| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
|---|
|
commit 708fa01597fa002599756bf56a96d0de1677375c upstream.
Commit 146d62e5a586 ("ovl: detect overlapping layers") made sure we don't
have overlapping layers, but it also broke the arguably valid use case of
mount -olowerdir=/,upperdir=/subdir,..
where upperdir overlaps lowerdir on the same filesystem. This has been
causing regressions.
Revert the check, but only for the specific case where upperdir and/or
workdir are subdirectories of lowerdir. Any other overlap (e.g. lowerdir
is subdirectory of upperdir, etc) case is crazy, so leave the check in
place for those.
Overlaps are detected at lookup time too, so reverting the mount time check
should be safe.
Fixes: 146d62e5a586 ("ovl: detect overlapping layers")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.2
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit eaab1d45cdb4bb0c846bd23c3d666d5b90af7b41 upstream.
Since commit 6815f479ca90 ("ovl: use only uppermetacopy state in
ovl_lookup()"), overlayfs doesn't put temporary dentry when there is a
metacopy error, which leads to dentry leaks when shutting down the related
superblock:
overlayfs: refusing to follow metacopy origin for (/file0)
...
BUG: Dentry (____ptrval____){i=3f33,n=file3} still in use (1) [unmount of overlay overlay]
...
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 432 at umount_check.cold+0x107/0x14d
CPU: 1 PID: 432 Comm: unmount-overlay Not tainted 5.12.0-rc5 #1
...
RIP: 0010:umount_check.cold+0x107/0x14d
...
Call Trace:
d_walk+0x28c/0x950
? dentry_lru_isolate+0x2b0/0x2b0
? __kasan_slab_free+0x12/0x20
do_one_tree+0x33/0x60
shrink_dcache_for_umount+0x78/0x1d0
generic_shutdown_super+0x70/0x440
kill_anon_super+0x3e/0x70
deactivate_locked_super+0xc4/0x160
deactivate_super+0xfa/0x140
cleanup_mnt+0x22e/0x370
__cleanup_mnt+0x1a/0x30
task_work_run+0x139/0x210
do_exit+0xb0c/0x2820
? __kasan_check_read+0x1d/0x30
? find_held_lock+0x35/0x160
? lock_release+0x1b6/0x660
? mm_update_next_owner+0xa20/0xa20
? reacquire_held_locks+0x3f0/0x3f0
? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4+0x22/0x30
do_group_exit+0x135/0x380
__do_sys_exit_group.isra.0+0x20/0x20
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3c/0x50
do_syscall_64+0x45/0x70
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
...
VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of overlay. Self-destruct in 5 seconds. Have a nice day...
This fix has been tested with a syzkaller reproducer.
Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.8+
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Fixes: 6815f479ca90 ("ovl: use only uppermetacopy state in ovl_lookup()")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210329164907.2133175-1-mic@digikod.net
Reviewed-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 0c93ac69407d63a85be0129aa55ffaec27ffebd3 upstream.
This does the directory entry name verification for the legacy
"fillonedir" (and compat) interface that goes all the way back to the
dark ages before we had a proper dirent, and the readdir() system call
returned just a single entry at a time.
Nobody should use this interface unless you still have binaries from
1991, but let's do it right.
This came up during discussions about unsafe_copy_to_user() and proper
checking of all the inputs to it, as the networking layer is looking to
use it in a few new places. So let's make sure the _old_ users do it
all right and proper, before we add new ones.
See also commit 8a23eb804ca4 ("Make filldir[64]() verify the directory
entry filename is valid") which did the proper modern interfaces that
people actually use. It had a note:
Note that I didn't bother adding the checks to any legacy interfaces
that nobody uses.
which this now corrects. Note that we really don't care about POSIX and
the presense of '/' in a directory entry, but verify_dirent_name() also
ends up doing the proper name length verification which is what the
input checking discussion was about.
[ Another option would be to remove the support for this particular very
old interface: any binaries that use it are likely a.out binaries, and
they will no longer run anyway since we removed a.out binftm support
in commit eac616557050 ("x86: Deprecate a.out support").
But I'm not sure which came first: getdents() or ELF support, so let's
pretend somebody might still have a working binary that uses the
legacy readdir() case.. ]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wjbvzCAhAtvG0d81W5o0-KT5PPTHhfJ5ieDFq+bGtgOYg@mail.gmail.com/
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit f8b78caf21d5bc3fcfc40c18898f9d52ed1451a5 ]
If IOCB_NOWAIT is set on submission, then that needs to get propagated to
REQ_NOWAIT on the block side. Otherwise we completely lose this
information, and any issuer of IOCB_NOWAIT IO will potentially end up
blocking on eg request allocation on the storage side.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 4b982bd0f383db9132e892c0c5144117359a6289 ]
S_ISBLK is marked as unbounded work for async preparation, because it
doesn't match S_ISREG. That is incorrect, as any read/write to a block
device is also a bounded operation. Fix it up and ensure that S_ISBLK
isn't marked unbounded.
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit ff132c5f93c06bd4432bbab5c369e468653bdec4 ]
Before this patch, gfs2's freeze function failed to report an error
when the target file system was already frozen as it should (and as
generic vfs function freeze_super does. Similarly, gfs2's thaw function
failed to report an error when trying to thaw a file system that is not
frozen, as vfs function thaw_super does. The errors were checked, but
it always returned a 0 return code.
This patch adds the missing error return codes to gfs2 freeze and thaw.
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 62dd0f98a0e5668424270b47a0c2e973795faba7 ]
Interrupting mount with ^C quickly enough can cause the kthread_run()
calls in gfs2's init_threads() to fail and the error path leads to a
deadlock on the s_umount rwsem. The abridged chain of events is:
[mount path]
get_tree_bdev()
sget_fc()
alloc_super()
down_write_nested(&s->s_umount, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); [acquired]
gfs2_fill_super()
gfs2_make_fs_rw()
init_threads()
kthread_run()
( Interrupted )
[Error path]
gfs2_gl_hash_clear()
flush_workqueue(glock_workqueue)
wait_for_completion()
[workqueue context]
glock_work_func()
run_queue()
do_xmote()
freeze_go_sync()
freeze_super()
down_write(&sb->s_umount) [deadlock]
In freeze_go_sync() there is a gfs2_withdrawn() check that we can use to
make sure freeze_super() is not called in the error path, so add a
gfs2_withdraw_delayed() call when init_threads() fails.
Ref: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=212231
Reported-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Price <anprice@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 7f6c411c9b50cfab41cc798e003eff27608c7016 ]
1) argument should not be freed in any case - the caller already has
it as ->s_fs_info (and uses it a lot afterwards)
2) allocate readlink buffer with kmalloc() - the caller has no way
to tell if it's got that (on absolute symlink) or a result of
kasprintf(). Sure, for SLAB and SLUB kfree() works on results of
kmem_cache_alloc(), but that's not documented anywhere, might change
in the future *and* is already not true for SLOB.
Fixes: 52b209f7b848 ("get rid of hostfs_read_inode()")
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit df41872b68601059dd4a84858952dcae58acd331 upstream.
I encountered a hung task issue, but not a performance one. I run DIO
on a device (need lba continuous, for example open channel ssd), maybe
hungtask in below case:
DIO: Checkpoint:
get addr A(at boundary), merge into BIO,
no submit because boundary missing
flush dirty data(get addr A+1), wait IO(A+1)
writeback timeout, because DIO(A) didn't submit
get addr A+2 fail, because checkpoint is doing
dio_send_cur_page() may clear sdio->boundary, so prevent it from missing
a boundary.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210322042253.38312-1-jack.qiu@huawei.com
Fixes: b1058b981272 ("direct-io: submit bio after boundary buffer is added to it")
Signed-off-by: Jack Qiu <jack.qiu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 90bd070aae6c4fb5d302f9c4b9c88be60c8197ec upstream.
The following deadlock is detected:
truncate -> setattr path is waiting for pending direct IO to be done (inode->i_dio_count become zero) with inode->i_rwsem held (down_write).
PID: 14827 TASK: ffff881686a9af80 CPU: 20 COMMAND: "ora_p005_hrltd9"
#0 __schedule at ffffffff818667cc
#1 schedule at ffffffff81866de6
#2 inode_dio_wait at ffffffff812a2d04
#3 ocfs2_setattr at ffffffffc05f322e [ocfs2]
#4 notify_change at ffffffff812a5a09
#5 do_truncate at ffffffff812808f5
#6 do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.18 at ffffffff81280cf2
#7 sys_ftruncate at ffffffff81280d8e
#8 do_syscall_64 at ffffffff81003949
#9 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff81a001ad
dio completion path is going to complete one direct IO (decrement
inode->i_dio_count), but before that it hung at locking inode->i_rwsem:
#0 __schedule+700 at ffffffff818667cc
#1 schedule+54 at ffffffff81866de6
#2 rwsem_down_write_failed+536 at ffffffff8186aa28
#3 call_rwsem_down_write_failed+23 at ffffffff8185a1b7
#4 down_write+45 at ffffffff81869c9d
#5 ocfs2_dio_end_io_write+180 at ffffffffc05d5444 [ocfs2]
#6 ocfs2_dio_end_io+85 at ffffffffc05d5a85 [ocfs2]
#7 dio_complete+140 at ffffffff812c873c
#8 dio_aio_complete_work+25 at ffffffff812c89f9
#9 process_one_work+361 at ffffffff810b1889
#10 worker_thread+77 at ffffffff810b233d
#11 kthread+261 at ffffffff810b7fd5
#12 ret_from_fork+62 at ffffffff81a0035e
Thus above forms ABBA deadlock. The same deadlock was mentioned in
upstream commit 28f5a8a7c033 ("ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock
in ocfs2_setattr()"). It seems that that commit only removed the
cluster lock (the victim of above dead lock) from the ABBA deadlock
party.
End-user visible effects: Process hang in truncate -> ocfs2_setattr path
and other processes hang at ocfs2_dio_end_io_write path.
This is to fix the deadlock itself. It removes inode_lock() call from
dio completion path to remove the deadlock and add ip_alloc_sem lock in
setattr path to synchronize the inode modifications.
[wen.gang.wang@oracle.com: remove the "had_alloc_lock" as suggested]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210402171344.1605-1-wen.gang.wang@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210331203654.3911-1-wen.gang.wang@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Wengang Wang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 4f0ed93fb92d3528c73c80317509df3f800a222b upstream.
That (and traversals in case of umount .) should be done before
complete_walk(). Either a braino or mismerge damage on queue
reorders - either way, I should've spotted that much earlier.
Fucked-up-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
X-Paperbag: Brown
Fixes: 161aff1d93ab "LOOKUP_MOUNTPOINT: fold path_mountpointat() into path_lookupat()"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.7+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 1ee4160c73b2102a52bc97a4128a89c34821414f ]
When we cancel a timeout we should emit a sensible return code, like
-ECANCELED but not 0, otherwise it may trick users.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7b0ad1065e3bd1994722702bd0ba9e7bc9b0683b.1616696997.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 219481a8f90ec3a5eed9638fb35609e4b1aeece7 ]
Make SMB2 not print out an error when an oplock break is received for an
unknown handle, similar to SMB1. The debug message which is printed for
these unknown handles may also be misleading, so fix that too.
The SMB2 lease break path is not affected by this patch.
Without this, a program which writes to a file from one thread, and
opens, reads, and writes the same file from another thread triggers the
below errors several times a minute when run against a Samba server
configured with "smb2 leases = no".
CIFS: VFS: \\192.168.0.1 No task to wake, unknown frame received! NumMids 2
00000000: 424d53fe 00000040 00000000 00000012 .SMB@...........
00000010: 00000001 00000000 ffffffff ffffffff ................
00000020: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 ................
00000030: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 ................
Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.whitchurch@axis.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit cee8f4f6fcabfdf229542926128e9874d19016d5 ]
RHBZ: 1933527
Under SMB1 + POSIX, if an inode is reused on a server after we have read and
cached a part of a file, when we then open the new file with the
re-cycled inode there is a chance that we may serve the old data out of cache
to the application.
This only happens for SMB1 (deprecated) and when posix are used.
The simplest solution to avoid this race is to force a revalidate
on smb1-posix open.
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 5116784039f0421e9a619023cfba3e302c3d9adc ]
The GD_NEED_PART_SCAN is set by bdev_check_media_change to initiate
a partition scan while removing a block device. It should be cleared
after blk_drop_paritions because blk_drop_paritions could return
-EBUSY and then the consequence __blkdev_get has no chance to do
delete_partition if GD_NEED_PART_SCAN already cleared.
It causes some problems on some card readers. Ex. Realtek card
reader 0bda:0328 and 0bda:0158. The device node of the partition
will not disappear after the memory card removed. Thus the user
applications can not update the device mapping correctly.
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1920874
Signed-off-by: Chris Chiu <chris.chiu@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210323085219.24428-1-chris.chiu@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit 5e46d1b78a03d52306f21f77a4e4a144b6d31486 upstream.
syzbot is reporting NULL pointer dereference at reiserfs_security_init()
[1], for commit ab17c4f02156c4f7 ("reiserfs: fixup xattr_root caching")
is assuming that REISERFS_SB(s)->xattr_root != NULL in
reiserfs_xattr_jcreate_nblocks() despite that commit made
REISERFS_SB(sb)->priv_root != NULL && REISERFS_SB(s)->xattr_root == NULL
case possible.
I guess that commit 6cb4aff0a77cc0e6 ("reiserfs: fix oops while creating
privroot with selinux enabled") wanted to check xattr_root != NULL
before reiserfs_xattr_jcreate_nblocks(), for the changelog is talking
about the xattr root.
The issue is that while creating the privroot during mount
reiserfs_security_init calls reiserfs_xattr_jcreate_nblocks which
dereferences the xattr root. The xattr root doesn't exist, so we get
an oops.
Therefore, update reiserfs_xattrs_initialized() to check both the
privroot and the xattr root.
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=8abaedbdeb32c861dc5340544284167dd0e46cde # [1]
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot <syzbot+690cb1e51970435f9775@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Fixes: 6cb4aff0a77c ("reiserfs: fix oops while creating privroot with selinux enabled")
Acked-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
MSG_WAITALL
[ Upstream commit 0031275d119efe16711cd93519b595e6f9b4b330 ]
Without that it's not safe to use them in a linked combination with
others.
Now combinations like IORING_OP_SENDMSG followed by IORING_OP_SPLICE
should be possible.
We already handle short reads and writes for the following opcodes:
- IORING_OP_READV
- IORING_OP_READ_FIXED
- IORING_OP_READ
- IORING_OP_WRITEV
- IORING_OP_WRITE_FIXED
- IORING_OP_WRITE
- IORING_OP_SPLICE
- IORING_OP_TEE
Now we have it for these as well:
- IORING_OP_SENDMSG
- IORING_OP_SEND
- IORING_OP_RECVMSG
- IORING_OP_RECV
For IORING_OP_RECVMSG we also check for the MSG_TRUNC and MSG_CTRUNC
flags in order to call req_set_fail_links().
There might be applications arround depending on the behavior
that even short send[msg]()/recv[msg]() retuns continue an
IOSQE_IO_LINK chain.
It's very unlikely that such applications pass in MSG_WAITALL,
which is only defined in 'man 2 recvmsg', but not in 'man 2 sendmsg'.
It's expected that the low level sock_sendmsg() call just ignores
MSG_WAITALL, as MSG_ZEROCOPY is also ignored without explicitly set
SO_ZEROCOPY.
We also expect the caller to know about the implicit truncation to
MAX_RW_COUNT, which we don't detect.
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c4e1a4cc0d905314f4d5dc567e65a7b09621aab3.1615908477.git.metze@samba.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 5dccdc5a1916d4266edd251f20bbbb113a5c495f ]
In ext4_rename(), when RENAME_WHITEOUT failed to add new entry into
directory, it ends up dropping new created whiteout inode under the
running transaction. After commit <9b88f9fb0d2> ("ext4: Do not iput inode
under running transaction"), we follow the assumptions that evict() does
not get called from a transaction context but in ext4_rename() it breaks
this suggestion. Although it's not a real problem, better to obey it, so
this patch add inode to orphan list and stop transaction before final
iput().
Signed-off-by: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210303131703.330415-2-yi.zhang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 76cd979f4f38a27df22efb5773a0d567181a9392 ]
We never want to generate any SIGPIPE, -EPIPE only is much better.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/38961085c3ec49fd21550c7788f214d1ff02d2d4.1615908477.git.metze@samba.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit efe814a471e0e58f28f1efaf430c8784a4f36626 ]
It's racy to modify req->flags from a not owning context, e.g. linked
timeout calling req_set_fail_links() for the master request might race
with that request setting/clearing flags while being executed
concurrently. Just remove req_set_fail_links(prev) from
io_link_timeout_fn(), io_async_find_and_cancel() and functions down the
line take care of setting the fail bit.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit b4250dd868d1b42c0a65de11ef3afbee67ba5d2f ]
When the server tries to do a callback and a client fails it due to
authentication problems, we need the server to set callback down
flag in RENEW so that client can recover.
Suggested-by: Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nfs/FB84E90A-1A03-48B3-8BF7-D9D10AC2C9FE@oracle.com/T/#t
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 5808fecc572391867fcd929662b29c12e6d08d81 ]
In case if isi.nr_pages is 0, we are making sis->pages (which is
unsigned int) a huge value in iomap_swapfile_activate() by assigning -1.
This could cause a kernel crash in kernel v4.18 (with below signature).
Or could lead to unknown issues on latest kernel if the fake big swap gets
used.
Fix this issue by returning -EINVAL in case of nr_pages is 0, since it
is anyway a invalid swapfile. Looks like this issue will be hit when
we have pagesize < blocksize type of configuration.
I was able to hit the issue in case of a tiny swap file with below
test script.
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/riteshharjani/LinuxStudy/master/scripts/swap-issue.sh
kernel crash analysis on v4.18
==============================
On v4.18 kernel, it causes a kernel panic, since sis->pages becomes
a huge value and isi.nr_extents is 0. When 0 is returned it is
considered as a swapfile over NFS and SWP_FILE is set (sis->flags |= SWP_FILE).
Then when swapoff was getting called it was calling a_ops->swap_deactivate()
if (sis->flags & SWP_FILE) is true. Since a_ops->swap_deactivate() is
NULL in case of XFS, it causes below panic.
Panic signature on v4.18 kernel:
=======================================
root@qemu:/home/qemu# [ 8291.723351] XFS (loop2): Unmounting Filesystem
[ 8292.123104] XFS (loop2): Mounting V5 Filesystem
[ 8292.132451] XFS (loop2): Ending clean mount
[ 8292.263362] Adding 4294967232k swap on /mnt1/test/swapfile. Priority:-2 extents:1 across:274877906880k
[ 8292.277834] Unable to handle kernel paging request for instruction fetch
[ 8292.278677] Faulting instruction address: 0x00000000
cpu 0x19: Vector: 400 (Instruction Access) at [c0000009dd5b7ad0]
pc: 0000000000000000
lr: c0000000003eb9dc: destroy_swap_extents+0xfc/0x120
sp: c0000009dd5b7d50
msr: 8000000040009033
current = 0xc0000009b6710080
paca = 0xc00000003ffcb280 irqmask: 0x03 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 5604, comm = swapoff
Linux version 4.18.0 (riteshh@xxxxxxx) (gcc version 8.4.0 (Ubuntu 8.4.0-1ubuntu1~18.04)) #57 SMP Wed Mar 3 01:33:04 CST 2021
enter ? for help
[link register ] c0000000003eb9dc destroy_swap_extents+0xfc/0x120
[c0000009dd5b7d50] c0000000025a7058 proc_poll_event+0x0/0x4 (unreliable)
[c0000009dd5b7da0] c0000000003f0498 sys_swapoff+0x3f8/0x910
[c0000009dd5b7e30] c00000000000bbe4 system_call+0x5c/0x70
Exception: c01 (System Call) at 00007ffff7d208d8
Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani <riteshh@linux.ibm.com>
[djwong: rework the comment to provide more details]
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 7005227369079963d25fb2d5d736d0feb2c44cf6 ]
When NFSD_V4 is enabled and CRYPTO is disabled,
Kbuild gives the following warning:
WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for CRYPTO_SHA256
Depends on [n]: CRYPTO [=n]
Selected by [y]:
- NFSD_V4 [=y] && NETWORK_FILESYSTEMS [=y] && NFSD [=y] && PROC_FS [=y]
WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for CRYPTO_MD5
Depends on [n]: CRYPTO [=n]
Selected by [y]:
- NFSD_V4 [=y] && NETWORK_FILESYSTEMS [=y] && NFSD [=y] && PROC_FS [=y]
This is because NFSD_V4 selects CRYPTO_MD5 and CRYPTO_SHA256,
without depending on or selecting CRYPTO, despite those config options
being subordinate to CRYPTO.
Signed-off-by: Julian Braha <julianbraha@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit c915fb80eaa6194fa9bd0a4487705cd5b0dda2f1 ]
__ext4_journalled_writepage should drop bhs' ref count on error paths
Signed-off-by: Zhaolong Zhang <zhangzl2013@126.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1614678151-70481-1-git-send-email-zhangzl2013@126.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit efc61345274d6c7a46a0570efbc916fcbe3e927b ]
When generic/371 is run on kvm-xfstests using 5.10 and 5.11 kernels, it
fails at significant rates on the two test scenarios that disable
delayed allocation (ext3conv and data_journal) and force actual block
allocation for the fallocate and pwrite functions in the test. The
failure rate on 5.10 for both ext3conv and data_journal on one test
system typically runs about 85%. On 5.11, the failure rate on ext3conv
sometimes drops to as low as 1% while the rate on data_journal
increases to nearly 100%.
The observed failures are largely due to ext4_should_retry_alloc()
cutting off block allocation retries when s_mb_free_pending (used to
indicate that a transaction in progress will free blocks) is 0.
However, free space is usually available when this occurs during runs
of generic/371. It appears that a thread attempting to allocate
blocks is just missing transaction commits in other threads that
increase the free cluster count and reset s_mb_free_pending while
the allocating thread isn't running. Explicitly testing for free space
availability avoids this race.
The current code uses a post-increment operator in the conditional
expression that determines whether the retry limit has been exceeded.
This means that the conditional expression uses the value of the
retry counter before it's increased, resulting in an extra retry cycle.
The current code actually retries twice before hitting its retry limit
rather than once.
Increasing the retry limit to 3 from the current actual maximum retry
count of 2 in combination with the change described above reduces the
observed failure rate to less that 0.1% on both ext3conv and
data_journal with what should be limited impact on users sensitive to
the overhead caused by retries.
A per filesystem percpu counter exported via sysfs is added to allow
users or developers to track the number of times the retry limit is
exceeded without resorting to debugging methods. This should provide
some insight into worst case retry behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Whitney <enwlinux@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210218151132.19678-1-enwlinux@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 3f9b9efd82a84f27e95d0414f852caf1fa839e83 ]
Right now "mount -t virtiofs -o dax myfs /mnt/virtiofs" succeeds even
if filesystem deivce does not have a cache window and hence DAX can't
be supported.
This gives a false sense to user that they are using DAX with virtiofs
but fact of the matter is that they are not.
Fix this by returning error if dax can't be supported and user has asked
for it.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit f91436d55a279f045987e8b8c1385585dca54be9 upstream.
syzbot found UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ext4_mb_init [1], when
1 << sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex is bigger than UINT_MAX,
where sbi->s_mb_prefetch is unsigned integer type.
32 is the maximum allowed power of s_log_groups_per_flex. Following if
check will also trigger UBSAN shift-out-of-bound:
if (1 << sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex >= UINT_MAX) {
So I'm checking it against the raw number, perhaps there is another way
to calculate UINT_MAX max power. Also use min_t as to make sure it's
uint type.
[1] UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in fs/ext4/mballoc.c:2713:24
shift exponent 60 is too large for 32-bit type 'int'
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
dump_stack+0x137/0x1be lib/dump_stack.c:120
ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:148 [inline]
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x432/0x4d0 lib/ubsan.c:395
ext4_mb_init_backend fs/ext4/mballoc.c:2713 [inline]
ext4_mb_init+0x19bc/0x19f0 fs/ext4/mballoc.c:2898
ext4_fill_super+0xc2ec/0xfbe0 fs/ext4/super.c:4983
Reported-by: syzbot+a8b4b0c60155e87e9484@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov <snovitoll@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210224095800.3350002-1-snovitoll@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 163f0ec1df33cf468509ff38cbcbb5eb0d7fac60 upstream.
Syzbot is reporting that ext4 can enter fs reclaim from kvmalloc() while
the transaction is started like:
fs_reclaim_acquire+0x117/0x150 mm/page_alloc.c:4340
might_alloc include/linux/sched/mm.h:193 [inline]
slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:493 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2817 [inline]
__kmalloc_node+0x5f/0x430 mm/slub.c:4015
kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:575 [inline]
kvmalloc_node+0x61/0xf0 mm/util.c:587
kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:781 [inline]
ext4_xattr_inode_cache_find fs/ext4/xattr.c:1465 [inline]
ext4_xattr_inode_lookup_create fs/ext4/xattr.c:1508 [inline]
ext4_xattr_set_entry+0x1ce6/0x3780 fs/ext4/xattr.c:1649
ext4_xattr_ibody_set+0x78/0x2b0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2224
ext4_xattr_set_handle+0x8f4/0x13e0 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2380
ext4_xattr_set+0x13a/0x340 fs/ext4/xattr.c:2493
This should be impossible since transaction start sets PF_MEMALLOC_NOFS.
Add some assertions to the code to catch if something isn't working as
expected early.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-ext4/000000000000563a0205bafb7970@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210222171626.21884-1-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 39f985c8f667c80a3d1eb19d31138032fa36b09e upstream.
Cachefiles was relying on wait_page_key and wait_bit_key being the
same layout, which is fragile. Now that wait_page_key is exposed in
the pagemap.h header, we can remove that fragility
A comment on the need to maintain structure layout equivalence was added by
Linus[1] and that is no longer applicable.
Fixes: 62906027091f ("mm: add PageWaiters indicating tasks are waiting for a page bit")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: kafs-testing@auristor.com
cc: linux-cachefs@redhat.com
cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210320054104.1300774-2-willy@infradead.org/
Link: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=3510ca20ece0150af6b10c77a74ff1b5c198e3e2 [1]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 45a4546c6167a2da348a31ca439d8a8ff773b6ea upstream.
For AES256 encryption (GCM and CCM), we need to adjust the size of a few
fields to 32 bytes instead of 16 to accommodate the larger keys.
Also, the L value supplied to the key generator needs to be changed from
to 256 when these algorithms are used.
Keeping the ioctl struct for dumping keys of the same size for now.
Will send out a different patch for that one.
Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.10+
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit cfc63fc8126a93cbf95379bc4cad79a7b15b6ece upstream.
There were two problems (one of which could cause data corruption)
that were noticed with duplicate extents (ie reflink)
when debugging why various xfstests were being incorrectly skipped
(e.g. generic/138, generic/140, generic/142). First, we were not
updating the file size locally in the cache when extending a
file due to reflink (it would refresh after actimeo expires)
but xfstest was checking the size immediately which was still
0 so caused the test to be skipped. Second, we were setting
the target file size (which could shrink the file) in all cases
to the end of the reflinked range rather than only setting the
target file size when reflink would extend the file.
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit d81269fecb8ce16eb07efafc9ff5520b2a31c486 ]
io_provide_buffers_prep()'s "p->len * p->nbufs" to sign extension
problems. Not a huge problem as it's only used for access_ok() and
increases the checked length, but better to keep typing right.
Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Fixes: efe68c1ca8f49 ("io_uring: validate the full range of provided buffers for access")
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/562376a39509e260d8532186a06226e56eb1f594.1616149233.git.asml.silence@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit 8b44ca2b634527151af07447a8090a5f3a043321 upstream.
The checks for maximum metadata block size is missing
SQUASHFS_BLOCK_OFFSET (the two byte length count).
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2069685113.2081245.1614583677427@webmail.123-reg.co.uk
Fixes: f37aa4c7366e23f ("squashfs: add more sanity checks in id lookup")
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
Cc: Sean Nyekjaer <sean@geanix.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit c1b2028315c6b15e8d6725e0d5884b15887d3daa upstream.
When mouting a squashfs image created without inode compression it fails
with: "unable to read inode lookup table"
It turns out that the BLOCK_OFFSET is missing when checking the
SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE agaist the actual size.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210226092903.1473545-1-sean@geanix.com
Fixes: eabac19e40c0 ("squashfs: add more sanity checks in inode lookup")
Signed-off-by: Sean Nyekjaer <sean@geanix.com>
Acked-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 0bb788300990d3eb5582d3301a720f846c78925c upstream.
While removing a qgroup's sysfs entry we end up taking the kernfs_mutex,
through kobject_del(), while holding the fs_info->qgroup_lock spinlock,
producing the following trace:
[821.843637] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:281
[821.843641] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 28214, name: podman
[821.843644] CPU: 3 PID: 28214 Comm: podman Tainted: G W 5.11.6 #15
[821.843646] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R330/084XW4, BIOS 2.11.0 12/08/2020
[821.843647] Call Trace:
[821.843650] dump_stack+0xa1/0xfb
[821.843656] ___might_sleep+0x144/0x160
[821.843659] mutex_lock+0x17/0x40
[821.843662] kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x1f/0x80
[821.843666] sysfs_remove_group+0x7d/0xe0
[821.843668] sysfs_remove_groups+0x28/0x40
[821.843670] kobject_del+0x2a/0x80
[821.843672] btrfs_sysfs_del_one_qgroup+0x2b/0x40 [btrfs]
[821.843685] __del_qgroup_rb+0x12/0x150 [btrfs]
[821.843696] btrfs_remove_qgroup+0x288/0x2a0 [btrfs]
[821.843707] btrfs_ioctl+0x3129/0x36a0 [btrfs]
[821.843717] ? __mod_lruvec_page_state+0x5e/0xb0
[821.843719] ? page_add_new_anon_rmap+0xbc/0x150
[821.843723] ? kfree+0x1b4/0x300
[821.843725] ? mntput_no_expire+0x55/0x330
[821.843728] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x5a/0xa0
[821.843731] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x70
[821.843733] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[821.843736] RIP: 0033:0x4cd3fb
[821.843741] RSP: 002b:000000c000906b20 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[821.843744] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000c000050000 RCX: 00000000004cd3fb
[821.843745] RDX: 000000c000906b98 RSI: 000000004010942a RDI: 000000000000000f
[821.843747] RBP: 000000c000907cd0 R08: 000000c000622901 R09: 0000000000000000
[821.843748] R10: 000000c000d992c0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 000000000000012d
[821.843749] R13: 000000000000012c R14: 0000000000000200 R15: 0000000000000049
Fix this by removing the qgroup sysfs entry while not holding the spinlock,
since the spinlock is only meant for protection of the qgroup rbtree.
Reported-by: Stuart Shelton <srcshelton@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/7A5485BB-0628-419D-A4D3-27B1AF47E25A@gmail.com/
Fixes: 49e5fb46211de0 ("btrfs: qgroup: export qgroups in sysfs")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 4f8be1f53bf615102d103c0509ffa9596f65b718 ]
The NFSv4 protocol doesn't have any notion of reomoving an attribute, so
removexattr(path,"system.nfs4_acl") doesn't make sense.
There's no documented return value. Arguably it could be EOPNOTSUPP but
I'm a little worried an application might take that to mean that we
don't support ACLs or xattrs. How about EINVAL?
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit e3d100eae44b42f309c1366efb8397368f1cf8ed ]
A customer has reported that their dmesg were being flooded by
CIFS: VFS: \\server Cancelling wait for mid xxx cmd: a
CIFS: VFS: \\server Cancelling wait for mid yyy cmd: b
CIFS: VFS: \\server Cancelling wait for mid zzz cmd: c
because some processes that were performing statfs(2) on the share had
been interrupted due to their automount setup when certain users
logged in and out.
Change it to FYI as they should be mostly informative rather than
error messages.
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit ad3dbe35c833c2d4d0bbf3f04c785d32f931e7c9 ]
CREATE requests return a post_op_fh3, rather than nfs_fh3. The
post_op_fh3 includes an extra word to indicate 'handle_follows'.
Without that additional word, create fails when full 64-byte
filehandles are in use.
Add NFS3_post_op_fh_sz, and correct the size calculation for
NFS3_createres_sz.
Signed-off-by: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit a0590473c5e6c4ef17c3132ad08fbad170f72d55 ]
This follows what was done in 8c2fabc6542d9d0f8b16bd1045c2eda59bdcde13.
With the default being m, it's impossible to build the module into the
kernel.
Signed-off-by: Timo Rothenpieler <timo@rothenpieler.org>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 1a5a2cfd34c17db73c53ef127272c8c1ae220485 ]
This patch adds code to function trans_drain to remove drained
bd elements from the ail lists, if queued, before freeing the bd.
If we don't remove the bd from the ail, function ail_drain will
try to reference the bd after it has been freed by trans_drain.
Thanks to Andy Price for his analysis of the problem.
Reported-by: Andy Price <anprice@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 88fd98a2306755b965e4f4567f84e73db3b6738c ]
When doing a large read or write workload we only
very gradually increase the number of credits
which can cause problems with parallelizing large i/o
(I/O ramps up more slowly than it should for large
read/write workloads) especially with multichannel
when the number of credits on the secondary channels
starts out low (e.g. less than about 130) or when
recovering after server throttled back the number
of credit.
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
