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commit 9a32a7e78bd0cd9a9b6332cbdc345ee5ffd0c5de upstream.
IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache before
it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It is not possible
for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible memory using this method,
since these systems implement a combination of hardware and software security measures
to prevent scenarios where protected data could be leaked.
However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that the
attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass "kernel
user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony Steinhauser of
Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself, but there is a possibility
it could be used in conjunction with side-channels or other weaknesses in the
privileged code to construct an attack.
This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege boundaries
of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache after user accesses.
This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f79643787e0a0762d2409b7b8334e83f22d85695 upstream.
IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache before
it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It is not possible
for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible memory using this method,
since these systems implement a combination of hardware and software security measures
to prevent scenarios where protected data could be leaked.
However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that the
attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass "kernel
user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony Steinhauser of
Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself, but there is a possibility
it could be used in conjunction with side-channels or other weaknesses in the
privileged code to construct an attack.
This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege boundaries
of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache on kernel entry.
This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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(backport only)
We're about to grow the exception handlers, which will make a bunch of them
no longer fit within the space available. We move them out of line.
This is a fiddly and error-prone business, so in the interests of reviewability
I haven't merged this in with the addition of the entry flush.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 505a314fb28ce122091691c51426fa85c084e115 ]
HMIs will crash the kernel due to
BRANCH_LINK_TO_FAR(hmi_exception_realmode)
Calling into the OPD instead of the actual code.
Fixes: 2337d207288f ("powerpc/64: CONFIG_RELOCATABLE support for hmi interrupts")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
[mpe: Use DOTSYM() rather than #ifdef]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0b66370c61fcf5fcc1d6901013e110284da6e2bb ]
Bare metal machine checks run an "early" handler in real mode before
running the main handler which reports the event.
The main handler runs exactly as a normal interrupt handler, after the
"windup" which sets registers back as they were at interrupt entry.
CFAR does not get restored by the windup code, so that will be wrong
when the handler is run.
Restore the CFAR to the saved value before running the late handler.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190802105709.27696-8-npiggin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit f474c28fbcbe42faca4eb415172c07d76adcb819 upstream.
powerpc hardware triggers watchpoint before executing the instruction.
To make trigger-after-execute behavior, kernel emulates the
instruction. If the instruction is 'load something into non-volatile
register', exception handler should restore emulated register state
while returning back, otherwise there will be register state
corruption. eg, adding a watchpoint on a list can corrput the list:
# cat /proc/kallsyms | grep kthread_create_list
c00000000121c8b8 d kthread_create_list
Add watchpoint on kthread_create_list->prev:
# perf record -e mem:0xc00000000121c8c0
Run some workload such that new kthread gets invoked. eg, I just
logged out from console:
list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev (c000000001214e00), \
but was c00000000121c8b8. (next=c00000000121c8b8).
WARNING: CPU: 59 PID: 309 at lib/list_debug.c:25 __list_add_valid+0xb4/0xc0
CPU: 59 PID: 309 Comm: kworker/59:0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.1.0-rc7+ #69
...
NIP __list_add_valid+0xb4/0xc0
LR __list_add_valid+0xb0/0xc0
Call Trace:
__list_add_valid+0xb0/0xc0 (unreliable)
__kthread_create_on_node+0xe0/0x260
kthread_create_on_node+0x34/0x50
create_worker+0xe8/0x260
worker_thread+0x444/0x560
kthread+0x160/0x1a0
ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x70
List corruption happened because it uses 'load into non-volatile
register' instruction:
Snippet from __kthread_create_on_node:
c000000000136be8: addis r29,r2,-19
c000000000136bec: ld r29,31424(r29)
if (!__list_add_valid(new, prev, next))
c000000000136bf0: mr r3,r30
c000000000136bf4: mr r5,r28
c000000000136bf8: mr r4,r29
c000000000136bfc: bl c00000000059a2f8 <__list_add_valid+0x8>
Register state from WARN_ON():
GPR00: c00000000059a3a0 c000007ff23afb50 c000000001344e00 0000000000000075
GPR04: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000001852af8bc1 0000000000000000
GPR08: 0000000000000001 0000000000000007 0000000000000006 00000000000004aa
GPR12: 0000000000000000 c000007ffffeb080 c000000000137038 c000005ff62aaa00
GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 c000007fffbe7600 c000007fffbe7370
GPR20: c000007fffbe7320 c000007fffbe7300 c000000001373a00 0000000000000000
GPR24: fffffffffffffef7 c00000000012e320 c000007ff23afcb0 c000000000cb8628
GPR28: c00000000121c8b8 c000000001214e00 c000007fef5b17e8 c000007fef5b17c0
Watchpoint hit at 0xc000000000136bec.
addis r29,r2,-19
=> r29 = 0xc000000001344e00 + (-19 << 16)
=> r29 = 0xc000000001214e00
ld r29,31424(r29)
=> r29 = *(0xc000000001214e00 + 31424)
=> r29 = *(0xc00000000121c8c0)
0xc00000000121c8c0 is where we placed a watchpoint and thus this
instruction was emulated by emulate_step. But because handle_dabr_fault
did not restore emulated register state, r29 still contains stale
value in above register state.
Fixes: 5aae8a5370802 ("powerpc, hw_breakpoints: Implement hw_breakpoints for 64-bit server processors")
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.36+
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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When we come into the softpatch handler (0x1500), we use r11 to store
the HSRR0 for later use by the denorm handler.
We also use the softpatch handler for the TM workarounds for
POWER9. Unfortunately, in kvmppc_interrupt_hv we later store r11 out
to the vcpu assuming it's still what we got from userspace.
This causes r11 to be corrupted in the VCPU and hence when we restore
the guest, we get a corrupted r11. We've seen this when running TM
tests inside guests on P9.
This fixes the problem by only touching r11 in the denorm case.
Fixes: 4bb3c7a020 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Work around transactional memory bugs in POWER9")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.17+
Test-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <sjitindarsingh@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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Because rfi_flush_fallback runs immediately before the return to
userspace it currently runs with the user r1 (stack pointer). This
means if we oops in there we will report a bad kernel stack pointer in
the exception entry path, eg:
Bad kernel stack pointer 7ffff7150e40 at c0000000000023b4
Oops: Bad kernel stack pointer, sig: 6 [#1]
LE SMP NR_CPUS=32 NUMA PowerNV
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1246 Comm: klogd Not tainted 4.18.0-rc2-gcc-7.3.1-00175-g0443f8a69ba3 #7
NIP: c0000000000023b4 LR: 0000000010053e00 CTR: 0000000000000040
REGS: c0000000fffe7d40 TRAP: 4100 Not tainted (4.18.0-rc2-gcc-7.3.1-00175-g0443f8a69ba3)
MSR: 9000000002803031 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,FP,ME,IR,DR,LE> CR: 44000442 XER: 20000000
CFAR: c00000000000bac8 IRQMASK: c0000000f1e66a80
GPR00: 0000000002000000 00007ffff7150e40 00007fff93a99900 0000000000000020
...
NIP [c0000000000023b4] rfi_flush_fallback+0x34/0x80
LR [0000000010053e00] 0x10053e00
Although the NIP tells us where we were, and the TRAP number tells us
what happened, it would still be nicer if we could report the actual
exception rather than barfing about the stack pointer.
We an do that fairly simply by loading the kernel stack pointer on
entry and restoring the user value before returning. That way we see a
regular oops such as:
Unrecoverable exception 4100 at c00000000000239c
Oops: Unrecoverable exception, sig: 6 [#1]
LE SMP NR_CPUS=32 NUMA PowerNV
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1251 Comm: klogd Not tainted 4.18.0-rc3-gcc-7.3.1-00097-g4ebfcac65acd-dirty #40
NIP: c00000000000239c LR: 0000000010053e00 CTR: 0000000000000040
REGS: c0000000f1e17bb0 TRAP: 4100 Not tainted (4.18.0-rc3-gcc-7.3.1-00097-g4ebfcac65acd-dirty)
MSR: 9000000002803031 <SF,HV,VEC,VSX,FP,ME,IR,DR,LE> CR: 44000442 XER: 20000000
CFAR: c00000000000bac8 IRQMASK: 0
...
NIP [c00000000000239c] rfi_flush_fallback+0x3c/0x80
LR [0000000010053e00] 0x10053e00
Call Trace:
[c0000000f1e17e30] [c00000000000b9e4] system_call+0x5c/0x70 (unreliable)
Note this shouldn't make the kernel stack pointer vulnerable to a
meltdown attack, because it should be flushed from the cache before we
return to userspace. The user r1 value will be in the cache, because
we load it in the return path, but that is harmless.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
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We only need to use __MASKABLE_EXCEPTION in one of the four cases for
hardware interrupt, so use the helper macros in the other cases.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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_MASKABLE_RELON_EXCEPTION_PSERIES() does nothing useful, update all
callers to use __MASKABLE_RELON_EXCEPTION_PSERIES() directly.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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_MASKABLE_EXCEPTION_PSERIES() does nothing useful, update all callers
to use __MASKABLE_EXCEPTION_PSERIES() directly.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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As with the other patches in this series, we are removing the
"PSERIES" from the name as it's no longer meaningful.
In this case it's not simply a case of removing the "PSERIES" as that
would result in a clash with the existing EXCEPTION_PROLOG_1.
Instead we name this one EXCEPTION_PROLOG_2, as it's usually used in
sequence after 0 and 1.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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files not using feature fixup don't need asm/feature-fixups.h
files using feature fixup need asm/feature-fixups.h
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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When the masked interrupt handler clears MSR[EE] for an interrupt in
the PACA_IRQ_MUST_HARD_MASK set, it does not set PACA_IRQ_HARD_DIS.
This makes them get out of synch.
With that taken into account, it's only low level irq manipulation
(and interrupt entry before reconcile) where they can be out of synch.
This makes the code less surprising.
It also allows the IRQ replay code to rely on the IRQ_HARD_DIS value
and not have to mtmsrd again in this case (e.g., for an external
interrupt that has been masked). The bigger benefit might just be
that there is not such an element of surprise in these two bits of
state.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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POWER9 DD1 was never a product. It is no longer supported by upstream
firmware, and it is not effectively supported in Linux due to lack of
testing.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
[mpe: Remove arch_make_huge_pte() entirely]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux
Pull powerpc updates from Michael Ellerman:
"Notable changes:
- Support for split PMD page table lock on 64-bit Book3S (Power8/9).
- Add support for HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE, so we properly support
live patching again.
- Add support for patching barrier_nospec in copy_from_user() and
syscall entry.
- A couple of fixes for our data breakpoints on Book3S.
- A series from Nick optimising TLB/mm handling with the Radix MMU.
- Numerous small cleanups to squash sparse/gcc warnings from Mathieu
Malaterre.
- Several series optimising various parts of the 32-bit code from
Christophe Leroy.
- Removal of support for two old machines, "SBC834xE" and "C2K"
("GEFanuc,C2K"), which is why the diffstat has so many deletions.
And many other small improvements & fixes.
There's a few out-of-area changes. Some minor ftrace changes OK'ed by
Steve, and a fix to our powernv cpuidle driver. Then there's a series
touching mm, x86 and fs/proc/task_mmu.c, which cleans up some details
around pkey support. It was ack'ed/reviewed by Ingo & Dave and has
been in next for several weeks.
Thanks to: Akshay Adiga, Alastair D'Silva, Alexey Kardashevskiy, Al
Viro, Andrew Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Anju T Sudhakar, Arnd
Bergmann, Balbir Singh, Cédric Le Goater, Christophe Leroy, Christophe
Lombard, Colin Ian King, Dave Hansen, Fabio Estevam, Finn Thain,
Frederic Barrat, Gautham R. Shenoy, Haren Myneni, Hari Bathini, Ingo
Molnar, Jonathan Neuschäfer, Josh Poimboeuf, Kamalesh Babulal,
Madhavan Srinivasan, Mahesh Salgaonkar, Mark Greer, Mathieu Malaterre,
Matthew Wilcox, Michael Neuling, Michal Suchanek, Naveen N. Rao,
Nicholas Piggin, Nicolai Stange, Olof Johansson, Paul Gortmaker, Paul
Mackerras, Peter Rosin, Pridhiviraj Paidipeddi, Ram Pai, Rashmica
Gupta, Ravi Bangoria, Russell Currey, Sam Bobroff, Samuel
Mendoza-Jonas, Segher Boessenkool, Shilpasri G Bhat, Simon Guo,
Souptick Joarder, Stewart Smith, Thiago Jung Bauermann, Torsten Duwe,
Vaibhav Jain, Wei Yongjun, Wolfram Sang, Yisheng Xie, YueHaibing"
* tag 'powerpc-4.18-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux: (251 commits)
powerpc/64s/radix: Fix missing ptesync in flush_cache_vmap
cpuidle: powernv: Fix promotion from snooze if next state disabled
powerpc: fix build failure by disabling attribute-alias warning in pci_32
ocxl: Fix missing unlock on error in afu_ioctl_enable_p9_wait()
powerpc-opal: fix spelling mistake "Uniterrupted" -> "Uninterrupted"
powerpc: fix spelling mistake: "Usupported" -> "Unsupported"
powerpc/pkeys: Detach execute_only key on !PROT_EXEC
powerpc/powernv: copy/paste - Mask SO bit in CR
powerpc: Remove core support for Marvell mv64x60 hostbridges
powerpc/boot: Remove core support for Marvell mv64x60 hostbridges
powerpc/boot: Remove support for Marvell mv64x60 i2c controller
powerpc/boot: Remove support for Marvell MPSC serial controller
powerpc/embedded6xx: Remove C2K board support
powerpc/lib: optimise PPC32 memcmp
powerpc/lib: optimise 32 bits __clear_user()
powerpc/time: inline arch_vtime_task_switch()
powerpc/Makefile: set -mcpu=860 flag for the 8xx
powerpc: Implement csum_ipv6_magic in assembly
powerpc/32: Optimise __csum_partial()
powerpc/lib: Adjust .balign inside string functions for PPC32
...
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A CPU that gets stuck with interrupts hard disable can be difficult to
debug, as on some platforms we have no way to interrupt the CPU to
find out what it's doing.
A stop-gap is to have the CPU save it's stack pointer (r1) in its paca
when it hard disables interrupts. That way if we can't interrupt it,
we can at least trace the stack based on where it last disabled
interrupts.
In some cases that will be total junk, but the stack trace code should
handle that. In the simple case of a CPU that disable interrupts and
then gets stuck in a loop, the stack trace should be informative.
We could clear the saved stack pointer when we enable interrupts, but
that loses information which could be useful if we have nothing else
to go on.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
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On some CPUs we can prevent a vulnerability related to store-to-load
forwarding by preventing store forwarding between privilege domains,
by inserting a barrier in kernel entry and exit paths.
This is known to be the case on at least Power7, Power8 and Power9
powerpc CPUs.
Barriers must be inserted generally before the first load after moving
to a higher privilege, and after the last store before moving to a
lower privilege, HV and PR privilege transitions must be protected.
Barriers are added as patch sections, with all kernel/hypervisor entry
points patched, and the exit points to lower privilge levels patched
similarly to the RFI flush patching.
Firmware advertisement is not implemented yet, so CPU flush types
are hard coded.
Thanks to Michal Suchánek for bug fixes and review.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mauricfo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michal Suchánek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Rather than override the machine type in .S code (which can hide wrong
or ambiguous code generation for the target), set the type to power4
for all assembly.
This also means we need to be careful not to build power4-only code
when we're not building for Book3S, such as the "power7" versions of
copyuser/page/memcpy.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
[mpe: Fix Book3E build, don't build the "power7" variants for non-Book3S]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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System Reset, being an NMI, must return more carefully than other
interrupts. It has traditionally returned via the nromal return
from exception path, but that has a number of problems.
- r13 does not get restored if returning to kernel. This is for
interrupts which may cause a context switch, which sreset will
never do. Interrupting OPAL (which uses a different r13) is one
place where this causes breakage.
- It may cause several other problems returning to kernel with
preempt or TIF_EMULATE_STACK_STORE if it hits at the wrong time.
It's safer just to have a simple restore and return, like machine
check which is the other NMI.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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For addresses above 512TB we allocate additional mmu contexts. To make
it all easy, addresses above 512TB are handled with IR/DR=1 and with
stack frame setup.
The mmu_context_t is also updated to track the new extended_ids. To
support upto 4PB we need a total 8 contexts.
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
[mpe: Minor formatting tweaks and comment wording, switch BUG to WARN
in get_ea_context().]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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Merge our fixes branch from the 4.16 cycle.
There were a number of important fixes merged, in particular some Power9
workarounds that we want in next for testing purposes. There's also been
some conflicting changes in the CPU features code which are best merged
and tested before going upstream.
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The SLB bad address handler's trap number fixup does not preserve the
low bit that indicates nonvolatile GPRs have not been saved. This
leads save_nvgprs to skip saving them, and subsequent functions and
return from interrupt will think they are saved.
This causes kernel branch-to-garbage debugging to not have correct
registers, can also cause userspace to have its registers clobbered
after a segfault.
Fixes: f0f558b131db ("powerpc/mm: Preserve CFAR value on SLB miss caused by access to bogus address")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9+
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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This brings in two series from Paul, one of which touches KVM code and
may need to be merged into the kvm-ppc tree to resolve conflicts.
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POWER9 has hardware bugs relating to transactional memory and thread
reconfiguration (changes to hardware SMT mode). Specifically, the core
does not have enough storage to store a complete checkpoint of all the
architected state for all four threads. The DD2.2 version of POWER9
includes hardware modifications designed to allow hypervisor software
to implement workarounds for these problems. This patch implements
those workarounds in KVM code so that KVM guests see a full, working
transactional memory implementation.
The problems center around the use of TM suspended state, where the
CPU has a checkpointed state but execution is not transactional. The
workaround is to implement a "fake suspend" state, which looks to the
guest like suspended state but the CPU does not store a checkpoint.
In this state, any instruction that would cause a transition to
transactional state (rfid, rfebb, mtmsrd, tresume) or would use the
checkpointed state (treclaim) causes a "soft patch" interrupt (vector
0x1500) to the hypervisor so that it can be emulated. The trechkpt
instruction also causes a soft patch interrupt.
On POWER9 DD2.2, we avoid returning to the guest in any state which
would require a checkpoint to be present. The trechkpt in the guest
entry path which would normally create that checkpoint is replaced by
either a transition to fake suspend state, if the guest is in suspend
state, or a rollback to the pre-transactional state if the guest is in
transactional state. Fake suspend state is indicated by a flag in the
PACA plus a new bit in the PSSCR. The new PSSCR bit is write-only and
reads back as 0.
On exit from the guest, if the guest is in fake suspend state, we still
do the treclaim instruction as we would in real suspend state, in order
to get into non-transactional state, but we do not save the resulting
register state since there was no checkpoint.
Emulation of the instructions that cause a softpatch interrupt is
handled in two paths. If the guest is in real suspend mode, we call
kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation_early() to handle the cases where the guest is
transitioning to transactional state. This is called before we do the
treclaim in the guest exit path; because we haven't done treclaim, we
can get back to the guest with the transaction still active. If the
instruction is a case that kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation_early() doesn't
handle, or if the guest is in fake suspend state, then we proceed to
do the complete guest exit path and subsequently call
kvmhv_p9_tm_emulation() in host context with the MMU on. This handles
all the cases including the cases that generate program interrupts
(illegal instruction or TM Bad Thing) and facility unavailable
interrupts.
The emulation is reasonably straightforward and is mostly concerned
with checking for exception conditions and updating the state of
registers such as MSR and CR0. The treclaim emulation takes care to
ensure that the TEXASR register gets updated as if it were the guest
treclaim instruction that had done failure recording, not the treclaim
done in hypervisor state in the guest exit path.
With this, the KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM capability returns true (1) even if
transactional memory is not available to host userspace.
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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The soft IRQ masking code has to hard-disable interrupts in cases
where the exception is not cleared by the masked handler. External
interrupts used this approach for soft masking. Now recently PMU
interrupts do the same thing.
The soft IRQ masking code additionally allowed for interrupt handlers
to hard-enable interrupts after soft-disabling them. The idea is to
allow PMU interrupts through to profile interrupt handlers.
So when interrupts are being replayed when there is a pending
interrupt that requires hard-disabling, there is a test to prevent
those handlers from hard-enabling them if there is a pending external
interrupt. may_hard_irq_enable() handles this.
After f442d00480 ("powerpc/64s: Add support to mask perf interrupts
and replay them"), may_hard_irq_enable() could prematurely enable
MSR[EE] when a PMU exception exists, which would result in the
interrupt firing again while masked, and MSR[EE] being disabled again.
I haven't seen that this could cause a serious problem, but it's
more consistent to handle these soft-masked interrupts in the same
way. So introduce a define for all types of interrupts that require
MSR[EE] masking in their soft-disable handlers, and use that in
may_hard_irq_enable().
Fixes: f442d004806e ("powerpc/64s: Add support to mask perf interrupts and replay them")
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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The fallback RFI flush is used when firmware does not provide a way
to flush the cache. It's a "displacement flush" that evicts useful
data by displacing it with an uninteresting buffer.
The flush has to take care to work with implementation specific cache
replacment policies, so the recipe has been in flux. The initial
slow but conservative approach is to touch all lines of a congruence
class, with dependencies between each load. It has since been
determined that a linear pattern of loads without dependencies is
sufficient, and is significantly faster.
Measuring the speed of a null syscall with RFI fallback flush enabled
gives the relative improvement:
P8 - 1.83x
P9 - 1.75x
The flush also becomes simpler and more adaptable to different cache
geometries.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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Merge our fixes branch from the 4.15 cycle.
Unusually the fixes branch saw some significant features merged,
notably the RFI flush patches, so we want the code in next to be
tested against that, to avoid any surprises when the two are merged.
There's also some other work on the panic handling that was reverted
in fixes and we now want to do properly in next, which would conflict.
And we also fix a few other minor merge conflicts.
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Handle Data and Instruction exceptions caused by memory
protection-key.
The CPU will detect the key fault if the HPTE is already
programmed with the key.
However if the HPTE is not hashed, a key fault will not
be detected by the hardware. The software will detect
pkey violation in such a case.
Signed-off-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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Two new bit mask field "IRQ_DISABLE_MASK_PMU" is introduced to support
the masking of PMI and "IRQ_DISABLE_MASK_ALL" to aid interrupt masking
checking.
Couple of new irq #defs "PACA_IRQ_PMI" and "SOFTEN_VALUE_0xf0*" added
to use in the exception code to check for PMI interrupts.
In the masked_interrupt handler, for PMIs we reset the MSR[EE] and
return. In the __check_irq_replay(), replay the PMI interrupt by
calling performance_monitor_common handler.
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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To support addition of "bitmask" to MASKABLE_* macros, factor out the
EXCPETION_PROLOG_1 macro.
Make it explicit the interrupt masking supported by a gievn interrupt
handler. Patch correspondingly extends the MASKABLE_* macros with an
addition's parameter. "bitmask" parameter is passed to SOFTEN_TEST
macro to decide on masking the interrupt.
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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The only difference between EXC_COMMON_HV and EXC_COMMON is that the
former adds "2" to the trap number which is supposed to represent the
fact that this is an "HV" interrupt which uses HSRR0/1.
However KVM is the only one who cares and it has its own separate macros.
In fact, we only have one user of EXC_COMMON_HV and it's for an
unknown interrupt case. All the other ones already using EXC_COMMON.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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On some CPUs we can prevent the Meltdown vulnerability by flushing the
L1-D cache on exit from kernel to user mode, and from hypervisor to
guest.
This is known to be the case on at least Power7, Power8 and Power9. At
this time we do not know the status of the vulnerability on other CPUs
such as the 970 (Apple G5), pasemi CPUs (AmigaOne X1000) or Freescale
CPUs. As more information comes to light we can enable this, or other
mechanisms on those CPUs.
The vulnerability occurs when the load of an architecturally
inaccessible memory region (eg. userspace load of kernel memory) is
speculatively executed to the point where its result can influence the
address of a subsequent speculatively executed load.
In order for that to happen, the first load must hit in the L1,
because before the load is sent to the L2 the permission check is
performed. Therefore if no kernel addresses hit in the L1 the
vulnerability can not occur. We can ensure that is the case by
flushing the L1 whenever we return to userspace. Similarly for
hypervisor vs guest.
In order to flush the L1-D cache on exit, we add a section of nops at
each (h)rfi location that returns to a lower privileged context, and
patch that with some sequence. Newer firmwares are able to advertise
to us that there is a special nop instruction that flushes the L1-D.
If we do not see that advertised, we fall back to doing a displacement
flush in software.
For guest kernels we support migration between some CPU versions, and
different CPUs may use different flush instructions. So that we are
prepared to migrate to a machine with a different flush instruction
activated, we may have to patch more than one flush instruction at
boot if the hypervisor tells us to.
In the end this patch is mostly the work of Nicholas Piggin and
Michael Ellerman. However a cast of thousands contributed to analysis
of the issue, earlier versions of the patch, back ports testing etc.
Many thanks to all of them.
Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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In the SLB miss handler we may be returning to user or kernel. We need
to add a check early on and save the result in the cr4 register, and
then we bifurcate the return path based on that.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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This commit does simple conversions of rfi/rfid to the new macros that
include the expected destination context. By simple we mean cases
where there is a single well known destination context, and it's
simply a matter of substituting the instruction for the appropriate
macro.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux
Pull powerpc updates from Michael Ellerman:
"A bit of a small release, I suspect in part due to me travelling for
KS. But my backlog of patches to review is smaller than usual, so I
think in part folks just didn't send as much this cycle.
Non-highlights:
- Five fixes for the >128T address space handling, both to fix bugs
in our implementation and to bring the semantics exactly into line
with x86.
Highlights:
- Support for a new OPAL call on bare metal machines which gives us a
true NMI (ie. is not masked by MSR[EE]=0) for debugging etc.
- Support for Power9 DD2 in the CXL driver.
- Improvements to machine check handling so that uncorrectable errors
can be reported into the generic memory_failure() machinery.
- Some fixes and improvements for VPHN, which is used under PowerVM
to notify the Linux partition of topology changes.
- Plumbing to enable TM (transactional memory) without suspend on
some Power9 processors (PPC_FEATURE2_HTM_NO_SUSPEND).
- Support for emulating vector loads form cache-inhibited memory, on
some Power9 revisions.
- Disable the fast-endian switch "syscall" by default (behind a
CONFIG), we believe it has never had any users.
- A major rework of the API drivers use when initiating and waiting
for long running operations performed by OPAL firmware, and changes
to the powernv_flash driver to use the new API.
- Several fixes for the handling of FP/VMX/VSX while processes are
using transactional memory.
- Optimisations of TLB range flushes when using the radix MMU on
Power9.
- Improvements to the VAS facility used to access coprocessors on
Power9, and related improvements to the way the NX crypto driver
handles requests.
- Implementation of PMEM_API and UACCESS_FLUSHCACHE for 64-bit.
Thanks to: Alexey Kardashevskiy, Alistair Popple, Allen Pais, Andrew
Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Arnd Bergmann, Balbir Singh, Benjamin
Herrenschmidt, Breno Leitao, Christophe Leroy, Christophe Lombard,
Cyril Bur, Frederic Barrat, Gautham R. Shenoy, Geert Uytterhoeven,
Guilherme G. Piccoli, Gustavo Romero, Haren Myneni, Joel Stanley,
Kamalesh Babulal, Kautuk Consul, Markus Elfring, Masami Hiramatsu,
Michael Bringmann, Michael Neuling, Michal Suchanek, Naveen N. Rao,
Nicholas Piggin, Oliver O'Halloran, Paul Mackerras, Pedro Miraglia
Franco de Carvalho, Philippe Bergheaud, Sandipan Das, Seth Forshee,
Shriya, Stephen Rothwell, Stewart Smith, Sukadev Bhattiprolu, Tyrel
Datwyler, Vaibhav Jain, Vaidyanathan Srinivasan, and William A.
Kennington III"
* tag 'powerpc-4.15-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux: (151 commits)
powerpc/64s: Fix Power9 DD2.0 workarounds by adding DD2.1 feature
powerpc/64s: Fix masking of SRR1 bits on instruction fault
powerpc/64s: mm_context.addr_limit is only used on hash
powerpc/64s/radix: Fix 128TB-512TB virtual address boundary case allocation
powerpc/64s/hash: Allow MAP_FIXED allocations to cross 128TB boundary
powerpc/64s/hash: Fix fork() with 512TB process address space
powerpc/64s/hash: Fix 128TB-512TB virtual address boundary case allocation
powerpc/64s/hash: Fix 512T hint detection to use >= 128T
powerpc: Fix DABR match on hash based systems
powerpc/signal: Properly handle return value from uprobe_deny_signal()
powerpc/fadump: use kstrtoint to handle sysfs store
powerpc/lib: Implement UACCESS_FLUSHCACHE API
powerpc/lib: Implement PMEM API
powerpc/powernv/npu: Don't explicitly flush nmmu tlb
powerpc/powernv/npu: Use flush_all_mm() instead of flush_tlb_mm()
powerpc/powernv/idle: Round up latency and residency values
powerpc/kprobes: refactor kprobe_lookup_name for safer string operations
powerpc/kprobes: Blacklist emulate_update_regs() from kprobes
powerpc/kprobes: Do not disable interrupts for optprobes and kprobes_on_ftrace
powerpc/kprobes: Disable preemption before invoking probe handler for optprobes
...
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On 64-bit Book3s, when we take an instruction fault the reason for the
fault may be reported in SRR1. For data faults the reason is reported
in DSISR (Data Storage Instruction Status Register).
The reasons reported in each do not necessarily correspond, so we mask
the SRR1 bits before copying them to the DSISR, which is then used by
the page fault code.
Prior to commit b4c001dc44f0 ("powerpc/mm: Use symbolic constants for
filtering SRR1 bits on ISIs") we used a hard-coded mask of 0x58200000,
which corresponds to:
DSISR_NOHPTE 0x40000000 /* no translation found */
DSISR_NOEXEC_OR_G 0x10000000 /* exec of no-exec or guarded */
DSISR_PROTFAULT 0x08000000 /* protection fault */
DSISR_KEYFAULT 0x00200000 /* Storage Key fault */
That commit added a #define for the mask, DSISR_SRR1_MATCH_64S, but
incorrectly used a different similarly named DSISR_BAD_FAULT_64S.
This had the effect of changing the mask to 0xa43a0000, which omits
everything but DSISR_KEYFAULT.
Luckily this had no visible effect, because in practice we hardly use
the DSISR bits. The lack of DSISR_NOHPTE means a TLB flush
optimisation was missed in the native HPTE code, and DSISR_NOEXEC_OR_G
and DSISR_PROTFAULT are both only used to trigger rare warnings.
So we got lucky, but let's fix it. The new value only has bits between
17 and 30 set, so we can continue to use andis.
Fixes: b4c001dc44f0 ("powerpc/mm: Use symbolic constants for filtering SRR1 bits on ISIs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.14+
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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Commit 398a719d34a1 ("powerpc/mm: Update bits used to skip hash_page")
mistakenly dropped the DSISR_DABRMATCH bit from the mask of bit tested
to skip trying to hash a page.
As a result, the DABR matches would no longer be detected.
This adds it back. We open code it in the 2 places where it matters
rather than fold it into DSISR_BAD_FAULT_32S/64S because this isn't
technically a bad fault and while we would never hit it with the
current code, I prefer if page_fault_is_bad() didn't trigger on these.
Fixes: 398a719d34a1 ("powerpc/mm: Update bits used to skip hash_page")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.14
Tested-by: Pedro Miraglia Franco de Carvalho <pedromfc@br.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
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CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64 indicates support for the "standard" powerpc MMU
on 64-bit CPUs. The "standard" MMU refers to the hash page table MMU
found in "server" processors, from IBM mainly.
Currently CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64 is == CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64. While it's
annoying to have two symbols that always have the same value, it's not
quite annoying enough to bother removing one.
However with the arrival of Power9, we now have the situation where
CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64 is enabled, but the kernel is running using the
Radix MMU - *not* the "standard" MMU. So it is now actively confusing
to use it, because it implies that code is disabled or inactive when
the Radix MMU is in use, however that is not necessarily true.
So s/CONFIG_PPC_STD_MMU_64/CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64/, and do some minor
formatting updates of some of the affected lines.
This will be a pain for backports, but c'est la vie.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
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If the host takes a system reset interrupt while a guest is running,
the CPU must exit the guest before processing the host exception
handler.
After this patch, taking a sysrq+x with a CPU running in |
