| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
|---|
|
[ Upstream commit 8dbd76e79a16b45b2ccb01d2f2e08dbf64e71e40 ]
Michal Kubecek and Firo Yang did a very nice analysis of crashes
happening in __inet_lookup_established().
Since a TCP socket can go from TCP_ESTABLISH to TCP_LISTEN
(via a close()/socket()/listen() cycle) without a RCU grace period,
I should not have changed listeners linkage in their hash table.
They must use the nulls protocol (Documentation/RCU/rculist_nulls.txt),
so that a lookup can detect a socket in a hash list was moved in
another one.
Since we added code in commit d296ba60d8e2 ("soreuseport: Resolve
merge conflict for v4/v6 ordering fix"), we have to add
hlist_nulls_add_tail_rcu() helper.
Fixes: 3b24d854cb35 ("tcp/dccp: do not touch listener sk_refcnt under synflood")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Reported-by: Firo Yang <firo.yang@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20191120083919.GH27852@unicorn.suse.cz/
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit a33121e5487b424339636b25c35d3a180eaa5f5e ]
In a case when a ptp chardev (like /dev/ptp0) is open but an underlying
device is removed, closing this file leads to a race. This reproduces
easily in a kvm virtual machine:
ts# cat openptp0.c
int main() { ... fp = fopen("/dev/ptp0", "r"); ... sleep(10); }
ts# uname -r
5.5.0-rc3-46cf053e
ts# cat /proc/cmdline
... slub_debug=FZP
ts# modprobe ptp_kvm
ts# ./openptp0 &
[1] 670
opened /dev/ptp0, sleeping 10s...
ts# rmmod ptp_kvm
ts# ls /dev/ptp*
ls: cannot access '/dev/ptp*': No such file or directory
ts# ...woken up
[ 48.010809] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 48.012502] CPU: 6 PID: 658 Comm: openptp0 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc3-46cf053e #25
[ 48.014624] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), ...
[ 48.016270] RIP: 0010:module_put.part.0+0x7/0x80
[ 48.017939] RSP: 0018:ffffb3850073be00 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 48.018339] RAX: 000000006b6b6b6b RBX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RCX: ffff89a476c00ad0
[ 48.018936] RDX: fffff65a08d3ea08 RSI: 0000000000000247 RDI: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b
[ 48.019470] ... ^^^ a slub poison
[ 48.023854] Call Trace:
[ 48.024050] __fput+0x21f/0x240
[ 48.024288] task_work_run+0x79/0x90
[ 48.024555] do_exit+0x2af/0xab0
[ 48.024799] ? vfs_write+0x16a/0x190
[ 48.025082] do_group_exit+0x35/0x90
[ 48.025387] __x64_sys_exit_group+0xf/0x10
[ 48.025737] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x130
[ 48.026056] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 48.026479] RIP: 0033:0x7f53b12082f6
[ 48.026792] ...
[ 48.030945] Modules linked in: ptp i6300esb watchdog [last unloaded: ptp_kvm]
[ 48.045001] Fixing recursive fault but reboot is needed!
This happens in:
static void __fput(struct file *file)
{ ...
if (file->f_op->release)
file->f_op->release(inode, file); <<< cdev is kfree'd here
if (unlikely(S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev != NULL &&
!(mode & FMODE_PATH))) {
cdev_put(inode->i_cdev); <<< cdev fields are accessed here
Namely:
__fput()
posix_clock_release()
kref_put(&clk->kref, delete_clock) <<< the last reference
delete_clock()
delete_ptp_clock()
kfree(ptp) <<< cdev is embedded in ptp
cdev_put
module_put(p->owner) <<< *p is kfree'd, bang!
Here cdev is embedded in posix_clock which is embedded in ptp_clock.
The race happens because ptp_clock's lifetime is controlled by two
refcounts: kref and cdev.kobj in posix_clock. This is wrong.
Make ptp_clock's sysfs device a parent of cdev with cdev_device_add()
created especially for such cases. This way the parent device with its
ptp_clock is not released until all references to the cdev are released.
This adds a requirement that an initialized but not exposed struct
device should be provided to posix_clock_register() by a caller instead
of a simple dev_t.
This approach was adopted from the commit 72139dfa2464 ("watchdog: Fix
the race between the release of watchdog_core_data and cdev"). See
details of the implementation in the commit 233ed09d7fda ("chardev: add
helper function to register char devs with a struct device").
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20191125125342.6189-1-vdronov@redhat.com/T/#u
Analyzed-by: Stephen Johnston <sjohnsto@redhat.com>
Analyzed-by: Vern Lovejoy <vlovejoy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 6d13de1489b6bf539695f96d945de3860e6d5e17 upstream.
As we've done with VFS, string operations, etc, reject usercopy sizes
larger than INT_MAX, which would be nice to have for catching bugs
related to size calculation overflows[1].
This adds 10 bytes to x86_64 defconfig text and 1980 bytes to the data
section:
text data bss dec hex filename
19691167 5134320 1646664 26472151 193eed7 vmlinux.before
19691177 5136300 1646664 26474141 193f69d vmlinux.after
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-s390&m=156631939010493&w=2
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/201908251612.F9902D7A@keescook
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Suggested-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 56144737e67329c9aaed15f942d46a6302e2e3d8 upstream.
syzbot reported various data-race caused by hrtimer_is_queued() reading
timer->state. A READ_ONCE() is required there to silence the warning.
Also add the corresponding WRITE_ONCE() when timer->state is set.
In remove_hrtimer() the hrtimer_is_queued() helper is open coded to avoid
loading timer->state twice.
KCSAN reported these cases:
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __remove_hrtimer / tcp_pacing_check
write to 0xffff8880b2a7d388 of 1 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0:
__remove_hrtimer+0x52/0x130 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:991
__run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1496 [inline]
__hrtimer_run_queues+0x250/0x600 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1576
hrtimer_run_softirq+0x10e/0x150 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1593
__do_softirq+0x115/0x33f kernel/softirq.c:292
run_ksoftirqd+0x46/0x60 kernel/softirq.c:603
smpboot_thread_fn+0x37d/0x4a0 kernel/smpboot.c:165
kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352
read to 0xffff8880b2a7d388 of 1 bytes by task 24652 on cpu 1:
tcp_pacing_check net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2235 [inline]
tcp_pacing_check+0xba/0x130 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2225
tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue+0x32c/0x5a0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3044
tcp_xmit_recovery+0x7c/0x120 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3558
tcp_ack+0x17b6/0x3170 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3717
tcp_rcv_established+0x37e/0xf50 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5696
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x381/0x4e0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1561
sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:945 [inline]
__release_sock+0x135/0x1e0 net/core/sock.c:2435
release_sock+0x61/0x160 net/core/sock.c:2951
sk_stream_wait_memory+0x3d7/0x7c0 net/core/stream.c:145
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0xb47/0x1f30 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1393
tcp_sendmsg+0x39/0x60 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1434
inet_sendmsg+0x6d/0x90 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:807
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0x9f/0xc0 net/socket.c:657
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __remove_hrtimer / __tcp_ack_snd_check
write to 0xffff8880a3a65588 of 1 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0:
__remove_hrtimer+0x52/0x130 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:991
__run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1496 [inline]
__hrtimer_run_queues+0x250/0x600 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1576
hrtimer_run_softirq+0x10e/0x150 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1593
__do_softirq+0x115/0x33f kernel/softirq.c:292
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:373 [inline]
irq_exit+0xbb/0xe0 kernel/softirq.c:413
exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:536 [inline]
smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0xe6/0x280 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1137
apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:830
read to 0xffff8880a3a65588 of 1 bytes by task 22891 on cpu 1:
__tcp_ack_snd_check+0x415/0x4f0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5265
tcp_ack_snd_check net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5287 [inline]
tcp_rcv_established+0x750/0xf50 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5708
tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x381/0x4e0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1561
sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:945 [inline]
__release_sock+0x135/0x1e0 net/core/sock.c:2435
release_sock+0x61/0x160 net/core/sock.c:2951
sk_stream_wait_memory+0x3d7/0x7c0 net/core/stream.c:145
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0xb47/0x1f30 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1393
tcp_sendmsg+0x39/0x60 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1434
inet_sendmsg+0x6d/0x90 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:807
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0x9f/0xc0 net/socket.c:657
__sys_sendto+0x21f/0x320 net/socket.c:1952
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1964 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1960 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0x89/0xb0 net/socket.c:1960
do_syscall_64+0xcc/0x370 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 24652 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
[ tglx: Added comments ]
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106174804.74723-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit f8cc62ca3e660ae3fdaee533b1d554297cd2ae82 upstream.
skb_peek_tail() can be used without protection of a lock,
as spotted by KCSAN [1]
In order to avoid load-stearing, add a READ_ONCE()
Note that the corresponding WRITE_ONCE() are already there.
[1]
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in sk_wait_data / skb_queue_tail
read to 0xffff8880b36a4118 of 8 bytes by task 20426 on cpu 1:
skb_peek_tail include/linux/skbuff.h:1784 [inline]
sk_wait_data+0x15b/0x250 net/core/sock.c:2477
kcm_wait_data+0x112/0x1f0 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1103
kcm_recvmsg+0xac/0x320 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:1130
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:871 [inline]
sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:889 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0x92/0xb0 net/socket.c:885
___sys_recvmsg+0x1a0/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2480
do_recvmmsg+0x19a/0x5c0 net/socket.c:2601
__sys_recvmmsg+0x1ef/0x200 net/socket.c:2680
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2703 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2696 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x89/0xb0 net/socket.c:2696
do_syscall_64+0xcc/0x370 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
write to 0xffff8880b36a4118 of 8 bytes by task 451 on cpu 0:
__skb_insert include/linux/skbuff.h:1852 [inline]
__skb_queue_before include/linux/skbuff.h:1958 [inline]
__skb_queue_tail include/linux/skbuff.h:1991 [inline]
skb_queue_tail+0x7e/0xc0 net/core/skbuff.c:3145
kcm_queue_rcv_skb+0x202/0x310 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:206
kcm_rcv_strparser+0x74/0x4b0 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:370
__strp_recv+0x348/0xf50 net/strparser/strparser.c:309
strp_recv+0x84/0xa0 net/strparser/strparser.c:343
tcp_read_sock+0x174/0x5c0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1639
strp_read_sock+0xd4/0x140 net/strparser/strparser.c:366
do_strp_work net/strparser/strparser.c:414 [inline]
strp_work+0x9a/0xe0 net/strparser/strparser.c:423
process_one_work+0x3d4/0x890 kernel/workqueue.c:2269
worker_thread+0xa0/0x800 kernel/workqueue.c:2415
kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 451 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: kstrp strp_work
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit a8de1304b7df30e3a14f2a8b9709bb4ff31a0385 ]
The DTC v1.5.1 added references to (U)INT32_MAX.
This is no problem for user-space programs since <stdint.h> defines
(U)INT32_MAX along with (u)int32_t.
For the kernel space, libfdt_env.h needs to be adjusted before we
pull in the changes.
In the kernel, we usually use s/u32 instead of (u)int32_t for the
fixed-width types.
Accordingly, we already have S/U32_MAX for their max values.
So, we should not add (U)INT32_MAX to <linux/limits.h> any more.
Instead, add them to the in-kernel libfdt_env.h to compile the
latest libfdt.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 6fcbcec9cfc7b3c6a2c1f1a23ebacedff7073e0a ]
Quota statistics counted as 64-bit per-cpu counter. Reading sums per-cpu
fractions as signed 64-bit int, filters negative values and then reports
lower half as signed 32-bit int.
Result may looks like:
fs.quota.allocated_dquots = 22327
fs.quota.cache_hits = -489852115
fs.quota.drops = -487288718
fs.quota.free_dquots = 22083
fs.quota.lookups = -486883485
fs.quota.reads = 22327
fs.quota.syncs = 335064
fs.quota.writes = 3088689
Values bigger than 2^31-1 reported as negative.
All counters except "allocated_dquots" and "free_dquots" are monotonic,
thus they should be reported as is without filtering negative values.
Kernel doesn't have generic helper for 64-bit sysctl yet,
let's use at least unsigned long.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/157337934693.2078.9842146413181153727.stgit@buzz
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit b12d66278dd627cbe1ea7c000aa4715aaf8830c8 ]
As seen on the new Raspberry Pi 4 and sta2x11's DMA implementation it is
possible for a device configured with 32 bit DMA addresses and a partial
DMA mapping located at the end of the address space to overflow. It
happens when a higher physical address, not DMAable, is translated to
it's DMA counterpart.
For example the Raspberry Pi 4, configurable up to 4 GB of memory, has
an interconnect capable of addressing the lower 1 GB of physical memory
with a DMA offset of 0xc0000000. It transpires that, any attempt to
translate physical addresses higher than the first GB will result in an
overflow which dma_capable() can't detect as it only checks for
addresses bigger then the maximum allowed DMA address.
Fix this by verifying in dma_capable() if the DMA address range provided
is at any point lower than the minimum possible DMA address on the bus.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Saenz Julienne <nsaenzjulienne@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit a445e940ea686fc60475564009821010eb213be3 ]
Daniele reported that issue previously fixed in c41f9ea998f3
("drivers: dma-coherent: Account dma_pfn_offset when used with device
tree") reappear shortly after 43fc509c3efb ("dma-coherent: introduce
interface for default DMA pool") where fix was accidentally dropped.
Lets put fix back in place and respect dma-ranges for reserved memory.
Fixes: 43fc509c3efb ("dma-coherent: introduce interface for default DMA pool")
Reported-by: Daniele Alessandrelli <daniele.alessandrelli@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Daniele Alessandrelli <daniele.alessandrelli@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Alexandre Torgue <alexandre.torgue@st.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Murzin <vladimir.murzin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 4544b9f25e70eae9f70a243de0cc802aa5c8cb69 ]
As we've seen from USB and other areas[1], we need to always do runtime
checks for DMA operating on memory regions that might be remapped. This
adds vmap checks (similar to those already in USB but missing in other
places) into dma_map_single() so all callers benefit from the checking.
[1] https://git.kernel.org/linus/3840c5b78803b2b6cc1ff820100a74a092c40cbb
Suggested-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[hch: fixed the printk message]
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit 85572c2c4a45a541e880e087b5b17a48198b2416 upstream.
The scheduler code calling cpufreq_update_util() may run during CPU
offline on the target CPU after the IRQ work lists have been flushed
for it, so the target CPU should be prevented from running code that
may queue up an IRQ work item on it at that point.
Unfortunately, that may not be the case if dvfs_possible_from_any_cpu
is set for at least one cpufreq policy in the system, because that
allows the CPU going offline to run the utilization update callback
of the cpufreq governor on behalf of another (online) CPU in some
cases.
If that happens, the cpufreq governor callback may queue up an IRQ
work on the CPU running it, which is going offline, and the IRQ work
may not be flushed after that point. Moreover, that IRQ work cannot
be flushed until the "offlining" CPU goes back online, so if any
other CPU calls irq_work_sync() to wait for the completion of that
IRQ work, it will have to wait until the "offlining" CPU is back
online and that may not happen forever. In particular, a system-wide
deadlock may occur during CPU online as a result of that.
The failing scenario is as follows. CPU0 is the boot CPU, so it
creates a cpufreq policy and becomes the "leader" of it
(policy->cpu). It cannot go offline, because it is the boot CPU.
Next, other CPUs join the cpufreq policy as they go online and they
leave it when they go offline. The last CPU to go offline, say CPU3,
may queue up an IRQ work while running the governor callback on
behalf of CPU0 after leaving the cpufreq policy because of the
dvfs_possible_from_any_cpu effect described above. Then, CPU0 is
the only online CPU in the system and the stale IRQ work is still
queued on CPU3. When, say, CPU1 goes back online, it will run
irq_work_sync() to wait for that IRQ work to complete and so it
will wait for CPU3 to go back online (which may never happen even
in principle), but (worse yet) CPU0 is waiting for CPU1 at that
point too and a system-wide deadlock occurs.
To address this problem notice that CPUs which cannot run cpufreq
utilization update code for themselves (for example, because they
have left the cpufreq policies that they belonged to), should also
be prevented from running that code on behalf of the other CPUs that
belong to a cpufreq policy with dvfs_possible_from_any_cpu set and so
in that case the cpufreq_update_util_data pointer of the CPU running
the code must not be NULL as well as for the CPU which is the target
of the cpufreq utilization update in progress.
Accordingly, change cpufreq_this_cpu_can_update() into a regular
function in kernel/sched/cpufreq.c (instead of a static inline in a
header file) and make it check the cpufreq_update_util_data pointer
of the local CPU if dvfs_possible_from_any_cpu is set for the target
cpufreq policy.
Also update the schedutil governor to do the
cpufreq_this_cpu_can_update() check in the non-fast-switch
case too to avoid the stale IRQ work issues.
Fixes: 99d14d0e16fa ("cpufreq: Process remote callbacks from any CPU if the platform permits")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pm/20191121093557.bycvdo4xyinbc5cb@vireshk-i7/
Reported-by: Anson Huang <anson.huang@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Anson Huang <anson.huang@nxp.com>
Cc: 4.14+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14+
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com> (i.MX8QXP-MEK)
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 9b8303fc6efa724bd6a90656434fbde2cc6ceb2c ]
nvmem_cell_write's buf argument uses different types based on
the configuration of CONFIG_NVMEM. The function prototype for
enabled NVMEM uses 'void *' type, but the static dummy function
for disabled NVMEM uses 'const char *' instead. Fix the different
behaviour by always expecting a 'void *' typed buf argument.
Fixes: 7a78a7f7695b ("power: reset: nvmem-reboot-mode: use NVMEM as reboot mode write interface")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Cc: Han Nandor <nandor.han@vaisala.com>
Cc: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
Reviewed-By: Han Nandor <nandor.han@vaisala.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191029114240.14905-2-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 2dc3947b53f573e8a75ea9cbec5588df88ca502e ]
Fix the status code of canceled requests initiated by the host according
to TP4028 (Status Code 0x371):
"Command Aborted By host: The command was aborted as a result of host
action (e.g., the host disconnected the Fabric connection)."
Also in a multipath environment, unless otherwise specified, errors of
this type (path related) should be retried using a different path, if
one is available.
Signed-off-by: Max Gurtovoy <maxg@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit cbb79863fc3175ed5ac506465948b02a893a8235 ]
If something has the IPMI driver open, don't allow the device
module to be unloaded. Before it would unload and the user would
get errors on use.
This change is made on user request, and it makes it consistent
with the I2C driver, which has the same behavior.
It does change things a little bit with respect to kernel users.
If the ACPI or IPMI watchdog (or any other kernel user) has
created a user, then the device module cannot be unloaded. Before
it could be unloaded,
This does not affect hot-plug. If the device goes away (it's on
something removable that is removed or is hot-removed via sysfs)
then it still behaves as it did before.
Reported-by: tony camuso <tcamuso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Tested-by: tony camuso <tcamuso@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 7d49a32a66d2215c5b3bf9bc67c9036ea9904111 ]
PHY IDs are 32-bit unsigned quantities. Ensure that they are always
treated as such, and not passed around as "int"s.
Fixes: 13d0ab6750b2 ("net: phy: check return code when requesting PHY driver module")
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit d2ed49cf6c13e379c5819aa5ac20e1f9674ebc89 ]
When a PHY is probed, if the top bit is set, we end up requesting a
module with the string "mdio:-10101110000000100101000101010001" -
the top bit is printed to a signed -1 value. This leads to the module
not being loaded.
Fix the module format string and the macro generating the values for
it to ensure that we only print unsigned types and the top bit is
always 0/1. We correctly end up with
"mdio:10101110000000100101000101010001".
Fixes: 8626d3b43280 ("phylib: Support phy module autoloading")
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit c6a3aea93571a5393602256d8f74772bd64c8225 upstream.
QOS requests for DEFAULT_VALUE are supposed to be ignored but this is
not the case for FREQ_QOS_MAX. Adding one request for MAX_DEFAULT_VALUE
and one for a real value will cause freq_qos_read_value to unexpectedly
return MAX_DEFAULT_VALUE (-1).
This happens because freq_qos max value is aggregated with PM_QOS_MIN
but FREQ_QOS_MAX_DEFAULT_VALUE is (-1) so it's smaller than other
values.
Fix this by redefining FREQ_QOS_MAX_DEFAULT_VALUE to S32_MAX.
Looking at current users for freq_qos it seems that none of them create
requests for FREQ_QOS_MAX_DEFAULT_VALUE.
Fixes: 77751a466ebd ("PM: QoS: Introduce frequency QoS")
Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez <leonard.crestez@nxp.com>
Reported-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Cc: 5.4+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.4+
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 2ac55d5e5ec9ad0a07e194f0eaca865fe5aa3c40 upstream.
It have turned out that it's not a good idea to unconditionally do a power
cycle and then to re-initialize the SDIO card, as currently done through
mmc_hw_reset() -> mmc_sdio_hw_reset(). This because there may be multiple
SDIO func drivers probed, who also shares the same SDIO card.
To address these scenarios, one may be tempted to use a notification
mechanism, as to allow the core to inform each of the probed func drivers,
about an ongoing HW reset. However, supporting such an operation from the
func driver point of view, may not be entirely trivial.
Therefore, let's use a more simplistic approach to solve the problem, by
instead forcing the card to be removed and re-detected, via scheduling a
rescan-work. In this way, we can rely on existing infrastructure, as the
func driver's ->remove() and ->probe() callbacks, becomes invoked to deal
with the cleanup and the re-initialization.
This solution may be considered as rather heavy, especially if a func
driver doesn't share its card with other func drivers. To address this,
let's keep the current immediate HW reset option as well, but run it only
when there is one func driver probed for the card.
Finally, to allow the caller of mmc_hw_reset(), to understand if the reset
is being asynchronously managed from a scheduled work, it returns 1
(propagated from mmc_sdio_hw_reset()). If the HW reset is executed
successfully and synchronously it returns 0, which maintains the existing
behaviour.
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.4+
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit d04ac224b1688f005a84f764cfe29844f8e9da08 ]
The skb_mpls_push was not updating ethertype of an ethernet packet if
the packet was originally received from a non ARPHRD_ETHER device.
In the below OVS data path flow, since the device corresponding to
port 7 is an l3 device (ARPHRD_NONE) the skb_mpls_push function does
not update the ethertype of the packet even though the previous
push_eth action had added an ethernet header to the packet.
recirc_id(0),in_port(7),eth_type(0x0800),ipv4(tos=0/0xfc,ttl=64,frag=no),
actions:push_eth(src=00:00:00:00:00:00,dst=00:00:00:00:00:00),
push_mpls(label=13,tc=0,ttl=64,bos=1,eth_type=0x8847),4
Fixes: 8822e270d697 ("net: core: move push MPLS functionality from OvS to core helper")
Signed-off-by: Martin Varghese <martin.varghese@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 040b5cfbcefa263ccf2c118c4938308606bb7ed8 ]
The skb_mpls_pop was not updating ethertype of an ethernet packet if the
packet was originally received from a non ARPHRD_ETHER device.
In the below OVS data path flow, since the device corresponding to port 7
is an l3 device (ARPHRD_NONE) the skb_mpls_pop function does not update
the ethertype of the packet even though the previous push_eth action had
added an ethernet header to the packet.
recirc_id(0),in_port(7),eth_type(0x8847),
mpls(label=12/0xfffff,tc=0/0,ttl=0/0x0,bos=1/1),
actions:push_eth(src=00:00:00:00:00:00,dst=00:00:00:00:00:00),
pop_mpls(eth_type=0x800),4
Fixes: ed246cee09b9 ("net: core: move pop MPLS functionality from OvS to core helper")
Signed-off-by: Martin Varghese <martin.varghese@nokia.com>
Acked-by: Pravin B Shelar <pshelar@ovn.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 04d26e7b159a396372646a480f4caa166d1b6720 ]
If no synflood happens for a long enough period of time, then the
synflood timestamp isn't refreshed and jiffies can advance so much
that time_after32() can't accurately compare them any more.
Therefore, we can end up in a situation where time_after32(now,
last_overflow + HZ) returns false, just because these two values are
too far apart. In that case, the synflood timestamp isn't updated as
it should be, which can trick tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() into
rejecting valid syncookies.
For example, let's consider the following scenario on a system
with HZ=1000:
* The synflood timestamp is 0, either because that's the timestamp
of the last synflood or, more commonly, because we're working with
a freshly created socket.
* We receive a new SYN, which triggers synflood protection. Let's say
that this happens when jiffies == 2147484649 (that is,
'synflood timestamp' + HZ + 2^31 + 1).
* Then tcp_synq_overflow() doesn't update the synflood timestamp,
because time_after32(2147484649, 1000) returns false.
With:
- 2147484649: the value of jiffies, aka. 'now'.
- 1000: the value of 'last_overflow' + HZ.
* A bit later, we receive the ACK completing the 3WHS. But
cookie_v[46]_check() rejects it because tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow()
says that we're not under synflood. That's because
time_after32(2147484649, 120000) returns false.
With:
- 2147484649: the value of jiffies, aka. 'now'.
- 120000: the value of 'last_overflow' + TCP_SYNCOOKIE_VALID.
Of course, in reality jiffies would have increased a bit, but this
condition will last for the next 119 seconds, which is far enough
to accommodate for jiffie's growth.
Fix this by updating the overflow timestamp whenever jiffies isn't
within the [last_overflow, last_overflow + HZ] range. That shouldn't
have any performance impact since the update still happens at most once
per second.
Now we're guaranteed to have fresh timestamps while under synflood, so
tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() can safely use it with time_after32() in
such situations.
Stale timestamps can still make tcp_synq_no_recent_overflow() return
the wrong verdict when not under synflood. This will be handled in the
next patch.
For 64 bits architectures, the problem was introduced with the
conversion of ->tw_ts_recent_stamp to 32 bits integer by commit
cca9bab1b72c ("tcp: use monotonic timestamps for PAWS").
The problem has always been there on 32 bits architectures.
Fixes: cca9bab1b72c ("tcp: use monotonic timestamps for PAWS")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 501a90c945103e8627406763dac418f20f3837b2 ]
syzbot was once again able to crash a host by setting a very small mtu
on loopback device.
Let's make inetdev_valid_mtu() available in include/net/ip.h,
and use it in ip_setup_cork(), so that we protect both ip_append_page()
and __ip_append_data()
Also add a READ_ONCE() when the device mtu is read.
Pairs this lockless read with one WRITE_ONCE() in __dev_set_mtu(),
even if other code paths might write over this field.
Add a big comment in include/linux/netdevice.h about dev->mtu
needing READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations.
Hopefully we will add the missing ones in followup patches.
[1]
refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9464 at lib/refcount.c:22 refcount_warn_saturate+0x138/0x1f0 lib/refcount.c:22
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 0 PID: 9464 Comm: syz-executor850 Not tainted 5.4.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118
panic+0x2e3/0x75c kernel/panic.c:221
__warn.cold+0x2f/0x3e kernel/panic.c:582
report_bug+0x289/0x300 lib/bug.c:195
fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:174 [inline]
fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:169 [inline]
do_error_trap+0x11b/0x200 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:267
do_invalid_op+0x37/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:286
invalid_op+0x23/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:1027
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x138/0x1f0 lib/refcount.c:22
Code: 06 31 ff 89 de e8 c8 f5 e6 fd 84 db 0f 85 6f ff ff ff e8 7b f4 e6 fd 48 c7 c7 e0 71 4f 88 c6 05 56 a6 a4 06 01 e8 c7 a8 b7 fd <0f> 0b e9 50 ff ff ff e8 5c f4 e6 fd 0f b6 1d 3d a6 a4 06 31 ff 89
RSP: 0018:ffff88809689f550 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff815e4336 RDI: ffffed1012d13e9c
RBP: ffff88809689f560 R08: ffff88809c50a3c0 R09: fffffbfff15d31b1
R10: fffffbfff15d31b0 R11: ffffffff8ae98d87 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000040100 R14: ffff888099041104 R15: ffff888218d96e40
refcount_add include/linux/refcount.h:193 [inline]
skb_set_owner_w+0x2b6/0x410 net/core/sock.c:1999
sock_wmalloc+0xf1/0x120 net/core/sock.c:2096
ip_append_page+0x7ef/0x1190 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1383
udp_sendpage+0x1c7/0x480 net/ipv4/udp.c:1276
inet_sendpage+0xdb/0x150 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:821
kernel_sendpage+0x92/0xf0 net/socket.c:3794
sock_sendpage+0x8b/0xc0 net/socket.c:936
pipe_to_sendpage+0x2da/0x3c0 fs/splice.c:458
splice_from_pipe_feed fs/splice.c:512 [inline]
__splice_from_pipe+0x3ee/0x7c0 fs/splice.c:636
splice_from_pipe+0x108/0x170 fs/splice.c:671
generic_splice_sendpage+0x3c/0x50 fs/splice.c:842
do_splice_from fs/splice.c:861 [inline]
direct_splice_actor+0x123/0x190 fs/splice.c:1035
splice_direct_to_actor+0x3b4/0xa30 fs/splice.c:990
do_splice_direct+0x1da/0x2a0 fs/splice.c:1078
do_sendfile+0x597/0xd00 fs/read_write.c:1464
__do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1525 [inline]
__se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1511 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1dd/0x220 fs/read_write.c:1511
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x441409
Code: e8 ac e8 ff ff 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 eb 08 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fffb64c4f78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000028
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000441409
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000073b8a R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000010
R10: 0000000000010001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000402180
R13: 0000000000402210 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Kernel Offset: disabled
Rebooting in 86400 seconds..
Fixes: 1470ddf7f8ce ("inet: Remove explicit write references to sk/inet in ip_append_data")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 37ef8c2c15bdc1322b160e38986c187de2b877b2 upstream.
The Rockchip PMIC driver can automatically detect connected component
versions by reading the ID_MSB and ID_LSB registers. The probe function
will always fail with RK818 PMICs because the ID_MSK is 0xFFF0 and the
RK818 template ID is 0x8181.
This patch changes this value to 0x8180.
Fixes: 9d6105e19f61 ("mfd: rk808: Fix up the chip id get failed")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Elaine Zhang <zhangqing@rock-chips.com>
Cc: Joseph Chen <chenjh@rock-chips.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Schultz <d.schultz@phytec.de>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit df4bb5d128e2c44848aeb36b7ceceba3ac85080d upstream.
There is a race window where quota was redirted once we drop dq_list_lock inside dqput(),
but before we grab dquot->dq_lock inside dquot_release()
TASK1 TASK2 (chowner)
->dqput()
we_slept:
spin_lock(&dq_list_lock)
if (dquot_dirty(dquot)) {
spin_unlock(&dq_list_lock);
dquot->dq_sb->dq_op->write_dquot(dquot);
goto we_slept
if (test_bit(DQ_ACTIVE_B, &dquot->dq_flags)) {
spin_unlock(&dq_list_lock);
dquot->dq_sb->dq_op->release_dquot(dquot);
dqget()
mark_dquot_dirty()
dqput()
goto we_slept;
}
So dquot dirty quota will be released by TASK1, but on next we_sleept loop
we detect this and call ->write_dquot() for it.
XFSTEST: https://github.com/dmonakhov/xfstests/commit/440a80d4cbb39e9234df4d7240aee1d551c36107
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191031103920.3919-2-dmonakhov@openvz.org
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmtrmonakhov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 2952db0fd51b0890f728df94ac563c21407f4f43 upstream.
Many drivers have ioctl() handlers that are completely compatible between
32-bit and 64-bit architectures, except for the argument that is passed
down from user space and may have to be passed through compat_ptr()
in order to become a valid 64-bit pointer.
Using ".compat_ptr = compat_ptr_ioctl" in file operations should let
us simplify a lot of those drivers to avoid #ifdef checks, and convert
additional drivers that don't have proper compat handling yet.
On most architectures, the compat_ptr_ioctl() just passes all arguments
to the corresponding ->ioctl handler. The exception is arch/s390, where
compat_ptr() clears the top bit of a 32-bit pointer value, so user space
pointers to the second 2GB alias the first 2GB, as is the case for native
32-bit s390 user space.
The compat_ptr_ioctl() function must therefore be used only with
ioctl functions that either ignore the argument or pass a pointer to a
compatible data type.
If any ioctl command handled by fops->unlocked_ioctl passes a plain
integer instead of a pointer, or any of the passed data types is
incompatible between 32-bit and 64-bit architectures, a proper handler
is required instead of compat_ptr_ioctl.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
|
|
commit 8670b2b8b029a6650d133486be9d2ace146fd29a upstream.
udev has a feature of creating /dev/<node> device-nodes if it finds
a devnode:<node> modalias. This allows for auto-loading of modules that
provide the node. This requires to use a statically allocated minor
number for misc character devices.
However, rfkill uses dynamic minor numbers and prevents auto-loading
of the module. So allocate the next static misc minor number and use
it for rfkill.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191024174042.19851-1-marcel@holtmann.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
commit add3efdd78b8a0478ce423bb9d4df6bd95e8b335 upstream.
When number of free space in the journal is very low, the arithmetic in
jbd2_log_space_left() could underflow resulting in very high number of
free blocks and thus triggering assertion failure in transaction commit
code complaining there's not enough space in the journal:
J_ASSERT(journal->j_free > 1);
Properly check for the low number of free blocks.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191105164437.32602-1-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit e23f568aa63f64cd6b355094224cc9356c0f696b upstream.
When the 32bit ino wraps around, kernfs increments the generation
number to distinguish reused ino instances. The wrap-around detection
tests whether the allocated ino is lower than what the cursor but the
cursor is pointing to the next ino to allocate so the condition never
triggers.
Fix it by remembering the last ino and comparing against that.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fixes: 4a3ef68acacf ("kernfs: implement i_generation")
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.14+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit 031097d9e079e40dce401031d1012e83d80eaf01 ]
TLS 1.3 started using the entry at the end of the SG array
for chaining-in the single byte content type entry. This mostly
works:
[ E E E E E E . . ]
^ ^
start end
E < content type
/
[ E E E E E E C . ]
^ ^
start end
(Where E denotes a populated SG entry; C denotes a chaining entry.)
If the array is full, however, the end will point to the start:
[ E E E E E E E E ]
^
start
end
And we end up overwriting the start:
E < content type
/
[ C E E E E E E E ]
^
start
end
The sg array is supposed to be a circular buffer with start and
end markers pointing anywhere. In case where start > end
(i.e. the circular buffer has "wrapped") there is an extra entry
reserved at the end to chain the two halves together.
[ E E E E E E . . l ]
(Where l is the reserved entry for "looping" back to front.
As suggested by John, let's reserve another entry for chaining
SG entries after the main circular buffer. Note that this entry
has to be pointed to by the end entry so its position is not fixed.
Examples of full messages:
[ E E E E E E E E . l ]
^ ^
start end
<---------------.
[ E E . E E E E E E l ]
^ ^
end start
Now the end will always point to an unused entry, so TLS 1.3
can always use it.
Fixes: 130b392c6cd6 ("net: tls: Add tls 1.3 support")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 3f186d974826847a07bc7964d79ec4eded475ad9 upstream.
The mutex will be used in subsequent changes to replace the busy looping of
a waiter when the futex owner is currently executing the exit cleanup to
prevent a potential live lock.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224556.845798895@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 18f694385c4fd77a09851fd301236746ca83f3cb upstream.
Instead of relying on PF_EXITING use an explicit state for the futex exit
and set it in the futex exit function. This moves the smp barrier and the
lock/unlock serialization into the futex code.
As with the DEAD state this is restricted to the exit path as exec
continues to use the same task struct.
This allows to simplify that logic in a next step.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224556.539409004@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 150d71584b12809144b8145b817e83b81158ae5f upstream.
To allow separate handling of the futex exit state in the futex exit code
for exit and exec, split futex_mm_release() into two functions and invoke
them from the corresponding exit/exec_mm_release() callsites.
Preparatory only, no functional change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224556.332094221@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
