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Patch series "Introduce mseal", v10.
This patchset proposes a new mseal() syscall for the Linux kernel.
In a nutshell, mseal() protects the VMAs of a given virtual memory range
against modifications, such as changes to their permission bits.
Modern CPUs support memory permissions, such as the read/write (RW) and
no-execute (NX) bits. Linux has supported NX since the release of kernel
version 2.6.8 in August 2004 [1]. The memory permission feature improves
the security stance on memory corruption bugs, as an attacker cannot
simply write to arbitrary memory and point the code to it. The memory
must be marked with the X bit, or else an exception will occur.
Internally, the kernel maintains the memory permissions in a data
structure called VMA (vm_area_struct). mseal() additionally protects the
VMA itself against modifications of the selected seal type.
Memory sealing is useful to mitigate memory corruption issues where a
corrupted pointer is passed to a memory management system. For example,
such an attacker primitive can break control-flow integrity guarantees
since read-only memory that is supposed to be trusted can become writable
or .text pages can get remapped. Memory sealing can automatically be
applied by the runtime loader to seal .text and .rodata pages and
applications can additionally seal security critical data at runtime. A
similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel with the
VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT [3] flag and on OpenBSD with the mimmutable syscall
[4]. Also, Chrome wants to adopt this feature for their CFI work [2] and
this patchset has been designed to be compatible with the Chrome use case.
Two system calls are involved in sealing the map: mmap() and mseal().
The new mseal() is an syscall on 64 bit CPU, and with following signature:
int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)
addr/len: memory range.
flags: reserved.
mseal() blocks following operations for the given memory range.
1> Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size,
via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore can
be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes.
2> Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location,
via mremap().
3> Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED).
4> Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any specific
risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because the use case is
unclear. In any case, users can rely on merging to expand a sealed VMA.
5> mprotect() and pkey_mprotect().
6> Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED) for anonymous
memory, when users don't have write permission to the memory. Those
behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages, effectively a
memset(0) for anonymous memory.
The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttger’s work in
V8 CFI [5]. Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this
API.
Indeed, the Chrome browser has very specific requirements for sealing,
which are distinct from those of most applications. For example, in the
case of libc, sealing is only applied to read-only (RO) or read-execute
(RX) memory segments (such as .text and .RELRO) to prevent them from
becoming writable, the lifetime of those mappings are tied to the lifetime
of the process.
Chrome wants to seal two large address space reservations that are managed
by different allocators. The memory is mapped RW- and RWX respectively
but write access to it is restricted using pkeys (or in the future ARM
permission overlay extensions). The lifetime of those mappings are not
tied to the lifetime of the process, therefore, while the memory is
sealed, the allocators still need to free or discard the unused memory.
For example, with madvise(DONTNEED).
However, always allowing madvise(DONTNEED) on this range poses a security
risk. For example if a jump instruction crosses a page boundary and the
second page gets discarded, it will overwrite the target bytes with zeros
and change the control flow. Checking write-permission before the discard
operation allows us to control when the operation is valid. In this case,
the madvise will only succeed if the executing thread has PKEY write
permissions and PKRU changes are protected in software by control-flow
integrity.
Although the initial version of this patch series is targeting the Chrome
browser as its first user, it became evident during upstream discussions
that we would also want to ensure that the patch set eventually is a
complete solution for memory sealing and compatible with other use cases.
The specific scenario currently in mind is glibc's use case of loading and
sealing ELF executables. To this end, Stephen is working on a change to
glibc to add sealing support to the dynamic linker, which will seal all
non-writable segments at startup. Once this work is completed, all
applications will be able to automatically benefit from these new
protections.
In closing, I would like to formally acknowledge the valuable
contributions received during the RFC process, which were instrumental in
shaping this patch:
Jann Horn: raising awareness and providing valuable insights on the
destructive madvise operations.
Liam R. Howlett: perf optimization.
Linus Torvalds: assisting in defining system call signature and scope.
Theo de Raadt: sharing the experiences and insight gained from
implementing mimmutable() in OpenBSD.
MM perf benchmarks
==================
This patch adds a loop in the mprotect/munmap/madvise(DONTNEED) to
check the VMAs’ sealing flag, so that no partial update can be made,
when any segment within the given memory range is sealed.
To measure the performance impact of this loop, two tests are developed.
[8]
The first is measuring the time taken for a particular system call,
by using clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC). The second is using
PERF_COUNT_HW_REF_CPU_CYCLES (exclude user space). Both tests have
similar results.
The tests have roughly below sequence:
for (i = 0; i < 1000, i++)
create 1000 mappings (1 page per VMA)
start the sampling
for (j = 0; j < 1000, j++)
mprotect one mapping
stop and save the sample
delete 1000 mappings
calculates all samples.
Below tests are performed on Intel(R) Pentium(R) Gold 7505 @ 2.00GHz,
4G memory, Chromebook.
Based on the latest upstream code:
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t t_mseal delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 909 944 35 35 104%
munmap__ 2 1398 1502 104 52 107%
munmap__ 4 2444 2594 149 37 106%
munmap__ 8 4029 4323 293 37 107%
munmap__ 16 6647 6935 288 18 104%
munmap__ 32 11811 12398 587 18 105%
mprotect 1 439 465 26 26 106%
mprotect 2 1659 1745 86 43 105%
mprotect 4 3747 3889 142 36 104%
mprotect 8 6755 6969 215 27 103%
mprotect 16 13748 14144 396 25 103%
mprotect 32 27827 28969 1142 36 104%
madvise_ 1 240 262 22 22 109%
madvise_ 2 366 442 76 38 121%
madvise_ 4 623 751 128 32 121%
madvise_ 8 1110 1324 215 27 119%
madvise_ 16 2127 2451 324 20 115%
madvise_ 32 4109 4642 534 17 113%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ vmas cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 1790 1890 100 100 106%
munmap__ 2 2819 3033 214 107 108%
munmap__ 4 4959 5271 312 78 106%
munmap__ 8 8262 8745 483 60 106%
munmap__ 16 13099 14116 1017 64 108%
munmap__ 32 23221 24785 1565 49 107%
mprotect 1 906 967 62 62 107%
mprotect 2 3019 3203 184 92 106%
mprotect 4 6149 6569 420 105 107%
mprotect 8 9978 10524 545 68 105%
mprotect 16 20448 21427 979 61 105%
mprotect 32 40972 42935 1963 61 105%
madvise_ 1 434 497 63 63 115%
madvise_ 2 752 899 147 74 120%
madvise_ 4 1313 1513 200 50 115%
madvise_ 8 2271 2627 356 44 116%
madvise_ 16 4312 4883 571 36 113%
madvise_ 32 8376 9319 943 29 111%
Based on the result, for 6.8 kernel, sealing check adds
20-40 nano seconds, or around 50-100 CPU cycles, per VMA.
In addition, I applied the sealing to 5.10 kernel:
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t tmseal delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 357 390 33 33 109%
munmap__ 2 442 463 21 11 105%
munmap__ 4 614 634 20 5 103%
munmap__ 8 1017 1137 120 15 112%
munmap__ 16 1889 2153 263 16 114%
munmap__ 32 4109 4088 -21 -1 99%
mprotect 1 235 227 -7 -7 97%
mprotect 2 495 464 -30 -15 94%
mprotect 4 741 764 24 6 103%
mprotect 8 1434 1437 2 0 100%
mprotect 16 2958 2991 33 2 101%
mprotect 32 6431 6608 177 6 103%
madvise_ 1 191 208 16 16 109%
madvise_ 2 300 324 24 12 108%
madvise_ 4 450 473 23 6 105%
madvise_ 8 753 806 53 7 107%
madvise_ 16 1467 1592 125 8 108%
madvise_ 32 2795 3405 610 19 122%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ nbr_vma cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 684 715 31 31 105%
munmap__ 2 861 898 38 19 104%
munmap__ 4 1183 1235 51 13 104%
munmap__ 8 1999 2045 46 6 102%
munmap__ 16 3839 3816 -23 -1 99%
munmap__ 32 7672 7887 216 7 103%
mprotect 1 397 443 46 46 112%
mprotect 2 738 788 50 25 107%
mprotect 4 1221 1256 35 9 103%
mprotect 8 2356 2429 72 9 103%
mprotect 16 4961 4935 -26 -2 99%
mprotect 32 9882 10172 291 9 103%
madvise_ 1 351 380 29 29 108%
madvise_ 2 565 615 49 25 109%
madvise_ 4 872 933 61 15 107%
madvise_ 8 1508 1640 132 16 109%
madvise_ 16 3078 3323 245 15 108%
madvise_ 32 5893 6704 811 25 114%
For 5.10 kernel, sealing check adds 0-15 ns in time, or 10-30
CPU cycles, there is even decrease in some cases.
It might be interesting to compare 5.10 and 6.8 kernel
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t_5_10 t_6_8 delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 357 909 552 552 254%
munmap__ 2 442 1398 956 478 316%
munmap__ 4 614 2444 1830 458 398%
munmap__ 8 1017 4029 3012 377 396%
munmap__ 16 1889 6647 4758 297 352%
munmap__ 32 4109 11811 7702 241 287%
mprotect 1 235 439 204 204 187%
mprotect 2 495 1659 1164 582 335%
mprotect 4 741 3747 3006 752 506%
mprotect 8 1434 6755 5320 665 471%
mprotect 16 2958 13748 10790 674 465%
mprotect 32 6431 27827 21397 669 433%
madvise_ 1 191 240 49 49 125%
madvise_ 2 300 366 67 33 122%
madvise_ 4 450 623 173 43 138%
madvise_ 8 753 1110 357 45 147%
madvise_ 16 1467 2127 660 41 145%
madvise_ 32 2795 4109 1314 41 147%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ vmas cpu_5_10 c_6_8 delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 684 1790 1106 1106 262%
munmap__ 2 861 2819 1958 979 327%
munmap__ 4 1183 4959 3776 944 419%
munmap__ 8 1999 8262 6263 783 413%
munmap__ 16 3839 13099 9260 579 341%
munmap__ 32 7672 23221 15549 486 303%
mprotect 1 397 906 509 509 228%
mprotect 2 738 3019 2281 1140 409%
mprotect 4 1221 6149 4929 1232 504%
mprotect 8 2356 9978 7622 953 423%
mprotect 16 4961 20448 15487 968 412%
mprotect 32 9882 40972 31091 972 415%
madvise_ 1 351 434 82 82 123%
madvise_ 2 565 752 186 93 133%
madvise_ 4 872 1313 442 110 151%
madvise_ 8 1508 2271 763 95 151%
madvise_ 16 3078 4312 1234 77 140%
madvise_ 32 5893 8376 2483 78 142%
From 5.10 to 6.8
munmap: added 250-550 ns in time, or 500-1100 in cpu cycle, per vma.
mprotect: added 200-750 ns in time, or 500-1200 in cpu cycle, per vma.
madvise: added 33-50 ns in time, or 70-110 in cpu cycle, per vma.
In comparison to mseal, which adds 20-40 ns or 50-100 CPU cycles, the
increase from 5.10 to 6.8 is significantly larger, approximately ten times
greater for munmap and mprotect.
When I discuss the mm performance with Brian Makin, an engineer who worked
on performance, it was brought to my attention that such performance
benchmarks, which measuring millions of mm syscall in a tight loop, may
not accurately reflect real-world scenarios, such as that of a database
service. Also this is tested using a single HW and ChromeOS, the data
from another HW or distribution might be different. It might be best to
take this data with a grain of salt.
This patch (of 5):
Wire up mseal syscall for all architectures.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-1-jeffxu@chromium.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-2-jeffxu@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> [Bug #2]
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Röttger <sroettger@google.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Amer Al Shanawany <amer.shanawany@gmail.com>
Cc: Javier Carrasco <javier.carrasco.cruz@gmail.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Context switching does take care to retain the correct lock owner across
the switch from 'prev' to 'next' tasks. This does rely on interrupts
remaining disabled for the entire duration of the switch.
This condition is guaranteed for normal process creation and context
switching between already running processes, because both 'prev' and
'next' already have interrupts disabled in their saved copies of the
status register.
The situation is different for newly created kernel threads. The status
register is set to PS_S in copy_thread(), which does leave the IPL at 0.
Upon restoring the 'next' thread's status register in switch_to() aka
resume(), interrupts then become enabled prematurely. resume() then
returns via ret_from_kernel_thread() and schedule_tail() where run queue
lock is released (see finish_task_switch() and finish_lock_switch()).
A timer interrupt calling scheduler_tick() before the lock is released
in finish_task_switch() will find the lock already taken, with the
current task as lock owner. This causes a spinlock recursion warning as
reported by Guenter Roeck.
As far as I can ascertain, this race has been opened in commit
533e6903bea0 ("m68k: split ret_from_fork(), simplify kernel_thread()")
but I haven't done a detailed study of kernel history so it may well
predate that commit.
Interrupts cannot be disabled in the saved status register copy for
kernel threads (init will complain about interrupts disabled when
finally starting user space). Disable interrupts temporarily when
switching the tasks' register sets in resume().
Note that a simple oriw 0x700,%sr after restoring sr is not enough here
- this leaves enough of a race for the 'spinlock recursion' warning to
still be observed.
Tested on ARAnyM and qemu (Quadra 800 emulation).
Fixes: 533e6903bea0 ("m68k: split ret_from_fork(), simplify kernel_thread()")
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/07811b26-677c-4d05-aeb4-996cd880b789@roeck-us.net
Signed-off-by: Michael Schmitz <schmitzmic@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240411033631.16335-1-schmitzmic@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull security module updates from Paul Moore:
- Add three new syscalls: lsm_list_modules(), lsm_get_self_attr(), and
lsm_set_self_attr().
The first syscall simply lists the LSMs enabled, while the second and
third get and set the current process' LSM attributes. Yes, these
syscalls may provide similar functionality to what can be found under
/proc or /sys, but they were designed to support multiple,
simultaneaous (stacked) LSMs from the start as opposed to the current
/proc based solutions which were created at a time when only one LSM
was allowed to be active at a given time.
We have spent considerable time discussing ways to extend the
existing /proc interfaces to support multiple, simultaneaous LSMs and
even our best ideas have been far too ugly to support as a kernel
API; after +20 years in the kernel, I felt the LSM layer had
established itself enough to justify a handful of syscalls.
Support amongst the individual LSM developers has been nearly
unanimous, with a single objection coming from Tetsuo (TOMOYO) as he
is worried that the LSM_ID_XXX token concept will make it more
difficult for out-of-tree LSMs to survive. Several members of the LSM
community have demonstrated the ability for out-of-tree LSMs to
continue to exist by picking high/unused LSM_ID values as well as
pointing out that many kernel APIs rely on integer identifiers, e.g.
syscalls (!), but unfortunately Tetsuo's objections remain.
My personal opinion is that while I have no interest in penalizing
out-of-tree LSMs, I'm not going to penalize in-tree development to
support out-of-tree development, and I view this as a necessary step
forward to support the push for expanded LSM stacking and reduce our
reliance on /proc and /sys which has occassionally been problematic
for some container users. Finally, we have included the linux-api
folks on (all?) recent revisions of the patchset and addressed all of
their concerns.
- Add a new security_file_ioctl_compat() LSM hook to handle the 32-bit
ioctls on 64-bit systems problem.
This patch includes support for all of the existing LSMs which
provide ioctl hooks, although it turns out only SELinux actually
cares about the individual ioctls. It is worth noting that while
Casey (Smack) and Tetsuo (TOMOYO) did not give explicit ACKs to this
patch, they did both indicate they are okay with the changes.
- Fix a potential memory leak in the CALIPSO code when IPv6 is disabled
at boot.
While it's good that we are fixing this, I doubt this is something
users are seeing in the wild as you need to both disable IPv6 and
then attempt to configure IPv6 labeled networking via
NetLabel/CALIPSO; that just doesn't make much sense.
Normally this would go through netdev, but Jakub asked me to take
this patch and of all the trees I maintain, the LSM tree seemed like
the best fit.
- Update the LSM MAINTAINERS entry with additional information about
our process docs, patchwork, bug reporting, etc.
I also noticed that the Lockdown LSM is missing a dedicated
MAINTAINERS entry so I've added that to the pull request. I've been
working with one of the major Lockdown authors/contributors to see if
they are willing to step up and assume a Lockdown maintainer role;
hopefully that will happen soon, but in the meantime I'll continue to
look after it.
- Add a handful of mailmap entries for Serge Hallyn and myself.
* tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (27 commits)
lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook
lsm: Add a __counted_by() annotation to lsm_ctx.ctx
calipso: fix memory leak in netlbl_calipso_add_pass()
selftests: remove the LSM_ID_IMA check in lsm/lsm_list_modules_test
MAINTAINERS: add an entry for the lockdown LSM
MAINTAINERS: update the LSM entry
mailmap: add entries for Serge Hallyn's dead accounts
mailmap: update/replace my old email addresses
lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static
lsm: convert security_setselfattr() to use memdup_user()
lsm: align based on pointer length in lsm_fill_user_ctx()
lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx()
lsm: correct error codes in security_getselfattr()
lsm: cleanup the size counters in security_getselfattr()
lsm: don't yet account for IMA in LSM_CONFIG_COUNT calculation
lsm: drop LSM_ID_IMA
LSM: selftests for Linux Security Module syscalls
SELinux: Add selfattr hooks
AppArmor: Add selfattr hooks
Smack: implement setselfattr and getselfattr hooks
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull vfs mount updates from Christian Brauner:
"This contains the work to retrieve detailed information about mounts
via two new system calls. This is hopefully the beginning of the end
of the saga that started with fsinfo() years ago.
The LWN articles in [1] and [2] can serve as a summary so we can avoid
rehashing everything here.
At LSFMM in May 2022 we got into a room and agreed on what we want to
do about fsinfo(). Basically, split it into pieces. This is the first
part of that agreement. Specifically, it is concerned with retrieving
information about mounts. So this only concerns the mount information
retrieval, not the mount table change notification, or the extended
filesystem specific mount option work. That is separate work.
Currently mounts have a 32bit id. Mount ids are already in heavy use
by libmount and other low-level userspace but they can't be relied
upon because they're recycled very quickly. We agreed that mounts
should carry a unique 64bit id by which they can be referenced
directly. This is now implemented as part of this work.
The new 64bit mount id is exposed in statx() through the new
STATX_MNT_ID_UNIQUE flag. If the flag isn't raised the old mount id is
returned. If it is raised and the kernel supports the new 64bit mount
id the flag is raised in the result mask and the new 64bit mount id is
returned. New and old mount ids do not overlap so they cannot be
conflated.
Two new system calls are introduced that operate on the 64bit mount
id: statmount() and listmount(). A summary of the api and usage can be
found on LWN as well (cf. [3]) but of course, I'll provide a summary
here as well.
Both system calls rely on struct mnt_id_req. Which is the request
struct used to pass the 64bit mount id identifying the mount to
operate on. It is extensible to allow for the addition of new
parameters and for future use in other apis that make use of mount
ids.
statmount() mimicks the semantics of statx() and exposes a set flags
that userspace may raise in mnt_id_req to request specific information
to be retrieved. A statmount() call returns a struct statmount filled
in with information about the requested mount. Supported requests are
indicated by raising the request flag passed in struct mnt_id_req in
the @mask argument in struct statmount.
Currently we do support:
- STATMOUNT_SB_BASIC:
Basic filesystem info
- STATMOUNT_MNT_BASIC
Mount information (mount id, parent mount id, mount attributes etc)
- STATMOUNT_PROPAGATE_FROM
Propagation from what mount in current namespace
- STATMOUNT_MNT_ROOT
Path of the root of the mount (e.g., mount --bind /bla /mnt returns /bla)
- STATMOUNT_MNT_POINT
Path of the mount point (e.g., mount --bind /bla /mnt returns /mnt)
- STATMOUNT_FS_TYPE
Name of the filesystem type as the magic number isn't enough due to submounts
The string options STATMOUNT_MNT_{ROOT,POINT} and STATMOUNT_FS_TYPE
are appended to the end of the struct. Userspace can use the offsets
in @fs_type, @mnt_root, and @mnt_point to reference those strings
easily.
The struct statmount reserves quite a bit of space currently for
future extensibility. This isn't really a problem and if this bothers
us we can just send a follow-up pull request during this cycle.
listmount() is given a 64bit mount id via mnt_id_req just as
statmount(). It takes a buffer and a size to return an array of the
64bit ids of the child mounts of the requested mount. Userspace can
thus choose to either retrieve child mounts for a mount in batches or
iterate through the child mounts. For most use-cases it will be
sufficient to just leave space for a few child mounts. But for big
mount tables having an iterator is really helpful. Iterating through a
mount table works by setting @param in mnt_id_req to the mount id of
the last child mount retrieved in the previous listmount() call"
Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/934469 [1]
Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/829212 [2]
Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/950569 [3]
* tag 'vfs-6.8.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
add selftest for statmount/listmount
fs: keep struct mnt_id_req extensible
wire up syscalls for statmount/listmount
add listmount(2) syscall
statmount: simplify string option retrieval
statmount: simplify numeric option retrieval
add statmount(2) syscall
namespace: extract show_path() helper
mounts: keep list of mounts in an rbtree
add unique mount ID
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Wire up all archs.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231025140205.3586473-7-mszeredi@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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The select of KEXEC for CRASH_DUMP in kernel/Kconfig.kexec will be
dropped, then compiling errors will be triggered if below config items are
set:
===
CONFIG_CRASH_CORE=y
CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE=y
CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP=y
===
Here, change the dependency of buinding machine_kexec.o relocate_kernel.o
and the ifdeffery in asm/kexe.h to CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231208073036.7884-3-bhe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric DeVolder <eric_devolder@yahoo.com>
Cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Wireup lsm_get_self_attr, lsm_set_self_attr and lsm_list_modules
system calls.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
[PM: forward ported beyond v6.6 due merge window changes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gerg/m68knommu
Pull m68knommu updates from Greg Ungerer:
"A few changes, most of them related to fixing warnings when compiling
with "W=1". These follow up Geert's recent changes for M68K for this
too. These ones complete the fixes for the nommu and ColdFire specific
code.
Also a couple of other fixes to improve ROM default addressing and
compiling for the Cleopatra boards.
Summary:
- improve default Kconfig ROM section settings
- fix compilation for some Cleopatra boards
- fixes and cleanups for warnings compiling with 'W=1'"
* tag 'm68knommu-for-v6.7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gerg/m68knommu:
m68k: 68000: fix warning in timer code
m68k: 68000: fix warnings in 68000 interrupt handling
m68k: coldfire: remove unused variable in MMU code
m68k: coldfire: fix warnings in uboot argument processing
m68k: coldfire: make mcf_maskimr() static
m68k: coldfire: ensure gpio prototypes visible
m68k: coldfire: add and use "vectors.h"
m68knommu: fix compilation for ColdFire/Cleopatra boards
m68knommu: improve config ROM setting defaults
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic
Pull ia64 removal and asm-generic updates from Arnd Bergmann:
- The ia64 architecture gets its well-earned retirement as planned,
now that there is one last (mostly) working release that will be
maintained as an LTS kernel.
- The architecture specific system call tables are updated for the
added map_shadow_stack() syscall and to remove references to the
long-gone sys_lookup_dcookie() syscall.
* tag 'asm-generic-6.7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic:
hexagon: Remove unusable symbols from the ptrace.h uapi
asm-generic: Fix spelling of architecture
arch: Reserve map_shadow_stack() syscall number for all architectures
syscalls: Cleanup references to sys_lookup_dcookie()
Documentation: Drop or replace remaining mentions of IA64
lib/raid6: Drop IA64 support
Documentation: Drop IA64 from feature descriptions
kernel: Drop IA64 support from sig_fault handlers
arch: Remove Itanium (IA-64) architecture
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git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/dma-mapping
Pull dma-mapping updates from Christoph Hellwig:
- get rid of the fake support for coherent DMA allocation on coldfire
with caches (Christoph Hellwig)
- add a few Kconfig dependencies so that Kconfig catches the use of
invalid configurations (Christoph Hellwig)
- fix a type in dma-debug output (Chuck Lever)
- rewrite a comment in swiotlb (Sean Christopherson)
* tag 'dma-mapping-6.7-2023-10-30' of git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/dma-mapping:
dma-debug: Fix a typo in a debugging eye-catcher
swiotlb: rewrite comment explaining why the source is preserved on DMA_FROM_DEVICE
m68k: remove unused includes from dma.c
m68k: don't provide arch_dma_alloc for nommu/coldfire
net: fec: use dma_alloc_noncoherent for data cache enabled coldfire
m68k: use the coherent DMA code for coldfire without data cache
dma-direct: warn when coherent allocations aren't supported
dma-direct: simplify the use atomic pool logic in dma_direct_alloc
dma-direct: add a CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_DMA_ALLOC symbol
dma-direct: add dependencies to CONFIG_DMA_GLOBAL_POOL
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/geert/linux-m68k
Pull m68k updates from Geert Uytterhoeven:
- misc aesthetical improvements for the floating point emulator
- remove the last user of strlcpy()
- use kernel's generic libgcc functions
- misc fixes for W=1 builds
- misc indentation fixes
- misc fixes and improvements
- defconfig updates
* tag 'm68k-for-v6.7-tag1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/geert/linux-m68k: (72 commits)
m68k: lib: Include <linux/libgcc.h> for __muldi3()
m68k: fpsp040: Fix indentation by 5 spaces
m68k: Fix indentation by 2 or 5 spaces in <asm/page_mm.h>
m68k: kernel: Fix indentation by 7 spaces in traps.c
m68k: sun3: Fix indentation by 5 or 7 spaces
m68k: Fix indentation by 7 spaces in <asm/io_mm.h>
m68k: defconfig: Update virt_defconfig for v6.6-rc3
m68k: defconfig: Update defconfigs for v6.6-rc1
m68k: io: Mark mmio read addresses as const
m68k: Replace GPL 2.0+ README.legal boilerplate with SPDX
m68k: sun3: Change led_pattern[] to unsigned char
m68k: Add missing types to asm/irq.h
m68k: sun3/3x: Add and use "sun3.h"
m68k: sun3x: Make dvma_print() static
m68k: sun3x: Make sun3x_halt() static
m68k: sun3x: Do not mark dvma_map_iommu() inline
m68k: sun3x: Fix signature of sun3_leds()
m68k: sun3: Make sun3_platform_init() static
m68k: sun3: Make print_pte() static
m68k: sun3: Annotate prom_printf() with __printf()
...
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When building with W=1:
CC arch/m68k/kernel/uboot.o
arch/m68k/kernel/uboot.c: In function ‘parse_uboot_commandline’:
arch/m68k/kernel/uboot.c:68:36: warning: variable ‘uboot_initrd_end’ set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
unsigned long uboot_initrd_start, uboot_initrd_end;
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/m68k/kernel/uboot.c:68:16: warning: variable ‘uboot_initrd_start’ set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
unsigned long uboot_initrd_start, uboot_initrd_end;
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/m68k/kernel/uboot.c:66:16: warning: variable ‘uboot_kbd’ set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
unsigned long uboot_kbd;
^~~~~~~~~
arch/m68k/kernel/uboot.c: At top level:
arch/m68k/kernel/uboot.c:90:13: warning: no previous prototype for ‘process_uboot_commandline’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
__init void process_uboot_commandline(char *commandp, int size)
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
A couple of issues here. Firstly we already have a bootinfo.h that has a
prototype for process_uboot_commandline(), we should include that.
Secondly uboot_kbd is not used at all and can be removed. Thirdly the
conditional code based on CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD means that sometimes
uboot_initrd_start and uboot_initrd_end are not needed. Make their
declaration and asignment conditional on CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD same as
the code that uses them.
Signed-off-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
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dma.c doesn't need most of the headers it includes. Also there is
no point in undefining the DEBUG symbol given that it isn't used
anywhere in this small file.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Tested-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
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Coldfire cores configured with a data cache can't provide coherent
DMA allocations at all.
Instead of returning non-coherent kernel memory in this case,
return NULL and fail the allocation.
The only driver that used to rely on the previous behavior (fec) has
been switched to use non-coherent allocations for this case recently.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
Tested-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
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Coldfire cores configured without a data cache are DMA coherent and
should thus simply use the simple coherent version of dma-direct.
Introduce a new COLDFIRE_COHERENT_DMA Kconfig symbol as a convenient
short hand for such configurations, and a M68K_NONCOHERENT_DMA symbol
for all cases where we need to build non-coherent DMA infrastructure
to simplify the Kconfig and code conditionals.
Not building the non-coherent DMA code slightly reduces the code
size for such configurations.
Numers for m5249evb_defconfig below:
text data bss dec hex filename
2896158 401052 65392 3362602 334f2a vmlinux.before
2895166 400988 65392 3361546 334b0a vmlinux.after
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Tested-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
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Indentation should use TABs, not spaces.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d1b38c9d389c1135f7856cf5f90852c2f1584c50.1696602993.git.geert@linux-m68k.org
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commit c35559f94ebc ("x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall")
recently added support for map_shadow_stack() but it is limited to x86
only for now. There is a possibility that other architectures (namely,
arm64 and RISC-V), that are implementing equivalent support for shadow
stacks, might need to add support for it.
Independent of that, reserving arch-specific syscall numbers in the
syscall tables of all architectures is good practice and would help
avoid future conflicts. map_shadow_stack() is marked as a conditional
syscall in sys_ni.c. Adding it to the syscall tables of other
architectures is harmless and would return ENOSYS when exercised.
Note, map_shadow_stack() was assigned #453 during the merge process
since #452 was taken by fchmodat2().
For Powerpc, map it to sys_ni_syscall() as is the norm for Powerpc
syscall tables.
For Alpha, map_shadow_stack() takes up #563 as Alpha still diverges from
the common syscall numbering system in the other architectures.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230515212255.GA562920@debug.ba.rivosinc.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/b402b80b-a7c6-4ef0-b977-c0f5f582b78a@sirena.org.uk/
Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc)
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
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Upstream Linux never had a "README.legal" file, but it was present
in early source releases of Linux/m68k. It contained a simple copyright
notice and a link to a version of the "COPYING" file that predated the
addition of the "only valid GPL version is v2" clause.
Get rid of the references to non-existent files by replacing the
boilerplate with SPDX license identifiers.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/23430c233728ab02ec0af8e714994398d383137a.1695031668.git.geert@linux-m68k.org
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When building with W=1:
arch/m68k/sun3/idprom.c:86:6: warning: no previous prototype for ‘sun3_get_model’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
86 | void sun3_get_model(char *model)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/m68k/sun3/config.c:53:24: warning: no previous prototype for ‘sun3_init’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
53 | asmlinkage void __init sun3_init(void)
| ^~~~~~~~~
arch/m68k/sun3/mmu_emu.c:117:6: warning: no previous prototype for ‘print_pte_vaddr’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
117 | void print_pte_vaddr (unsigned long vaddr)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/m68k/sun3/mmu_emu.c:126:13: warning: no previous prototype for ‘mmu_emu_init’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
126 | void __init mmu_emu_init(unsigned long bootmem_end)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/m68k/sun3/mmu_emu.c:353:5: warning: no previous prototype for ‘mmu_emu_handle_fault’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
353 | int mmu_emu_handle_fault (unsigned long vaddr, int read_flag, int kernel_fault)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/m68k/sun3/leds.c:6:6: warning: no previous prototype for ‘sun3_leds’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
6 | void sun3_leds(unsigned char byte)
| ^~~~~~~~~
arch/m68k/sun3/intersil.c:27:5: warning: no previous prototype for ‘sun3_hwclk’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
27 | int sun3_hwclk(int set, struct rtc_time *t)
| ^~~~~~~~~~
arch/m68k/sun3x/config.c:30:6: warning: no previous prototype for ‘sun3_leds’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
30 | void sun3_leds(unsigned char byte)
| ^~~~~~~~~
Fix this by introducing a new header file "sun3.h" for holding the
prototypes of functions implemented in arch/m68k/sun3/ and
arch/m68k/sun3x/.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87856ef9ef8955f459fb691faca921c0a688bc80.1694613528.git.geert@linux-m68k.org
|
|
When building with W=1:
arch/m68k/mvme16x/config.c:208:6: warning: no previous prototype for ‘mvme16x_cons_write’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
208 | void mvme16x_cons_write(struct console *co, const char *str, unsigned count)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Fix this by introducing a new header file "mvme16x.h" for holding the
prototypes of functions implemented in arch/m68k/mvme16x/.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6200cc3b26fad215c4524748af04692e38c5ecd2.1694613528.git.geert@linux-m68k.org
|
|
When building with W=1:
arch/m68k/mm/fault.c:22:5: warning: no previous prototype for ‘send_fault_sig’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
22 | int send_fault_sig(struct pt_regs *regs)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/m68k/mm/fault.c:68:5: warning: no previous prototype for ‘do_page_fault’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
68 | int do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~
Fix this by introducing a new header file "fault.h" for holding the
prototypes of functions implemented in arch/m68k/mm/fault.c.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ef004b8cfe4aac892aa0fb7714c2ed81a02a9b89.1694613528.git.geert@linux-m68k.org
|
|
When building with W=1:
arch/m68k/mm/motorola.c:414:13: warning: no previous prototype for ‘paging_init’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
414 | void __init paging_init(void)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~
arch/m68k/mm/sun3mmu.c:36:13: warning: no previous prototype for ‘paging_init’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
36 | void __init paging_init(void)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~
Fix this by consolidating the multiple prototypes into the common
<asm/pgtable.h>.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1b03fde54f205e972e19959b8e335022205d538c.1694613528.git.geert@linux-m68k.org
|
|
When building with W=1:
arch/m68k/kernel/vectors.c:52:13: warning: no previous prototype for ‘base_trap_init’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
52 | void __init base_trap_init(void)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Fix this by introducing a new header file "vectors.h" for holding the
prototypes of functions implemented in arch/m68k/kernel/vectors.c.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bd0a2f65bc1681dc45e2b24951bd89f9ddbe2eef.1694613528.git.geert@linux-m68k.org
|
|
When building with W=1:
arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c:754:17: warning: no previous prototype for ‘buserr_c’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
754 | asmlinkage void buserr_c(struct frame *fp)
| ^~~~~~~~
arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c:1140:17: warning: no previous prototype for ‘set_esp0’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
1140 | asmlinkage void set_esp0(unsigned long ssp)
| ^~~~~~~~
arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c:1155:17: warning: no previous prototype for ‘fpemu_signal’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
1155 | asmlinkage void fpemu_signal(int signal, int code, void *addr)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c:1149:17: warning: no previous prototype for ‘fpsp040_die’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
1149 | asmlinkage void fpsp040_die(void)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~
Fix this by introducing a new header file "traps.h" for holding the
prototypes of functions implemented in arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/652cbbb1c9e339980a86068ebdd0a69362324af8.1694613528.git.geert@linux-m68k.org
|
|
When building with W=1:
arch/m68k/kernel/signal.c:756:18: warning: no previous prototype for ‘do_sigreturn’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
756 | asmlinkage void *do_sigreturn(struct pt_regs *regs, struct switch_stack *sw)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/m68k/kernel/signal.c:783:18: warning: no previous prototype for ‘do_rt_sigreturn’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
783 | asmlinkage void *do_rt_sigreturn(struct pt_regs *regs, struct switch_stack *sw)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/m68k/kernel/signal.c:1112:17: warning: no previous prototype for ‘do_notify_resume’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
1112 | asmlinkage void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Fix this by introducing a new header file "signal.h" for holding the
prototypes of functions implemented in arch/m68k/kernel/signal.c.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/25cecda80698829cec18721a9d0f058cc69df0cc.1694613528.git.geert@linux-m68k.org
|
|
When building with W=1:
arch/m68k/kernel/ptrace.c:275:16: warning: no previous prototype for ‘syscall_trace_enter’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
275 | asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(void)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/m68k/kernel/ptrace.c:288:17: warning: no previous prototype for ‘syscall_trace_leave’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
288 | asmlinkage void syscall_trace_leave(void)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Fix this by introducing a new header file "ptrace.h" for holding the
prototypes of functions implemented in arch/m68k/kernel/ptrace.c.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b4b3577b2149ebd65c3b3c7acccebc0e7e596f9d.1694613528.git.geert@linux-m68k.org
|
|
When building with W=1:
arch/m68k/kernel/process.c:115:16: warning: no previous prototype for ‘m68k_clone’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
115 | asmlinkage int m68k_clone(struct pt_regs *regs)
| ^~~~~~~~~~
arch/m68k/kernel/process.c:136:16: warning: no previous prototype for ‘m68k_clone3’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
136 | asmlinkage int m68k_clone3(struct pt_regs *regs)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~
Fix this by introducing a new header file "process.h" for holding the
prototypes of functions implemented in arch/m68k/kernel/process.c.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5e50257d8fcae3eb202ce5f439dc29c09cb6c44f.1694613528.git.geert@linux-m68k.org
|
|
When building with W=1:
arch/m68k/kernel/ints.c:165:17: warning: no previous prototype for ‘handle_badint’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
165 | asmlinkage void handle_badint(struct pt_regs *regs)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~
Fix this by introducing a new header file "ints.h" for holding the
prototypes of functions implemented in arch/m68k/kernel/ints.c.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/dc65d01ca4c7de94ce814e5b5e1f726fff97566b.1694613528.git.geert@linux-m68k.org
|
|
When building with W=1:
arch/m68k/kernel/sys_m68k.c:40:17: warning: no previous prototype for ‘sys_mmap2’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
40 | asmlinkage long sys_mmap2(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
| ^~~~~~~~~
arch/m68k/kernel/sys_m68k.c:378:1: warning: no previous prototype for ‘sys_cacheflush’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
378 | sys_cacheflush (unsigned long addr, int scope, int cache, unsigned long len)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/m68k/kernel/sys_m68k.c:463:1: warning: no previous prototype for ‘sys_atomic_cmpxchg_32’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
463 | sys_atomic_cmpxchg_32(unsigned long newval, int oldval, int d3, int d4, int d5,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/m68k/kernel/sys_m68k.c:564:16: warning: no previous prototype for ‘sys_getpagesize’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
564 | asmlinkage int sys_getpagesize(void)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/m68k/kernel/sys_m68k.c:569:26: warning: no previous prototype for ‘sys_get_thread_area’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
569 | asmlinkage unsigned long sys_get_thread_area(void)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/m68k/kernel/sys_m68k.c:574:16: warning: no previous prototype for ‘sys_set_thread_area’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
574 | asmlinkage int sys_set_thread_area(unsigned long tp)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
arch/m68k/kernel/sys_m68k.c:580:16: warning: no previous prototype for ‘sys_atomic_barrier’ [-Wmissing-prototypes]
580 | asmlinkage int sys_atomic_barrier(void)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Fix this by introducing a new header file <asm/syscalls.h> for holding
the prototypes for m68k-specific syscalls, and including the generic
ones.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/80b721eeb499562cd5d49887b0eee10dd172c88d.1694613528.git.geert@linux-m68k.org
|
