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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 shadow stack support from Dave Hansen:
"This is the long awaited x86 shadow stack support, part of Intel's
Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).
CET consists of two related security features: shadow stacks and
indirect branch tracking. This series implements just the shadow stack
part of this feature, and just for userspace.
The main use case for shadow stack is providing protection against
return oriented programming attacks. It works by maintaining a
secondary (shadow) stack using a special memory type that has
protections against modification. When executing a CALL instruction,
the processor pushes the return address to both the normal stack and
to the special permission shadow stack. Upon RET, the processor pops
the shadow stack copy and compares it to the normal stack copy.
For more information, refer to the links below for the earlier
versions of this patch set"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220130211838.8382-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230613001108.3040476-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/
* tag 'x86_shstk_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (47 commits)
x86/shstk: Change order of __user in type
x86/ibt: Convert IBT selftest to asm
x86/shstk: Don't retry vm_munmap() on -EINTR
x86/kbuild: Fix Documentation/ reference
x86/shstk: Move arch detail comment out of core mm
x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS
x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK
x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack
selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test
x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack
x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface
x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status
x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace
x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall
x86/shstk: Check that signal frame is shadow stack mem
x86/shstk: Check that SSP is aligned on sigreturn
x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk
x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support
...
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Currently kcov instrument is disabled for object files under
arch/x86/kernel folder.
For object files under arch/x86/kernel, actually just disabling the kcov
instrument of files:"head32.o or head64.o and sev.o" could achieve
successful booting and provide kcov coverage for object files that do not
disable kcov instrument. The additional kcov coverage collected from
arch/x86/kernel folder helps kernel fuzzing efforts to find bugs.
Link to related improvement discussion is below:
https://groups.google.com/g/syzkaller/c/Dsl-RYGCqs8/m/x-tfpTyFBAAJ Related
ticket is as follow: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198443
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/06c0bb7b5f61e5884bf31180e8c122648c752010.1690771380.git.pengfei.xu@intel.com
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@google.com>
Cc: <heng.su@intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>,
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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The following warning is reported when frame pointers and kernel IBT are
enabled:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: ibt_selftest+0x11: sibling call from callable instruction with modified stack frame
The problem is that objtool interprets the indirect branch in
ibt_selftest() as a sibling call, and GCC inserts a (partial) frame
pointer prologue before it:
0000 000000000003f550 <ibt_selftest>:
0000 3f550: f3 0f 1e fa endbr64
0004 3f554: e8 00 00 00 00 call 3f559 <ibt_selftest+0x9> 3f555: R_X86_64_PLT32 __fentry__-0x4
0009 3f559: 55 push %rbp
000a 3f55a: 48 8d 05 02 00 00 00 lea 0x2(%rip),%rax # 3f563 <ibt_selftest_ip>
0011 3f561: ff e0 jmp *%rax
Note the inline asm is missing ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT, so the 'push %rbp'
happens before the indirect branch and the 'mov %rsp, %rbp' happens
afterwards.
Simplify the generated code and make it easier to understand for both
tools and humans by moving the selftest to proper asm.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/99a7e16b97bda97bf0a04aa141d6241cd8a839a2.1680912949.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
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Add three new arch_prctl() handles:
- ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE/DISABLE enables or disables the specified
feature. Returns 0 on success or a negative value on error.
- ARCH_SHSTK_LOCK prevents future disabling or enabling of the
specified feature. Returns 0 on success or a negative value
on error.
The features are handled per-thread and inherited over fork(2)/clone(2),
but reset on exec().
Co-developed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-27-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
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Today the control protection handler is defined in traps.c and used only
for the kernel IBT feature. To reduce ifdeffery, move it to it's own file.
In future patches, functionality will be added to make this handler also
handle user shadow stack faults. So name the file cet.c.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-8-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
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These functions are already marked as NOKPROBE to prevent recursion and
we have the same reason to blacklist them if rethook is used with fprobe,
since they are beyond the recursion-free region ftrace can guard.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230517034510.15639-5-zegao@tencent.com/
Fixes: f3a112c0c40d ("x86,rethook,kprobes: Replace kretprobe with rethook on x86")
Signed-off-by: Ze Gao <zegao@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
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Also remove the now-empty signal_compat.c.
Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221219193904.190220-3-brgerst@gmail.com
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 core updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Add the call depth tracking mitigation for Retbleed which has been
long in the making. It is a lighterweight software-only fix for
Skylake-based cores where enabling IBRS is a big hammer and causes a
significant performance impact.
What it basically does is, it aligns all kernel functions to 16 bytes
boundary and adds a 16-byte padding before the function, objtool
collects all functions' locations and when the mitigation gets
applied, it patches a call accounting thunk which is used to track
the call depth of the stack at any time.
When that call depth reaches a magical, microarchitecture-specific
value for the Return Stack Buffer, the code stuffs that RSB and
avoids its underflow which could otherwise lead to the Intel variant
of Retbleed.
This software-only solution brings a lot of the lost performance
back, as benchmarks suggest:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220915111039.092790446@infradead.org/
That page above also contains a lot more detailed explanation of the
whole mechanism
- Implement a new control flow integrity scheme called FineIBT which is
based on the software kCFI implementation and uses hardware IBT
support where present to annotate and track indirect branches using a
hash to validate them
- Other misc fixes and cleanups
* tag 'x86_core_for_v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (80 commits)
x86/paravirt: Use common macro for creating simple asm paravirt functions
x86/paravirt: Remove clobber bitmask from .parainstructions
x86/debug: Include percpu.h in debugreg.h to get DECLARE_PER_CPU() et al
x86/cpufeatures: Move X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH from bit 18 to bit 19 of word 11, to leave space for WIP X86_FEATURE_SGX_EDECCSSA bit
x86/Kconfig: Enable kernel IBT by default
x86,pm: Force out-of-line memcpy()
objtool: Fix weak hole vs prefix symbol
objtool: Optimize elf_dirty_reloc_sym()
x86/cfi: Add boot time hash randomization
x86/cfi: Boot time selection of CFI scheme
x86/ibt: Implement FineIBT
objtool: Add --cfi to generate the .cfi_sites section
x86: Add prefix symbols for function padding
objtool: Add option to generate prefix symbols
objtool: Avoid O(bloody terrible) behaviour -- an ode to libelf
objtool: Slice up elf_create_section_symbol()
kallsyms: Revert "Take callthunks into account"
x86: Unconfuse CONFIG_ and X86_FEATURE_ namespaces
x86/retpoline: Fix crash printing warning
x86/paravirt: Fix a !PARAVIRT build warning
...
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[ bp: Fixup merge conflict caused by changes coming from the kbuild tree. ]
Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220606203802.158958-9-brgerst@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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There are significant differences between signal handling on 32-bit vs.
64-bit, like different structure layouts and legacy syscalls. Instead
of duplicating that code for native and compat, merge both versions
into one file.
Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220606203802.158958-8-brgerst@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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Mitigating the Intel SKL RSB underflow issue in software requires to
track the call depth. That is every CALL and every RET need to be
intercepted and additional code injected.
The existing retbleed mitigations already include means of redirecting
RET to __x86_return_thunk; this can be re-purposed and RET can be
redirected to another function doing RET accounting.
CALL accounting will use the function padding introduced in prior
patches. For each CALL instruction, the destination symbol's padding
is rewritten to do the accounting and the CALL instruction is adjusted
to call into the padding.
This ensures only affected CPUs pay the overhead of this accounting.
Unaffected CPUs will leave the padding unused and have their 'JMP
__x86_return_thunk' replaced with an actual 'RET' instruction.
Objtool has been modified to supply a .call_sites section that lists
all the 'CALL' instructions. Additionally the paravirt instruction
sites are iterated since they will have been patched from an indirect
call to direct calls (or direct instructions in which case it'll be
ignored).
Module handling and the actual thunk code for SKL will be added in
subsequent steps.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220915111147.470877038@infradead.org
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull MM updates from Andrew Morton:
- Yu Zhao's Multi-Gen LRU patches are here. They've been under test in
linux-next for a couple of months without, to my knowledge, any
negative reports (or any positive ones, come to that).
- Also the Maple Tree from Liam Howlett. An overlapping range-based
tree for vmas. It it apparently slightly more efficient in its own
right, but is mainly targeted at enabling work to reduce mmap_lock
contention.
Liam has identified a number of other tree users in the kernel which
could be beneficially onverted to mapletrees.
Yu Zhao has identified a hard-to-hit but "easy to fix" lockdep splat
at [1]. This has yet to be addressed due to Liam's unfortunately
timed vacation. He is now back and we'll get this fixed up.
- Dmitry Vyukov introduces KMSAN: the Kernel Memory Sanitizer. It uses
clang-generated instrumentation to detect used-unintialized bugs down
to the single bit level.
KMSAN keeps finding bugs. New ones, as well as the legacy ones.
- Yang Shi adds a userspace mechanism (madvise) to induce a collapse of
memory into THPs.
- Zach O'Keefe has expanded Yang Shi's madvise(MADV_COLLAPSE) to
support file/shmem-backed pages.
- userfaultfd updates from Axel Rasmussen
- zsmalloc cleanups from Alexey Romanov
- cleanups from Miaohe Lin: vmscan, hugetlb_cgroup, hugetlb and
memory-failure
- Huang Ying adds enhancements to NUMA balancing memory tiering mode's
page promotion, with a new way of detecting hot pages.
- memcg updates from Shakeel Butt: charging optimizations and reduced
memory consumption.
- memcg cleanups from Kairui Song.
- memcg fixes and cleanups from Johannes Weiner.
- Vishal Moola provides more folio conversions
- Zhang Yi removed ll_rw_block() :(
- migration enhancements from Peter Xu
- migration error-path bugfixes from Huang Ying
- Aneesh Kumar added ability for a device driver to alter the memory
tiering promotion paths. For optimizations by PMEM drivers, DRM
drivers, etc.
- vma merging improvements from Jakub Matěn.
- NUMA hinting cleanups from David Hildenbrand.
- xu xin added aditional userspace visibility into KSM merging
activity.
- THP & KSM code consolidation from Qi Zheng.
- more folio work from Matthew Wilcox.
- KASAN updates from Andrey Konovalov.
- DAMON cleanups from Kaixu Xia.
- DAMON work from SeongJae Park: fixes, cleanups.
- hugetlb sysfs cleanups from Muchun Song.
- Mike Kravetz fixes locking issues in hugetlbfs and in hugetlb core.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAOUHufZabH85CeUN-MEMgL8gJGzJEWUrkiM58JkTbBhh-jew0Q@mail.gmail.com [1]
* tag 'mm-stable-2022-10-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (555 commits)
hugetlb: allocate vma lock for all sharable vmas
hugetlb: take hugetlb vma_lock when clearing vma_lock->vma pointer
hugetlb: fix vma lock handling during split vma and range unmapping
mglru: mm/vmscan.c: fix imprecise comments
mm/mglru: don't sync disk for each aging cycle
mm: memcontrol: drop dead CONFIG_MEMCG_SWAP config symbol
mm: memcontrol: use do_memsw_account() in a few more places
mm: memcontrol: deprecate swapaccounting=0 mode
mm: memcontrol: don't allocate cgroup swap arrays when memcg is disabled
mm/secretmem: remove reduntant return value
mm/hugetlb: add available_huge_pages() func
mm: remove unused inline functions from include/linux/mm_inline.h
selftests/vm: add selftest for MADV_COLLAPSE of uffd-minor memory
selftests/vm: add file/shmem MADV_COLLAPSE selftest for cleared pmd
selftests/vm: add thp collapse shmem testing
selftests/vm: add thp collapse file and tmpfs testing
selftests/vm: modularize thp collapse memory operations
selftests/vm: dedup THP helpers
mm/khugepaged: add tracepoint to hpage_collapse_scan_file()
mm/madvise: add file and shmem support to MADV_COLLAPSE
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild
Pull Kbuild updates from Masahiro Yamada:
- Remove potentially incomplete targets when Kbuid is interrupted by
SIGINT etc in case GNU Make may miss to do that when stderr is piped
to another program.
- Rewrite the single target build so it works more correctly.
- Fix rpm-pkg builds with V=1.
- List top-level subdirectories in ./Kbuild.
- Ignore auto-generated __kstrtab_* and __kstrtabns_* symbols in
kallsyms.
- Avoid two different modules in lib/zstd/ having shared code, which
potentially causes building the common code as build-in and modular
back-and-forth.
- Unify two modpost invocations to optimize the build process.
- Remove head-y syntax in favor of linker scripts for placing
particular sections in the head of vmlinux.
- Bump the minimal GNU Make version to 3.82.
- Clean up misc Makefiles and scripts.
* tag 'kbuild-v6.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: (41 commits)
docs: bump minimal GNU Make version to 3.82
ia64: simplify esi object addition in Makefile
Revert "kbuild: Check if linker supports the -X option"
kbuild: rebuild .vmlinux.export.o when its prerequisite is updated
kbuild: move modules.builtin(.modinfo) rules to Makefile.vmlinux_o
zstd: Fixing mixed module-builtin objects
kallsyms: ignore __kstrtab_* and __kstrtabns_* symbols
kallsyms: take the input file instead of reading stdin
kallsyms: drop duplicated ignore patterns from kallsyms.c
kbuild: reuse mksysmap output for kallsyms
mksysmap: update comment about __crc_*
kbuild: remove head-y syntax
kbuild: use obj-y instead extra-y for objects placed at the head
kbuild: hide error checker logs for V=1 builds
kbuild: re-run modpost when it is updated
kbuild: unify two modpost invocations
kbuild: move vmlinux.o rule to the top Makefile
kbuild: move .vmlinux.objs rule to Makefile.modpost
kbuild: list sub-directories in ./Kbuild
Makefile.compiler: replace cc-ifversion with compiler-specific macros
...
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Instrumenting some files with KMSAN will result in kernel being unable to
link, boot or crashing at runtime for various reasons (e.g. infinite
recursion caused by instrumentation hooks calling instrumented code
again).
Completely omit KMSAN instrumentation in the following places:
- arch/x86/boot and arch/x86/realmode/rm, as KMSAN doesn't work for i386;
- arch/x86/entry/vdso, which isn't linked with KMSAN runtime;
- three files in arch/x86/kernel - boot problems;
- arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c - recursion.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-33-glider@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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The objects placed at the head of vmlinux need special treatments:
- arch/$(SRCARCH)/Makefile adds them to head-y in order to place
them before other archives in the linker command line.
- arch/$(SRCARCH)/kernel/Makefile adds them to extra-y instead of
obj-y to avoid them going into built-in.a.
This commit gets rid of the latter.
Create vmlinux.a to collect all the objects that are unconditionally
linked to vmlinux. The objects listed in head-y are moved to the head
of vmlinux.a by using 'ar m'.
With this, arch/$(SRCARCH)/kernel/Makefile can consistently use obj-y
for builtin objects.
There is no *.o that is directly linked to vmlinux. Drop unneeded code
in scripts/clang-tools/gen_compile_commands.py.
$(AR) mPi needs 'T' to workaround the llvm-ar bug. The fix was suggested
by Nathan Chancellor [1].
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/llvm/YyjjT5gQ2hGMH0ni@dev-arch.thelio-3990X/
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>
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With CONFIG_CFI_CLANG, the compiler injects a type preamble immediately
before each function and a check to validate the target function type
before indirect calls:
; type preamble
__cfi_function:
mov <id>, %eax
function:
...
; indirect call check
mov -<id>,%r10d
add -0x4(%r11),%r10d
je .Ltmp1
ud2
.Ltmp1:
call __x86_indirect_thunk_r11
Add error handling code for the ud2 traps emitted for the checks, and
allow CONFIG_CFI_CLANG to be selected on x86_64.
This produces the following oops on CFI failure (generated using lkdtm):
[ 21.441706] CFI failure at lkdtm_indirect_call+0x16/0x20 [lkdtm]
(target: lkdtm_increment_int+0x0/0x10 [lkdtm]; expected type: 0x7e0c52a)
[ 21.444579] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 21.445296] CPU: 0 PID: 132 Comm: sh Not tainted
5.19.0-rc8-00020-g9f27360e674c #1
[ 21.445296] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 21.445296] RIP: 0010:lkdtm_indirect_call+0x16/0x20 [lkdtm]
[ 21.445296] Code: 52 1c c0 48 c7 c1 c5 50 1c c0 e9 25 48 2a cc 0f 1f
44 00 00 49 89 fb 48 c7 c7 50 b4 1c c0 41 ba 5b ad f3 81 45 03 53 f8
[ 21.445296] RSP: 0018:ffffa9f9c02ffdc0 EFLAGS: 00000292
[ 21.445296] RAX: 0000000000000027 RBX: ffffffffc01cb300 RCX: 385cbbd2e070a700
[ 21.445296] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: c0000000ffffdfff RDI: ffffffffc01cb450
[ 21.445296] RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff8d081610
[ 21.445296] R10: 00000000bcc90825 R11: ffffffffc01c2fc0 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 21.445296] R13: ffffa31b827a6000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000002
[ 21.445296] FS: 00007f08b42216a0(0000) GS:ffffa31b9f400000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 21.445296] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 21.445296] CR2: 0000000000c76678 CR3: 0000000001940000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 21.445296] Call Trace:
[ 21.445296] <TASK>
[ 21.445296] lkdtm_CFI_FORWARD_PROTO+0x30/0x50 [lkdtm]
[ 21.445296] direct_entry+0x12d/0x140 [lkdtm]
[ 21.445296] full_proxy_write+0x5d/0xb0
[ 21.445296] vfs_write+0x144/0x460
[ 21.445296] ? __x64_sys_wait4+0x5a/0xc0
[ 21.445296] ksys_write+0x69/0xd0
[ 21.445296] do_syscall_64+0x51/0xa0
[ 21.445296] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[ 21.445296] RIP: 0033:0x7f08b41a6fe1
[ 21.445296] Code: be 07 00 00 00 41 89 c0 e8 7e ff ff ff 44 89 c7 89
04 24 e8 91 c6 02 00 8b 04 24 48 83 c4 68 c3 48 63 ff b8 01 00 00 03
[ 21.445296] RSP: 002b:00007ffcdf65c2e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[ 21.445296] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f08b4221690 RCX: 00007f08b41a6fe1
[ 21.445296] RDX: 0000000000000012 RSI: 0000000000c738f0 RDI: 0000000000000001
[ 21.445296] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: fefefefefefefeff R09: fefefefeffc5ff4e
[ 21.445296] R10: 00007f08b42222b0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000c738f0
[ 21.445296] R13: 0000000000000012 R14: 00007ffcdf65c401 R15: 0000000000c70450
[ 21.445296] </TASK>
[ 21.445296] Modules linked in: lkdtm
[ 21.445296] Dumping ftrace buffer:
[ 21.445296] (ftrace buffer empty)
[ 21.471442] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 21.471811] RIP: 0010:lkdtm_indirect_call+0x16/0x20 [lkdtm]
[ 21.472467] Code: 52 1c c0 48 c7 c1 c5 50 1c c0 e9 25 48 2a cc 0f 1f
44 00 00 49 89 fb 48 c7 c7 50 b4 1c c0 41 ba 5b ad f3 81 45 03 53 f8
[ 21.474400] RSP: 0018:ffffa9f9c02ffdc0 EFLAGS: 00000292
[ 21.474735] RAX: 0000000000000027 RBX: ffffffffc01cb300 RCX: 385cbbd2e070a700
[ 21.475664] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: c0000000ffffdfff RDI: ffffffffc01cb450
[ 21.476471] RBP: 0000000000000006 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff8d081610
[ 21.477127] R10: 00000000bcc90825 R11: ffffffffc01c2fc0 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 21.477959] R13: ffffa31b827a6000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000002
[ 21.478657] FS: 00007f08b42216a0(0000) GS:ffffa31b9f400000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 21.479577] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 21.480307] CR2: 0000000000c76678 CR3: 0000000001940000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 21.481460] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220908215504.3686827-23-samitolvanen@google.com
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Commit 3ad38ceb2769 ("x86/mm: Remove CONFIG_DEBUG_NX_TEST")
removed arch/x86/kernel/test_nx.c
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220711041247.119357-1-masahiroy@kernel.org
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The file-wide OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD annotation is used with
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER to tell objtool to skip the entire file when frame
pointers are enabled. However that annotation is now deprecated because
it doesn't work with IBT, where objtool runs on vmlinux.o instead of
individual translation units.
Instead, use more fine-grained function-specific annotations:
- The 'save_mcount_regs' macro does funny things with the frame pointer.
Use STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD_FP to tell objtool to ignore the
functions using it.
- The return_to_handler() "function" isn't actually a callable function.
Instead of being called, it's returned to. The real return address
isn't on the stack, so unwinding is already doomed no matter which
unwinder is used. So just remove the STT_FUNC annotation, telling
objtool to ignore it. That also removes the implicit
ANNOTATE_NOENDBR, which now needs to be made explicit.
Fixes the following warning:
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: __fentry__+0x16: return with modified stack frame
Fixes: ed53a0d97192 ("x86/alternative: Use .ibt_endbr_seal to seal indirect calls")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b7a7a42fe306aca37826043dac89e113a1acdbac.1654268610.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
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git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/dma-mapping
Pull dma-mapping updates from Christoph Hellwig:
- don't over-decrypt memory (Robin Murphy)
- takes min align mask into account for the swiotlb max mapping size
(Tianyu Lan)
- use GFP_ATOMIC in dma-debug (Mikulas Patocka)
- fix DMA_ATTR_NO_KERNEL_MAPPING on xen/arm (me)
- don't fail on highmem CMA pages in dma_direct_alloc_pages (me)
- cleanup swiotlb initialization and share more code with swiotlb-xen
(me, Stefano Stabellini)
* tag 'dma-mapping-5.19-2022-05-25' of git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/dma-mapping: (23 commits)
dma-direct: don't over-decrypt memory
swiotlb: max mapping size takes min align mask into account
swiotlb: use the right nslabs-derived sizes in swiotlb_init_late
swiotlb: use the right nslabs value in swiotlb_init_remap
swiotlb: don't panic when the swiotlb buffer can't be allocated
dma-debug: change allocation mode from GFP_NOWAIT to GFP_ATIOMIC
dma-direct: don't fail on highmem CMA pages in dma_direct_alloc_pages
swiotlb-xen: fix DMA_ATTR_NO_KERNEL_MAPPING on arm
x86: remove cruft from <asm/dma-mapping.h>
swiotlb: remove swiotlb_init_with_tbl and swiotlb_init_late_with_tbl
swiotlb: merge swiotlb-xen initialization into swiotlb
swiotlb: provide swiotlb_init variants that remap the buffer
swiotlb: pass a gfp_mask argument to swiotlb_init_late
swiotlb: add a SWIOTLB_ANY flag to lift the low memory restriction
swiotlb: make the swiotlb_init interface more useful
x86: centralize setting SWIOTLB_FORCE when guest memory encryption is enabled
x86: remove the IOMMU table infrastructure
MIPS/octeon: use swiotlb_init instead of open coding it
arm/xen: don't check for xen_initial_domain() in xen_create_contiguous_region
swiotlb: rename swiotlb_late_init_with_default_size
...
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The IOMMU table tries to separate the different IOMMUs into different
backends, but actually requires various cross calls.
Rewrite the code to do the generic swiotlb/swiotlb-xen setup directly
in pci-dma.c and then just call into the IOMMU drivers.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
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Due to
103a4908ad4d ("x86/head/64: Disable stack protection for head$(BITS).o")
kernel/head{32,64}.c are compiled with -fno-stack-protector to allow
a call to set_bringup_idt_handler(), which would otherwise have stack
protection enabled with CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG.
While sufficient for that case, there may still be issues with calls to
any external functions that were compiled with stack protection enabled
that in-turn make stack-protected calls, or if the exception handlers
set up by set_bringup_idt_handler() make calls to stack-protected
functions.
Subsequent patches for SEV-SNP CPUID validation support will introduce
both such cases. Attempting to disable stack protection for everything
in scope to address that is prohibitive since much of the code, like the
SEV-ES #VC handler, is shared code that remains in use after boot and
could benefit from having stack protection enabled. Attempting to inline
calls is brittle and can quickly balloon out to library/helper code
where that's not really an option.
Instead, re-enable stack protection for head32.c/head64.c, and make the
appropriate changes to ensure the segment used for the stack canary is
initialized in advance of any stack-protected C calls.
For head64.c:
- The BSP will enter from startup_64() and call into C code
(startup_64_setup_env()) shortly after setting up the stack, which
may result in calls to stack-protected code. Set up %gs early to allow
for this safely.
- APs will enter from secondary_startup_64*(), and %gs will be set up
soon after. There is one call to C code prior to %gs being setup
(__startup_secondary_64()), but it is only to fetch 'sme_me_mask'
global, so just load 'sme_me_mask' directly instead, and remove the
now-unused __startup_secondary_64() function.
For head32.c:
- BSPs/APs will set %fs to __BOOT_DS prior to any C calls. In recent
kernels, the compiler is configured to access the stack canary at
%fs:__stack_chk_guard [1], which overlaps with the initial per-cpu
'__stack_chk_guard' variable in the initial/"master" .data..percpu
area. This is sufficient to allow access to the canary for use
during initial startup, so no changes are needed there.
[1] 3fb0fdb3bbe7 ("x86/stackprotector/32: Make the canary into a regular percpu variable")
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Suggested-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> #for 64-bit %gs set up
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220307213356.2797205-24-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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Replaces the kretprobe code with rethook on x86. With this patch,
kretprobe on x86 uses the rethook instead of kretprobe specific
trampoline code.
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/164826163692.2455864.13745421016848209527.stgit@devnote2
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Move cc_platform.c to arch/x86/coco/. The directory is going to be the
home space for code related to confidential computing.
Intel TDX code will land here. AMD SEV code will also eventually be
moved there.
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220222185740.26228-3-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
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Make arch_stack_walk() available for ARCH_STACKWALK architectures
without it being entangled in STACKTRACE.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211022152104.356586621@infradead.org/
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
[Mark: rebase, drop unnecessary arm change]
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211129142849.3056714-2-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Introduce an x86 version of the cc_platform_has() function. This will be
used to replace vendor specific calls like sme_active(), sev_active(),
etc.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210928191009.32551-4-bp@alien8.de
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git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm-misc into drm-next
drm-misc-next for v5.15-rc1:
UAPI Changes:
- Remove sysfs stats for dma-buf attachments, as it causes a performance regression.
Previous merge is not in a rc kernel yet, so no userspace regression possible.
Cross-subsystem Changes:
- Sanitize user input in kyro's viewport ioctl.
- Use refcount_t in fb_info->count
- Assorted fixes to dma-buf.
- Extend x86 efifb handling to all archs.
- Fix neofb divide by 0.
- Document corpro,gm7123 bridge dt bindings.
Core Changes:
- Slightly rework drm master handling.
- Cleanup vgaarb handling.
- Assorted fixes.
Driver Changes:
- Add support for ws2401 panel.
- Assorted fixes to stm, ast, bochs.
- Demidlayer ingenic irq.
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
From: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/2d0d2fe8-01fc-e216-c3fd-38db9e69944e@linux.intel.com
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The x86 architecture has generic support to register a system framebuffer
platform device. It either registers a "simple-framebuffer" if the config
option CONFIG_X86_SYSFB is enabled, or a legacy VGA/VBE/EFI FB device.
But the code is generic enough to be reused by other architectures and can
be moved out of the arch/x86 directory.
This will allow to also support the simple{fb,drm} drivers on non-x86 EFI
platforms, such as aarch64 where these drivers are only supported with DT.
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20210625130947.1803678-2-javierm@redhat.com
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In the context of high-performance computing (HPC), the Operating System
Noise (*osnoise*) refers to the interference experienced by an application
due to activities inside the operating system. In the context of Linux,
NMIs, IRQs, SoftIRQs, and any other system thread can cause noise to the
system. Moreover, hardware-related jobs can also cause noise, for example,
via SMIs.
The osnoise tracer leverages the hwlat_detector by running a similar
loop with preemption, SoftIRQs and IRQs enabled, thus allowing all
the sources of *osnoise* during its execution. Using the same approach
of hwlat, osnoise takes note of the entry and exit point of any
source of interferences, increasing a per-cpu interference counter. The
osnoise tracer also saves an interference counter for each source of
interference. The interference counter for NMI, IRQs, SoftIRQs, and
threads is increased anytime the tool observes these interferences' entry
events. When a noise happens without any interference from the operating
system level, the hardware noise counter increases, pointing to a
hardware-related noise. In this way, osnoise can account for any
source of interference. At the end of the period, the osnoise tracer
prints the sum of all noise, the max single noise, the percentage of CPU
available for the thread, and the counters for the noise sources.
Usage
Write the ASCII text "osnoise" into the current_tracer file of the
tracing system (generally mounted at /sys/kernel/tracing).
For example::
[root@f32 ~]# cd /sys/kernel/tracing/
[root@f32 tracing]# echo osnoise > current_tracer
It is possible to follow the trace by reading the trace trace file::
[root@f32 tracing]# cat trace
# tracer: osnoise
#
# _-----=> irqs-off
# / _----=> need-resched
# | / _---=> hardirq/softirq
# || / _--=> preempt-depth MAX
# || / SINGLE Interference counters:
# |||| RUNTIME NOISE % OF CPU NOISE +-----------------------------+
# TASK-PID CPU# |||| TIMESTAMP IN US IN US AVAILABLE IN US HW NMI IRQ SIRQ THREAD
# | | | |||| | | | | | | | | | |
<...>-859 [000] .... 81.637220: 1000000 190 99.98100 9 18 0 1007 18 1
<...>-860 [001] .... 81.638154: 1000000 656 99.93440 74 23 0 1006 16 3
<...>-861 [002] .... 81.638193: 1000000 5675 99.43250 202 6 0 1013 25 21
<...>-862 [003] .... 81.638242: 1000000 125 99.98750 45 1 0 1011 23 0
<...>-863 [004] .... 81.638260: 1000000 1721 99.82790 168 7 0 1002 49 41
<...>-864 [005] .... 81.638286: 1000000 263 99.97370 57 6 0 1006 26 2
<...>-865 [006] .... 81.638302: 1000000 109 99.98910 21 3 0 1006 18 1
<...>-866 [007] .... 81.638326: 1000000 7816 99.21840 107 8 0 1016 39 19
In addition to the regular trace fields (from TASK-PID to TIMESTAMP), the
tracer prints a message at the end of each period for each CPU that is
running an osnoise/CPU thread. The osnoise specific fields report:
- The RUNTIME IN USE reports the amount of time in microseconds that
the osnoise thread kept looping reading the time.
- The NOISE IN US reports the sum of noise in microseconds observed
by the osnoise tracer during the associated runtime.
- The % OF CPU AVAILABLE reports the percentage of CPU available for
the osnoise thread during the runtime window.
- The MAX SINGLE NOISE IN US reports the maximum single noise observed
during the runtime window.
- The Interference counters display how many each of the respective
interference happened during the runtime window.
Note that the example above shows a high number of HW noise samples.
The reason being is that this sample was taken on a virtual machine,
and the host interference is detected as a hardware interference.
Tracer options
The tracer has a set of options inside the osnoise directory, they are:
- osnoise/cpus: CPUs at which a osnoise thread will execute.
- osnoise/period_us: the period of the osnoise thread.
- osnoise/runtime_us: how long an osnoise thread will look for noise.
- osnoise/stop_tracing_us: stop the system tracing if a single noise
higher than the configured value happens. Writing 0 disables this
option.
- osnoise/stop_tracing_total_us: stop the system tracing if total noise
higher than the configured value happens. Writing 0 disables this
option.
- tracing_threshold: the minimum delta between two time() reads to be
considered as noise, in us. When set to 0, the default value will
be used, which is currently 5 us.
Additional Tracing
In addition to the tracer, a set of tracepoints were added to
facilitate the identification of the osnoise source.
- osnoise:sample_threshold: printed anytime a noise is higher than
the configurable tolerance_ns.
- osnoise:nmi_noise: noise from NMI, including the duration.
- osnoise:irq_noise: noise from an IRQ, including the duration.
- osnoise:softirq_noise: noise from a SoftIRQ, including the
duration.
- osnoise:thread_noise: noise from a thread, including the duration.
Note that all the values are *net values*. For example, if while osnoise
is running, another thread preempts the osnoise thread, it will start a
thread_noise duration at the start. Then, an IRQ takes place, preempting
the thread_noise, starting a irq_noise. When the IRQ ends its execution,
it will compute its duration, and this duration will be subtracted from
the thread_noise, in such a way as to avoid the double accounting of the
IRQ execution. This logic is valid for all sources of noise.
Here is one example of the usage of these tracepoints::
osnoise/8-961 [008] d.h. 5789.857532: irq_noise: local_timer:236 start 5789.857529929 duration 1845 ns
osnoise/8-961 [008] dNh. 5789.858408: irq_noise: local_timer:236 start 5789.858404871 duration 2848 ns
migration/8-54 [008] d... 5789.858413: thread_noise: migration/8:54 start 5789.858409300 duration 3068 ns
osnoise/8-961 [008] .... 5789.858413: sample_threshold: start 5789.858404555 duration 8723 ns interferences 2
In this example, a noise sample of 8 microseconds was reported in the last
line, pointing to two interferences. Looking backward in the trace, the
two previous entries were about the migration thread running after a
timer IRQ execution. The first event is not part of the noise because
it took place one millisecond before.
It is worth noticing that the sum of the duration reported in the
tracepoints is smaller than eight us reported in the sample_threshold.
The reason roots in the overhead of the entry and exit code that happens
before and after any interference execution. This justifies the dual
approach: measuring thread and tracing.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e649467042d60e7b62714c9c6751a56299d15119.1624372313.git.bristot@redhat.com
Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kate Carcia <kcarcia@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Cc: Clark Willaims <williams@redhat.com>
Cc: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
[
Made the following functions static:
trace_irqentry_callback()
trace_irqexit_callback()
trace_intel_irqentry_callback()
trace_intel_irqexit_callback()
Added to include/trace.h:
osnoise_arch_register()
osnoise_arch_unregister()
Fixed define logic for LATENCY_FS_NOTIFY
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
]
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
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SEV-SNP builds upon the SEV-ES functionality while adding new hardware
protection. Version 2 of the GHCB specification adds new NAE events that
are SEV-SNP specific. Rename the sev-es.{ch} to sev.{ch} so that all
SEV* functionality can be consolidated in one place.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210427111636.1207-2-brijesh.singh@amd.com
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There is no need any longer to have different paravirt patch functions
for native and Xen. Eliminate native_patch() and rename
paravirt_patch_default() to paravirt_patch().
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel. |
