC_85xx Testing Approach and Results There are 388 config files in the arch/<arch>/configs directories. For each of these config files, a .config is generated both before and after this Kconfig series, and checked for equivalence. This approach allows for a rather rapid check of all architectures and a wide variety of configs wrt/ KEXEC and CRASH, and avoids requiring compiling for all architectures and running kernels and run-time testing. For each config file, the olddefconfig, allnoconfig and allyesconfig targets are utilized. In testing the randconfig has revealed problems as well, but is not used in the before and after equivalence check since one can not generate the "same" .config for before and after, even if using the same KCONFIG_SEED since the option list is different. As such, the following script steps compare the before and after of 'make olddefconfig'. The new symbols introduced by this series are filtered out, but otherwise the config files are PASS only if they were equivalent, and FAIL otherwise. The script performs the test by doing the following: # Obtain the "golden" .config output for given config file # Reset test sandbox git checkout master git branch -D test_Kconfig git checkout -B test_Kconfig master make distclean # Write out updated config cp -f <config file> .config make ARCH=<arch> olddefconfig # Track each item in .config, LHSB is "golden" scoreboard .config # Obtain the "changed" .config output for given config file # Reset test sandbox make distclean # Apply this Kconfig series git am <this Kconfig series> # Write out updated config cp -f <config file> .config make ARCH=<arch> olddefconfig # Track each item in .config, RHSB is "changed" scoreboard .config # Determine test result # Filter-out new symbols introduced by this series # Filter-out symbol=n which not in either scoreboard # Compare LHSB "golden" and RHSB "changed" scoreboards and issue PASS/FAIL The script was instrumental during the refactoring of Kconfig as it continually revealed problems. The end result being that the solution presented in this series passes all configs as checked by the script, with the following exceptions: - arch/ia64/configs/zx1_config with olddefconfig This config file has: # CONFIG_KEXEC is not set CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP=y and this refactor now couples KEXEC to CRASH_DUMP, so it is not possible to enable CRASH_DUMP without KEXEC. - arch/sh/configs/* with allyesconfig The arch/sh/Kconfig codes CRASH_DUMP as dependent upon BROKEN_ON_MMU (which clearly is not meant to be set). This symbol is not provided but with the allyesconfig it is set to yes which enables CRASH_DUMP. But KEXEC is coded as dependent upon MMU, and is set to no in arch/sh/mm/Kconfig, so KEXEC is not enabled. This refactor now couples KEXEC to CRASH_DUMP, so it is not possible to enable CRASH_DUMP without KEXEC. While the above exceptions are not equivalent to their original, the config file produced is valid (and in fact better wrt/ CRASH_DUMP handling). This patch (of 14) The config options for kexec and crash features are consolidated into new file kernel/Kconfig.kexec. Under the "General Setup" submenu is a new submenu "Kexec and crash handling". All the kexec and crash options that were once in the arch-dependent submenu "Processor type and features" are now consolidated in the new submenu. The following options are impacted: - KEXEC - KEXEC_FILE - KEXEC_SIG - KEXEC_SIG_FORCE - KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG - KEXEC_JUMP - CRASH_DUMP The three main options are KEXEC, KEXEC_FILE and CRASH_DUMP. Architectures specify support of certain KEXEC and CRASH features with similarly named new ARCH_SUPPORTS_<option> config options. Architectures can utilize the new ARCH_SELECTS_<option> config options to specify additional components when <option> is enabled. To summarize, the ARCH_SUPPORTS_<option> permits the <option> to be enabled, and the ARCH_SELECTS_<option> handles side effects (ie. select statements). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230712161545.87870-1-eric.devolder@oracle.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230712161545.87870-2-eric.devolder@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Eric DeVolder <eric.devolder@oracle.com> Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Cc. "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> # for x86 Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de> Cc: Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@canonical.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Cc: Marc Aurèle La France <tsi@tuyoix.net> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org> Cc: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com> Cc: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Cc: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Cc: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com> Cc: Zi Yan <ziy@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-07-28cpu/SMT: Create topology_smt_thread_allowed()Michael Ellerman1-0/+3
Some architectures allows partial SMT states, i.e. when not all SMT threads are brought online. To support that, add an architecture helper which checks whether a given CPU is allowed to be brought online depending on how many SMT threads are currently enabled. Since this is only applicable to architecture supporting partial SMT, only these architectures should select the new configuration variable CONFIG_SMT_NUM_THREADS_DYNAMIC. For the other architectures, not supporting the partial SMT states, there is no need to define topology_cpu_smt_allowed(), the generic code assumed that all the threads are allowed or only the primary ones. Call the helper from cpu_smt_enable(), and cpu_smt_allowed() when SMT is enabled, to check if the particular thread should be onlined. Notably, also call it from cpu_smt_disable() if CPU_SMT_ENABLED, to allow offlining some threads to move from a higher to lower number of threads online. [ ldufour: Slightly reword the commit's description ] [ ldufour: Introduce CONFIG_SMT_NUM_THREADS_DYNAMIC ] Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Signed-off-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230705145143.40545-7-ldufour@linux.ibm.com
2023-07-11mm: Rename arch pte_mkwrite()'s to pte_mkwrite_novma()Rick Edgecombe1-0/+8
The x86 Shadow stack feature includes a new type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function properly. One of these unusual properties is that shadow stack memory is writable, but only in limited ways. These limits are applied via a specific PTE bit combination. Nevertheless, the memory is writable, and core mm code will need to apply the writable permissions in the typical paths that call pte_mkwrite(). The goal is to make pte_mkwrite() take a VMA, so that the x86 implementation of it can know whether to create regular writable or shadow stack mappings. But there are a couple of challenges to this. Modifying the signatures of each arch pte_mkwrite() implementation would be error prone because some are generated with macros and would need to be re-implemented. Also, some pte_mkwrite() callers operate on kernel memory without a VMA. So this can be done in a three step process. First pte_mkwrite() can be renamed to pte_mkwrite_novma() in each arch, with a generic pte_mkwrite() added that just calls pte_mkwrite_novma(). Next callers without a VMA can be moved to pte_mkwrite_novma(). And lastly, pte_mkwrite() and all callers can be changed to take/pass a VMA. Start the process by renaming pte_mkwrite() to pte_mkwrite_novma() and adding the pte_mkwrite() wrapper in linux/pgtable.h. Apply the same pattern for pmd_mkwrite(). Since not all archs have a pmd_mkwrite_novma(), create a new arch config HAS_HUGE_PAGE that can be used to tell if pmd_mkwrite() should be defined. Otherwise in the !HAS_HUGE_PAGE cases the compiler would not be able to find pmd_mkwrite_novma(). No functional change. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wiZjSu7c9sFYZb3q04108stgHff2wfbokGCCgW7riz+8Q@mail.gmail.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-2-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
2023-06-28Merge tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2023-06-24-19-23' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-11/+5
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Pull non-mm updates from Andrew Morton: - Arnd Bergmann has fixed a bunch of -Wmissing-prototypes in top-level directories - Douglas Anderson has added a new "buddy" mode to the hardlockup detector. It permits the detector to work on architectures which cannot provide the required interrupts, by having CPUs periodically perform checks on other CPUs - Zhen Lei has enhanced kexec's ability to support two crash regions - Petr Mladek has done a lot of cleanup on the hard lockup detector's Kconfig entries - And the usual bunch of singleton patches in various places * tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2023-06-24-19-23' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (72 commits) kernel/time/posix-stubs.c: remove duplicated include ocfs2: remove redundant assignment to variable bit_off watchdog/hardlockup: fix typo in config HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PREFER_BUDDY powerpc: move arch_trigger_cpumask_backtrace from nmi.h to irq.h devres: show which resource was invalid in __devm_ioremap_resource() watchdog/hardlockup: define HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH watchdog/sparc64: define HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_SPARC64 watchdog/hardlockup: make HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG sparc64-specific watchdog/hardlockup: declare arch_touch_nmi_watchdog() only in linux/nmi.h watchdog/hardlockup: make the config checks more straightforward watchdog/hardlockup: sort hardlockup detector related config values a logical way watchdog/hardlockup: move SMP barriers from common code to buddy code watchdog/buddy: simplify the dependency for HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PREFER_BUDDY watchdog/buddy: don't copy the cpumask in watchdog_next_cpu() watchdog/buddy: cleanup how watchdog_buddy_check_hardlockup() is called watchdog/hardlockup: remove softlockup comment in touch_nmi_watchdog() watchdog/hardlockup: in watchdog_hardlockup_check() use cpumask_copy() watchdog/hardlockup: don't use raw_cpu_ptr() in watchdog_hardlockup_kick() watchdog/hardlockup: HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG must implement watchdog_hardlockup_probe() watchdog/hardlockup: keep kernel.nmi_watchdog sysctl as 0444 if probe fails ...
2023-06-27Merge tag 'landlock-6.5-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-7/+0
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux Pull landlock updates from Mickaël Salaün: "Add support for Landlock to UML. To do this, this fixes the way hostfs manages inodes according to the underlying filesystem [1]. They are now properly handled as for other filesystems, which enables Landlock support (and probably other features). This also extends Landlock's tests with 6 pseudo filesystems, including hostfs" [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230612191430.339153-1-mic@digikod.net/ * tag 'landlock-6.5-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux: selftests/landlock: Add hostfs tests selftests/landlock: Add tests for pseudo filesystems selftests/landlock: Make mounts configurable selftests/landlock: Add supports_filesystem() helper selftests/landlock: Don't create useless file layouts hostfs: Fix ephemeral inodes
2023-06-26Merge tag 'smp-core-2023-06-26' of ↵Linus Torvalds1-0/+23
ssh://gitolite.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull SMP updates from Thomas Gleixner: "A large update for SMP management: - Parallel CPU bringup The reason why people are interested in parallel bringup is to shorten the (kexec) reboot time of cloud servers to reduce the downtime of the VM tenants. The current fully serialized bringup does the following per AP: 1) Prepare callbacks (allocate, intialize, create threads) 2) Kick the AP alive (e.g. INIT/SIPI on x86) 3) Wait for the AP to report alive state 4) Let the AP continue through the atomic bringup 5) Let the AP run the threaded bringup to full online state There are two significant delays: #3 The time for an AP to report alive state in start_secondary() on x86 has been measured in the range between 350us and 3.5ms depending on vendor and CPU type, BIOS microcode size etc. #4 The atomic bringup does the microcode update. This has been measured to take up to ~8ms on the primary threads depending on the microcode patch size to apply. On a two socket SKL server with 56 cores (112 threads) the boot CPU spends on current mainline about 800ms busy waiting for the APs to come up and apply microcode. That's more than 80% of the actual onlining procedure. This can be reduced significantly by splitting the bringup mechanism into two parts: 1) Run the prepare callbacks and kick the AP alive for each AP which needs to be brought up. The APs wake up, do their firmware initialization and run the low level kernel startup code including microcode loading in parallel up to the first synchronization point. (#1 and #2 above) 2) Run the rest of the bringup code strictly serialized per CPU (#3 - #5 above) as it's done today. Parallelizing that stage of the CPU bringup might be possible in theory, but it's questionable whether required surgery would be justified for a pretty small gain. If the system is large enough the first AP is already waiting at the first synchronization point when the boot CPU finished the wake-up of the last AP. That reduces the AP bringup time on that SKL from ~800ms to ~80ms, i.e. by a factor ~10x. The actual gain varies wildly depending on the system, CPU, microcode patch size and other factors. There are some opportunities to reduce the overhead further, but that needs some deep surgery in the x86 CPU bringup code. For now this is only enabled on x86, but the core functionality obviously works for all SMP capable architectures. - Enhancements for SMP function call tracing so it is possible to locate the scheduling and the actual execution points. That allows to measure IPI delivery time precisely" * tag 'smp-core-2023-06-26' of ssh://gitolite.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (45 commits) trace,smp: Add tracepoints for scheduling remotelly called functions trace,smp: Add tracepoints around remotelly called functions MAINTAINERS: Add CPU HOTPLUG entry x86/smpboot: Fix the parallel bringup decision x86/realmode: Make stack lock work in trampoline_compat() x86/smp: Initialize cpu_primary_thread_mask late cpu/hotplug: Fix off by one in cpuhp_bringup_mask() x86/apic: Fix use of X{,2}APIC_ENABLE in asm with older binutils x86/smpboot/64: Implement arch_cpuhp_init_parallel_bringup() and enable it x86/smpboot: Support parallel startup of secondary CPUs x86/smpboot: Implement a bit spinlock to protect the realmode stack x86/apic: Save the APIC virtual base address cpu/hotplug: Allow "parallel" bringup up to CPUHP_BP_KICK_AP_STATE x86/apic: Provide cpu_primary_thread mask x86/smpboot: Enable split CPU startup cpu/hotplug: Provide a split up CPUHP_BRINGUP mechanism cpu/hotplug: Reset task stack state in _cpu_up() cpu/hotplug: Remove unused state functions riscv: Switch to hotplug core state synchronization parisc: Switch to hotplug core state synchronization ...
2023-06-19watchdog/hardlockup: make HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG sparc64-specificPetr Mladek1-18/+0
There are several hardlockup detector implementations and several Kconfig values which allow selection and build of the preferred one. CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR was introduced by the commit 23637d477c1f53acb ("lockup_detector: Introduce CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR") in v2.6.36. It was a preparation step for introducing the new generic perf hardlockup detector. The existing arch-specific variants did not support the to-be-created generic build configurations, sysctl interface, etc. This distinction was made explicit by the commit 4a7863cc2eb5f98 ("x86, nmi_watchdog: Remove ARCH_HAS_NMI_WATCHDOG and rely on CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR") in v2.6.38. CONFIG_HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG was introduced by the commit d314d74c695f967e105 ("nmi watchdog: do not use cpp symbol in Kconfig") in v3.4-rc1. It replaced the above mentioned ARCH_HAS_NMI_WATCHDOG. At that time, it was still used by three architectures, namely blackfin, mn10300, and sparc. The support for blackfin and mn10300 architectures has been completely dropped some time ago. And sparc is the only architecture with the historic NMI watchdog at the moment. And the old sparc implementation is really special. It is always built on sparc64. It used to be always enabled until the commit 7a5c8b57cec93196b ("sparc: implement watchdog_nmi_enable and watchdog_nmi_disable") added in v4.10-rc1. There are only few locations where the sparc64 NMI watchdog interacts with the generic hardlockup detectors code: + implements arch_touch_nmi_watchdog() which is called from the generic touch_nmi_watchdog() + implements watchdog_hardlockup_enable()/disable() to support /proc/sys/kernel/nmi_watchdog + is always preferred over other generic watchdogs, see CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR + includes asm/nmi.h into linux/nmi.h because some sparc-specific functions are needed in sparc-specific code which includes only linux/nmi.h. The situation became more complicated after the commit 05a4a95279311c3 ("kernel/watchdog: split up config options") and commit 2104180a53698df5 ("powerpc/64s: implement arch-specific hardlockup watchdog") in v4.13-rc1. They introduced HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH. It was used for powerpc specific hardlockup detector. It was compatible with the perf one regarding the general boot, sysctl, and programming interfaces. HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH was defined as a superset of HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG. It made some sense because all arch-specific detectors had some common requirements, namely: + implemented arch_touch_nmi_watchdog() + included asm/nmi.h into linux/nmi.h + defined the default value for /proc/sys/kernel/nmi_watchdog But it actually has made things pretty complicated when the generic buddy hardlockup detector was added. Before the generic perf detector was newer supported together with an arch-specific one. But the buddy detector could work on any SMP system. It means that an architecture could support both the arch-specific and buddy detector. As a result, there are few tricky dependencies. For example, CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR depends on: ((HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF || HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_BUDDY) && !HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG) || HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH The problem is that the very special sparc implementation is defined as: HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG && !HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH Another problem is that the meaning of HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG is far from clear without reading understanding the history. Make the logic less tricky and more self-explanatory by making HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG specific for the sparc64 implementation. And rename it to HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_SPARC64. Note that HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PREFER_BUDDY, HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF, and HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_BUDDY may conflict only with HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH. They depend on HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR and it is not longer enabled when HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG is set. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230616150618.6073-5-pmladek@suse.com Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-06-19watchdog/hardlockup: make the config checks more straightforwardPetr Mladek1-6/+17
There are four possible variants of hardlockup detectors: + buddy: available when SMP is set. + perf: available when HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF is set. + arch-specific: available when HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH is set. + sparc64 special variant: available when HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG is set and HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH is not set. The check for the sparc64 variant is more complicated because HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG is used to #ifdef code used by both arch-specific and sparc64 specific variant. Therefore it is automatically selected with HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH. This complexity is partly hidden in HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_NON_ARCH. It reduces the size of some checks but it makes them harder to follow. Finally, the other temporary variable HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_NON_ARCH is used to re-compute HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF/BUDDY when the global HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR switch is enabled/disabled. Make the logic more straightforward by the following changes: + Better explain the role of HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH and HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG in comments. + Add HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_BUDDY so that there is separate HAVE_* for all four hardlockup detector variants. Use it in the other conditions instead of SMP. It makes it clear that it is about the buddy detector. + Open code HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_NON_ARCH in HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR and HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PREFER_BUDDY. It helps to understand the conditions between the four hardlockup detector variants. + Define the exact conditions when HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF/BUDDY can be enabled. It explains the dependency on the other hardlockup detector variants. Also it allows to remove HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_NON_ARCH by using "imply". It triggers re-evaluating HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF/BUDDY when the global HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR switch is changed. + Add dependency on HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR so that the affected variables disappear when the hardlockup detectors are disabled. Another nice side effect is that HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PREFER_BUDDY value is not preserved when the global switch is disabled. The user has to make the decision again when it gets re-enabled. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230616150618.6073-3-pmladek@suse.com Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-06-19watchdog/hardlockup: HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG must implement ↵Douglas Anderson1-1/+2
watchdog_hardlockup_probe() Right now there is one arch (sparc64) that selects HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG without selecting HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH. Because of that one architecture, we have some special case code in the watchdog core to handle the fact that watchdog_hardlockup_probe() isn't implemented. Let's implement watchdog_hardlockup_probe() for sparc64 and get rid of the special case. As a side effect of doing this, code inspection tells us that we could fix a minor bug where the system won't properly realize that NMI watchdogs are disabled. Specifically, on powerpc if CONFIG_PPC_WATCHDOG is turned off the arch might still select CONFIG_HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH which selects CONFIG_HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG. Since CONFIG_PPC_WATCHDOG was off then nothing will override the "weak" watchdog_hardlockup_probe() and we'll fallback to looking at CONFIG_HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230526184139.2.Ic6ebbf307ca0efe91f08ce2c1eb4a037ba6b0700@changeid Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org> Suggested-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-06-16init: Provide arch_cpu_finalize_init()Thomas Gleixner1-0/+3
check_bugs() has become a dumping ground for all sorts of activities to finalize the CPU initialization before running the rest of the init code. Most are empty, a few do actual bug checks, some do alternative patching and some cobble a CPU advertisement string together.... Aside of that the current implementation requires duplicated function declaration and mostly empty header files for them. Provide a new function arch_cpu_finalize_init(). Provide a generic declaration if CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT is selected and a stub inline otherwise. This requires a temporary #ifdef in start_kernel() which will be removed along with check_bugs() once the architectures are converted over. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230613224544.957805717@linutronix.de
2023-06-12hostfs: Fix ephemeral inodesMickaël Salaün1-7/+0
hostfs creates a new inode for each opened or created file, which created useless inode allocations and forbade identifying a host file with a kernel inode. Fix this uncommon filesystem behavior by tying kernel inodes to host file's inode and device IDs. Even if the host filesystem inodes may be recycled, this cannot happen while a file referencing it is opened, which is the case with hostfs. It should be noted that hostfs inode IDs may not be unique for the same hostfs superblock because multiple host's (backed) superblocks may be used. Delete inodes when dropping them to force backed host's file descriptors closing. This enables to entirely remove ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES, and then makes Landlock fully supported by UML. This is very useful for testing changes. These changes also factor out and simplify some helpers thanks to the new hostfs_inode_update() and the hostfs_iget() revamp: read_name(), hostfs_create(), hostfs_lookup(), hostfs_mknod(), and hostfs_fill_sb_common(). A following commit with new Landlock tests check this new hostfs inode consistency. Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230612191430.339153-2-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
2023-05-15cpu/hotplug: Allow "parallel" bringup up to CPUHP_BP_KICK_AP_STATEThomas Gleixner1-0/+4
There is often significant latency in the early stages of CPU bringup, and time is wasted by waking each CPU (e.g. with SIPI/INIT/INIT on x86) and then waiting for it to respond before moving on to the next. Allow a platform to enable parallel setup which brings all to be onlined CPUs up to the CPUHP_BP_KICK_AP state. While this state advancement on the control CPU (BP) is single-threaded the important part is the last state CPUHP_BP_KICK_AP which wakes the to be onlined CPUs up. This allows the CPUs to run up to the first sychronization point cpuhp_ap_sync_alive() where they wait for the control CPU to release them one by one for the full onlining procedure. This parallelism depends on the CPU hotplug core sync mechanism which ensures that the parallel brought up CPUs wait for release before touching any state which would make the CPU visible to anything outside the hotplug control mechanism. To handle the SMT constraints of X86 correctly the bringup happens in two iterations when CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT is enabled. The control CPU brings up the primary SMT threads of each core first, which can load the microcode without the need to rendevouz with the thread siblings. Once that's completed it brings up the secondary SMT threads. Co-developed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Tested-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name> Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc Tested-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@igalia.com> # Steam Deck Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230512205257.240231377@linutronix.de
2023-05-15cpu/hotplug: Provide a split up CPUHP_BRINGUP mechanismThomas Gleixner1-0/+4
The bring up logic of a to be onlined CPU consists of several parts, which are considered to be a single hotplug state: 1) Control CPU issues the wake-up 2) To be onlined CPU starts up, does the minimal initialization, reports to be alive and waits for release into the complete bring-up. 3) Control CPU waits for the alive report and releases the upcoming CPU for the complete bring-up. Allow to split this into two states: 1) Control CPU issues the wake-up After that the to be onlined CPU starts up, does the minimal initialization, reports to be alive and waits for release into the full bring-up. As this can run after the control CPU dropped the hotplug locks the code which is executed on the AP before it reports alive has to be carefully audited to not violate any of the hotplug constraints, especially not modifying any of the various cpumasks. This is really only meant to avoid waiting for the AP to react on the wake-up. Of course an architecture can move strict CPU related setup functionality, e.g. microcode loading, with care before the synchronization point to save further pointless waiting time. 2) Control CPU waits for the alive report and releases the upcoming CPU for the complete bring-up. This allows that the two states can be split up to run all to be onlined CPUs up to state #1 on the control CPU and then at a later point run state #2. This spares some of the latencies of the full serialized per CPU bringup by avoiding the per CPU wakeup/wait serialization. The assumption is that the first AP already waits when the last AP has been woken up. This obvioulsy depends on the hardware latencies and depending on the timings this might still not completely eliminate all wait scenarios. This split is just a preparatory step for enabling the parallel bringup later. The boot time bringup is still fully serialized. It has a separate config switch so that architectures which want to support parallel bringup can test the split of the CPUHP_BRINGUG step separately. To enable this the architecture must support the CPU hotplug core sync mechanism and has to be audited that there are no implicit hotplug state dependencies which require a fully serialized bringup. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Tested-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name> Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc Tested-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@igalia.com> # Steam Deck Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230512205257.080801387@linutronix.de
2023-05-15cpu/hotplug: Add CPU state tracking and synchronizationThomas Gleixner1-0/+15
The CPU state tracking and synchronization mechanism in smpboot.c is completely independent of the hotplug code and all logic around it is implemented in architecture specific code. Except for the state reporting of the AP there is absolutely nothing architecture specific and the sychronization and decision functions can be moved into the generic hotplug core code. Provide an integrated variant and add the core synchronization and decision points. This comes in two flavours: 1) DEAD state synchronization Updated by the architecture code once the AP reaches the point where it is ready to be torn down by the control CPU, e.g. by removing power or clocks or tear down via the hypervisor. The control CPU waits for this state to be reached with a timeout. If the state is reached an architecture specific cleanup function is invoked. 2) Full state synchronization This extends #1 with AP alive synchronization. This is new functionality, which allows to replace architecture specific wait mechanims, e.g. cpumasks, completely. It also prevents that an AP which is in a limbo state can be brought up again. This can happen when an AP failed to report dead state during a previous off-line operation. The dead synchronization is what most architectures use. Only x86 makes a bringup decision based on that state at the moment. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com> Tested-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name> Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc Tested-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli@igalia.com> # Steam Deck Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230512205256.476305035@linutronix.de
2023-03-28lazy tlb: shoot lazies, non-refcounting lazy tlb mm reference handling schemeNicholas Piggin1-0/+15
On big systems, the mm refcount can become highly contented when doing a lot of context switching with threaded applications. user<->idle switch is one of the important cases. Abandoning lazy tlb entirely slows this switching down quite a bit in the common uncontended case, so that is not viable. Implement a scheme where lazy tlb mm references do not contribute to the refcount, instead they get explicitly removed when the refcount reaches zero. The final mmdrop() sends IPIs to all CPUs in the mm_cpumask and they switch away from this mm to init_mm if it was being used as the lazy tlb mm. Enabling the shoot lazies option therefore requires that the arch ensures that mm_cpumask contains all CPUs that could possibly be using mm. A DEBUG_VM option IPIs every CPU in the system after this to ensure there are no references remaining before the mm is freed. Shootdown IPIs cost could be an issue, but they have not been observed to be a serious problem with this scheme, because short-lived processes tend not to migrate CPUs much, therefore they don't get much chance to leave lazy tlb mm references on remote CPUs. There are a lot of options to reduce them if necessary, described in comments. The near-worst-case can be benchmarked with will-it-scale: context_switch1_threads -t $(($(nproc) / 2)) This will create nproc threads (nproc / 2 switching pairs) all sharing the same mm that spread over all CPUs so each CPU does thread->idle->thread switching. [ Rik came up with basically the same idea a few years ago, so credit to him for that. ] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20230118080011.2258375-1-npiggin@gmail.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20180728215357.3249-11-riel@surriel.com/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230203071837.1136453-5-npiggin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-03-28lazy tlb: allow lazy tlb mm refcounting to be configurableNicholas Piggin1-0/+17
Add CONFIG_MMU_TLB_REFCOUNT which enables refcounting of the lazy tlb mm when it is context switched. This can be disabled by architectures that don't require this refcounting if they clean up lazy tlb mms when the last refcount is dropped. Currently this is always enabled, so the patch introduces no functional change. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230203071837.1136453-4-npiggin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy