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2026-03-19btrfs: abort transaction on failure to update root in the received subvol ioctlFilipe Manana1-1/+2
commit 0f475ee0ebce5c9492b260027cd95270191675fa upstream. If we failed to update the root we don't abort the transaction, which is wrong since we already used the transaction to remove an item from the uuid tree. Fixes: dd5f9615fc5c ("Btrfs: maintain subvolume items in the UUID tree") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.12+ Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <asj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19btrfs: add missing RCU unlock in error path in ↵Bart Van Assche1-0/+1
try_release_subpage_extent_buffer() commit b2840e33127ce0eea880504b7f133e780f567a9b upstream. Call rcu_read_lock() before exiting the loop in try_release_subpage_extent_buffer() because there is a rcu_read_unlock() call past the loop. This has been detected by the Clang thread-safety analyzer. Fixes: ad580dfa388f ("btrfs: fix subpage deadlock in try_release_subpage_extent_buffer()") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.18+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19btrfs: fix transaction abort on set received ioctl due to item overflowFilipe Manana3-2/+59
commit 87f2c46003fce4d739138aab4af1942b1afdadac upstream. If the set received ioctl fails due to an item overflow when attempting to add the BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL we have to abort the transaction since we did some metadata updates before. This means that if a user calls this ioctl with the same received UUID field for a lot of subvolumes, we will hit the overflow, trigger the transaction abort and turn the filesystem into RO mode. A malicious user could exploit this, and this ioctl does not even requires that a user has admin privileges (CAP_SYS_ADMIN), only that he/she owns the subvolume. Fix this by doing an early check for item overflow before starting a transaction. This is also race safe because we are holding the subvol_sem semaphore in exclusive (write) mode. A test case for fstests will follow soon. Fixes: dd5f9615fc5c ("Btrfs: maintain subvolume items in the UUID tree") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.12+ Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <asj@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19btrfs: fix transaction abort on file creation due to name hash collisionFilipe Manana1-0/+19
commit 2d1ababdedd4ba38867c2500eb7f95af5ddeeef7 upstream. If we attempt to create several files with names that result in the same hash, we have to pack them in same dir item and that has a limit inherent to the leaf size. However if we reach that limit, we trigger a transaction abort and turns the filesystem into RO mode. This allows for a malicious user to disrupt a system, without the need to have administration privileges/capabilities. Reproducer: $ cat exploit-hash-collisions.sh #!/bin/bash DEV=/dev/sdi MNT=/mnt/sdi # Use smallest node size to make the test faster and require fewer file # names that result in hash collision. mkfs.btrfs -f --nodesize 4K $DEV mount $DEV $MNT # List of names that result in the same crc32c hash for btrfs. declare -a names=( 'foobar' '%a8tYkxfGMLWRGr55QSeQc4PBNH9PCLIvR6jZnkDtUUru1t@RouaUe_L:@xGkbO3nCwvLNYeK9vhE628gss:T$yZjZ5l-Nbd6CbC$M=hqE-ujhJICXyIxBvYrIU9-TDC' 'AQci3EUB%shMsg-N%frgU:02ByLs=IPJU0OpgiWit5nexSyxZDncY6WB:=zKZuk5Zy0DD$Ua78%MelgBuMqaHGyKsJUFf9s=UW80PcJmKctb46KveLSiUtNmqrMiL9-Y0I_l5Fnam04CGIg=8@U:Z' 'CvVqJpJzueKcuA$wqwePfyu7VxuWNN3ho$p0zi2H8QFYK$7YlEqOhhb%:hHgjhIjW5vnqWHKNP4' 'ET:vk@rFU4tsvMB0$C_p=xQHaYZjvoF%-BTc%wkFW8yaDAPcCYoR%x$FH5O:' 'HwTon%v7SGSP4FE08jBwwiu5aot2CFKXHTeEAa@38fUcNGOWvE@Mz6WBeDH_VooaZ6AgsXPkVGwy9l@@ZbNXabUU9csiWrrOp0MWUdfi$EZ3w9GkIqtz7I_eOsByOkBOO' 'Ij%2VlFGXSuPvxJGf5UWy6O@1svxGha%b@=%wjkq:CIgE6u7eJOjmQY5qTtxE2Rjbis9@us' 'KBkjG5%9R8K9sOG8UTnAYjxLNAvBmvV5vz3IiZaPmKuLYO03-6asI9lJ_j4@6Xo$KZicaLWJ3Pv8XEwVeUPMwbHYWwbx0pYvNlGMO9F:ZhHAwyctnGy%_eujl%WPd4U2BI7qooOSr85J-C2V$LfY' 'NcRfDfuUQ2=zP8K3CCF5dFcpfiOm6mwenShsAb_F%n6GAGC7fT2JFFn:c35X-3aYwoq7jNX5$ZJ6hI3wnZs$7KgGi7wjulffhHNUxAT0fRRLF39vJ@NvaEMxsMO' 'Oj42AQAEzRoTxa5OuSKIr=A_lwGMy132v4g3Pdq1GvUG9874YseIFQ6QU' 'Ono7avN5GjC:_6dBJ_' 'WHmN2gnmaN-9dVDy4aWo:yNGFzz8qsJyJhWEWcud7$QzN2D9R0efIWWEdu5kwWr73NZm4=@CoCDxrrZnRITr-kGtU_cfW2:%2_am' 'WiFnuTEhAG9FEC6zopQmj-A-$LDQ0T3WULz%ox3UZAPybSV6v1Z$b4L_XBi4M4BMBtJZpz93r9xafpB77r:lbwvitWRyo$odnAUYlYMmU4RvgnNd--e=I5hiEjGLETTtaScWlQp8mYsBovZwM2k' 'XKyH=OsOAF3p%uziGF_ZVr$ivrvhVgD@1u%5RtrV-gl_vqAwHkK@x7YwlxX3qT6WKKQ%PR56NrUBU2dOAOAdzr2=5nJuKPM-T-$ZpQfCL7phxQbUcb:BZOTPaFExc-qK-gDRCDW2' 'd3uUR6OFEwZr%ns1XH_@tbxA@cCPmbBRLdyh7p6V45H$P2$F%w0RqrD3M0g8aGvWpoTFMiBdOTJXjD:JF7=h9a_43xBywYAP%r$SPZi%zDg%ql-KvkdUCtF9OLaQlxmd' 'ePTpbnit%hyNm@WELlpKzNZYOzOTf8EQ$sEfkMy1VOfIUu3coyvIr13-Y7Sv5v-Ivax2Go_GQRFMU1b3362nktT9WOJf3SpT%z8sZmM3gvYQBDgmKI%%RM-G7hyrhgYflOw%z::ZRcv5O:lDCFm' 'evqk743Y@dvZAiG5J05L_ROFV@$2%rVWJ2%3nxV72-W7$e$-SK3tuSHA2mBt$qloC5jwNx33GmQUjD%akhBPu=VJ5g$xhlZiaFtTrjeeM5x7dt4cHpX0cZkmfImndYzGmvwQG:$euFYmXn$_2rA9mKZ' 'gkgUtnihWXsZQTEkrMAWIxir09k3t7jk_IK25t1:cy1XWN0GGqC%FrySdcmU7M8MuPO_ppkLw3=Dfr0UuBAL4%GFk2$Ma10V1jDRGJje%Xx9EV2ERaWKtjpwiZwh0gCSJsj5UL7CR8RtW5opCVFKGGy8Cky' 'hNgsG_8lNRik3PvphqPm0yEH3P%%fYG:kQLY=6O-61Wa6nrV_WVGR6TLB09vHOv%g4VQRP8Gzx7VXUY1qvZyS' 'isA7JVzN12xCxVPJZ_qoLm-pTBuhjjHMvV7o=F:EaClfYNyFGlsfw-Kf%uxdqW-kwk1sPl2vhbjyHU1A6$hz' 'kiJ_fgcdZFDiOptjgH5PN9-PSyLO4fbk_:u5_2tz35lV_iXiJ6cx7pwjTtKy-XGaQ5IefmpJ4N_ZqGsqCsKuqOOBgf9LkUdffHet@Wu' 'lvwtxyhE9:%Q3UxeHiViUyNzJsy:fm38pg_b6s25JvdhOAT=1s0$pG25x=LZ2rlHTszj=gN6M4zHZYr_qrB49i=pA--@WqWLIuX7o1S_SfS@2FSiUZN' 'rC24cw3UBDZ=5qJBUMs9e$=S4Y94ni%Z8639vnrGp=0Hv4z3dNFL0fBLmQ40=EYIY:Z=SLc@QLMSt2zsss2ZXrP7j4=' 'uwGl2s-fFrf@GqS=DQqq2I0LJSsOmM%xzTjS:lzXguE3wChdMoHYtLRKPvfaPOZF2fER@j53evbKa7R%A7r4%YEkD=kicJe@SFiGtXHbKe4gCgPAYbnVn' 'UG37U6KKua2bgc:IHzRs7BnB6FD:2Mt5Cc5NdlsW%$1tyvnfz7S27FvNkroXwAW:mBZLA1@qa9WnDbHCDmQmfPMC9z-Eq6QT0jhhPpqyymaD:R02ghwYo%yx7SAaaq-:x33LYpei$5g8DMl3C' 'y2vjek0FE1PDJC0qpfnN:x8k2wCFZ9xiUF2ege=JnP98R%wxjKkdfEiLWvQzmnW' '8-HCSgH5B%K7P8_jaVtQhBXpBk:pE-$P7ts58U0J@iR9YZntMPl7j$s62yAJO@_9eanFPS54b=UTw$94C-t=HLxT8n6o9P=QnIxq-f1=Ne2dvhe6WbjEQtc' 'YPPh:IFt2mtR6XWSmjHptXL_hbSYu8bMw-JP8@PNyaFkdNFsk$M=xfL6LDKCDM-mSyGA_2MBwZ8Dr4=R1D%7-mCaaKGxb990jzaagRktDTyp' '9hD2ApKa_t_7x-a@GCG28kY:7$M@5udI1myQ$x5udtggvagmCQcq9QXWRC5hoB0o-_zHQUqZI5rMcz_kbMgvN5jr63LeYA4Cj-c6F5Ugmx6DgVf@2Jqm%MafecpgooqreJ53P-QTS' ) # Now create files with all those names in the same parent directory. # It should not fail since a 4K leaf has enough space for them. for name in "${names[@]}"; do touch $MNT/$name done # Now add one more file name that causes a crc32c hash collision. # This should fail, but it should not turn the filesystem into RO mode # (which could be exploited by malicious users) due to a transaction # abort. touch $MNT/'W6tIm-VK2@BGC@IBfcgg6j_p:pxp_QUqtWpGD5Ok_GmijKOJJt' # Check that we are able to create another file, with a name that does not cause # a crc32c hash collision. echo -n "hello world" > $MNT/baz # Unmount and mount again, verify file baz exists and with the right content. umount $MNT mount $DEV $MNT echo "File baz content: $(cat $MNT/baz)" umount $MNT When running the reproducer: $ ./exploit-hash-collisions.sh (...) touch: cannot touch '/mnt/sdi/W6tIm-VK2@BGC@IBfcgg6j_p:pxp_QUqtWpGD5Ok_GmijKOJJt': Value too large for defined data type ./exploit-hash-collisions.sh: line 57: /mnt/sdi/baz: Read-only file system cat: /mnt/sdi/baz: No such file or directory File baz content: And the transaction abort stack trace in dmesg/syslog: $ dmesg (...) [758240.509761] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [758240.510668] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -75) [758240.511577] WARNING: fs/btrfs/inode.c:6854 at btrfs_create_new_inode+0x805/0xb50 [btrfs], CPU#6: touch/888644 [758240.513513] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_zero (...) [758240.523221] CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 888644 Comm: touch Tainted: G W 6.19.0-rc8-btrfs-next-225+ #1 PREEMPT(full) [758240.524621] Tainted: [W]=WARN [758240.525037] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [758240.526331] RIP: 0010:btrfs_create_new_inode+0x80b/0xb50 [btrfs] [758240.527093] Code: 0f 82 cf (...) [758240.529211] RSP: 0018:ffffce64418fbb48 EFLAGS: 00010292 [758240.529935] RAX: 00000000ffffffd3 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00000000ffffffb5 [758240.531040] RDX: 0000000d04f33e06 RSI: 00000000ffffffb5 RDI: ffffffffc0919dd0 [758240.531920] RBP: ffffce64418fbc10 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffffb5 [758240.532928] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8e52c0000000 R12: ffff8e53eee7d0f0 [758240.533818] R13: ffff8e57f70932a0 R14: ffff8e5417629568 R15: 0000000000000000 [758240.534664] FS: 00007f1959a2a740(0000) GS:ffff8e5b27cae000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [758240.535821] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [758240.536644] CR2: 00007f1959b10ce0 CR3: 000000012a2cc005 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 [758240.537517] Call Trace: [758240.537828] <TASK> [758240.538099] btrfs_create_common+0xbf/0x140 [btrfs] [758240.538760] path_openat+0x111a/0x15b0 [758240.539252] do_filp_open+0xc2/0x170 [758240.539699] ? preempt_count_add+0x47/0xa0 [758240.540200] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xe4/0x1a0 [758240.540800] ? __check_object_size+0x1b3/0x230 [758240.541661] ? alloc_fd+0x118/0x180 [758240.542315] do_sys_openat2+0x70/0xd0 [758240.543012] __x64_sys_openat+0x50/0xa0 [758240.543723] do_syscall_64+0x50/0xf20 [758240.544462] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [758240.545397] RIP: 0033:0x7f1959abc687 [758240.546019] Code: 48 89 fa (...) [758240.548522] RSP: 002b:00007ffe16ff8690 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 [758240.566278] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1959a2a740 RCX: 00007f1959abc687 [758240.567068] RDX: 0000000000000941 RSI: 00007ffe16ffa333 RDI: ffffffffffffff9c [758240.567860] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [758240.568707] R10: 00000000000001b6 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000561eec7c4b90 [758240.569712] R13: 0000561eec7c311f R14: 00007ffe16ffa333 R15: 0000000000000000 [758240.570758] </TASK> [758240.571040] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [758240.571681] BTRFS: error (device sdi state A) in btrfs_create_new_inode:6854: errno=-75 unknown [758240.572899] BTRFS info (device sdi state EA): forced readonly Fix this by checking for hash collision, and if the adding a new name is possible, early in btrfs_create_new_inode() before we do any tree updates, so that we don't need to abort the transaction if we cannot add the new name due to the leaf size limit. A test case for fstests will be sent soon. Fixes: caae78e03234 ("btrfs: move common inode creation code into btrfs_create_new_inode()") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Reviewed-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19btrfs: fix transaction abort when snapshotting received subvolumesFilipe Manana1-0/+16
commit e1b18b959025e6b5dbad668f391f65d34b39595a upstream. Currently a user can trigger a transaction abort by snapshotting a previously received snapshot a bunch of times until we reach a BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL item overflow (the maximum item size we can store in a leaf). This is very likely not common in practice, but if it happens, it turns the filesystem into RO mode. The snapshot, send and set_received_subvol and subvol_setflags (used by receive) don't require CAP_SYS_ADMIN, just inode_owner_or_capable(). A malicious user could use this to turn a filesystem into RO mode and disrupt a system. Reproducer script: $ cat test.sh #!/bin/bash DEV=/dev/sdi MNT=/mnt/sdi # Use smallest node size to make the test faster. mkfs.btrfs -f --nodesize 4K $DEV mount $DEV $MNT # Create a subvolume and set it to RO so that it can be used for send. btrfs subvolume create $MNT/sv touch $MNT/sv/foo btrfs property set $MNT/sv ro true # Send and receive the subvolume into snaps/sv. mkdir $MNT/snaps btrfs send $MNT/sv | btrfs receive $MNT/snaps # Now snapshot the received subvolume, which has a received_uuid, a # lot of times to trigger the leaf overflow. total=500 for ((i = 1; i <= $total; i++)); do echo -ne "\rCreating snapshot $i/$total" btrfs subvolume snapshot -r $MNT/snaps/sv $MNT/snaps/sv_$i > /dev/null done echo umount $MNT When running the test: $ ./test.sh (...) Create subvolume '/mnt/sdi/sv' At subvol /mnt/sdi/sv At subvol sv Creating snapshot 496/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Value too large for defined data type Creating snapshot 497/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system Creating snapshot 498/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system Creating snapshot 499/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system Creating snapshot 500/500ERROR: Could not create subvolume: Read-only file system And in dmesg/syslog: $ dmesg (...) [251067.627338] BTRFS warning (device sdi): insert uuid item failed -75 (0x4628b21c4ac8d898, 0x2598bee2b1515c91) type 252! [251067.629212] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [251067.630033] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -75) [251067.630871] WARNING: fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1907 at create_pending_snapshot.cold+0x52/0x465 [btrfs], CPU#10: btrfs/615235 [251067.632851] Modules linked in: btrfs dm_zero (...) [251067.644071] CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 615235 Comm: btrfs Tainted: G W 6.19.0-rc8-btrfs-next-225+ #1 PREEMPT(full) [251067.646165] Tainted: [W]=WARN [251067.646733] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [251067.648735] RIP: 0010:create_pending_snapshot.cold+0x55/0x465 [btrfs] [251067.649984] Code: f0 48 0f (...) [251067.653313] RSP: 0018:ffffce644908fae8 EFLAGS: 00010292 [251067.653987] RAX: 00000000ffffff01 RBX: ffff8e5639e63a80 RCX: 00000000ffffffd3 [251067.655042] RDX: ffff8e53faa76b00 RSI: 00000000ffffffb5 RDI: ffffffffc0919750 [251067.656077] RBP: ffffce644908fbd8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffce644908f820 [251067.657068] R10: ffff8e5adc1fffa8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8e53c0431bd0 [251067.658050] R13: ffff8e5414593600 R14: ffff8e55efafd000 R15: 00000000ffffffb5 [251067.659019] FS: 00007f2a4944b3c0(0000) GS:ffff8e5b27dae000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [251067.660115] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [251067.660943] CR2: 00007ffc5aa57898 CR3: 00000005813a2003 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 [251067.661972] Call Trace: [251067.662292] <TASK> [251067.662653] create_pending_snapshots+0x97/0xc0 [btrfs] [251067.663413] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x26e/0xc00 [btrfs] [251067.664257] ? btrfs_qgroup_convert_reserved_meta+0x35/0x390 [btrfs] [251067.665238] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x15/0x30 [251067.665837] ? record_root_in_trans+0xa2/0xd0 [btrfs] [251067.666531] btrfs_mksubvol+0x330/0x580 [btrfs] [251067.667145] btrfs_mksnapshot+0x74/0xa0 [btrfs] [251067.667827] __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x194/0x1d0 [btrfs] [251067.668595] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x107/0x130 [btrfs] [251067.669479] btrfs_ioctl+0x1580/0x2690 [btrfs] [251067.670093] ? count_memcg_events+0x6d/0x180 [251067.670849] ? handle_mm_fault+0x1a0/0x2a0 [251067.671652] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x92/0xe0 [251067.672406] do_syscall_64+0x50/0xf20 [251067.673129] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [251067.674096] RIP: 0033:0x7f2a495648db [251067.674812] Code: 00 48 89 (...) [251067.678227] RSP: 002b:00007ffc5aa57840 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [251067.679691] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f2a495648db [251067.681145] RDX: 00007ffc5aa588b0 RSI: 0000000050009417 RDI: 0000000000000004 [251067.682511] RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [251067.683842] R10: 000000000000000a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffc5aa59910 [251067.685176] R13: 00007ffc5aa588b0 R14: 0000000000000004 R15: 0000000000000006 [251067.686524] </TASK> [251067.686972] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [251067.687890] BTRFS: error (device sdi state A) in create_pending_snapshot:1907: errno=-75 unknown [251067.689049] BTRFS info (device sdi state EA): forced readonly [251067.689054] BTRFS warning (device sdi state EA): Skipping commit of aborted transaction. [251067.690119] BTRFS: error (device sdi state EA) in cleanup_transaction:2043: errno=-75 unknown [251067.702028] BTRFS info (device sdi state EA): last unmount of filesystem 46dc3975-30a2-4a69-a18f-418b859cccda Fix this by ignoring -EOVERFLOW errors from btrfs_uuid_tree_add() in the snapshot creation code when attempting to add the BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL item. This is OK because it's not critical and we are still able to delete the snapshot, as snapshot/subvolume deletion ignores if a BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL is missing (see inode.c:btrfs_delete_subvolume()). As for send/receive, we can still do send/receive operations since it always peeks the first root ID in the existing BTRFS_UUID_KEY_RECEIVED_SUBVOL (it could peek any since all snapshots have the same content), and even if the key is missing, it falls back to searching by BTRFS_UUID_KEY_SUBVOL key. A test case for fstests will be sent soon. Fixes: dd5f9615fc5c ("Btrfs: maintain subvolume items in the UUID tree") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.12+ Reviewed-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19smb: client: fix iface port assignment in parse_server_interfacesHenrique Carvalho1-2/+12
commit d4c7210d2f3ea481a6481f03040a64d9077a6172 upstream. parse_server_interfaces() initializes interface socket addresses with CIFS_PORT. When the mount uses a non-default port this overwrites the configured destination port. Later, cifs_chan_update_iface() copies this sockaddr into server->dstaddr, causing reconnect attempts to use the wrong port after server interface updates. Use the existing port from server->dstaddr instead. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: fe856be475f7 ("CIFS: parse and store info on iface queries") Tested-by: Dr. Thomas Orgis <thomas.orgis@uni-hamburg.de> Reviewed-by: Enzo Matsumiya <ematsumiya@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Henrique Carvalho <henrique.carvalho@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19smb: client: fix in-place encryption corruption in SMB2_write()Bharath SM1-1/+4
commit d78840a6a38d312dc1a51a65317bb67e46f0b929 upstream. SMB2_write() places write payload in iov[1..n] as part of rq_iov. smb3_init_transform_rq() pointer-shares rq_iov, so crypt_message() encrypts iov[1] in-place, replacing the original plaintext with ciphertext. On a replayable error, the retry sends the same iov[1] which now contains ciphertext instead of the original data, resulting in corruption. The corruption is most likely to be observed when connections are unstable, as reconnects trigger write retries that re-send the already-encrypted data. This affects SFU mknod, MF symlinks, etc. On kernels before 6.10 (prior to the netfs conversion), sync writes also used this path and were similarly affected. The async write path wasn't unaffected as it uses rq_iter which gets deep-copied. Fix by moving the write payload into rq_iter via iov_iter_kvec(), so smb3_init_transform_rq() deep-copies it before encryption. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #6.3+ Acked-by: Henrique Carvalho <henrique.carvalho@suse.com> Acked-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com> Acked-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.org> Signed-off-by: Bharath SM <bharathsm@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19smb: client: fix atomic open with O_DIRECT & O_SYNCPaulo Alcantara3-15/+15
commit 4a7d2729dc99437dbb880a64c47828c0d191b308 upstream. When user application requests O_DIRECT|O_SYNC along with O_CREAT on open(2), CREATE_NO_BUFFER and CREATE_WRITE_THROUGH bits were missed in CREATE request when performing an atomic open, thus leading to potentially data integrity issues. Fix this by setting those missing bits in CREATE request when O_DIRECT|O_SYNC has been specified in cifs_do_create(). Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.org> Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Henrique Carvalho <henrique.carvalho@suse.com> Cc: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com> Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19xfs: ensure dquot item is deleted from AIL only after log shutdownLong Li1-1/+7
commit 186ac39b8a7d3ec7ce9c5dd45e5c2730177f375c upstream. In xfs_qm_dqflush(), when a dquot flush fails due to corruption (the out_abort error path), the original code removed the dquot log item from the AIL before calling xfs_force_shutdown(). This ordering introduces a subtle race condition that can lead to data loss after a crash. The AIL tracks the oldest dirty metadata in the journal. The position of the tail item in the AIL determines the log tail LSN, which is the oldest LSN that must be preserved for crash recovery. When an item is removed from the AIL, the log tail can advance past the LSN of that item. The race window is as follows: if the dquot item happens to be at the tail of the log, removing it from the AIL allows the log tail to advance. If a concurrent log write is sampling the tail LSN at the same time and subsequently writes a complete checkpoint (i.e., one containing a commit record) to disk before the shutdown takes effect, the journal will no longer protect the dquot's last modification. On the next mount, log recovery will not replay the dquot changes, even though they were never written back to disk, resulting in silent data loss. Fix this by calling xfs_force_shutdown() before xfs_trans_ail_delete() in the out_abort path. Once the log is shut down, no new log writes can complete with an updated tail LSN, making it safe to remove the dquot item from the AIL. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: b707fffda6a3 ("xfs: abort consistently on dquot flush failure") Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19xfs: fix undersized l_iclog_roundoff valuesDarrick J. Wong1-0/+2
commit 52a8a1ba883defbfe3200baa22cf4cd21985d51a upstream. If the superblock doesn't list a log stripe unit, we set the incore log roundoff value to 512. This leads to corrupt logs and unmountable filesystems in generic/617 on a disk with 4k physical sectors... XFS (sda1): Mounting V5 Filesystem ff3121ca-26e6-4b77-b742-aaff9a449e1c XFS (sda1): Torn write (CRC failure) detected at log block 0x318e. Truncating head block from 0x3197. XFS (sda1): failed to locate log tail XFS (sda1): log mount/recovery failed: error -74 XFS (sda1): log mount failed XFS (sda1): Mounting V5 Filesystem ff3121ca-26e6-4b77-b742-aaff9a449e1c XFS (sda1): Ending clean mount ...on the current xfsprogs for-next which has a broken mkfs. xfs_info shows this... meta-data=/dev/sda1 isize=512 agcount=4, agsize=644992 blks = sectsz=4096 attr=2, projid32bit=1 = crc=1 finobt=1, sparse=1, rmapbt=1 = reflink=1 bigtime=1 inobtcount=1 nrext64=1 = exchange=1 metadir=1 data = bsize=4096 blocks=2579968, imaxpct=25 = sunit=0 swidth=0 blks naming =version 2 bsize=4096 ascii-ci=0, ftype=1, parent=1 log =internal log bsize=4096 blocks=16384, version=2 = sectsz=4096 sunit=0 blks, lazy-count=1 realtime =none extsz=4096 blocks=0, rtextents=0 = rgcount=0 rgsize=268435456 extents = zoned=0 start=0 reserved=0 ...observe that the log section has sectsz=4096 sunit=0, which means that the roundoff factor is 512, not 4096 as you'd expect. We should fix mkfs not to generate broken filesystems, but anyone can fuzz the ondisk superblock so we should be more cautious. I think the inadequate logic predates commit a6a65fef5ef8d0, but that's clearly going to require a different backport. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.14 Fixes: a6a65fef5ef8d0 ("xfs: log stripe roundoff is a property of the log") Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19xfs: fix returned valued from xfs_defer_can_appendCarlos Maiolino1-1/+1
commit 54fcd2f95f8d216183965a370ec69e1aab14f5da upstream. xfs_defer_can_append returns a bool, it shouldn't be returning a NULL. Found by code inspection. Fixes: 4dffb2cbb483 ("xfs: allow pausing of pending deferred work items") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.8 Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Acked-by: Souptick Joarder <souptick.joarder@hpe.com> Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19xfs: fix integer overflow in bmap intent sort comparatorLong Li1-1/+1
commit 362c490980867930a098b99f421268fbd7ca05fd upstream. xfs_bmap_update_diff_items() sorts bmap intents by inode number using a subtraction of two xfs_ino_t (uint64_t) values, with the result truncated to int. This is incorrect when two inode numbers differ by more than INT_MAX (2^31 - 1), which is entirely possible on large XFS filesystems. Fix this by replacing the subtraction with cmp_int(). Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.9 Fixes: 9f3afb57d5f1 ("xfs: implement deferred bmbt map/unmap operations") Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19cifs: make default value of retrans as zeroShyam Prasad N1-1/+1
commit e3beefd3af09f8e460ddaf39063d3d7664d7ab59 upstream. When retrans mount option was introduced, the default value was set as 1. However, in the light of some bugs that this has exposed recently we should change it to 0 and retain the old behaviour before this option was introduced. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Bharath SM <bharathsm@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19ksmbd: fix use-after-free by using call_rcu() for oplock_infoNamjae Jeon2-10/+24
commit 1dfd062caa165ec9d7ee0823087930f3ab8a6294 upstream. ksmbd currently frees oplock_info immediately using kfree(), even though it is accessed under RCU read-side critical sections in places like opinfo_get() and proc_show_files(). Since there is no RCU grace period delay between nullifying the pointer and freeing the memory, a reader can still access oplock_info structure after it has been freed. This can leads to a use-after-free especially in opinfo_get() where atomic_inc_not_zero() is called on already freed memory. Fix this by switching to deferred freeing using call_rcu(). Fixes: 18b4fac5ef17 ("ksmbd: fix use-after-free in smb_break_all_levII_oplock()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19ksmbd: Don't log keys in SMB3 signing and encryption key generationThorsten Blum1-20/+2
commit 441336115df26b966575de56daf7107ed474faed upstream. When KSMBD_DEBUG_AUTH logging is enabled, generate_smb3signingkey() and generate_smb3encryptionkey() log the session, signing, encryption, and decryption key bytes. Remove the logs to avoid exposing credentials. Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev> Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19smb: server: fix use-after-free in smb2_open()Marios Makassikis1-3/+2
commit 1e689a56173827669a35da7cb2a3c78ed5c53680 upstream. The opinfo pointer obtained via rcu_dereference(fp->f_opinfo) is dereferenced after rcu_read_unlock(), creating a use-after-free window. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marios Makassikis <mmakassikis@freebox.fr> Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19ksmbd: fix use-after-free in smb_lazy_parent_lease_break_close()Namjae Jeon1-2/+4
commit eac3361e3d5dd8067b3258c69615888eb45e9f25 upstream. opinfo pointer obtained via rcu_dereference(fp->f_opinfo) is being accessed after rcu_read_unlock() has been called. This creates a race condition where the memory could be freed by a concurrent writer between the unlock and the subsequent pointer dereferences (opinfo->is_lease, etc.), leading to a use-after-free. Fixes: 5fb282ba4fef ("ksmbd: fix possible null-deref in smb_lazy_parent_lease_break_close") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19nsfs: tighten permission checks for handle openingChristian Brauner1-1/+1
commit d2324a9317f00013facb0ba00b00440e19d2af5e upstream. Even privileged services should not necessarily be able to see other privileged service's namespaces so they can't leak information to each other. Use may_see_all_namespaces() helper that centralizes this policy until the nstree adapts. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260226-work-visibility-fixes-v1-2-d2c2853313bd@kernel.org Fixes: 5222470b2fbb ("nsfs: support file handles") Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Cc: stable@kernel.org # v6.18+ Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19iomap: reject delalloc mappings during writebackDarrick J. Wong1-6/+7
commit d320f160aa5ff36cdf83c645cca52b615e866e32 upstream. Filesystems should never provide a delayed allocation mapping to writeback; they're supposed to allocate the space before replying. This can lead to weird IO errors and crashes in the block layer if the filesystem is being malicious, or if it hadn't set iomap->dev because it's a delalloc mapping. Fix this by failing writeback on delalloc mappings. Currently no filesystems actually misbehave in this manner, but we ought to be stricter about things like that. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.5 Fixes: 598ecfbaa742ac ("iomap: lift the xfs writeback code to iomap") Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260302173002.GL13829@frogsfrogsfrogs Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19iomap: don't mark folio uptodate if read IO has bytes pendingJoanne Koong1-3/+12
commit debc1a492b2695d05973994fb0f796dbd9ceaae6 upstream. If a folio has ifs metadata attached to it and the folio is partially read in through an async IO helper with the rest of it then being read in through post-EOF zeroing or as inline data, and the helper successfully finishes the read first, then post-EOF zeroing / reading inline will mark the folio as uptodate in iomap_set_range_uptodate(). This is a problem because when the read completion path later calls iomap_read_end(), it will call folio_end_read(), which sets the uptodate bit using XOR semantics. Calling folio_end_read() on a folio that was already marked uptodate clears the uptodate bit. Fix this by not marking the folio as uptodate if the read IO has bytes pending. The folio uptodate state will be set in the read completion path through iomap_end_read() -> folio_end_read(). Reported-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com> Suggested-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Tested-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.19 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/aYbmy8JdgXwsGaPP@autotest-wegao.qe.prg2.suse.org/ Fixes: b2f35ac4146d ("iomap: add caller-provided callbacks for read and readahead") Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260303233420.874231-2-joannelkoong@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19btrfs: fix chunk map leak in btrfs_map_block() after ↵Mark Harmstone1-2/+4
btrfs_chunk_map_num_copies() commit f15fb3d41543244d1179f423da4a4832a55bc050 upstream. Fix a chunk map leak in btrfs_map_block(): if we return early with -EINVAL, we're not freeing the chunk map that we've just looked up. Fixes: 0ae653fbec2b ("btrfs: reduce chunk_map lookups in btrfs_map_block()") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.12+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Harmstone <mark@harmstone.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19nfsd: Fix cred ref leak in nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit().Kuniyuki Iwashima1-1/+1
commit 92978c83bb4eef55d02a6c990c01c423131eefa7 upstream. nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit() uses get_current_cred() without put_cred(). As we can see from other callers, svc_xprt_create_from_sa() does not require the extra refcount. nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit() is always in the process context, sendmsg(), and current->cred does not go away. Let's use current_cred() in nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit(). Fixes: 16a471177496 ("NFSD: add listener-{set,get} netlink command") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19nsfs: tighten permission checks for ns iteration ioctlsChristian Brauner1-0/+13
commit e6b899f08066e744f89df16ceb782e06868bd148 upstream. Even privileged services should not necessarily be able to see other privileged service's namespaces so they can't leak information to each other. Use may_see_all_namespaces() helper that centralizes this policy until the nstree adapts. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260226-work-visibility-fixes-v1-1-d2c2853313bd@kernel.org Fixes: a1d220d9dafa ("nsfs: iterate through mount namespaces") Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Cc: stable@kernel.org # v6.12+ Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19ceph: add a bunch of missing ceph_path_info initializersMax Kellermann4-6/+6
commit 43323a5934b660afae687e8e4e95ac328615a5c4 upstream. ceph_mdsc_build_path() must be called with a zero-initialized ceph_path_info parameter, or else the following ceph_mdsc_free_path_info() may crash. Example crash (on Linux 6.18.12): virt_to_cache: Object is not a Slab page! WARNING: CPU: 184 PID: 2871736 at mm/slub.c:6732 kmem_cache_free+0x316/0x400 [...] Call Trace: [...] ceph_open+0x13d/0x3e0 do_dentry_open+0x134/0x480 vfs_open+0x2a/0xe0 path_openat+0x9a3/0x1160 [...] cache_from_obj: Wrong slab cache. names_cache but object is from ceph_inode_info WARNING: CPU: 184 PID: 2871736 at mm/slub.c:6746 kmem_cache_free+0x2dd/0x400 [...] kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:634! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:__slab_free+0x1a4/0x350 Some of the ceph_mdsc_build_path() callers had initializers, but others had not, even though they were all added by commit 15f519e9f883 ("ceph: fix race condition validating r_parent before applying state"). The ones without initializer are suspectible to random crashes. (I can imagine it could even be possible to exploit this bug to elevate privileges.) Unfortunately, these Ceph functions are undocumented and its semantics can only be derived from the code. I see that ceph_mdsc_build_path() initializes the structure only on success, but not on error. Calling ceph_mdsc_free_path_info() after a failed ceph_mdsc_build_path() call does not even make sense, but that's what all callers do, and for it to be safe, the structure must be zero-initialized. The least intrusive approach to fix this is therefore to add initializers everywhere. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 15f519e9f883 ("ceph: fix race condition validating r_parent before applying state") Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com> Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19ceph: fix memory leaks in ceph_mdsc_build_path()Max Kellermann1-0/+3
commit 040d159a45ded7f33201421a81df0aa2a86e5a0b upstream. Add __putname() calls to error code paths that did not free the "path" pointer obtained by __getname(). If ownership of this pointer is not passed to the caller via path_info.path, the function must free it before returning. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 3fd945a79e14 ("ceph: encode encrypted name in ceph_mdsc_build_path and dentry release") Fixes: 550f7ca98ee0 ("ceph: give up on paths longer than PATH_MAX") Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com> Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19ceph: do not skip the first folio of the next object in writebackHristo Venev1-1/+0
commit 081a0b78ef30f5746cda3e92e28b4d4ae92901d1 upstream. When `ceph_process_folio_batch` encounters a folio past the end of the current object, it should leave it in the batch so that it is picked up in the next iteration. Removing the folio from the batch means that it does not get written back and remains dirty instead. This makes `fsync()` silently skip some of the data, delays capability release, and breaks coherence with `O_DIRECT`. The link below contains instructions for reproducing the bug. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: ce80b76dd327 ("ceph: introduce ceph_process_folio_batch() method") Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/75156 Signed-off-by: Hristo Venev <hristo@venev.name> Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19ceph: fix i_nlink underrun during async unlinkMax Kellermann1-1/+14
commit ce0123cbb4a40a2f1bbb815f292b26e96088639f upstream. During async unlink, we drop the `i_nlink` counter before we receive the completion (that will eventually update the `i_nlink`) because "we assume that the unlink will succeed". That is not a bad idea, but it races against deletions by other clients (or against the completion of our own unlink) and can lead to an underrun which emits a WARNING like this one: WARNING: CPU: 85 PID: 25093 at fs/inode.c:407 drop_nlink+0x50/0x68 Modules linked in: CPU: 85 UID: 3221252029 PID: 25093 Comm: php-cgi8.1 Not tainted 6.14.11-cm4all1-ampere #655 Hardware name: Supermicro ARS-110M-NR/R12SPD-A, BIOS 1.1b 10/17/2023 pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : drop_nlink+0x50/0x68 lr : ceph_unlink+0x6c4/0x720 sp : ffff80012173bc90 x29: ffff80012173bc90 x28: ffff086d0a45aaf8 x27: ffff0871d0eb5680 x26: ffff087f2a64a718 x25: 0000020000000180 x24: 0000000061c88647 x23: 0000000000000002 x22: ffff07ff9236d800 x21: 0000000000001203 x20: ffff07ff9237b000 x19: ffff088b8296afc0 x18: 00000000f3c93365 x17: 0000000000070000 x16: ffff08faffcbdfe8 x15: ffff08faffcbdfec x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 45445f65645f3037 x12: 34385f6369706f74 x11: 0000a2653104bb20 x10: ffffd85f26d73290 x9 : ffffd85f25664f94 x8 : 00000000000000c0 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000002 x5 : 0000000000000081 x4 : 0000000000000481 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff08727d3f91e8 Call trace: drop_nlink+0x50/0x68 (P) vfs_unlink+0xb0/0x2e8 do_unlinkat+0x204/0x288 __arm64_sys_unlinkat+0x3c/0x80 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x54/0xe8 do_el0_svc+0xa4/0xc8 el0_svc+0x18/0x58 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x104/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x154/0x158 In ceph_unlink(), a call to ceph_mdsc_submit_request() submits the CEPH_MDS_OP_UNLINK to the MDS, but does not wait for completion. Meanwhile, between this call and the following drop_nlink() call, a worker thread may process a CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT, CEPH_CAP_OP_GRANT or just a CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_REPLY (the latter of which could be our own completion). These will lead to a set_nlink() call, updating the `i_nlink` counter to the value received from the MDS. If that new `i_nlink` value happens to be zero, it is illegal to decrement it further. But that is exactly what ceph_unlink() will do then. The WARNING can be reproduced this way: 1. Force async unlink; only the async code path is affected. Having no real clue about Ceph internals, I was unable to find out why the MDS wouldn't give me the "Fxr" capabilities, so I patched get_caps_for_async_unlink() to always succeed. (Note that the WARNING dump above was found on an unpatched kernel, without this kludge - this is not a theoretical bug.) 2. Add a sleep call after ceph_mdsc_submit_request() so the unlink completion gets handled by a worker thread before drop_nlink() is called. This guarantees that the `i_nlink` is already zero before drop_nlink() runs. The solution is to skip the counter decrement when it is already zero, but doing so without a lock is still racy (TOCTOU). Since ceph_fill_inode() and handle_cap_grant() both hold the `ceph_inode_info.i_ceph_lock` spinlock while set_nlink() runs, this seems like the proper lock to protect the `i_nlink` updates. I found prior art in NFS and SMB (using `inode.i_lock`) and AFS (using `afs_vnode.cb_lock`). All three have the zero check as well. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 2ccb45462aea ("ceph: perform asynchronous unlink if we have sufficient caps") Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann@ionos.com> Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-19rxrpc, afs: Fix missing error pointer check after rxrpc_kernel_lookup_peer()Miaoqian Lin1-4/+4
[ Upstream commit 4245a79003adf30e67f8e9060915bd05cb31d142 ] rxrpc_kernel_lookup_peer() can also return error pointers in addition to NULL, so just checking for NULL is not sufficient. Fix this by: (1) Changing rxrpc_kernel_lookup_peer() to return -ENOMEM rather than NULL on allocation failure. (2) Making the callers in afs use IS_ERR() and PTR_ERR() to pass on the error code returned. Fixes: 72904d7b9bfb ("rxrpc, afs: Allow afs to pin rxrpc_peer objects") Signed-off-by: Miaoqian Lin <linmq006@gmail.com> Co-developed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com> cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/368272.1772713861@warthog.procyon.org.uk Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-03-19btrfs: hold space_info->lock when clearing periodic reclaim readySun YangKai1-1/+4
[ Upstream commit b8883b61f2fc50dcf22938cbed40fec05020552f ] btrfs_set_periodic_reclaim_ready() requires space_info->lock to be held, as enforced by lockdep_assert_held(). However, btrfs_reclaim_sweep() was calling it after do_reclaim_sweep() returns, at which point space_info->lock is no longer held. Fix this by explicitly acquiring space_info->lock before clearing the periodic reclaim ready flag in btrfs_reclaim_sweep(). Reported-by: Chris Mason <clm@meta.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/20260208182556.891815-1-clm@meta.com/ Fixes: 19eff93dc738 ("btrfs: fix periodic reclaim condition") Reviewed-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> Signed-off-by: Sun YangKai <sunk67188@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-03-19nfs: return EISDIR on nfs3_proc_create if d_alias is a dirRoberto Bergantinos Corpas1-1/+6
[ Upstream commit 410666a298c34ebd57256fde6b24c96bd23059a2 ] If we found an alias through nfs3_do_create/nfs_add_or_obtain /d_splice_alias which happens to be a dir dentry, we don't return any error, and simply forget about this alias, but the original dentry we were adding and passed as parameter remains negative. This later causes an oops on nfs_atomic_open_v23/finish_open since we supply a negative dentry to do_dentry_open. This has been observed running lustre-racer, where dirs and files are created/removed concurrently with the same name and O_EXCL is not used to open files (frequent file redirection). While d_splice_alias typically returns a directory alias or NULL, we explicitly check d_is_dir() to ensure that we don't attempt to perform file operations (like finish_open) on a directory inode, which triggers the observed oops. Fixes: 7c6c5249f061 ("NFS: add atomic_open for NFSv3 to handle O_TRUNC correctly.") Reviewed-by: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Roberto Bergantinos Corpas <rbergant@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-03-19fs: init flags_valid before calling vfs_fileattr_getEdward Adam Davis1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit cb184dd19154fc486fa3d9e02afe70a97e54e055 ] syzbot reported a uninit-value bug in [1]. Similar to the "*get" context where the kernel's internal file_kattr structure is initialized before calling vfs_fileattr_get(), we should use the same mechanism when using fa. [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in fuse_fileattr_get+0xeb4/0x1450 fs/fuse/ioctl.c:517 fuse_fileattr_get+0xeb4/0x1450 fs/fuse/ioctl.c:517 vfs_fileattr_get fs/file_attr.c:94 [inline] __do_sys_file_getattr fs/file_attr.c:416 [inline] Local variable fa.i created at: __do_sys_file_getattr fs/file_attr.c:380 [inline] __se_sys_file_getattr+0x8c/0xbd0 fs/file_attr.c:372 Reported-by: syzbot+7c31755f2cea07838b0c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7c31755f2cea07838b0c Tested-by: syzbot+7c31755f2cea07838b0c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/tencent_B6C4583771D76766D71362A368696EC3B6