summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/fs
AgeCommit message (Collapse)AuthorFilesLines
2021-11-26f2fs: fix to use WHINT_MODEKeoseong Park1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 011e0868e0cf1237675b22e36fffa958fb08f46e ] Since active_logs can be set to 2 or 4 or NR_CURSEG_PERSIST_TYPE(6), it cannot be set to NR_CURSEG_TYPE(8). That is, whint_mode is always off. Therefore, the condition is changed from NR_CURSEG_TYPE to NR_CURSEG_PERSIST_TYPE. Cc: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Fixes: d0b9e42ab615 (f2fs: introduce inmem curseg) Reported-by: tanghuan <tanghuan@vivo.com> Signed-off-by: Keoseong Park <keosung.park@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Fengnan Chang <changfengnan@vivo.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-21erofs: fix unsafe pagevec reuse of hooked pclustersGao Xiang2-9/+17
commit 86432a6dca9bed79111990851df5756d3eb5f57c upstream. There are pclusters in runtime marked with Z_EROFS_PCLUSTER_TAIL before actual I/O submission. Thus, the decompression chain can be extended if the following pcluster chain hooks such tail pcluster. As the related comment mentioned, if some page is made of a hooked pcluster and another followed pcluster, it can be reused for in-place I/O (since I/O should be submitted anyway): _______________________________________________________________ | tail (partial) page | head (partial) page | |_____PRIMARY_HOOKED___|____________PRIMARY_FOLLOWED____________| However, it's by no means safe to reuse as pagevec since if such PRIMARY_HOOKED pclusters finally move into bypass chain without I/O submission. It's somewhat hard to reproduce with LZ4 and I just found it (general protection fault) by ro_fsstressing a LZMA image for long time. I'm going to actively clean up related code together with multi-page folio adaption in the next few months. Let's address it directly for easier backporting for now. Call trace for reference: z_erofs_decompress_pcluster+0x10a/0x8a0 [erofs] z_erofs_decompress_queue.isra.36+0x3c/0x60 [erofs] z_erofs_runqueue+0x5f3/0x840 [erofs] z_erofs_readahead+0x1e8/0x320 [erofs] read_pages+0x91/0x270 page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x18b/0x240 filemap_get_pages+0x10a/0x5f0 filemap_read+0xa9/0x330 new_sync_read+0x11b/0x1a0 vfs_read+0xf1/0x190 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211103182006.4040-1-xiang@kernel.org Fixes: 3883a79abd02 ("staging: erofs: introduce VLE decompression support") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.19+ Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-11-21erofs: remove the occupied parameter from z_erofs_pagevec_enqueue()Yue Hu2-7/+2
commit 7dea3de7d384f4c8156e8bd93112ba6db1eb276c upstream. No any behavior to variable occupied in z_erofs_attach_page() which is only caller to z_erofs_pagevec_enqueue(). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210419102623.2015-1-zbestahu@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Yue Hu <huyue2@yulong.com> Reviewed-by: Gao Xiang <xiang@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <xiang@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-11-18f2fs: should use GFP_NOFS for directory inodesJaegeuk Kim2-2/+2
commit 92d602bc7177325e7453189a22e0c8764ed3453e upstream. We use inline_dentry which requires to allocate dentry page when adding a link. If we allow to reclaim memory from filesystem, we do down_read(&sbi->cp_rwsem) twice by f2fs_lock_op(). I think this should be okay, but how about stopping the lockdep complaint [1]? f2fs_create() - f2fs_lock_op() - f2fs_do_add_link() - __f2fs_find_entry - f2fs_get_read_data_page() -> kswapd - shrink_node - f2fs_evict_inode - f2fs_lock_op() [1] fs_reclaim ){+.+.}-{0:0} : kswapd0: lock_acquire+0x114/0x394 kswapd0: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x40/0x50 kswapd0: prepare_alloc_pages+0x94/0x1ec kswapd0: __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x78/0x1b0 kswapd0: pagecache_get_page+0x2e0/0x57c kswapd0: f2fs_get_read_data_page+0xc0/0x394 kswapd0: f2fs_find_data_page+0xa4/0x23c kswapd0: find_in_level+0x1a8/0x36c kswapd0: __f2fs_find_entry+0x70/0x100 kswapd0: f2fs_do_add_link+0x84/0x1ec kswapd0: f2fs_mkdir+0xe4/0x1e4 kswapd0: vfs_mkdir+0x110/0x1c0 kswapd0: do_mkdirat+0xa4/0x160 kswapd0: __arm64_sys_mkdirat+0x24/0x34 kswapd0: el0_svc_common.llvm.17258447499513131576+0xc4/0x1e8 kswapd0: do_el0_svc+0x28/0xa0 kswapd0: el0_svc+0x24/0x38 kswapd0: el0_sync_handler+0x88/0xec kswapd0: el0_sync+0x1c0/0x200 kswapd0: -> #1 ( &sbi->cp_rwsem ){++++}-{3:3} : kswapd0: lock_acquire+0x114/0x394 kswapd0: down_read+0x7c/0x98 kswapd0: f2fs_do_truncate_blocks+0x78/0x3dc kswapd0: f2fs_truncate+0xc8/0x128 kswapd0: f2fs_evict_inode+0x2b8/0x8b8 kswapd0: evict+0xd4/0x2f8 kswapd0: iput+0x1c0/0x258 kswapd0: do_unlinkat+0x170/0x2a0 kswapd0: __arm64_sys_unlinkat+0x4c/0x68 kswapd0: el0_svc_common.llvm.17258447499513131576+0xc4/0x1e8 kswapd0: do_el0_svc+0x28/0xa0 kswapd0: el0_svc+0x24/0x38 kswapd0: el0_sync_handler+0x88/0xec kswapd0: el0_sync+0x1c0/0x200 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: bdbc90fa55af ("f2fs: don't put dentry page in pagecache into highmem") Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Stanley Chu <stanley.chu@mediatek.com> Reviewed-by: Light Hsieh <light.hsieh@mediatek.com> Tested-by: Light Hsieh <light.hsieh@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-11-18NFSv4: Fix a regression in nfs_set_open_stateid_locked()Trond Myklebust1-7/+8
[ Upstream commit 01d29f87fcfef38d51ce2b473981a5c1e861ac0a ] If we already hold open state on the client, yet the server gives us a completely different stateid to the one we already hold, then we currently treat it as if it were an out-of-sequence update, and wait for 5 seconds for other updates to come in. This commit fixes the behaviour so that we immediately start processing of the new stateid, and then leave it to the call to nfs4_test_and_free_stateid() to decide what to do with the old stateid. Fixes: b4868b44c562 ("NFSv4: Wait for stateid updates after CLOSE/OPEN_DOWNGRADE") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-18Fix user namespace leakAlexey Gladkov1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit d5f458a979650e5ed37212f6134e4ee2b28cb6ed ] Fixes: 61ca2c4afd9d ("NFS: Only reference user namespace from nfs4idmap struct instead of cred") Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-18NFS: Fix an Oops in pnfs_mark_request_commit()Trond Myklebust1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit f0caea8882a7412a2ad4d8274f0280cdf849c9e2 ] Olga reports seeing the following Oops when doing O_DIRECT writes to a pNFS flexfiles server: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 1 PID: 234186 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc4+ #4 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM/RHEL-AV, BIOS 1.13.0-2.module+el8.3.0+7353+9de0a3cc 04/01/2014 Workqueue: nfsiod rpc_async_release [sunrpc] RIP: 0010:nfs_mark_request_commit+0x12/0x30 [nfs] Code: ff ff be 03 00 00 00 e8 ac 34 83 eb e9 29 ff ff ff e8 22 bc d7 eb 66 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 85 f6 74 16 48 8b 42 10 48 8b 40 18 <48> 8b 40 18 48 85 c0 74 05 e9 70 fc 15 ec 48 89 d6 e9 68 ed ff ff RSP: 0018:ffffa82f0159fe00 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8f3393141880 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffffa82f0159fe08 RSI: ffff8f3381252500 RDI: ffff8f3393141880 RBP: ffff8f33ac317c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8f3487724cb0 R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffff8f3485bccee0 R14: ffff8f33ac317c10 R15: ffff8f33ac317cd8 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8f34fbc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000122120006 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: nfs_direct_write_completion+0x13b/0x250 [nfs] rpc_free_task+0x39/0x60 [sunrpc] rpc_async_release+0x29/0x40 [sunrpc] process_one_work+0x1ce/0x370 worker_thread+0x30/0x380 ? process_one_work+0x370/0x370 kthread+0x11a/0x140 ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 Reported-by: Olga Kornievskaia <aglo@umich.edu> Fixes: 9c455a8c1e14 ("NFS/pNFS: Clean up pNFS commit operations") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-18NFS: Fix up commit deadlocksTrond Myklebust3-6/+7
[ Upstream commit 133a48abf6ecc535d7eddc6da1c3e4c972445882 ] If O_DIRECT bumps the commit_info rpcs_out field, then that could lead to fsync() hangs. The fix is to ensure that O_DIRECT calls nfs_commit_end(). Fixes: 723c921e7dfc ("sched/wait, fs/nfs: Convert wait_on_atomic_t() usage to the new wait_var_event() API") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-18fs: orangefs: fix error return code of orangefs_revalidate_lookup()Jia-Ju Bai1-1/+3
[ Upstream commit 4c2b46c824a78fc8190d8eafaaea5a9078fe7479 ] When op_alloc() returns NULL to new_op, no error return code of orangefs_revalidate_lookup() is assigned. To fix this bug, ret is assigned with -ENOMEM in this case. Fixes: 8bb8aefd5afb ("OrangeFS: Change almost all instances of the string PVFS2 to OrangeFS.") Reported-by: TOTE Robot <oslab@tsinghua.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-18NFS: Fix deadlocks in nfs_scan_commit_list()Trond Myklebust1-15/+2
[ Upstream commit 64a93dbf25d3a1368bb58ddf0f61d0a92d7479e3 ] Partially revert commit 2ce209c42c01 ("NFS: Wait for requests that are locked on the commit list"), since it can lead to deadlocks between commit requests and nfs_join_page_group(). For now we should assume that any locked requests on the commit list are either about to be removed and committed by another task, or the writes they describe are about to be retransmitted. In either case, we should not need to worry. Fixes: 2ce209c42c01 ("NFS: Wait for requests that are locked on the commit list") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-18pnfs/flexfiles: Fix misplaced barrier in nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_dsBaptiste Lepers2-4/+4
[ Upstream commit a2915fa06227b056a8f9b0d79b61dca08ad5cfc6 ] _nfs4_pnfs_v3/v4_ds_connect do some work smp_wmb ds->ds_clp = clp; And nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds currently does smp_rmb if(ds->ds_clp) ... This patch places the smp_rmb after the if. This ensures that following reads only happen once nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds has checked that data has been properly initialized. Fixes: d67ae825a59d6 ("pnfs/flexfiles: Add the FlexFile Layout Driver") Signed-off-by: Baptiste Lepers <baptiste.lepers@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-18NFS: Fix dentry verifier racesTrond Myklebust1-4/+3
[ Upstream commit cec08f452a687fce9dfdf47946d00a1d12a8bec5 ] If the directory changed while we were revalidating the dentry, then don't update the dentry verifier. There is no value in setting the verifier to an older value, and we could end up overwriting a more up to date verifier from a parallel revalidation. Fixes: efeda80da38d ("NFSv4: Fix revalidation of dentries with delegations") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Tested-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-18JFS: fix memleak in jfs_mountDongliang Mu1-29/+22
[ Upstream commit c48a14dca2cb57527dde6b960adbe69953935f10 ] In jfs_mount, when diMount(ipaimap2) fails, it goes to errout35. However, the following code does not free ipaimap2 allocated by diReadSpecial. Fix this by refactoring the error handling code of jfs_mount. To be specific, modify the lable name and free ipaimap2 when the above error ocurrs. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Dongliang Mu <mudongliangabcd@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-18erofs: don't trigger WARN() when decompression failsGao Xiang1-1/+0
[ Upstream commit a0961f351d82d43ab0b845304caa235dfe249ae9 ] syzbot reported a WARNING [1] due to corrupted compressed data. As Dmitry said, "If this is not a kernel bug, then the code should not use WARN. WARN if for kernel bugs and is recognized as such by all testing systems and humans." [1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000b3586105cf0ff45e@google.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211025074311.130395-1-hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> Reported-by: syzbot+d8aaffc3719597e8cfb4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-18btrfs: do not take the uuid_mutex in btrfs_rm_deviceJosef Bacik1-5/+5
[ Upstream commit 8ef9dc0f14ba6124c62547a4fdc59b163d8b864e ] We got the following lockdep splat while running fstests (specifically btrfs/003 and btrfs/020 in a row) with the new rc. This was uncovered by 87579e9b7d8d ("loop: use worker per cgroup instead of kworker") which converted loop to using workqueues, which comes with lockdep annotations that don't exist with kworkers. The lockdep splat is as follows: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.14.0-rc2-custom+ #34 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ losetup/156417 is trying to acquire lock: ffff9c7645b02d38 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x84/0x600 but task is already holding lock: ffff9c7647395468 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x41/0x650 [loop] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #5 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xba/0x7c0 lo_open+0x28/0x60 [loop] blkdev_get_whole+0x28/0xf0 blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0x168/0x3c0 blkdev_open+0xd2/0xe0 do_dentry_open+0x163/0x3a0 path_openat+0x74d/0xa40 do_filp_open+0x9c/0x140 do_sys_openat2+0xb1/0x170 __x64_sys_openat+0x54/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #4 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xba/0x7c0 blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xd1/0x3c0 blkdev_get_by_path+0xc0/0xd0 btrfs_scan_one_device+0x52/0x1f0 [btrfs] btrfs_control_ioctl+0xac/0x170 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #3 (uuid_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0xba/0x7c0 btrfs_rm_device+0x48/0x6a0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x2d1c/0x3110 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae -> #2 (sb_writers#11){.+.+}-{0:0}: lo_write_bvec+0x112/0x290 [loop] loop_process_work+0x25f/0xcb0 [loop] process_one_work+0x28f/0x5d0 worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0 kthread+0x140/0x170 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 -> #1 ((work_completion)(&lo->rootcg_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: process_one_work+0x266/0x5d0 worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0 kthread+0x140/0x170 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 -> #0 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x1130/0x1dc0 lock_acquire+0xf5/0x320 flush_workqueue+0xae/0x600 drain_workqueue+0xa0/0x110 destroy_workqueue+0x36/0x250 __loop_clr_fd+0x9a/0x650 [loop] lo_ioctl+0x29d/0x780 [loop] block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (wq_completion)loop0 --> &disk->open_mutex --> &lo->lo_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock(&disk->open_mutex); lock(&lo->lo_mutex); lock((wq_completion)loop0); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by losetup/156417: #0: ffff9c7647395468 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x41/0x650 [loop] stack backtrace: CPU: 8 PID: 156417 Comm: losetup Not tainted 5.14.0-rc2-custom+ #34 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x72 check_noncircular+0x10a/0x120 __lock_acquire+0x1130/0x1dc0 lock_acquire+0xf5/0x320 ? flush_workqueue+0x84/0x600 flush_workqueue+0xae/0x600 ? flush_workqueue+0x84/0x600 drain_workqueue+0xa0/0x110 destroy_workqueue+0x36/0x250 __loop_clr_fd+0x9a/0x650 [loop] lo_ioctl+0x29d/0x780 [loop] ? __lock_acquire+0x3a0/0x1dc0 ? update_dl_rq_load_avg+0x152/0x360 ? lock_is_held_type+0xa5/0x120 ? find_held_lock.constprop.0+0x2b/0x80 block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f645884de6b Usually the uuid_mutex exists to protect the fs_devices that map together all of the devices that match a specific uuid. In rm_device we're messing with the uuid of a device, so it makes sense to protect that here. However in doing that it pulls in a whole host of lockdep dependencies, as we call mnt_may_write() on the sb before we grab the uuid_mutex, thus we end up with the dependency chain under the uuid_mutex being added under the normal sb write dependency chain, which causes problems with loop devices. We don't need the uuid mutex here however. If we call btrfs_scan_one_device() before we scratch the super block we will find the fs_devices and not find the device itself and return EBUSY because the fs_devices is open. If we call it after the scratch happens it will not appear to be a valid btrfs file system. We do not need to worry about other fs_devices modifying operations here because we're protected by the exclusive operations locking. So drop the uuid_mutex here in order to fix the lockdep splat. A more detailed explanation from the discussion: We are worried about rm and scan racing with each other, before this change we'll zero the device out under the UUID mutex so when scan does run it'll make sure that it can go through the whole device scan thing without rm messing with us. We aren't worried if the scratch happens first, because the result is we don't think this is a btrfs device and we bail out. The only case we are concerned with is we scratch _after_ scan is able to read the superblock and gets a seemingly valid super block, so lets consider this case. Scan will call device_list_add() with the device we're removing. We'll call find_fsid_with_metadata_uuid() and get our fs_devices for this UUID. At this point we lock the fs_devices->device_list_mutex. This is what protects us in this case, but we have two cases here. 1. We aren't to the device removal part of the RM. We found our device, and device name matches our path, we go down and we set total_devices to our super number of devices, which doesn't affect anything because we haven't done the remove yet. 2. We are past the device removal part, which is protected by the device_list_mutex. Scan doesn't find the device, it goes down and does the if (fs_devices->opened) return -EBUSY; check and we bail out. Nothing about this situation is ideal, but the lockdep splat is real, and the fix is safe, tho admittedly a bit scary looking. Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> [ copy more from the discussion ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-18btrfs: reflink: initialize return value to 0 in btrfs_extent_same()Sidong Yang1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 44bee215f72f13874c0e734a0712c2e3264c0108 ] Fix a warning reported by smatch that ret could be returned without initialized. The dedupe operations are supposed to to return 0 for a 0 length range but the caller does not pass olen == 0. To keep this behaviour and also fix the warning initialize ret to 0. Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sidong Yang <realwakka@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-18gfs2: Fix glock_hash_walk bugsAndreas Gruenbacher1-10/+12
[ Upstream commit 7427f3bb49d81525b7dd1d0f7c5f6bbc752e6f0e ] So far, glock_hash_walk took a reference on each glock it iterated over, and it was the examiner's responsibility to drop those references. Dropping the final reference to a glock can sleep and the examiners are called in a RCU critical section with spin locks held, so examiners that didn't need the extra reference had to drop it asynchronously via gfs2_glock_queue_put or similar. This wasn't done correctly in thaw_glock which did call gfs2_glock_put, and not at all in dump_glock_func. Change glock_hash_walk to not take glock references at all. That way, the examiners that don't need them won't have to bother with slow asynchronous puts, and the examiners that do need references can take them themselves. Reported-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-18gfs2: Cancel remote delete work asynchronouslyAndreas Gruenbacher1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 486408d690e130c3adacf816754b97558d715f46 ] In gfs2_inode_lookup and gfs2_create_inode, we're calling gfs2_cancel_delete_work which currently cancels any remote delete work (delete_work_func) synchronously. This means that if the work is currently running, it will wait for it to finish. We're doing this to pevent a previous instance of an inode from having any influence on the next instance. However, delete_work_func uses gfs2_inode_lookup internally, and we can end up in a deadlock when delete_work_func gets interrupted at the wrong time. For example, (1) An inode's iopen glock has delete work queued, but the inode itself has been evicted from the inode cache. (2) The delete work is preempted before reaching gfs2_inode_lookup. (3) Another process recreates the inode (gfs2_create_inode). It tries to cancel any outstanding delete work, which blocks waiting for the ongoing delete work to finish. (4) The delete work calls gfs2_inode_lookup, which blocks waiting for gfs2_create_inode to instantiate and unlock the new inode => deadlock. It turns out that when the delete work notices that its inode has been re-instantiated, it will do nothing. This means that it's safe to cancel the delete work asynchronously. This prevents the kind of deadlock described above. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-18tracefs: Have tracefs directories not set OTH permission bits by defaultSteven Rostedt (VMware)1-1/+2
[ Upstream commit 49d67e445742bbcb03106b735b2ab39f6e5c56bc ] The tracefs file system is by default mounted such that only root user can access it. But there are legitimate reasons to create a group and allow those added to the group to have access to tracing. By changing the permissions of the tracefs mount point to allow access, it will allow group access to the tracefs directory. There should not be any real reason to allow all access to the tracefs directory as it contains sensitive information. Have the default permission of directories being created not have any OTH (other) bits set, such that an admin that wants to give permission to a group has to first disable all OTH bits in the file system. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210818153038.664127804@goodmis.org Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-18fs/proc/uptime.c: Fix idle time reporting in /proc/uptimeJosh Don2-7/+11
[ Upstream commit a130e8fbc7de796eb6e680724d87f4737a26d0ac ] /proc/uptime reports idle time by reading the CPUTIME_IDLE field from the per-cpu kcpustats. However, on NO_HZ systems, idle time is not continually updated on idle cpus, leading this value to appear incorrectly small. /proc/stat performs an accounting update when reading idle time; we can use the same approach for uptime. With this patch, /proc/stat and /proc/uptime now agree on idle time. Additionally, the following shows idle time tick up consistently on an idle machine: (while true; do cat /proc/uptime; sleep 1; done) | awk '{print $2-prev; prev=$2}' Reported-by: Luigi Rizzo <lrizzo@google.com> Signed-off-by: Josh Don <joshdon@google.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210827165438.3280779-1-joshdon@google.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-18fscrypt: allow 256-bit master keys with AES-256-XTSEric Biggers3-17/+56
[ Upstream commit 7f595d6a6cdc336834552069a2e0a4f6d4756ddf ] fscrypt currently requires a 512-bit master key when AES-256-XTS is used, since AES-256-XTS keys are 512-bit and fscrypt requires that the master key be at least as long any key that will be derived from it. However, this is overly strict because AES-256-XTS doesn't actually have a 512-bit security strength, but rather 256-bit. The fact that XTS takes twice the expected key size is a quirk of the XTS mode. It is sufficient to use 256 bits of entropy for AES-256-XTS, provided that it is first properly expanded into a 512-bit key, which HKDF-SHA512 does. Therefore, relax the check of the master key size to use the security strength of the derived key rather than the size of the derived key (except for v1 encryption policies, which don't use HKDF). Besides making things more flexible for userspace, this is needed in order for the use of a KDF which only takes a 256-bit key to be introduced into the fscrypt key hierarchy. This will happen with hardware-wrapped keys support, as all known hardware which supports that feature uses an SP800-108 KDF using AES-256-CMAC, so the wrapped keys are wrapped 256-bit AES keys. Moreover, there is interest in fscrypt supporting the same type of AES-256-CMAC based KDF in software as an alternative to HKDF-SHA512. There is no security problem with such features, so fix the key length check to work properly with them. Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210921030303.5598-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-18quota: correct error number in free_dqentry()Zhang Yi1-0/+1
commit d0e36a62bd4c60c09acc40e06ba4831a4d0bc75b upstream. Fix the error path in free_dqentry(), pass out the error number if the block to free is not correct. Fixes: 1ccd14b9c271 ("quota: Split off quota tree handling into a separate file") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211008093821.1001186-3-yi.zhang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-11-18quota: check block number when reading the block in quota fileZhang Yi1-0/+14
commit 9bf3d20331295b1ecb81f4ed9ef358c51699a050 upstream. The block number in the quota tree on disk should be smaller than the v2_disk_dqinfo.dqi_blocks. If the quota file was corrupted, we may be allocating an 'allocated' block and that would lead to a loop in a tree, which will probably trigger oops later. This patch adds a check for the block number in the quota tree to prevent such potential issue. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211008093821.1001186-2-yi.zhang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-11-18ovl: fix use after free in struct ovl_aio_reqyangerkun1-2/+14
commit 9a254403760041528bc8f69fe2f5e1ef86950991 upstream. Example for triggering use after free in a overlay on ext4 setup: aio_read ovl_read_iter vfs_iter_read ext4_file_read_iter ext4_dio_read_iter iomap_dio_rw -> -EIOCBQUEUED /* * Here IO is completed in a separate thread, * ovl_aio_cleanup_handler() frees aio_req which has iocb embedded */ file_accessed(iocb->ki_filp); /**BOOM**/ Fix by introducing a refcount in ovl_aio_req similarly to aio_kiocb. This guarantees that iocb is only freed after vfs_read/write_iter() returns on underlying fs. Fixes: 2406a307ac7d ("ovl: implement async IO routines") Signed-off-by: yangerkun <yangerkun@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210930032228.3199690-3-yangerkun@huawei.com/ Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.6 Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-11-18btrfs: call btrfs_check_rw_degradable only if there is a missing deviceAnand Jain1-1/+2
commit 5c78a5e7aa835c4f08a7c90fe02d19f95a776f29 upstream. In open_ctree() in btrfs_check_rw_degradable() [1], we check each block group individually if at least the minimum number of devices is available for that profile. If all the devices are available, then we don't have to check degradable. [1] open_ctree() :: 3559 if (!sb_rdonly(sb) && !btrfs_check_rw_degradable(fs_info, NULL)) { Also before calling btrfs_check_rw_degradable() in open_ctee() at the line number shown below [2] we call btrfs_read_chunk_tree() and down to add_missing_dev() to record number of missing devices. [2] open_ctree() :: 3454 ret = btrfs_read_chunk_tree(fs_info); btrfs_read_chunk_tree() read_one_chunk() / read_one_dev() add_missing_dev() So, check if there is any missing device before btrfs_check_rw_degradable() in open_ctree(). Also, with this the mount command could save ~16ms.[3] in the most common case, that is no device is missing. [3] 1) * 16934.96 us | btrfs_check_rw_degradable [btrfs](); CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-11-18btrfs: fix lost error handling when replaying directory deletesFilipe Manana1-1/+3
commit 10adb1152d957a4d570ad630f93a88bb961616c1 upstream. At replay_dir_deletes(), if find_dir_range() returns an error we break out of the main while loop and then assign a value of 0 (success) to the 'ret' variable, resulting in completely ignoring that an error happened. Fix that by jumping to the 'out' label when find_dir_range() returns an error (negative value). CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-11-18btrfs: clear MISSING device status bit in btrfs_close_one_deviceLi Zhang1-1/+3
commit 5d03dbebba2594d2e6fbf3b5dd9060c5a835de3b upstream. Reported bug: https://github.com/kdave/btrfs-progs/issues/389 There's a problem with scrub reporting aborted status but returning error code 0, on a filesystem with missing and readded device. Roughly these steps: - mkfs -d raid1 dev1 dev2 - fill with data - unmount - make dev1 disappear - mount -o degraded - copy more data - make dev1 appear again Running scrub afterwards reports that the command was aborted, but the system log message says the exit code was 0. It seems that the cause of the error is decrementing fs_devices->missing_devices but not clearing device->dev_state. Every time we umount filesystem, it would call close_ctree, And it would eventually involve btrfs_close_one_device to close the device, but it only decrements fs_devices->missing_devices but does not clear the device BTRFS_DEV_STATE_MISSING bit. Worse, this bug will cause Integer Overflow, because every time umount, fs_devices->missing_devices will decrease. If fs_devices->missing_devices value hit 0, it would overflow. With added debugging: loop1: detected capacity change from 0 to 20971520 BTRFS: device fsid 56ad51f1-5523-463b-8547-c19486c51ebb devid 1 transid 21 /dev/loop1 scanned by systemd-udevd (2311) loop2: detected capacity change from 0 to 20971520 BTRFS: device fsid 56ad51f1-5523-463b-8547-c19486c51ebb devid 2 transid 17 /dev/loop2 scanned by systemd-udevd (2313) BTRFS info (device loop1): flagging fs with big metadata feature BTRFS info (device loop1): allowing degraded mounts BTRFS info (device loop1): using free space tree BTRFS info (device loop1): has skinny extents BTRFS info (device loop1): before clear_missing.00000000f706684d /dev/loop1 0 BTRFS warning (device loop1): devid 2 uuid 6635ac31-56dd-4852-873b-c60f5e2d53d2 is missing BTRFS info (device loop1): before clear_missing.0000000000000000 /dev/loop2 1 BTRFS info (device loop1): flagging fs with big metadata feature BTRFS info (device loop1): allowing degraded mounts BTRFS info (device loop1): using free space tree BTRFS info (device loop1): has skinny extents BTRFS info (device loop1): before clear_missing.00000000f706684d /dev/loop1 0 BTRFS warning (device loop1): devid 2 uuid 6635ac31-56dd-4852-873b-c60f5e2d53d2 is missing BTRFS info (device loop1): before clear_missing.0000000000000000 /dev/loop2 0 BTRFS info (device loop1): flagging fs with big metadata feature BTRFS info (device loop1): allowing degraded mounts BTRFS info (device loop1): using free space tree BTRFS info (device loop1): has skinny extents BTRFS info (device loop1): before clear_missing.00000000f706684d /dev/loop1 18446744073709551615 BTRFS warning (device loop1): devid 2 uuid 6635ac31-56dd-4852-873b-c60f5e2d53d2 is missing BTRFS info (device loop1): before clear_missing.0000000000000000 /dev/loop2 18446744073709551615 If fs_devices->missing_devices is 0, next time it would be 18446744073709551615 After apply this patch, the fs_devices->missing_devices seems to be right: $ truncate -s 10g test1 $ truncate -s 10g test2 $ losetup /dev/loop1 test1 $ losetup /dev/loop2 test2 $ mkfs.btrfs -draid1 -mraid1 /dev/loop1 /dev/loop2 -f $ losetup -d /dev/loop2 $ mount -o degraded /dev/loop1 /mnt/1 $ umount /mnt/1 $ mount -o degraded /dev/loop1 /mnt/1 $ umount /mnt/1 $ mount -o degraded /dev/loop1 /mnt/1 $ umount /mnt/1 $ dmesg loop1: detected capacity change from 0 to 20971520 loop2: detected capacity change from 0 to 20971520 BTRFS: device fsid 15aa1203-98d3-4a66-bcae-ca82f629c2cd devid 1 transid 5 /dev/loop1 scanned by mkfs.btrfs (1863) BTRFS: device fsid 15aa1203-98d3-4a66-bcae-ca82f629c2cd devid 2 transid 5 /dev/loop2 scanned by mkfs.btrfs (1863) BTRFS info (device loop1): flagging fs with big metadata feature BTRFS info (device loop1): allowing degraded mounts BTRFS info (device loop1): disk space caching is enabled BTRFS info (device loop1): has skinny extents BTRFS info (device loop1): before clear_missing.00000000975bd577 /dev/loop1 0 BTRFS warning (device loop1): devid 2 uuid 8b333791-0b3f-4f57-b449-1c1ab6b51f38 is missing BTRFS info (device loop1): before clear_missing.0000000000000000 /dev/loop2 1 BTRFS info (device loop1): checking UUID tree BTRFS info (device loop1): flagging fs with big metadata feature BTRFS info (device loop1): allowing degraded mounts BTRFS info (device loop1): disk space caching is enabled BTRFS info (device loop1): has skinny extents BTRFS info (device loop1): before clear_missing.00000000975bd577 /dev/loop1 0 BTRFS warning (device loop1): devid 2 uuid 8b333791-0b3f-4f57-b449-1c1ab6b51f38 is missing BTRFS info (device loop1): before clear_missing.0000000000000000 /dev/loop2 1 BTRFS info (device loop1): flagging fs with big metadata feature BTRFS info (device loop1): allowing degraded mounts BTRFS info (device loop1): disk space caching is enabled BTRFS info (device loop1): has skinny extents BTRFS info (device loop1): before clear_missing.00000000975bd577 /dev/loop1 0 BTRFS warning (device loop1): devid 2 uuid 8b333791-0b3f-4f57-b449-1c1ab6b51f38 is missing BTRFS info (device loop1): before clear_missing.0000000000000000 /dev/loop2 1 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Signed-off-by: Li Zhang <zhanglikernel@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-11-18fuse: fix page stealingMiklos Szeredi1-2/+12
commit 712a951025c0667ff00b25afc360f74e639dfabe upstream. It is possible to trigger a crash by splicing anon pipe bufs to the fuse device. The reason for this is that anon_pipe_buf_release() will reuse buf->page if the refcount is 1, but that page might have already been stolen and its flags modified (e.g. PG_lru added). This happens in the unlikely case of fuse_dev_splice_write() getting around to calling pipe_buf_release() after a page has been stolen, added to the page cache and removed from the page cache. Fix by calling pipe_buf_release() right after the page was inserted into the page cache. In this case the page has an elevated refcount so any release function will know that the page isn't reusable. Reported-by: Frank Dinoff <fdinoff@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAAmZXrsGg2xsP1CK+cbuEMumtrqdvD-NKnWzhNcvn71RV3c1yw@mail.gmail.com/ Fixes: dd3bb14f44a6 ("fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.35 Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-11-18ext4: refresh the ext4_ext_path struct after dropping i_data_sem.yangerkun1-1/+13
commit 1811bc401aa58c7bdb0df3205aa6613b49d32127 upstream. After we drop i_data sem, we need to reload the ext4_ext_path structure since the extent tree can change once i_data_sem is released. This addresses the BUG: [52117.465187] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [52117.465686] kernel BUG at fs/ext4/extents.c:1756! ... [52117.478306] Call Trace: [52117.478565] ext4_ext_shift_extents+0x3ee/0x710 [52117.479020] ext4_fallocate+0x139c/0x1b40 [52117.479405] ? __do_sys_newfstat+0x6b/0x80 [52117.479805] vfs_fallocate+0x151/0x4b0 [52117.480177] ksys_fallocate+0x4a/0xa0 [52117.480533] __x64_sys_fallocate+0x22/0x30 [52117.480930] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 [52117.481277] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [52117.481769] RIP: 0033:0x7fa062f855ca Cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210903062748.4118886-4-yangerkun@huawei.com Signed-off-by: yangerkun <yangerkun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-11-18ext4: ensure enough credits in ext4_ext_shift_path_extentsyangerkun1-34/+15
commit 4268496e48dc681cfa53b92357314b5d7221e625 upstream. Like ext4_ext_rm_leaf, we can ensure that there are enough credits before every call that will consume credits. As part of this fix we fold the functionality of ext4_access_path() into ext4_ext_shift_path_extents(). This change is needed as a preparation for the next bugfix patch. Cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210903062748.4118886-3-yangerkun@huawei.com Signed-off-by: yangerkun <yangerkun@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-11-18ext4: fix lazy initialization next schedule time computation in more ↵Shaoying Xu1-5/+4
granular unit commit 39fec6889d15a658c3a3ebb06fd69d3584ddffd3 upstream. Ext4 file system has default lazy inode table initialization setup once it is mounted. However, it has issue on computing the next schedule time that makes the timeout same amount in jiffies but different real time in secs if with various HZ values. Therefore, fix by measuring the current time in a more granular unit nanoseconds and make the next schedule time independent of the HZ value. Fixes: bfff68738f1c ("ext4: add support for lazy inode table initialization") Signed-off-by: Shaoying Xu <shaoyi@amazon.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210902164412.9994-2-shaoyi@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-11-18exfat: fix incorrect loading of i_blocks for large filesSungjong Seo1-1/+1
commit 0c336d6e33f4bedc443404c89f43c91c8bd9ee11 upstream. When calculating i_blocks, there was a mistake that was masked with a 32-bit variable. So i_blocks for files larger than 4 GiB had incorrect values. Mask with a 64-bit variable instead of 32-bit one. Fixes: 5f2aa075070c ("exfat: add inode operations") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.7+ Reported-by: Ganapathi Kamath <hgkamath@hotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sungjong Seo <sj1557.seo@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-11-18ocfs2: fix data corruption on truncateJan Kara1-2/+6
commit 839b63860eb3835da165642923120d305925561d upstream. Patch series "ocfs2: Truncate data corruption fix". As further testing has shown, commit 5314454ea3f ("ocfs2: fix data corruption after conversion from inline format") didn't fix all the data corruption issues the customer started observing after 6dbf7bb55598 ("fs: Don't invalidate page buffers in block_write_full_page()") This time I have tracked them down to two bugs in ocfs2 truncation code. One bug (truncating page cache before clearing tail cluster and setting i_size) could cause data corruption even before 6dbf7bb55598, but before that commit it needed a race with page fault, after 6dbf7bb55598 it started to be pretty deterministic. Another bug (zeroing pages beyond old i_size) used to be harmless inefficiency before commit 6dbf7bb55598. But after commit 6dbf7bb55598 in combination with the first bug it resulted in deterministic data corruption. Although fixing only the first problem is needed to stop data corruption, I've fixed both issues to make the code more robust. This patch (of 2): ocfs2_truncate_file() did unmap invalidate page cache pages before zeroing partial tail cluster and setting i_size. Thus some pages could be left (and likely have left if the cluster zeroing happened) in the page cache beyond i_size after truncate finished letting user possibly see stale data once the file was extended again. Also the tail cluster zeroing was not guaranteed to finish before truncate finished causing possible stale data exposure. The problem started to be particularly easy to hit after commit 6dbf7bb55598 "fs: Don't invalidate page buffers in block_write_full_page()" stopped invalidation of pages beyond i_size from page writeback path. Fix these problems by unmapping and invalidating pages in the page cache after the i_size is reduced and tail cluster is zeroed out. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211025150008.29002-1-jack@suse.cz Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211025151332.11301-1-jack@suse.cz Fixes: ccd979bdbce9 ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster Filesystem") Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-11-12isofs: Fix out of bound access for corrupted isofs imageJan Kara1-0/+2
commit e96a1866b40570b5950cda8602c2819189c62a48 upstream. When isofs image is suitably corrupted isofs_read_inode() can read data beyond the end of buffer. Sanity-check the directory entry length before using it. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+6fc7fb214625d82af7d1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-11-06Revert "io_uring: reinforce cancel on flush during exit"Lee Jones1-1/+2
This reverts commit 88dbd085a51ec78c83dde79ad63bca8aa4272a9d. Causes the following Syzkaller reported issue: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 546 Comm: syz-executor631 Tainted: G B 5.10.76-syzkaller-01178-g4944ec82ebb9 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:arch_atomic_try_cmpxchg syzkaller/managers/android-5-10/kernel/./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:202 [inline] RIP: 0010:atomic_try_cmpxchg_acquire syzkaller/managers/android-5-10/kernel/./include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:707 [inline] RIP: 0010:queued_spin_lock syzkaller/managers/android-5-10/kernel/./include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:82 [inline] RIP: 0010:do_raw_spin_lock_flags syzkaller/managers/android-5-10/kernel/./include/linux/spinlock.h:195 [inline] RIP: 0010:__raw_spin_lock_irqsave syzkaller/managers/android-5-10/kernel/./include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:119 [inline] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10d/0x210 syzkaller/managers/android-5-10/kernel/kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159 Code: 00 00 00 e8 d5 29 09 fd 4c 89 e7 be 04 00 00 00 e8 c8 29 09 fd 42 8a 04 3b 84 c0 0f 85 be 00 00 00 8b 44 24 40 b9 01 00 00 00 <f0> 41 0f b1 4d 00 75 45 48 c7 44 24 20 0e 36 e0 45 4b c7 04 37 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000f174e0 EFLAGS: 00010097 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 1ffff920001e2ea4 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffc90000f17520 RBP: ffffc90000f175b0 R08: dffffc0000000000 R09: 0000000000000003 R10: fffff520001e2ea5 R11: 0000000000000004 R12: ffffc90000f17520 R13: 0000000000000010 R14: 1ffff920001e2ea0 R15: dffffc0000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8881f7100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 000000000640f000 CR4: 00000000003506a0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: prepare_to_wait+0x9c/0x290 syzkaller/managers/android-5-10/kernel/kernel/sched/wait.c:248 io_uring_cancel_files syzkaller/managers/android-5-10/kernel/fs/io_uring.c:8690 [inline] io_uring_cancel_task_requests+0x16a9/0x1ed0 syzkaller/managers/android-5-10/kernel/fs/io_uring.c:8760 io_uring_flush+0x170/0x6d0 syzkaller/managers/androi