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[ Upstream commit 71e6864eacbef0b2645ca043cdfbac272cb6cea3 ]
Linux allows doing a flush/fsync on a file open for read-only,
but the protocol does not allow that. If the file passed in
on the flush is read-only try to find a writeable handle for
the same inode, if that is not possible skip sending the
fsync call to the server to avoid breaking the apps.
Reported-by: Julian Sikorski <belegdol@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Julian Sikorski <belegdol@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8cfc0c7ed34f7929ce7e5d7c6eecf4d01ba89a84 ]
ceph_statfs currently stuffs the cluster fsid into the f_fsid field.
This was fine when we only had a single filesystem per cluster, but now
that we have multiples we need to use something that will vary between
them.
Change ceph_statfs to xor each 32-bit chunk of the fsid (aka cluster id)
into the lower bits of the statfs->f_fsid. Change the lower bits to hold
the fscid (filesystem ID within the cluster).
That should give us a value that is guaranteed to be unique between
filesystems within a cluster, and should minimize the chance of
collisions between mounts of different clusters.
URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/52812
Reported-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6663b138ded1a59e630c9e605e42aa7fde490cdc ]
Inconsistent node block will cause a file fail to open or read,
which could make the user process crashes or stucks. Let's mark
SBI_NEED_FSCK flag to trigger a fix at next fsck time. After
unlinking the corrupted file, the user process could regenerate
a new one and work correctly.
Signed-off-by: Weichao Guo <guoweichao@oppo.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 57bbeacdbee72a54eb97d56b876cf9c94059fc34 ]
We observed the following deadlock in the stress test under low
memory scenario:
Thread A Thread B
- erofs_shrink_scan
- erofs_try_to_release_workgroup
- erofs_workgroup_try_to_freeze -- A
- z_erofs_do_read_page
- z_erofs_collection_begin
- z_erofs_register_collection
- erofs_insert_workgroup
- xa_lock(&sbi->managed_pslots) -- B
- erofs_workgroup_get
- erofs_wait_on_workgroup_freezed -- A
- xa_erase
- xa_lock(&sbi->managed_pslots) -- B
To fix this, it needs to hold xa_lock before freezing the workgroup
since xarray will be touched then. So let's hold the lock before
accessing each workgroup, just like what we did with the radix tree
before.
[ Gao Xiang: Jianhua Hao also reports this issue at
https://lore.kernel.org/r/b10b85df30694bac8aadfe43537c897a@xiaomi.com ]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211118135844.3559-1-huangjianan@oppo.com
Fixes: 64094a04414f ("erofs: convert workstn to XArray")
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Huang Jianan <huangjianan@oppo.com>
Reported-by: Jianhua Hao <haojianhua1@xiaomi.com>
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <xiang@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d3c45824ad65aebf765fcf51366d317a29538820 ]
The failure to retrieve post-op attributes has no bearing on whether or
not the clone operation itself was successful. We must therefore ignore
the return value of decode_getfattr() when looking at the success or
failure of nfs4_xdr_dec_clone().
Fixes: 36022770de6c ("nfs42: add CLONE xdr functions")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit c1e63117711977cc4295b2ce73de29dd17066c82 upstream.
To clear a user buffer we cannot simply use memset, we have to use
clear_user(). With a virtio-mem device that registers a vmcore_cb and
has some logically unplugged memory inside an added Linux memory block,
I can easily trigger a BUG by copying the vmcore via "cp":
systemd[1]: Starting Kdump Vmcore Save Service...
kdump[420]: Kdump is using the default log level(3).
kdump[453]: saving to /sysroot/var/crash/127.0.0.1-2021-11-11-14:59:22/
kdump[458]: saving vmcore-dmesg.txt to /sysroot/var/crash/127.0.0.1-2021-11-11-14:59:22/
kdump[465]: saving vmcore-dmesg.txt complete
kdump[467]: saving vmcore
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00007f2374e01000
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation
PGD 7a523067 P4D 7a523067 PUD 7a528067 PMD 7a525067 PTE 800000007048f867
Oops: 0003 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 PID: 468 Comm: cp Not tainted 5.15.0+ #6
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.14.0-27-g64f37cc530f1-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:read_from_oldmem.part.0.cold+0x1d/0x86
Code: ff ff ff e8 05 ff fe ff e9 b9 e9 7f ff 48 89 de 48 c7 c7 38 3b 60 82 e8 f1 fe fe ff 83 fd 08 72 3c 49 8d 7d 08 4c 89 e9 89 e8 <49> c7 45 00 00 00 00 00 49 c7 44 05 f8 00 00 00 00 48 83 e7 f81
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000073be08 EFLAGS: 00010212
RAX: 0000000000001000 RBX: 00000000002fd000 RCX: 00007f2374e01000
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000000ffffdfff RDI: 00007f2374e01008
RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc9000073bc50
R10: ffffc9000073bc48 R11: ffffffff829461a8 R12: 000000000000f000
R13: 00007f2374e01000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88807bd421e8
FS: 00007f2374e12140(0000) GS:ffff88807f000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f2374e01000 CR3: 000000007a4aa000 CR4: 0000000000350eb0
Call Trace:
read_vmcore+0x236/0x2c0
proc_reg_read+0x55/0xa0
vfs_read+0x95/0x190
ksys_read+0x4f/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Some x86-64 CPUs have a CPU feature called "Supervisor Mode Access
Prevention (SMAP)", which is used to detect wrong access from the kernel
to user buffers like this: SMAP triggers a permissions violation on
wrong access. In the x86-64 variant of clear_user(), SMAP is properly
handled via clac()+stac().
To fix, properly use clear_user() when we're dealing with a user buffer.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211112092750.6921-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: 997c136f518c ("fs/proc/vmcore.c: add hook to read_from_oldmem() to check for non-ram pages")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Philipp Rudo <prudo@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 473441720c8616dfaf4451f9c7ea14f0eb5e5d65 upstream.
Checking buf->flags should be done before the pipe_buf_release() is called
on the pipe buffer, since releasing the buffer might modify the flags.
This is exactly what page_cache_pipe_buf_release() does, and which results
in the same VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PageLRU(page)) that the original patch was
trying to fix.
Reported-by: Justin Forbes <jmforbes@linuxtx.org>
Fixes: 712a951025c0 ("fuse: fix page stealing")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.35
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 54fde91f52f515e0b1514f0f0fa146e87a672227 upstream.
Christoph pointed out that I'm updating bdev->bd_inode for the device
time when we remove block devices from a btrfs file system, however this
isn't actually exposed to anything. The inode we want to update is the
one that's associated with the path to the device, usually on devtmpfs,
so that blkid notices the difference.
We still don't want to do the blkdev_open, so use kern_path() to get the
path to the given device and do the update time on that inode.
Fixes: 8f96a5bfa150 ("btrfs: update the bdev time directly when closing")
Reported-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e60feb445fce9e51c1558a6aa7faf9dd5ded533b upstream.
If you already have an inode and need to update the time on the inode
there is no way to do this properly. Export this helper to allow file
systems to update time on the inode so the appropriate handler is
called, either ->update_time or generic_update_time.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 45da9c1767ac31857df572f0a909fbe88fd5a7e9 upstream.
Ordered work functions aren't guaranteed to be handled by the same thread
which executed the normal work functions. The only way execution between
normal/ordered functions is synchronized is via the WORK_DONE_BIT,
unfortunately the used bitops don't guarantee any ordering whatsoever.
This manifested as seemingly inexplicable crashes on ARM64, where
async_chunk::inode is seen as non-null in async_cow_submit which causes
submit_compressed_extents to be called and crash occurs because
async_chunk::inode suddenly became NULL. The call trace was similar to:
pc : submit_compressed_extents+0x38/0x3d0
lr : async_cow_submit+0x50/0xd0
sp : ffff800015d4bc20
<registers omitted for brevity>
Call trace:
submit_compressed_extents+0x38/0x3d0
async_cow_submit+0x50/0xd0
run_ordered_work+0xc8/0x280
btrfs_work_helper+0x98/0x250
process_one_work+0x1f0/0x4ac
worker_thread+0x188/0x504
kthread+0x110/0x114
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
Fix this by adding respective barrier calls which ensure that all
accesses preceding setting of WORK_DONE_BIT are strictly ordered before
setting the flag. At the same time add a read barrier after reading of
WORK_DONE_BIT in run_ordered_work which ensures all subsequent loads
would be strictly ordered after reading the bit. This in turn ensures
are all accesses before WORK_DONE_BIT are going to be strictly ordered
before any access that can occur in ordered_func.
Reported-by: Chris Murphy <lists@colorremedies.com>
Fixes: 08a9ff326418 ("btrfs: Added btrfs_workqueue_struct implemented ordered execution based on kernel workqueue")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2011928
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Tested-by: Chris Murphy <chris@colorremedies.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a48fc69fe6588b48d878d69de223b91a386a7cb4 upstream.
udf_readdir() didn't validate the directory position it should start
reading from. Thus when user uses lseek(2) on directory file descriptor
it can trick udf_readdir() into reading from a position in the middle of
directory entry which then upsets directory parsing code resulting in
errors or even possible kernel crashes. Similarly when the directory is
modified between two readdir calls, the directory position need not be
valid anymore.
Add code to validate current offset in the directory. This is actually
rather expensive for UDF as we need to read from the beginning of the
directory and parse all directory entries. This is because in UDF a
directory is just a stream of data containing directory entries and
since file names are fully under user's control we cannot depend on
detecting magic numbers and checksums in the header of directory entry
as a malicious attacker could fake them. We skip this step if we detect
that nothing changed since the last readdir call.
Reported-by: Nathan Wilson <nate@chickenbrittle.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ca98d72141dd81f42893a9a43d7ededab3355fba ]
As Pavel Machek reported in [1]
This code looks quite confused: part of function returns 1 on
corruption, part returns -errno. The problem is not stable-specific.
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/9/19/207
Let's fix to make 'insane cp_payload case' to return 1 rater than
EFSCORRUPTED, so that return value can be kept consistent for all
error cases, it can avoid confusion of code logic.
Fixes: 65ddf6564843 ("f2fs: fix to do sanity check for sb/cp fields correctly")
Reported-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 02d58cd253d7536c412993573fc6b3b4454960eb ]
Compresse file and normal file has differ in i_addr addressing,
specifically addrs per inode/block. So, we will face data loss, if we
disable the compression flag on non-empty files. Therefore we should
disallow not only enabling but disabling the compression flag on
non-empty files.
Fixes: 4c8ff7095bef ("f2fs: support data compression")
Signed-off-by: Sungjong Seo <sj1557.seo@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Hyeong-Jun Kim <hj514.kim@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 011e0868e0cf1237675b22e36fffa958fb08f46e ]
Since active_logs can be set to 2 or 4 or NR_CURSEG_PERSIST_TYPE(6),
it cannot be set to NR_CURSEG_TYPE(8).
That is, whint_mode is always off.
Therefore, the condition is changed from NR_CURSEG_TYPE to NR_CURSEG_PERSIST_TYPE.
Cc: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Fixes: d0b9e42ab615 (f2fs: introduce inmem curseg)
Reported-by: tanghuan <tanghuan@vivo.com>
Signed-off-by: Keoseong Park <keosung.park@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Fengnan Chang <changfengnan@vivo.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 86432a6dca9bed79111990851df5756d3eb5f57c upstream.
There are pclusters in runtime marked with Z_EROFS_PCLUSTER_TAIL
before actual I/O submission. Thus, the decompression chain can be
extended if the following pcluster chain hooks such tail pcluster.
As the related comment mentioned, if some page is made of a hooked
pcluster and another followed pcluster, it can be reused for in-place
I/O (since I/O should be submitted anyway):
_______________________________________________________________
| tail (partial) page | head (partial) page |
|_____PRIMARY_HOOKED___|____________PRIMARY_FOLLOWED____________|
However, it's by no means safe to reuse as pagevec since if such
PRIMARY_HOOKED pclusters finally move into bypass chain without I/O
submission. It's somewhat hard to reproduce with LZ4 and I just found
it (general protection fault) by ro_fsstressing a LZMA image for long
time.
I'm going to actively clean up related code together with multi-page
folio adaption in the next few months. Let's address it directly for
easier backporting for now.
Call trace for reference:
z_erofs_decompress_pcluster+0x10a/0x8a0 [erofs]
z_erofs_decompress_queue.isra.36+0x3c/0x60 [erofs]
z_erofs_runqueue+0x5f3/0x840 [erofs]
z_erofs_readahead+0x1e8/0x320 [erofs]
read_pages+0x91/0x270
page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x18b/0x240
filemap_get_pages+0x10a/0x5f0
filemap_read+0xa9/0x330
new_sync_read+0x11b/0x1a0
vfs_read+0xf1/0x190
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211103182006.4040-1-xiang@kernel.org
Fixes: 3883a79abd02 ("staging: erofs: introduce VLE decompression support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.19+
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7dea3de7d384f4c8156e8bd93112ba6db1eb276c upstream.
No any behavior to variable occupied in z_erofs_attach_page() which
is only caller to z_erofs_pagevec_enqueue().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210419102623.2015-1-zbestahu@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Yue Hu <huyue2@yulong.com>
Reviewed-by: Gao Xiang <xiang@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <xiang@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 92d602bc7177325e7453189a22e0c8764ed3453e upstream.
We use inline_dentry which requires to allocate dentry page when adding a link.
If we allow to reclaim memory from filesystem, we do down_read(&sbi->cp_rwsem)
twice by f2fs_lock_op(). I think this should be okay, but how about stopping
the lockdep complaint [1]?
f2fs_create()
- f2fs_lock_op()
- f2fs_do_add_link()
- __f2fs_find_entry
- f2fs_get_read_data_page()
-> kswapd
- shrink_node
- f2fs_evict_inode
- f2fs_lock_op()
[1]
fs_reclaim
){+.+.}-{0:0}
:
kswapd0: lock_acquire+0x114/0x394
kswapd0: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x40/0x50
kswapd0: prepare_alloc_pages+0x94/0x1ec
kswapd0: __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x78/0x1b0
kswapd0: pagecache_get_page+0x2e0/0x57c
kswapd0: f2fs_get_read_data_page+0xc0/0x394
kswapd0: f2fs_find_data_page+0xa4/0x23c
kswapd0: find_in_level+0x1a8/0x36c
kswapd0: __f2fs_find_entry+0x70/0x100
kswapd0: f2fs_do_add_link+0x84/0x1ec
kswapd0: f2fs_mkdir+0xe4/0x1e4
kswapd0: vfs_mkdir+0x110/0x1c0
kswapd0: do_mkdirat+0xa4/0x160
kswapd0: __arm64_sys_mkdirat+0x24/0x34
kswapd0: el0_svc_common.llvm.17258447499513131576+0xc4/0x1e8
kswapd0: do_el0_svc+0x28/0xa0
kswapd0: el0_svc+0x24/0x38
kswapd0: el0_sync_handler+0x88/0xec
kswapd0: el0_sync+0x1c0/0x200
kswapd0:
-> #1
(
&sbi->cp_rwsem
){++++}-{3:3}
:
kswapd0: lock_acquire+0x114/0x394
kswapd0: down_read+0x7c/0x98
kswapd0: f2fs_do_truncate_blocks+0x78/0x3dc
kswapd0: f2fs_truncate+0xc8/0x128
kswapd0: f2fs_evict_inode+0x2b8/0x8b8
kswapd0: evict+0xd4/0x2f8
kswapd0: iput+0x1c0/0x258
kswapd0: do_unlinkat+0x170/0x2a0
kswapd0: __arm64_sys_unlinkat+0x4c/0x68
kswapd0: el0_svc_common.llvm.17258447499513131576+0xc4/0x1e8
kswapd0: do_el0_svc+0x28/0xa0
kswapd0: el0_svc+0x24/0x38
kswapd0: el0_sync_handler+0x88/0xec
kswapd0: el0_sync+0x1c0/0x200
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: bdbc90fa55af ("f2fs: don't put dentry page in pagecache into highmem")
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stanley Chu <stanley.chu@mediatek.com>
Reviewed-by: Light Hsieh <light.hsieh@mediatek.com>
Tested-by: Light Hsieh <light.hsieh@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 01d29f87fcfef38d51ce2b473981a5c1e861ac0a ]
If we already hold open state on the client, yet the server gives us a
completely different stateid to the one we already hold, then we
currently treat it as if it were an out-of-sequence update, and wait for
5 seconds for other updates to come in.
This commit fixes the behaviour so that we immediately start processing
of the new stateid, and then leave it to the call to
nfs4_test_and_free_stateid() to decide what to do with the old stateid.
Fixes: b4868b44c562 ("NFSv4: Wait for stateid updates after CLOSE/OPEN_DOWNGRADE")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d5f458a979650e5ed37212f6134e4ee2b28cb6ed ]
Fixes: 61ca2c4afd9d ("NFS: Only reference user namespace from nfs4idmap struct instead of cred")
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f0caea8882a7412a2ad4d8274f0280cdf849c9e2 ]
Olga reports seeing the following Oops when doing O_DIRECT writes to a
pNFS flexfiles server:
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 234186 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc4+ #4
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM/RHEL-AV, BIOS 1.13.0-2.module+el8.3.0+7353+9de0a3cc 04/01/2014
Workqueue: nfsiod rpc_async_release [sunrpc]
RIP: 0010:nfs_mark_request_commit+0x12/0x30 [nfs]
Code: ff ff be 03 00 00 00 e8 ac 34 83 eb e9 29 ff ff
ff e8 22 bc d7 eb 66 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 85 f6 74 16 48 8b 42 10 48
8b 40 18 <48> 8b 40 18 48 85 c0 74 05 e9 70 fc 15 ec 48 89 d6 e9 68 ed
ff ff
RSP: 0018:ffffa82f0159fe00 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8f3393141880 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffffa82f0159fe08 RSI: ffff8f3381252500 RDI: ffff8f3393141880
RBP: ffff8f33ac317c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff8f3487724cb0
R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffff8f3485bccee0 R14: ffff8f33ac317c10 R15: ffff8f33ac317cd8
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8f34fbc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000122120006 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
nfs_direct_write_completion+0x13b/0x250 [nfs]
rpc_free_task+0x39/0x60 [sunrpc]
rpc_async_release+0x29/0x40 [sunrpc]
process_one_work+0x1ce/0x370
worker_thread+0x30/0x380
? process_one_work+0x370/0x370
kthread+0x11a/0x140
? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
Reported-by: Olga Kornievskaia <aglo@umich.edu>
Fixes: 9c455a8c1e14 ("NFS/pNFS: Clean up pNFS commit operations")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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|
[ Upstream commit 133a48abf6ecc535d7eddc6da1c3e4c972445882 ]
If O_DIRECT bumps the commit_info rpcs_out field, then that could lead
to fsync() hangs. The fix is to ensure that O_DIRECT calls
nfs_commit_end().
Fixes: 723c921e7dfc ("sched/wait, fs/nfs: Convert wait_on_atomic_t() usage to the new wait_var_event() API")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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|
[ Upstream commit 4c2b46c824a78fc8190d8eafaaea5a9078fe7479 ]
When op_alloc() returns NULL to new_op, no error return code of
orangefs_revalidate_lookup() is assigned.
To fix this bug, ret is assigned with -ENOMEM in this case.
Fixes: 8bb8aefd5afb ("OrangeFS: Change almost all instances of the string PVFS2 to OrangeFS.")
Reported-by: TOTE Robot <oslab@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Marshall <hubcap@omnibond.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 64a93dbf25d3a1368bb58ddf0f61d0a92d7479e3 ]
Partially revert commit 2ce209c42c01 ("NFS: Wait for requests that are
locked on the commit list"), since it can lead to deadlocks between
commit requests and nfs_join_page_group().
For now we should assume that any locked requests on the commit list are
either about to be removed and committed by another task, or the writes
they describe are about to be retransmitted. In either case, we should
not need to worry.
Fixes: 2ce209c42c01 ("NFS: Wait for requests that are locked on the commit list")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a2915fa06227b056a8f9b0d79b61dca08ad5cfc6 ]
_nfs4_pnfs_v3/v4_ds_connect do
some work
smp_wmb
ds->ds_clp = clp;
And nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds currently does
smp_rmb
if(ds->ds_clp)
...
This patch places the smp_rmb after the if. This ensures that following
reads only happen once nfs4_ff_layout_prepare_ds has checked that data
has been properly initialized.
Fixes: d67ae825a59d6 ("pnfs/flexfiles: Add the FlexFile Layout Driver")
Signed-off-by: Baptiste Lepers <baptiste.lepers@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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|
[ Upstream commit cec08f452a687fce9dfdf47946d00a1d12a8bec5 ]
If the directory changed while we were revalidating the dentry, then
don't update the dentry verifier. There is no value in setting the
verifier to an older value, and we could end up overwriting a more up to
date verifier from a parallel revalidation.
Fixes: efeda80da38d ("NFSv4: Fix revalidation of dentries with delegations")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Tested-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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|
[ Upstream commit c48a14dca2cb57527dde6b960adbe69953935f10 ]
In jfs_mount, when diMount(ipaimap2) fails, it goes to errout35. However,
the following code does not free ipaimap2 allocated by diReadSpecial.
Fix this by refactoring the error handling code of jfs_mount. To be
specific, modify the lable name and free ipaimap2 when the above error
ocurrs.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Dongliang Mu <mudongliangabcd@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a0961f351d82d43ab0b845304caa235dfe249ae9 ]
syzbot reported a WARNING [1] due to corrupted compressed data.
As Dmitry said, "If this is not a kernel bug, then the code should
not use WARN. WARN if for kernel bugs and is recognized as such by
all testing systems and humans."
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000b3586105cf0ff45e@google.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211025074311.130395-1-hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+d8aaffc3719597e8cfb4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 8ef9dc0f14ba6124c62547a4fdc59b163d8b864e ]
We got the following lockdep splat while running fstests (specifically
btrfs/003 and btrfs/020 in a row) with the new rc. This was uncovered
by 87579e9b7d8d ("loop: use worker per cgroup instead of kworker") which
converted loop to using workqueues, which comes with lockdep
annotations that don't exist with kworkers. The lockdep splat is as
follows:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.14.0-rc2-custom+ #34 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
losetup/156417 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff9c7645b02d38 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: flush_workqueue+0x84/0x600
but task is already holding lock:
ffff9c7647395468 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x41/0x650 [loop]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #5 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock+0xba/0x7c0
lo_open+0x28/0x60 [loop]
blkdev_get_whole+0x28/0xf0
blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0x168/0x3c0
blkdev_open+0xd2/0xe0
do_dentry_open+0x163/0x3a0
path_openat+0x74d/0xa40
do_filp_open+0x9c/0x140
do_sys_openat2+0xb1/0x170
__x64_sys_openat+0x54/0x90
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
-> #4 (&disk->open_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock+0xba/0x7c0
blkdev_get_by_dev.part.0+0xd1/0x3c0
blkdev_get_by_path+0xc0/0xd0
btrfs_scan_one_device+0x52/0x1f0 [btrfs]
btrfs_control_ioctl+0xac/0x170 [btrfs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
-> #3 (uuid_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__mutex_lock+0xba/0x7c0
btrfs_rm_device+0x48/0x6a0 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl+0x2d1c/0x3110 [btrfs]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
-> #2 (sb_writers#11){.+.+}-{0:0}:
lo_write_bvec+0x112/0x290 [loop]
loop_process_work+0x25f/0xcb0 [loop]
process_one_work+0x28f/0x5d0
worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0
kthread+0x140/0x170
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
-> #1 ((work_completion)(&lo->rootcg_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
process_one_work+0x266/0x5d0
worker_thread+0x55/0x3c0
kthread+0x140/0x170
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
-> #0 ((wq_completion)loop0){+.+.}-{0:0}:
__lock_acquire+0x1130/0x1dc0
lock_acquire+0xf5/0x320
flush_workqueue+0xae/0x600
drain_workqueue+0xa0/0x110
destroy_workqueue+0x36/0x250
__loop_clr_fd+0x9a/0x650 [loop]
lo_ioctl+0x29d/0x780 [loop]
block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
(wq_completion)loop0 --> &disk->open_mutex --> &lo->lo_mutex
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&lo->lo_mutex);
lock(&disk->open_mutex);
lock(&lo->lo_mutex);
lock((wq_completion)loop0);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by losetup/156417:
#0: ffff9c7647395468 (&lo->lo_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __loop_clr_fd+0x41/0x650 [loop]
stack backtrace:
CPU: 8 PID: 156417 Comm: losetup Not tainted 5.14.0-rc2-custom+ #34
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x72
check_noncircular+0x10a/0x120
__lock_acquire+0x1130/0x1dc0
lock_acquire+0xf5/0x320
? flush_workqueue+0x84/0x600
flush_workqueue+0xae/0x600
? flush_workqueue+0x84/0x600
drain_workqueue+0xa0/0x110
destroy_workqueue+0x36/0x250
__loop_clr_fd+0x9a/0x650 [loop]
lo_ioctl+0x29d/0x780 [loop]
? __lock_acquire+0x3a0/0x1dc0
? update_dl_rq_load_avg+0x152/0x360
? lock_is_held_type+0xa5/0x120
? find_held_lock.constprop.0+0x2b/0x80
block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f645884de6b
Usually the uuid_mutex exists to protect the fs_devices that map
together all of the devices that match a specific uuid. In rm_device
we're messing with the uuid of a device, so it makes sense to protect
that here.
However in doing that it pulls in a whole host of lockdep dependencies,
as we call mnt_may_write() on the sb before we grab the uuid_mutex, thus
we end up with the dependency chain under the uuid_mutex being added
under the normal sb write dependency chain, which causes problems with
loop devices.
We don't need the uuid mutex here however. If we call
btrfs_scan_one_device() before we scratch the super block we will find
the fs_devices and not find the device itself and return EBUSY because
the fs_devices is open. If we call it after the scratch happens it will
not appear to be a valid btrfs file system.
We do not need to worry about other fs_devices modifying operations here
because we're protected by the exclusive operations locking.
So drop the uuid_mutex here in order to fix the lockdep splat.
A more detailed explanation from the discussion:
We are worried about rm and scan racing with each other, before this
change we'll zero the device out under the UUID mutex so when scan does
run it'll make sure that it can go through the whole device scan thing
without rm messing with us.
We aren't worried if the scratch happens first, because the result is we
don't think this is a btrfs device and we bail out.
The only case we are concerned with is we scratch _after_ scan is able
to read the superblock and gets a seemingly valid super block, so lets
consider this case.
Scan will call device_list_add() with the device we're removing. We'll
call find_fsid_with_metadata_uuid() and get our fs_devices for this
UUID. At this point we lock the fs_devices->device_list_mutex. This is
what protects us in this case, but we have two cases here.
1. We aren't to the device removal part of the RM. We found our device,
and device name matches our path, we go down and we set total_devices
to our super number of devices, which doesn't affect anything because
we haven't done the remove yet.
2. We are past the device removal part, which is protected by the
device_list_mutex. Scan doesn't find the device, it goes down and
does the
if (fs_devices->opened)
return -EBUSY;
check and we bail out.
Nothing about this situation is ideal, but the lockdep splat is real,
and the fix is safe, tho admittedly a bit scary looking.
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ copy more from the discussion ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 44bee215f72f13874c0e734a0712c2e3264c0108 ]
Fix a warning reported by smatch that ret could be returned without
initialized. The dedupe operations are supposed to to return 0 for a 0
length range but the caller does not pass olen == 0. To keep this
behaviour and also fix the warning initialize ret to 0.
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sidong Yang <realwakka@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7427f3bb49d81525b7dd1d0f7c5f6bbc752e6f0e ]
So far, glock_hash_walk took a reference on each glock it iterated over, and it
was the examiner's responsibility to drop those references. Dropping the final
reference to a glock can sleep and the examiners are called in a RCU critical
section with spin locks held, so examiners that didn't need the extra reference
had to drop it asynchronously via gfs2_glock_queue_put or similar. This wasn't
done correctly in thaw_glock which did call gfs2_glock_put, and not at all in
dump_glock_func.
Change glock_hash_walk to not take glock references at all. That way, the
examiners that don't need them won't have to bother with slow asynchronous
puts, and the examiners that do need references can take them themselves.
Reported-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 486408d690e130c3adacf816754b97558d715f46 ]
In gfs2_inode_lookup and gfs2_create_inode, we're calling
gfs2_cancel_delete_work which currently cancels any remote delete work
(delete_work_func) synchronously. This means that if the work is
currently running, it will wait for it to finish. We're doing this to
pevent a previous instance of an inode from having any influence on the
next instance.
However, delete_work_func uses gfs2_inode_lookup internally, and we can
end up in a deadlock when delete_work_func gets interrupted at the wrong
time. For example,
(1) An inode's iopen glock has delete work queued, but the inode
itself has been evicted from the inode cache.
(2) The delete work is preempted before reaching gfs2_inode_lookup.
(3) Another process recreates the inode (gfs2_create_inode). It tries
to cancel any outstanding delete work, which blocks waiting for
the ongoing delete work to finish.
(4) The delete work calls gfs2_inode_lookup, which blocks waiting for
gfs2_create_inode to instantiate and unlock the new inode =>
deadlock.
It turns out that when the delete work notices that its inode has been
re-instantiated, it will do nothing. This means that it's safe to
cancel the delete work asynchronously. This prevents the kind of
deadlock described above.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson <rpeterso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 49d67e445742bbcb03106b735b2ab39f6e5c56bc ]
The tracefs file system is by default mounted such that only root user can
access it. But there are legitimate reasons to create a group and allow
those added to the group to have access to tracing. By changing the
permissions of the tracefs mount point to allow access, it will allow
group access to the tracefs directory.
There should not be any real reason to allow all access to the tracefs
directory as it contains sensitive information. Have the default
permission of directories being created not have any OTH (other) bits set,
such that an admin that wants to give permission to a group has to first
disable all OTH bits in the file system.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210818153038.664127804@goodmis.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a130e8fbc7de796eb6e680724d87f4737a26d0ac ]
/proc/uptime reports idle time by reading the CPUTIME_IDLE field from
the per-cpu kcpustats. However, on NO_HZ systems, idle time is not
continually updated on idle cpus, leading this value to appear
incorrectly small.
/proc/stat performs an accounting update when reading idle time; we
can use the same approach for uptime.
With this patch, /proc/stat and /proc/uptime now agree on idle time.
Additionally, the following shows idle time tick up consistently on an
idle machine:
(while true; do cat /proc/uptime; sleep 1; done) | awk '{print $2-prev; prev=$2}'
Reported-by: Luigi Rizzo <lrizzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Don <joshdon@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210827165438.3280779-1-joshdon@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7f595d6a6cdc336834552069a2e0a4f6d4756ddf ]
fscrypt currently requires a 512-bit master key when AES-256-XTS is
used, since AES-256-XTS keys are 512-bit and fscrypt requires that the
master key be at least as long any key that will be derived from it.
However, this is overly strict because AES-256-XTS doesn't actually have
a 512-bit security strength, but rather 256-bit. The fact that XTS
takes twice the expected key size is a quirk of the XTS mode. It is
sufficient to use 256 bits of entropy for AES-256-XTS, provided that it
is first properly expanded into a 512-bit key, which HKDF-SHA512 does.
Therefore, relax the check of the master key size to use the security
strength of the derived key rather than the size of the derived key
(except for v1 encryption policies, which don't use HKDF).
Besides making things more flexible for userspace, this is needed in
order for the use of a KDF which only takes a 256-bit key to be
introduced into the fscrypt key hierarchy. This will happen with
hardware-wrapped keys support, as all known hardware which supports that
feature uses an SP800-108 KDF using AES-256-CMAC, so the wrapped keys
are wrapped 256-bit AES keys. Moreover, there is interest in fscrypt
supporting the same type of AES-256-CMAC based KDF in software as an
alternative to HKDF-SHA512. There is no security problem with such
features, so fix the key length check to work properly with them.
Reviewed-by: Paul Crowley <paulcrowley@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210921030303.5598-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit d0e36a62bd4c60c09acc40e06ba4831a4d0bc75b upstream.
Fix the error path in free_dqentry(), pass out the error number if the
block to free is not correct.
Fixes: 1ccd14b9c271 ("quota: Split off quota tree handling into a separate file")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211008093821.1001186-3-yi.zhang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9bf3d20331295b1ecb81f4ed9ef358c51699a050 upstream.
The block number in the quota tree on disk should be smaller than the
v2_disk_dqinfo.dqi_blocks. If the quota file was corrupted, we may be
allocating an 'allocated' block and that would lead to a loop in a tree,
which will probably trigger oops later. This patch adds a check for the
block number in the quota tree to prevent such potential issue.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211008093821.1001186-2-yi.zhang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9a254403760041528bc8f69fe2f5e1ef86950991 upstream.
Example for triggering use after free in a overlay on ext4 setup:
aio_read
ovl_read_iter
vfs_iter_read
ext4_file_read_iter
ext4_dio_read_iter
iomap_dio_rw -> -EIOCBQUEUED
/*
* Here IO is completed in a separate thread,
* ovl_aio_cleanup_handler() frees aio_req which has iocb embedded
*/
file_accessed(iocb->ki_filp); /**BOOM**/
Fix by introducing a refcount in ovl_aio_req similarly to aio_kiocb. This
guarantees that iocb is only freed after vfs_read/write_iter() returns on
underlying fs.
Fixes: 2406a307ac7d ("ovl: implement async IO routines")
Signed-off-by: yangerkun <yangerkun@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210930032228.3199690-3-yangerkun@huawei.com/
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.6
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5c78a5e7aa835c4f08a7c90fe02d19f95a776f29 upstream.
In open_ctree() in btrfs_check_rw_degradable() [1], we check each block
group individually if at least the minimum number of devices is available
for that profile. If all the devices are available, then we don't have to
check degradable.
[1]
open_ctree()
::
3559 if (!sb_rdonly(sb) && !btrfs_check_rw_degradable(fs_info, NULL)) {
Also before calling btrfs_check_rw_degradable() in open_ctee() at the
line number shown below [2] we call btrfs_read_chunk_tree() and down to
add_missing_dev() to record number of missing devices.
[2]
open_ctree()
::
3454 ret = btrfs_read_chunk_tree(fs_info);
btrfs_read_chunk_tree()
read_one_chunk() / read_one_dev()
add_missing_dev()
So, check if there is any missing device before btrfs_check_rw_degradable()
in open_ctree().
Also, with this the mount command could save ~16ms.[3] in the most
common case, that is no device is missing.
[3]
1) * 16934.96 us | btrfs_check_rw_degradable [btrfs]();
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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