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commit 31e62c2ebbfdc3fe3dbdf5e02c92a9dc67087a3a upstream.
The 'dumpability' of a task is fundamentally about the memory image of
the task - the concept comes from whether it can core dump or not - and
makes no sense when you don't have an associated mm.
And almost all users do in fact use it only for the case where the task
has a mm pointer.
But we have one odd special case: ptrace_may_access() uses 'dumpable' to
check various other things entirely independently of the MM (typically
explicitly using flags like PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS). Including for
threads that no longer have a VM (and maybe never did, like most kernel
threads).
It's not what this flag was designed for, but it is what it is.
The ptrace code does check that the uid/gid matches, so you do have to
be uid-0 to see kernel thread details, but this means that the
traditional "drop capabilities" model doesn't make any difference for
this all.
Make it all make a *bit* more sense by saying that if you don't have a
MM pointer, we'll use a cached "last dumpability" flag if the thread
ever had a MM (it will be zero for kernel threads since it is never
set), and require a proper CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability to override.
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d134feeb5df33fbf77f482f52a366a44642dba09 ]
Add print_hex_dump_devel() as the hex dump equivalent of pr_devel(),
which emits output only when DEBUG is enabled, but keeps call sites
compiled otherwise.
Suggested-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Stable-dep-of: 177730a273b1 ("crypto: caam - guard HMAC key hex dumps in hash_digest_key")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit fc69decc811b155a0ed8eef17ee940f28c4f6dbc ]
The TX fast path and reporting paths walk egress QoS mappings without
RTNL. Convert the mapping lists to RCU-protected pointers, use RCU
reader annotations in readers, and defer freeing mapping nodes with an
embedded rcu_head.
This prepares the egress QoS mapping code for safe removal of mapping
nodes in a follow-up change while preserving the current behavior.
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Longxuan Yu <ylong030@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/9136768189f8c6d3f824f476c62d2fa1111688e8.1776647968.git.yuantan098@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Stable-dep-of: 7dddc74af369 ("8021q: delete cleared egress QoS mappings")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d6bf2e64dec87322f2b11565ddb59c0e967f96e3 ]
Kingston eMMC IY2964 and IB2932 takes a fixed ~2 seconds for each secure
erase/trim operation regardless of size - that is, a single secure
erase/trim operation of 1MB takes the same time as 1GB. With default
calculated 3.5MB max discard size, secure erase 1GB requires ~300 separate
operations taking ~10 minutes total.
Add a card quirk, MMC_QUIRK_FIXED_SECURE_ERASE_TRIM_TIME, to set maximum
secure erase size for those devices. This allows 1GB secure erase to
complete in a single operation, reducing time from 10 minutes to just 2
seconds.
Signed-off-by: Luke Wang <ziniu.wang_1@nxp.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 263ff314cc5602599d481b0912a381555fcbad28 ]
Some eMMC vendors need to report manufacturing dates beyond 2025 but are
reluctant to update the EXT_CSD revision from 8 to 9. Changing the
Updating the EXT_CSD revision may involve additional testing or
qualification steps with customers. To ease this transition and avoid a
full re-qualification process, a workaround is needed. This
patch introduces a temporary quirk that re-purposes the year codes
corresponding to 2010, 2011, and 2012 to represent the years 2026, 2027,
and 2028, respectively. This solution is only valid for this three-year
period.
After 2028, vendors must update their firmware to set EXT_CSD_REV=9 to
continue reporting the correct manufacturing date in compliance with the
JEDEC standard.
The `MMC_QUIRK_BROKEN_MDT` is introduced and enabled for all Sandisk
devices to handle this behavior.
Signed-off-by: Avri Altman <avri.altman@sandisk.com>
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Stable-dep-of: d6bf2e64dec8 ("mmc: core: Optimize time for secure erase/trim for some Kingston eMMCs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 010b7723c0a3b9ad58f50b715dbe2e7781d29400 upstream.
If time slice extensions have been disabled on the kernel command line,
then advertising them in RSEQ flags is wrong.
Adjust the conditionals to reflect reality, fixup the misleading comments
about the gap of these flags and the rseq::flags field.
Fixes: d6200245c75e ("rseq: Allow registering RSEQ with slice extension")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260428224427.437059375%40kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e9766e6f7d330dce7530918d8c6e3ec96d6c6e24 upstream.
rseq_reset() uses memset() to clear the tasks rseq data. That's racy
against membarrier() and preemption.
Guard it with irqsave to cure this.
Fixes: faba9d250eae ("rseq: Introduce struct rseq_data")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260428224427.353887714%40kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7746e3bd4cc19b5092e00d32d676e329bfcb6900 upstream.
fsnotify_get_mark_safe() may return false for a mark on an unrelated group,
which results in bypassing the permission check.
Fix by skipping over detached marks that are not in the current group.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: abc77577a669 ("fsnotify: Provide framework for dropping SRCU lock in ->handle_event")
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260410144950.156160-1-mszeredi@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7deba791ad495ce1d7921683f4f7d1190fa210d1 upstream.
Incrementally consumed buffer rings are generally fully consumed, but
it's quite possible that the application has a minimum size it needs to
meet to avoid truncation. Currently that minimum limit is 1 byte, but
this should be a setting that is the hands of the application. For
recvmsg multishot, a prime use case for incrementally consumed buffers,
the application may get spurious -EFAULT returned at the end of an
incrementally consumed buffer, as less space is available than the
headers need.
Grab a u32 field in struct io_uring_buf_reg, which the application can
use to inform the kernel of the minimum size that should be available
in an incrementally consumed buffer. If less than that is available,
the current buffer is fully processed and the next one will be picked.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ae98dbf43d75 ("io_uring/kbuf: add support for incremental buffer consumption")
Link: https://github.com/axboe/liburing/issues/1433
Signed-off-by: Martin Michaelis <code@mgjm.de>
[axboe: write commit message, change io_buffer_list member name]
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8de779dc40d35d39fa07387b6f921eb11df0f511 upstream.
dlfb_ops_mmap() uses remap_pfn_range() to map vmalloc framebuffer pages
to userspace but sets no vm_ops on the VMA. This means the kernel cannot
track active mmaps. When dlfb_realloc_framebuffer() replaces the backing
buffer via FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO, existing mmap PTEs are not invalidated.
On USB disconnect, dlfb_ops_destroy() calls vfree() on the old pages
while userspace PTEs still reference them, resulting in a use-after-free:
the process retains read/write access to freed kernel pages.
Add vm_operations_struct with open/close callbacks that maintain an
atomic mmap_count on struct dlfb_data. In dlfb_realloc_framebuffer(),
check mmap_count and return -EBUSY if the buffer is currently mapped,
preventing buffer replacement while userspace holds stale PTEs.
Tested with PoC using dummy_hcd + raw_gadget USB device emulation.
Signed-off-by: Rajat Gupta <rajgupt@qti.qualcomm.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5b484311507b5d403c1f7a45f6aa3778549e268b upstream.
Even though nobody should use this value (except when declaring the
"flags" bitmap), kernel-doc still gets upset that it's not documented.
It reports:
WARNING: ../include/linux/device.h:519
Enum value 'DEV_FLAG_COUNT' not described in enum 'struct_device_flags'
Add the description of DEV_FLAG_COUNT.
Fixes: a2225b6e834a ("driver core: Don't let a device probe until it's ready")
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/f318cd43-81fd-48b9-abf7-92af85f12f91@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260413195910.1.I23aca74fe2d3636a47df196a80920fecb2643220@changeid
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3e4bb2706817710d9461394da8b75be79981586b ]
Patch series "mm: expand mmap_prepare functionality and usage", v4.
This series expands the mmap_prepare functionality, which is intended to
replace the deprecated f_op->mmap hook which has been the source of bugs
and security issues for some time.
This series starts with some cleanup of existing mmap_prepare logic, then
adds documentation for the mmap_prepare call to make it easier for
filesystem and driver writers to understand how it works.
It then importantly adds a vm_ops->mapped hook, a key feature that was
missing from mmap_prepare previously - this is invoked when a driver which
specifies mmap_prepare has successfully been mapped but not merged with
another VMA.
mmap_prepare is invoked prior to a merge being attempted, so you cannot
manipulate state such as reference counts as if it were a new mapping.
The vm_ops->mapped hook allows a driver to perform tasks required at this
stage, and provides symmetry against subsequent vm_ops->open,close calls.
The series uses this to correct the afs implementation which wrongly
manipulated reference count at mmap_prepare time.
It then adds an mmap_prepare equivalent of vm_iomap_memory() -
mmap_action_simple_ioremap(), then uses this to update a number of drivers.
It then splits out the mmap_prepare compatibility layer (which allows for
invocation of mmap_prepare hooks in an mmap() hook) in such a way as to
allow for more incremental implementation of mmap_prepare hooks.
It then uses this to extend mmap_prepare usage in drivers.
Finally it adds an mmap_prepare equivalent of vm_map_pages(), which lays
the foundation for future work which will extend mmap_prepare to DMA
coherent mappings.
This patch (of 21):
Rather than passing arbitrary fields, pass a vm_area_desc pointer to mmap
prepare functions to mmap prepare, and an action and vma pointer to mmap
complete in order to put all the action-specific logic in the function
actually doing the work.
Additionally, allow mmap prepare functions to return an error so we can
error out as soon as possible if there is something logically incorrect in
the input.
Update remap_pfn_range_prepare() to properly check the input range for the
CoW case.
Also remove io_remap_pfn_range_complete(), as we can simply set up the
fields correctly in io_remap_pfn_range_prepare() and use
remap_pfn_range_complete() for this.
While we're here, make remap_pfn_range_prepare_vma() a little neater, and
pass mmap_action directly to call_action_complete().
Then, update compat_vma_mmap() to perform its logic directly, as
__compat_vma_map() is not used by anything so we don't need to export it.
Also update compat_vma_mmap() to use vfs_mmap_prepare() rather than
calling the mmap_prepare op directly.
Finally, update the VMA userland tests to reflect the changes.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1774045440.git.ljs@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/99f408e4694f44ab12bdc55fe0bd9685d3bd1117.1774045440.git.ljs@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (Oracle) <ljs@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka (SUSE) <vbabka@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexandre Torgue <alexandre.torgue@foss.st.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Bodo Stroesser <bostroesser@gmail.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan <kys@microsoft.com>
Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Cc: "Martin K. Petersen" <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: Maxime Coquelin <mcoquelin.stm32@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pfalcato@suse.de>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Vignesh Raghavendra <vigneshr@ti.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Stable-dep-of: f96e1d5f15b7 ("mm: avoid deadlock when holding rmap on mmap_prepare error")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a2be37eedb52ea26938fa4cc9de1ff84963c57ad upstream.
All the functions operating on the 'handle' pointer are claiming it is a
pointer to const thus they should not modify the handle. In fact that's
a false statement, because first thing these functions do is drop the
cast to const with container_of:
struct acpm_info *acpm = handle_to_acpm_info(handle);
And with such cast the handle is easily writable with simple:
acpm->handle.ops.pmic_ops.read_reg = NULL;
The code is not correct logically, either, because functions like
acpm_get_by_node() and acpm_handle_put() are meant to modify the handle
reference counting, thus they must modify the handle. Modification here
happens anyway, even if the reference counting is stored in the
container which the handle is part of.
The code does not have actual visible bug, but incorrect 'const'
annotations could lead to incorrect compiler decisions.
Fixes: a88927b534ba ("firmware: add Exynos ACPM protocol driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@oss.qualcomm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260224104203.42950-2-krzysztof.kozlowski@oss.qualcomm.com
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 37beb42560165869838e7d91724f3e629db64129 upstream.
kstack_offset was previously maintained per-cpu, but this caused a
couple of issues. So let's instead make it per-task.
Issue 1: add_random_kstack_offset() and choose_random_kstack_offset()
expected and required to be called with interrupts and preemption
disabled so that it could manipulate per-cpu state. But arm64, loongarch
and risc-v are calling them with interrupts and preemption enabled. I
don't _think_ this causes any functional issues, but it's certainly
unexpected and could lead to manipulating the wrong cpu's state, which
could cause a minor performance degradation due to bouncing the cache
lines. By maintaining the state per-task those functions can safely be
called in preemptible context.
Issue 2: add_random_kstack_offset() is called before executing the
syscall and expands the stack using a previously chosen random offset.
choose_random_kstack_offset() is called after executing the syscall and
chooses and stores a new random offset for the next syscall. With
per-cpu storage for this offset, an attacker could force cpu migration
during the execution of the syscall and prevent the offset from being
updated for the original cpu such that it is predictable for the next
syscall on that cpu. By maintaining the state per-task, this problem
goes away because the per-task random offset is updated after the
syscall regardless of which cpu it is executing on.
Fixes: 39218ff4c625 ("stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/dd8c37bc-795f-4c7a-9086-69e584d8ab24@arm.com/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260303150840.3789438-2-ryan.roberts@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6af36aeb147a06dea47c49859cd6ca5659aeb987 upstream.
Stacked filesystems such as overlayfs do not currently provide the
necessary mechanisms for LSMs to properly enforce access controls on the
mmap() and mprotect() operations. In order to resolve this gap, a LSM
security blob is being added to the backing_file struct and the following
new LSM hooks are being created:
security_backing_file_alloc()
security_backing_file_free()
security_mmap_backing_file()
The first two hooks are to manage the lifecycle of the LSM security blob
in the backing_file struct, while the third provides a new mmap() access
control point for the underlying backing file. It is also expected that
LSMs will likely want to update their security_file_mprotect() callback
to address issues with their mprotect() controls, but that does not
require a change to the security_file_mprotect() LSM hook.
There are a three other small changes to support these new LSM hooks:
* Pass the user file associated with a backing file down to
alloc_empty_backing_file() so it can be included in the
security_backing_file_alloc() hook.
* Add getter and setter functions for the backing_file struct LSM blob
as the backing_file struct remains private to fs/file_table.c.
* Constify the file struct field in the LSM common_audit_data struct to
better support LSMs that need to pass a const file struct pointer into
the common LSM audit code.
Thanks to Arnd Bergmann for identifying the missing EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL()
and supplying a fixup.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-erofs@lists.ozlabs.org
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9ded47ad003f09a94b6a710b5c47f4aa5ceb7429 upstream.
Hold state of deferred I/O in struct fb_deferred_io_state. Allocate an
instance as part of initializing deferred I/O and remove it only after
the final mapping has been closed. If the fb_info and the contained
deferred I/O meanwhile goes away, clear struct fb_deferred_io_state.info
to invalidate the mapping. Any access will then result in a SIGBUS
signal.
Fixes a long-standing problem, where a device hot-unplug happens while
user space still has an active mapping of the graphics memory. The hot-
unplug frees the instance of struct fb_info. Accessing the memory will
operate on undefined state.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Fixes: 60b59beafba8 ("fbdev: mm: Deferred IO support")
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: linux-fbdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.22+
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6f1d4d2ecfcd1b577dc87350ea965fe81f272e83 upstream.
Outside of the EFI tpm code, the TPM_MEMREMAP()/TPM_MEMUNMAP functions are
defined as trivial macros, leading to the mapping_size variable ending
up unused:
In file included from drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c:16:
In file included from drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h:28:
include/linux/tpm_eventlog.h:167:6: error: variable 'mapping_size' set but not used [-Werror,-Wunused-but-set-variable]
167 | int mapping_size;
Turn the stubs into inline functions to avoid this warning.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.3+
Fixes: c46f3405692d ("tpm: Reserve the TPM final events table")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a663bac71a2f0b3ac6c373168ca57b2a6e6381aa upstream.
From the MCTP Base specification (DSP0236 v1.2.1), the first byte of
the MCTP header contains a 4 bit reserved field, and 4 bit version.
On our current receive path, we require those 4 reserved bits to be
zero, but the 9500-8i card is non-conformant, and may set these
reserved bits.
DSP0236 states that the reserved bits must be written as zero, and
ignored when read. While the device might not conform to the former,
we should accept these message to conform to the latter.
Relax our check on the MCTP version byte to allow non-zero bits in the
reserved field.
Fixes: 889b7da23abf ("mctp: Add initial routing framework")
Signed-off-by: Yuan Zhaoming <yuanzm2@lenovo.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Jeremy Kerr <jk@codeconstruct.com.au>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260417141340.5306-1-yuanzhaoming901030@126.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0422e7a4883f25101903f3e8105c0808aa5f4ce9 upstream.
If a RESPONSE packet gets a temporary failure during processing, it may end
up in a partially decrypted state - and then get requeued for a retry.
Fix this by just discarding the packet; we will send another CHALLENGE
packet and thereby elicit a further response. Similarly, discard an
incoming CHALLENGE packet if we get an error whilst generating a RESPONSE;
the server will send another CHALLENGE.
Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260422161438.2593376-4-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260423200909.3049438-3-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit def304aae2edf321d2671fd6ca766a93c21f877e upstream.
Fix handling of a packet with a misaligned crypto length. Also handle
non-ENOMEM errors from decryption by aborting. Further, remove the
WARN_ON_ONCE() so that it can't be remotely triggered (a trace line can
still be emitted).
Fixes: f93af41b9f5f ("rxrpc: Fix missing error checks for rxkad encryption/decryption failure")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260408121252.2249051-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422161438.2593376-3-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 1f2740150f904bfa60e4bad74d65add3ccb5e7f8 upstream.
If skb_unshare() fails to unshare a packet due to allocation failure in
rxrpc_input_packet(), the skb pointer in the parent (rxrpc_io_thread())
will be NULL'd out. This will likely cause the call to
trace_rxrpc_rx_done() to oops.
Fix this by moving the unsharing down to where rxrpc_input_call_event()
calls rxrpc_input_call_packet(). There are a number of places prior to
that where we ignore DATA packets for a variety of reasons (such as the
call already being complete) for which an unshare is then avoided.
And with that, rxrpc_input_packet() doesn't need to take a pointer to the
pointer to the packet, so change that to just a pointer.
Fixes: 2d1faf7a0ca3 ("rxrpc: Simplify skbuff accounting in receive path")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260408121252.2249051-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422161438.2593376-4-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 4afc71bba8b7d7841681e7647ae02f5079aaf28f upstream.
Commit 1ba9f8979426 ("vmlinux.lds: Unify TEXT_MAIN, DATA_MAIN, and
related macros") added .text and made .data, .bss, and .rodata sections
unconditional in the module linker script, but without an explicit
address like the other sections in the same file.
When linking modules with ld.bfd -r, sections defined without an address
inherit the location counter, resulting in non-zero sh_addr values in
the .ko. Relocatable objects are expected to have sh_addr=0 for these
sections and these non-zero addresses confuse elfutils and have been
reported to cause segmentation faults in SystemTap [1].
Add the 0 address specifier to all sections in module.lds, including the
.codetag.* sections via MOD_SEPARATE_CODETAG_SECTIONS macro.
Link: https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=33958
Fixes: 1ba9f8979426 ("vmlinux.lds: Unify TEXT_MAIN, DATA_MAIN, and related macros")
Signed-off-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit e75e38055b9df5eafd663c6db00e634f534dc426 upstream.
LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC does not allow
LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF with ruleset_fd=-1, preventing
a multithreaded process from atomically propagating subdomain log muting
to all threads without creating a domain layer. Relax the fd=-1
condition to accept TSYNC alongside LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF, and update the
documentation accordingly.
Add flag validation tests for all TSYNC combinations with ruleset_fd=-1,
and audit tests verifying both transition directions: muting via TSYNC
(logged to not logged) and override via TSYNC (not logged to logged).
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 42fc7e6543f6 ("landlock: Multithreading support for landlock_restrict_self()")
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260407164107.2012589-2-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit dbeb256e8dd87233d891b170c0b32a6466467036 upstream.
When an RSS QP is destroyed (e.g. DPDK exit), mana_ib_destroy_qp_rss()
destroys the RX WQ objects but does not disable vPort RX steering in
firmware. This leaves stale steering configuration that still points to
the destroyed RX objects.
If traffic continues to arrive (e.g. peer VM is still transmitting) and
the VF interface is subsequently brought up (mana_open), the firmware
may deliver completions using stale CQ IDs from the old RX objects.
These CQ IDs can be reused by the ethernet driver for new TX CQs,
causing RX completions to land on TX CQs:
WARNING: mana_poll_tx_cq+0x1b8/0x220 [mana] (is_sq == false)
WARNING: mana_gd_process_eq_events+0x209/0x290 (cq_table lookup fails)
Fix this by disabling vPort RX steering before destroying RX WQ objects.
Note that mana_fence_rqs() cannot be used here because the fence
completion is delivered on the CQ, which is polled by user-mode (e.g.
DPDK) and not visible to the kernel driver.
Refactor the disable logic into a shared mana_disable_vport_rx() in
mana_en, exported for use by mana_ib, replacing the duplicate code.
The ethernet driver's mana_dealloc_queues() is also updated to call
this common function.
Fixes: 0266a177631d ("RDMA/mana_ib: Add a driver for Microsoft Azure Network Adapter")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260325194100.1929056-1-longli@microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 33c3f6c2b48cd84b441dba1ee3e62290e53930f4 upstream.
When kdamond_fn() main loop is finished, the function cancels remaining
damos_walk() request and unset the damon_ctx->kdamond so that API callers
and API functions themselves can show the context is terminated.
damos_walk() adds the caller's request to the queue first. After that, it
shows if the kdamond of the damon_ctx is still running (damon_ctx->kdamond
is set). Only if the kdamond is running, damos_walk() starts waiting for
the kdamond's handling of the newly added request.
The damos_walk() requests registration and damon_ctx->kdamond unset are
protected by different mutexes, though. Hence, damos_walk() could race
with damon_ctx->kdamond unset, and result in deadlocks.
For example, let's suppose kdamond successfully finished the damow_walk()
request cancelling. Right after that, damos_walk() is called for the
context. It registers the new request, and shows the context is still
running, because damon_ctx->kdamond unset is not yet done. Hence the
damos_walk() caller starts waiting for the handling of the request.
However, the kdamond is already on the termination steps, so it never
handles the new request. As a result, the damos_walk() caller thread
infinitely waits.
Fix this by introducing another damon_ctx field, namely
walk_control_obsolete. It is protected by the
damon_ctx->walk_control_lock, which protects damos_walk() request
registration. Initialize (unset) it in kdamond_fn() before letting
damon_start() returns and set it just before the cancelling of the
remaining damos_walk() request is executed. damos_walk() reads the
obsolete field under the lock and avoids adding a new request.
After this change, only requests that are guaranteed to be handled or
cancelled are registered. Hence the after-registration DAMON context
termination check is no longer needed. Remove it together.
The issue is found by sashiko [1].
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260327233319.3528-3-sj@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260325141956.87144-1-sj@kernel.org [1]
Fixes: bf0eaba0ff9c ("mm/damon/core: implement damos_walk()")
Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.14.x
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 55da81663b9642dd046b26dd6f1baddbcf337c1e upstream.
Patch series "mm/damon/core: fix damon_call()/damos_walk() vs kdmond exit
race".
damon_call() and damos_walk() can leak memory and/or deadlock when they
race with kdamond terminations. Fix those.
This patch (of 2);
When kdamond_fn() main loop is finished, the function cancels all
remaining damon_call() requests and unset the damon_ctx->kdamond so that
API callers and API functions themselves can know the context is
terminated. damon_call() adds the caller's request to the queue first.
After that, it shows if the kdamond of the damon_ctx is still running
(damon_ctx->kdamond is set). Only if the kdamond is running, damon_call()
starts waiting for the kdamond's handling of the newly added request.
The damon_call() requests registration and damon_ctx->kdamond unset are
protected by different mutexes, though. Hence, damon_call() could race
with damon_ctx->kdamond unset, and result in deadlocks.
For example, let's suppose kdamond successfully finished the damon_call()
requests cancelling. Right after that, damon_call() is called for the
context. It registers the new request, and shows the context is still
running, because damon_ctx->kdamond unset is not yet done. Hence the
damon_call() caller starts waiting for the handling of the request.
However, the kdamond is already on the termination steps, so it never
handles the new request. As a result, the damon_call() caller threads
infinitely waits.
Fix this by introducing another damon_ctx field, namely
call_controls_obsolete. It is protected by the
damon_ctx->call_controls_lock, which protects damon_call() requests
registration. Initialize (unset) it in kdamond_fn() before letting
damon_start() returns and set it just before the cancelling of remaining
damon_call() requests is executed. damon_call() reads the obsolete field
under the lock and avoids adding a new request.
After this change, only requests that are guaranteed to be handled or
cancelled are registered. Hence the after-registration DAMON context
termination check is no longer needed. Remove it together.
Note that the deadlock will not happen when damon_call() is called for
repeat mode request. In tis case, damon_call() returns instead of waiting
for the handling when the request registration succeeds and it shows the
kdamond is running. However, if the request also has dealloc_on_cancel,
the request memory would be leaked.
The issue is found by sashiko [1].
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260327233319.3528-1-sj@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260327233319.3528-2-sj@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260325141956.87144-1-sj@kernel.org [1]
Fixes: 42b7491af14c ("mm/damon/core: introduce damon_call()")
Signed-off-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.14.x
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 6b1842775a460245e97d36d3a67d0cfba7c4ff79 upstream.
Due to initialization ordering, page_ext is allocated and initialized
relatively late during boot. Some pages have already been allocated and
freed before page_ext becomes available, leaving their codetag
uninitialized.
A clear example is in init_section_page_ext(): alloc_page_ext() calls
kmemleak_alloc(). If the slab cache has no free objects, it falls back to
the buddy allocator to allocate memory. However, at this point page_ext
is not yet fully initialized, so these newly allocated pages have no
codetag set. These pages may later be reclaimed by KASAN, which causes
the warning to trigger when they are freed because their codetag ref is
still empty.
Use a global array to track pages allocated before page_ext is fully
initialized. The array size is fixed at 8192 entries, and will emit a
warning if this limit is exceeded. When page_ext initialization
completes, set their codetag to empty to avoid warnings when they are
freed later.
This warning is only observed with CONFIG_MEM_ALLOC_PROFILING_DEBUG=Y and
mem_profiling_compressed disabled:
[ 9.582133] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 9.582137] alloc_tag was not set
[ 9.582139] WARNING: ./include/linux/alloc_tag.h:164 at __pgalloc_tag_sub+0x40f/0x550, CPU#5: systemd/1
[ 9.582190] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 7.0.0-rc4 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
[ 9.582192] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 9.582194] RIP: 0010:__pgalloc_tag_sub+0x40f/0x550
[ 9.582196] Code: 00 00 4c 29 e5 48 8b 05 1f 88 56 05 48 8d 4c ad 00 48 8d 2c c8 e9 87 fd ff ff 0f 0b 0f 0b e9 f3 fe ff ff 48 8d 3d 61 2f ed 03 <67> 48 0f b9 3a e9 b3 fd ff ff 0f 0b eb e4 e8 5e cd 14 02 4c 89 c7
[ 9.582197] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000001f940 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 9.582200] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff92000003f2b RCX: 1ffff110200d806c
[ 9.582201] RDX: ffff8881006c0360 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff9bc7b460
[ 9.582202] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff3a62324
[ 9.582203] R10: ffffffff9d311923 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffea0004001b00
[ 9.582204] R13: 0000000000002000 R14: ffffea0000000000 R15: ffff8881006c0360
[ 9.582206] FS: 00007ffbbcf2d940(0000) GS:ffff888450479000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 9.582208] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 9.582210] CR2: 000055ee3aa260d0 CR3: 0000000148b67005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[ 9.582211] PKRU: 55555554
[ 9.582212] Call Trace:
[ 9.582213] <TASK>
[ 9.582214] ? __pfx___pgalloc_tag_sub+0x10/0x10
[ 9.582216] ? check_bytes_and_report+0x68/0x140
[ 9.582219] __free_frozen_pages+0x2e4/0x1150
[ 9.582221] ? __free_slab+0xc2/0x2b0
[ 9.582224] qlist_free_all+0x4c/0xf0
[ 9.582227] kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x15d/0x180
[ 9.582229] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x69/0x90
[ 9.582232] kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x14a/0x500
[ 9.582234] do_getname+0x96/0x310
[ 9.582237] do_readlinkat+0x91/0x2f0
[ 9.582239] ? __pfx_do_readlinkat+0x10/0x10
[ 9.582240] ? get_random_bytes_user+0x1df/0x2c0
[ 9.582244] __x64_sys_readlinkat+0x96/0x100
[ 9.582246] do_syscall_64+0xce/0x650
[ 9.582250] ? __x64_sys_getrandom+0x13a/0x1e0
[ 9.582252] ? __pfx___x64_sys_getrandom+0x10/0x10
[ 9.582254] ? do_syscall_64+0x114/0x650
[ 9.582255] ? ksys_read+0xfc/0x1d0
[ 9.582258] ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
[ 9.582260] ? do_syscall_64+0x114/0x650
[ 9.582262] ? do_syscall_64+0x114/0x650
[ 9.582264] ? __pfx_fput_close_sync+0x10/0x10
[ 9.582266] ? file_close_fd_locked+0x178/0x2a0
[ 9.582268] ? __x64_sys_faccessat2+0x96/0x100
[ 9.582269] ? __x64_sys_close+0x7d/0xd0
[ 9.582271] ? do_syscall_64+0x114/0x650
[ 9.582273] ? do_syscall_64+0x114/0x650
[ 9.582275] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x50/0xa0
[ 9.582277] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x50/0xa0
[ 9.582279] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 9.582280] RIP: 0033:0x7ffbbda345ee
[ 9.582282] Code: 0f 1f 40 00 48 8b 15 29 38 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 0f 1f 40 00 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 0b 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d fa 37 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[ 9.582284] RSP: 002b:00007ffe2ad8de58 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000010b
[ 9.582286] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055ee3aa25570 RCX: 00007ffbbda345ee
[ 9.582287] RDX: 000055ee3aa25570 RSI: 00007ffe2ad8dee0 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
[ 9.582288] RBP: 0000000000001000 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000001001
[ 9.582289] R10: 0000000000001000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000033
[ 9.582290] R13: 00007ffe2ad8dee0 R14: 00000000ffffff9c R15: 00007ffe2ad8deb0
[ 9.582292] </TASK>
[ 9.582293] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260331081312.123719-1-hao.ge@linux.dev
Fixes: dcfe378c81f72 ("lib: introduce support for page allocation tagging")
Signed-off-by: Hao Ge <hao.ge@linux.dev>
Suggested-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Acked-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit d239462787b072c78eb19fc1f155c3d411256282 upstream.
Droppable mappings must not be lockable. There is a check for VMAs with
VM_DROPPABLE set in mlock_fixup() along with checks for other types of
unlockable VMAs which ensures this when calling mlock()/mlock2().
For mlockall(MCL_FUTURE), the check for unlockable VMAs is different. In
apply_mlockall_flags(), if the flags parameter has MCL_FUTURE set, the
current task's mm's default VMA flag field mm->def_flags has VM_LOCKED
applied to it. VM_LOCKONFAULT is also applied if MCL_ONFAULT is also set.
When these flags are set as default in this manner they are cleared in
__mmap_complete() for new mappings that do not support mlock. A check for
VM_DROPPABLE in __mmap_complete() is missing resulting in droppable
mappings created with VM_LOCKED set. To fix this and reduce that chance
of similar bugs in the future, introduce and use vma_supports_mlock().
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260310155821.17869-1-anthony.yznaga@oracle.com
Fixes: 9651fcedf7b9 ("mm: add MAP_DROPPABLE for designating always lazily freeable mappings")
Signed-off-by: Anthony Yznaga <anthony.yznaga@oracle.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) <david@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Pedro Falcato <pfalcato@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (Oracle) <ljs@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (Oracle) <ljs@kernel.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Liam Howlett <liam.howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit f72e77c33e4b5657af35125e75bab249256030f3 upstream.
In various places in the kernel, we modify the fwnode "flags" member
by doing either:
fwnode->flags |= SOME_FLAG;
fwnode->flags &= ~SOME_FLAG;
This type of modification is not thread-safe. If two threads are both
mucking with the flags at the same time then one can clobber the
other.
While flags are often modified while under the "fwnode_link_lock",
this is not universally true.
Create some accessor functions for setting, clearing, and testing the
FWNODE flags and move all users to these accessor functions. New
accessor functions use set_bit() and clear_bit(), which are
thread-safe.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c2c724c868c4 ("driver core: Add fw_devlink_parse_fwtree()")
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rafael J. Wysocki (Intel) <rafael@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Saravana Kannan <saravanak@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260317090112.v2.1.I0a4d03104ecd5103df3d76f66c8d21b1d15a2e38@changeid
[ Fix fwnode_clear_flag() argument alignment, restore dropped blank
line in fwnode_dev_initialized(), and remove unnecessary parentheses
around fwnode_test_flag() calls. - Danilo ]
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
commit a2225b6e834a838ae3c93709760edc0a169eb2f2 upstream.
The moment we link a "struct device" into the list of devices for the
bus, it's possible probe can happen. This is because another thread
can load the driver at any time and that can cause the device to
probe. This has been seen in practice with a stack crawl that looks
like this [1]:
really_probe()
__driver_probe_device()
driver_probe_device()
__driver_attach()
bus_for_each_dev()
driver_attach()
bus_add_driver()
driver_register()
__platform_driver_register()
init_module() [some module]
do_one_initcall()
do_init_module()
load_module()
__arm64_sys_finit_module()
invoke_syscall()
As a result of the above, it was seen that device_links_driver_bound()
could be called for the device before "dev->fwnode->dev" was
assigned. This prevented __fw_devlink_pickup_dangling_consumers() from
being called which meant that other devices waiting on our driver's
sub-nodes were stuck deferring forever.
It's believed that this problem is showing up suddenly for two
reasons:
1. Android has recently (last ~1 year) implemented an optimization to
the order it loads modules [2]. When devices opt-in to this faster
loading, modules are loaded one-after-the-other very quickly. This
is unlike how other distributions do it. The reproduction of this
problem has only been seen on devices that opt-in to Android's
"parallel module loading".
2. Android devices typically opt-in to fw_devlink, and the most
noticeable issue is |
