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2018-02-03bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON configAlexei Starovoitov1-5/+8
[ upstream commit 290af86629b25ffd1ed6232c4e9107da031705cb ] The BPF interpreter has been used as part of the spectre 2 attack CVE-2017-5715. A quote from goolge project zero blog: "At this point, it would normally be necessary to locate gadgets in the host kernel code that can be used to actually leak data by reading from an attacker-controlled location, shifting and masking the result appropriately and then using the result of that as offset to an attacker-controlled address for a load. But piecing gadgets together and figuring out which ones work in a speculation context seems annoying. So instead, we decided to use the eBPF interpreter, which is built into the host kernel - while there is no legitimate way to invoke it from inside a VM, the presence of the code in the host kernel's text section is sufficient to make it usable for the attack, just like with ordinary ROP gadgets." To make attacker job harder introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config option that removes interpreter from the kernel in favor of JIT-only mode. So far eBPF JIT is supported by: x64, arm64, arm32, sparc64, s390, powerpc64, mips64 The start of JITed program is randomized and code page is marked as read-only. In addition "constant blinding" can be turned on with net.core.bpf_jit_harden v2->v3: - move __bpf_prog_ret0 under ifdef (Daniel) v1->v2: - fix init order, test_bpf and cBPF (Daniel's feedback) - fix offloaded bpf (Jakub's feedback) - add 'return 0' dummy in case something can invoke prog->bpf_func - retarget bpf tree. For bpf-next the patch would need one extra hunk. It will be sent when the trees are merged back to net-next Considered doing: int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = BPF_EBPF_JIT_DEFAULT; but it seems better to land the patch as-is and in bpf-next remove bpf_jit_enable global variable from all JITs, consolidate in one place and remove this jit_init() function. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-16dynamic-debug-howto: fix optional/omitted ending line number to be LARGE ↵Randy Dunlap1-0/+4
instead of 0 [ Upstream commit 1f3c790bd5989fcfec9e53ad8fa09f5b740c958f ] line-range is supposed to treat "1-" as "1-endoffile", so handle the special case by setting last_lineno to UINT_MAX. Fixes this error: dynamic_debug:ddebug_parse_query: last-line:0 < 1st-line:1 dynamic_debug:ddebug_exec_query: query parse failed Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/10a6a101-e2be-209f-1f41-54637824788e@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Acked-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-16lib/genalloc.c: make the avail variable an atomic_long_tStephen Bates1-5/+5
[ Upstream commit 36a3d1dd4e16bcd0d2ddfb4a2ec7092f0ae0d931 ] If the amount of resources allocated to a gen_pool exceeds 2^32 then the avail atomic overflows and this causes problems when clients try and borrow resources from the pool. This is only expected to be an issue on 64 bit systems. Add the <linux/atomic.h> header to pull in atomic_long* operations. So that 32 bit systems continue to use atomic32_t but 64 bit systems can use atomic64_t. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509033843-25667-1-git-send-email-sbates@raithlin.com Signed-off-by: Stephen Bates <sbates@raithlin.com> Reviewed-by: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com> Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel Mentz <danielmentz@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-16ASN.1: check for error from ASN1_OP_END__ACT actionsEric Biggers1-0/+2
commit 81a7be2cd69b412ab6aeacfe5ebf1bb6e5bce955 upstream. asn1_ber_decoder() was ignoring errors from actions associated with the opcodes ASN1_OP_END_SEQ_ACT, ASN1_OP_END_SET_ACT, ASN1_OP_END_SEQ_OF_ACT, and ASN1_OP_END_SET_OF_ACT. In practice, this meant the pkcs7_note_signed_info() action (since that was the only user of those opcodes). Fix it by checking for the error, just like the decoder does for actions associated with the other opcodes. This bug allowed users to leak slab memory by repeatedly trying to add a specially crafted "pkcs7_test" key (requires CONFIG_PKCS7_TEST_KEY). In theory, this bug could also be used to bypass module signature verification, by providing a PKCS#7 message that is misparsed such that a signature's ->authattrs do not contain its ->msgdigest. But it doesn't seem practical in normal cases, due to restrictions on the format of the ->authattrs. Fixes: 42d5ec27f873 ("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-16ASN.1: fix out-of-bounds read when parsing indefinite length itemEric Biggers1-21/+26
commit e0058f3a874ebb48b25be7ff79bc3b4e59929f90 upstream. In asn1_ber_decoder(), indefinitely-sized ASN.1 items were being passed to the action functions before their lengths had been computed, using the bogus length of 0x80 (ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH). This resulted in reading data past the end of the input buffer, when given a specially crafted message. Fix it by rearranging the code so that the indefinite length is resolved before the action is called. This bug was originally found by fuzzing the X.509 parser in userspace using libFuzzer from the LLVM project. KASAN report (cleaned up slightly): BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy ./include/linux/string.h:341 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in x509_fabricate_name.constprop.1+0x1a4/0x940 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:366 Read of size 128 at addr ffff880035dd9eaf by task keyctl/195 CPU: 1 PID: 195 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.14.0-09238-g1d3b78bbc6e9 #26 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0xd1/0x175 lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_address_description+0x78/0x260 mm/kasan/report.c:252 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline] kasan_report+0x23f/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409 memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:302 memcpy ./include/linux/string.h:341 [inline] x509_fabricate_name.constprop.1+0x1a4/0x940 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:366 asn1_ber_decoder+0xb4a/0x1fd0 lib/asn1_decoder.c:447 x509_cert_parse+0x1c7/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:89 x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174 asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388 key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850 SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline] SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Allocated by task 195: __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab.c:3675 [inline] __kmalloc_node+0x47/0x60 mm/slab.c:3682 kvmalloc ./include/linux/mm.h:540 [inline] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:104 [inline] SyS_add_key+0x19e/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96 Fixes: 42d5ec27f873 ("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder") Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-30lib/mpi: call cond_resched() from mpi_powm() loopEric Biggers1-0/+2
commit 1d9ddde12e3c9bab7f3d3484eb9446315e3571ca upstream. On a non-preemptible kernel, if KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE is called with the largest permitted inputs (16384 bits), the kernel spends 10+ seconds doing modular exponentiation in mpi_powm() without rescheduling. If all threads do it, it locks up the system. Moreover, it can cause rcu_sched-stall warnings. Notwithstanding the insanity of doing this calculation in kernel mode rather than in userspace, fix it by calling cond_resched() as each bit from the exponent is processed. It's still noninterruptible, but at least it's preemptible now. Do the cond_resched() once per bit rather than once per MPI limb because each limb might still easily take 100+ milliseconds on slow CPUs. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-15test: firmware_class: report errors properly on failureBrian Norris1-3/+8
commit 47e0bbb7fa985a0f1b5794a8653fae4f8f49de77 upstream. request_firmware() failures currently won't get reported at all (the error code is discarded). What's more, we get confusing messages, like: # echo -n notafile > /sys/devices/virtual/misc/test_firmware/trigger_request [ 8280.311856] test_firmware: loading 'notafile' [ 8280.317042] test_firmware: load of 'notafile' failed: -2 [ 8280.322445] test_firmware: loaded: 0 # echo $? 0 Report the failures via write() errors, and don't say we "loaded" anything. Signed-off-by: Brian Norris <computersforpeace@gmail.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-15KEYS: fix NULL pointer dereference during ASN.1 parsing [ver #2]Eric Biggers1-2/+2
commit 624f5ab8720b3371367327a822c267699c1823b8 upstream. syzkaller reported a NULL pointer dereference in asn1_ber_decoder(). It can be reproduced by the following command, assuming CONFIG_PKCS7_TEST_KEY=y: keyctl add pkcs7_test desc '' @s The bug is that if the data buffer is empty, an integer underflow occurs in the following check: if (unlikely(dp >= datalen - 1)) goto data_overrun_error; This results in the NULL data pointer being dereferenced. Fix it by checking for 'datalen - dp < 2' instead. Also fix the similar check for 'dp >= datalen - n' later in the same function. That one possibly could result in a buffer overread. The NULL pointer dereference was reproducible using the "pkcs7_test" key type but not the "asymmetric" key type because the "asymmetric" key type checks for a 0-length payload before calling into the ASN.1 decoder but the "pkcs7_test" key type does not. The bug report was: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: asn1_ber_decoder+0x17f/0xe60 lib/asn1_decoder.c:233 PGD 7b708067 P4D 7b708067 PUD 7b6ee067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 522 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc8 #7 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.3-20171021_125229-anatol 04/01/2014 task: ffff9b6b3798c040 task.stack: ffff9b6b37970000 RIP: 0010:asn1_ber_decoder+0x17f/0xe60 lib/asn1_decoder.c:233 RSP: 0018:ffff9b6b37973c78 EFLAGS: 00010216 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000021c RDX: ffffffff814a04ed RSI: ffffb1524066e000 RDI: ffffffff910759e0 RBP: ffff9b6b37973d60 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff9b6b3caa4180 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000002 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f10ed1f2700(0000) GS:ffff9b6b3ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000007b6f3000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: pkcs7_parse_message+0xee/0x240 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c:139 verify_pkcs7_signature+0x33/0x180 certs/system_keyring.c:216 pkcs7_preparse+0x41/0x70 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c:63 key_create_or_update+0x180/0x530 security/keys/key.c:855 SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline] SyS_add_key+0xbf/0x250 security/keys/keyctl.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x4585c9 RSP: 002b:00007f10ed1f1bd8 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000f8 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f10ed1f2700 RCX: 00000000004585c9 RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020008ffb RDI: 0000000020008000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffffffffffff R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 00007fff1b2260ae R13: 00007fff1b2260af R14: 00007f10ed1f2700 R15: 0000000000000000 Code: dd ca ff 48 8b 45 88 48 83 e8 01 4c 39 f0 0f 86 a8 07 00 00 e8 53 dd ca ff 49 8d 46 01 48 89 85 58 ff ff ff 48 8b 85 60 ff ff ff <42> 0f b6 0c 30 89 c8 88 8d 75 ff ff ff 83 e0 1f 89 8d 28 ff ff RIP: asn1_ber_decoder+0x17f/0xe60 lib/asn1_decoder.c:233 RSP: ffff9b6b37973c78 CR2: 0000000000000000 Fixes: 42d5ec27f873 ("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-08KEYS: fix out-of-bounds read during ASN.1 parsingEric Biggers1-0/+3
commit 2eb9eabf1e868fda15808954fb29b0f105ed65f1 upstream. syzkaller with KASAN reported an out-of-bounds read in asn1_ber_decoder(). It can be reproduced by the following command, assuming CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER=y and CONFIG_KASAN=y: keyctl add asymmetric desc $'\x30\x30' @s The bug is that the length of an ASN.1 data value isn't validated in the case where it is encoded using the short form, causing the decoder to read past the end of the input buffer. Fix it by validating the length. The bug report was: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in asn1_ber_decoder+0x10cb/0x1730 lib/asn1_decoder.c:233 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88003cccfa02 by task syz-executor0/6818 CPU: 1 PID: 6818 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc7-00008-g5f479447d983 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline] dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b lib/dump_stack.c:52 print_address_description+0x79/0x2a0 mm/kasan/report.c:252 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline] kasan_report+0x236/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409 __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427 asn1_ber_decoder+0x10cb/0x1730 lib/asn1_decoder.c:233 x509_cert_parse+0x1db/0x650 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:89 x509_key_preparse+0x64/0x7a0 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174 asymmetric_key_preparse+0xcb/0x1a0 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388 key_create_or_update+0x347/0xb20 security/keys/key.c:855 SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline] SyS_add_key+0x1cd/0x340 security/keys/keyctl.c:62 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x447c89 RSP: 002b:00007fca7a5d3bd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000f8 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fca7a5d46cc RCX: 0000000000447c89 RDX: 0000000020006f4a RSI: 0000000020006000 RDI: 0000000020001ff5 RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: fffffffffffffffd R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fca7a5d49c0 R15: 00007fca7a5d4700 Fixes: 42d5ec27f873 ("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-02assoc_array: Fix a buggy node-splitting caseDavid Howells1-34/+17
commit ea6789980fdaa610d7eb63602c746bf6ec70cd2b upstream. This fixes CVE-2017-12193. Fix a case in the assoc_array implementation in which a new leaf is added that needs to go into a node that happens to be full, where the existing leaves in that node cluster together at that level to the exclusion of new leaf. What needs to happen is that the existing leaves get moved out to a new node, N1, at level + 1 and the existing node needs replacing with one, N0, that has pointers to the new leaf and to N1. The code that tries to do this gets this wrong in two ways: (1) The pointer that should've pointed from N0 to N1 is set to point recursively to N0 instead. (2) The backpointer from N0 needs to be set correctly in the case N0 is either the root node or reached through a shortcut. Fix this by removing this path and using the split_node path instead, which achieves the same end, but in a more general way (thanks to Eric Biggers for spotting the redundancy). The problem manifests itself as: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010 IP: assoc_array_apply_edit+0x59/0xe5 Fixes: 3cb989501c26 ("Add a generic associative array implementation.") Reported-and-tested-by: WU Fan <u3536072@connect.hku.hk> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-10-27lib/digsig: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payloadEric Biggers1-0/+6
commit 192cabd6a296cbc57b3d8c05c4c89d87fc102506 upstream. digsig_verify() requests a user key, then accesses its payload. However, a revoked key has a NULL payload, and we failed to check for this. request_key() *does* skip revoked keys, but there is still a window where the key can be revoked before we acquire its semaphore. Fix it by checking for a NULL payload, treating it like a key which was already revoked at the time it was requested. Fixes: 051dbb918c7f ("crypto: digital signature verification support") Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-08-11lib/Kconfig.debug: fix frv build failureSudip Mukherjee1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit da0510c47519fe0999cffe316e1d370e29f952be ] The build of frv allmodconfig was failing with the errors like: /tmp/cc0JSPc3.s: Assembler messages: /tmp/cc0JSPc3.s:1839: Error: symbol `.LSLT0' is already defined /tmp/cc0JSPc3.s:1842: Error: symbol `.LASLTP0' is already defined /tmp/cc0JSPc3.s:1969: Error: symbol `.LELTP0' is already defined /tmp/cc0JSPc3.s:1970: Error: symbol `.LELT0' is already defined Commit 866ced950bcd ("kbuild: Support split debug info v4") introduced splitting the debug info and keeping that in a separate file. Somehow, the frv-linux gcc did not like that and I am guessing that instead of splitting it started copying. The first report about this is at: https://lists.01.org/pipermail/kbuild-all/2015-July/010527.html. I will try and see if this can work with frv and if still fails I will open a bug report with gcc. But meanwhile this is the easiest option to solve build failure of frv. Fixes: 866ced950bcd ("kbuild: Support split debug info v4") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1482062348-5352-1-git-send-email-sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudip.mukherjee@codethink.co.uk> Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-07-05swiotlb: ensure that page-sized mappings are page-alignedNikita Yushchenko1-3/+3
[ Upstream commit 602d9858f07c72eab64f5f00e2fae55f9902cfbe ] Some drivers do depend on page mappings to be page aligned. Swiotlb already enforces such alignment for mappings greater than page, extend that to page-sized mappings as well. Without this fix, nvme hits BUG() in nvme_setup_prps(), because that routine assumes page-aligned mappings. Signed-off-by: Nikita Yushchenko <nikita.yoush@cogentembedded.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-29lib/cmdline.c: fix get_options() overflow while parsing rangesIlya Matveychikov1-3/+3
commit a91e0f680bcd9e10c253ae8b62462a38bd48f09f upstream. When using get_options() it's possible to specify a range of numbers, like 1-100500. The problem is that it doesn't track array size while calling internally to get_range() which iterates over the range and fills the memory with numbers. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2613C75C-B04D-4BFF-82A6-12F97BA0F620@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ilya V. Matveychikov <matvejchikov@gmail.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-06-14usercopy: Adjust tests to deal with SMAP/PANKees Cook1-2/+18
commit f5f893c57e37ca730808cb2eee3820abd05e7507 upstream. Under SMAP/PAN/etc, we cannot write directly to userspace memory, so this rearranges the test bytes to get written through copy_to_user(). Additionally drops the bad copy_from_user() test that would trigger a memcpy() against userspace on failure. [arnd: the test module was added in 3.14, and this backported patch should apply cleanly on all version from 3.14 to 4.10. The original patch was in 4.11 on top of a context change I saw the bug triggered with kselftest on a 4.4.y stable kernel] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-05-14bpf, arm64: fix jit branch offset related to ldimm64Daniel Borkmann1-0/+45
[ Upstream commit ddc665a4bb4b728b4e6ecec8db1b64efa9184b9c ] When the instruction right before the branch destination is a 64 bit load immediate, we currently calculate the wrong jump offset in the ctx->offset[] array as we only account one instruction slot for the 64 bit load immediate although it uses two BPF instructions. Fix it up by setting the offset into the right slot after we incremented the index. Before (ldimm64 test 1): [...] 00000020: 52800007 mov w7, #0x0 // #0 00000024: d2800060 mov x0, #0x3 // #3 00000028: d2800041 mov x1, #0x2 // #2 0000002c: eb01001f cmp x0, x1 00000030: 54ffff82 b.cs 0x00000020 00000034: d29fffe7 mov x7, #0xffff // #65535 00000038: f2bfffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #16 0000003c: f2dfffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #32 00000040: f2ffffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #48 00000044: d29dddc7 mov x7, #0xeeee // #61166 00000048: f2bdddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #16 0000004c: f2ddddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #32 00000050: f2fdddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #48 [...] After (ldimm64 test 1): [...] 00000020: 52800007 mov w7, #0x0 // #0 00000024: d2800060 mov x0, #0x3 // #3 00000028: d2800041 mov x1, #0x2 // #2 0000002c: eb01001f cmp x0, x1 00000030: 540000a2 b.cs 0x00000044 00000034: d29fffe7 mov x7, #0xffff // #65535 00000038: f2bfffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #16 0000003c: f2dfffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #32 00000040: f2ffffe7 movk x7, #0xffff, lsl #48 00000044: d29dddc7 mov x7, #0xeeee // #61166 00000048: f2bdddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #16 0000004c: f2ddddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #32 00000050: f2fdddc7 movk x7, #0xeeee, lsl #48 [...] Also, add a couple of test cases to make sure JITs pass this test. Tested on Cavium ThunderX ARMv8. The added test cases all pass after the fix. Fixes: 8eee539ddea0 ("arm64: bpf: fix out-of-bounds read in bpf2a64_offset()") Reported-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-12-02mpi: Fix NULL ptr dereference in mpi_powm() [ver #3]Andrey Ryabinin1-1/+6
commit f5527fffff3f002b0a6b376163613b82f69de073 upstream. This fixes CVE-2016-8650. If mpi_powm() is given a zero exponent, it wants to immediately return either 1 or 0, depending on the modulus. However, if the result was initalised with zero limb space, no limbs space is allocated and a NULL-pointer exception ensues. Fix this by allocating a minimal amount of limb space for the result when the 0-exponent case when the result is 1 and not touching the limb space when the result is 0. This affects the use of RSA keys and X.509 certificates that carry them. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6 PGD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 3014 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.9.0-rc6-fscache+ #278 Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014 task: ffff8804011944c0 task.stack: ffff880401294000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8138ce5d>] [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6 RSP: 0018:ffff880401297ad8 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88040868bec0 RCX: ffff88040868bba0 RDX: ffff88040868b260 RSI: ffff88040868bec0 RDI: ffff88040868bee0 RBP: ffff880401297ba8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000047 R11: ffffffff8183b210 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff8804087c7600 R14: 000000000000001f R15: ffff880401297c50 FS: 00007f7a7918c700(0000) GS:ffff88041fb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000401250000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 Stack: ffff88040868bec0 0000000000000020 ffff880401297b00 ffffffff81376cd4 0000000000000100 ffff880401297b10 ffffffff81376d12 ffff880401297b30 ffffffff81376f37 0000000000000100 0000000000000000 ffff880401297ba8 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81376cd4>] ? __sg_page_iter_next+0x43/0x66 [<ffffffff81376d12>] ? sg_miter_get_next_page+0x1b/0x5d [<ffffffff81376f37>] ? sg_miter_next+0x17/0xbd [<ffffffff8138ba3a>] ? mpi_read_raw_from_sgl+0xf2/0x146 [<ffffffff8132a95c>] rsa_verify+0x9d/0xee [<ffffffff8132acca>] ? pkcs1pad_sg_set_buf+0x2e/0xbb [<ffffffff8132af40>] pkcs1pad_verify+0xc0/0xe1 [<ffffffff8133cb5e>] public_key_verify_signature+0x1b0/0x228 [<ffffffff8133d974>] x509_check_for_self_signed+0xa1/0xc4 [<ffffffff8133cdde>] x509_cert_parse+0x167/0x1a1 [<ffffffff8133d609>] x509_key_preparse+0x21/0x1a1 [<ffffffff8133c3d7>] asymmetric_key_preparse+0x34/0x61 [<ffffffff812fc9f3>] key_create_or_update+0x145/0x399 [<ffffffff812fe227>] SyS_add_key+0x154/0x19e [<ffffffff81001c2b>] do_syscall_64+0x80/0x191 [<ffffffff816825e4>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Code: 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 81 ec a8 00 00 00 44 8b 71 04 8b 42 04 4c 8b 67 18 45 85 f6 89 45 80 0f 84 b4 06 00 00 85 c0 75 2f 41 ff ce <49> c7 04 24 01 00 00 00 b0 01 75 0b 48 8b 41 18 48 83 38 01 0f RIP [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6 RSP <ffff880401297ad8> CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace d82015255d4a5d8d ]--- Basically, this is a backport of a libgcrypt patch: http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libgcrypt.git;a=patch;h=6e1adb05d290aeeb1c230c763970695f4a538526 Fixes: cdec9cb5167a ("crypto: GnuPG based MPI lib - source files (part 1)") Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-11-18lib/genalloc.c: start search from start of chunkDaniel Mentz1-1/+2
commit 62e931fac45b17c2a42549389879411572f75804 upstream. gen_pool_alloc_algo() iterates over the chunks of a pool trying to find a contiguous block of memory that satisfies the allocation request. The shortcut if (size > atomic_read(&chunk->avail)) continue; makes the loop skip over chunks that do not have enough bytes left to fulfill the request. There are two situations, though, where an allocation might still fail: (1) The available memory is not contiguous, i.e. the request cannot be fulfilled due to external fragmentation. (2) A race condition. Another thread runs the same code concurrently and is quicker to grab the available memory. In those situations, the loop calls pool->algo() to search the entire chunk, and pool->algo() returns some value that is >= end_bit to indicate that the search failed. This return value is then assigned to start_bit. The variables start_bit and end_bit describe the range that should be searched, and this range should be reset for every chunk that is searched. Today, the code fails to reset start_bit to 0. As a result, prefixes of subsequent chunks are ignored. Memory allocations might fail even though there is plenty of room left in these prefixes of those other chunks. Fixes: 7f184275aa30 ("lib, Make gen_pool memory allocator lockless") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1477420604-28918-1-git-send-email-danielmentz@google.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Mentz <danielmentz@google.com> Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-10-28lib: add "on"/"off" support to kstrtoboolKees Cook1-3/+17
commit a81a5a17d44b26521fb1199f8ccf27f4af337a67 upstream. Add support for "on" and "off" when converting to boolean. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Amitkumar Karwar <akarwar@marvell.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Nishant Sarmukadam <nishants@marvell.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-10-28lib: move strtobool() to kstrtobool()Kees Cook2-29/+50
commit ef951599074ba4fad2d0efa0a977129b41e6d203 upstream. Create the kstrtobool_from_user() helper and move strtobool() logic into the new kstrtobool() (matching all the other kstrto* functions). Provides an inline wrapper for existing strtobool() callers. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Amitkumar Karwar <akarwar@marvell.com> Cc: Nishant Sarmukadam <nishants@marvell.com> Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-09-24fix iov_iter_fault_in_readable()Al Viro1-22/+2
commit d4690f1e1cdabb4d61207b6787b1605a0dc0aeab upstream. ... by turning it into what used to be multipages counterpart Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-09-15lib/mpi: mpi_write_sgl(): fix skipping of leading zero limbsNicolai Stange1-12/+9
commit f2d1362ff7d266b3d2b1c764d6c2ef4a3b457f23 upstream. Currently, if the number of leading zeros is greater than fits into a complete limb, mpi_write_sgl() skips them by iterating over them limb-wise. However, it fails to adjust its internal leading zeros tracking variable, lzeros, accordingly: it does a p -= sizeof(alimb); continue; which should really have been a lzeros -= sizeof(alimb); continue; Since lzeros never decreases if its initial value >= sizeof(alimb), nothing gets copied by mpi_write_sgl() in that case. Instead of skipping the high order zero limbs within the loop as shown above, fix the issue by adjusting the copying loop's bounds. Fixes: 2d4d1eea540b ("lib/mpi: Add mpi sgl helpers") Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nicstange@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-09-15KEYS: Fix ASN.1 indefinite length object parsingDavid Howells1-7/+9
[ Upstream commit 23c8a812dc3c621009e4f0e5342aa4e2ede1ceaa ] This fixes CVE-2016-0758. In the ASN.1 decoder, when the length field of an ASN.1 value is extracted, it isn't validated against the remaining amount of data before being added to the cursor. With a sufficiently large size indicated, the check: datalen - dp < 2 may then fail due to integer overflow. Fix this by checking the length indicated against the amount of remaining data in both places a definite length is determined. Whilst we're at it, make the following changes: (1) Check the maximum size of extended length does not exceed the capacity of the variable it's being stored in (len) rather than the type that variable is assumed to be (size_t). (2) Compare the EOC tag to the symbolic constant ASN1_EOC rather than the integer 0. (3) To reduce confusion, move the initialisation of len outside of: for (len = 0; n > 0; n--) { since it doesn't have anything to do with the loop counter n. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com> Acked-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-06-07dma-debug: avoid spinlock recursion when disabling dma-debugVille Syrjälä1-1/+1
commit 3017cd63f26fc655d56875aaf497153ba60e9edf upstream. With netconsole (at least) the pr_err("... disablingn") call can recurse back into the dma-debug code, where it'll try to grab free_entries_lock again. Avoid the problem by doing the printk after dropping the lock. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1463678421-18683-1-git-send-email-ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-05-11lib/test-string_helpers.c: fix and improve string_get_size() testsVitaly Kuznetsov1-18/+49
commit 72676bb53f33fd0ef3a1484fc1ecfd306dc6ff40 upstream. Recently added commit 564b026fbd0d ("string_helpers: fix precision loss for some inputs") fixed precision issues for string_get_size() and broke tests. Fix and improve them: test both STRING_UNITS_2 and STRING_UNITS_10 at a time, better failure reporting, test small an huge values. Fixes: 564b026fbd0d28e9 ("string_helpers: fix precision loss for some inputs") Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Odin.com> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-05-04lib/mpi: Endianness fixMichal Marek1-18/+21
commit 3ee0cb5fb5eea2110db1b5cb7f67029b7be8a376 upstream. The limbs are integers in the host endianness, so we can't simply iterate over the individual bytes. The current code happens to work on little-endian, because the order of the limbs in the MPI array is the same as the order of the bytes in each limb, but it breaks on big-endian. Fixes: 0f74fbf77d45 ("MPI: Fix mpi_read_buffer") Signed-off-by: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-05-04lib: lz4: fixed zram with lz4 on big endian machinesRui Salvaterra1-9/+12
commit 3e26a691fe3fe1e02a76e5bab0c143ace4b137b4 upstream. Based on Sergey's test patch [1], this fixes zram with lz4 compression on big endian cpus. Note that the 64-bit preprocessor test is not a cleanup, it's part of the fix, since those identifiers are bogus (for example, __ppc64__ isn't defined anywhere else in the kernel, which means we'd fall into the 32-bit definitions on ppc64). Tested on ppc64 with no regression on x86_64. [1] http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=145994470805853&w=4 Suggested-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Rui Salvaterra <rsalvaterra@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-05-04assoc_array: don't call compare_object() on a nodeJerome Marchand1-1/+3
commit 8d4a2ec1e0b41b0cf9a0c5cd4511da7f8e4f3de2 upstream. Changes since V1: fixed the description and added KASan warning. In assoc_array_insert_into_terminal_node(), we call the compare_object() method on all non-empty slots, even when they're not leaves, passing a pointer to an unexpected structure to compare_object(). Currently it causes an out-of-bound read access in keyring_compare_object detected by KASan (see below). The issue is easily reproduced with keyutils testsuite. Only call compare_object() when the slot is a leave. KASan warning: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in keyring_compare_object+0x213/0x240 at addr ffff880060a6f838 Read of size 8 by task keyctl/1655 ============================================================================= BUG kmalloc-192 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint INFO: Allocated in assoc_array_insert+0xfd0/0x3a60 age=69 cpu=1 pid=1647 ___slab_alloc+0x563/0x5c0 __slab_alloc+0x51/0x90 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x263/0x300 assoc_array_insert+0xfd0/0x3a60 __key_link_begin+0xfc/0x270 key_create_or_update+0x459/0xaf0 SyS_add_key+0x1ba/0x350 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76 INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001829b80 objects=16 used=8 fp=0xffff880060a6f550 flags=0x3fff8000004080 INFO: Object 0xffff880060a6f740 @offset=5952 fp=0xffff880060a6e5d1 Bytes b4 ffff880060a6f730: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f740: d1 e5 a6 60 00 88 ff ff 0e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...`............ Object ffff880060a6f750: 02 cf 8e 60 00 88 ff ff 02 c0 8e 60 00 88 ff ff ...`.......`.... Object ffff880060a6f760: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f770: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f780: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f790: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f7a0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f7b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f7c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f7d0: 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f7e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ Object ffff880060a6f7f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ CPU: 0 PID: 1655 Comm: keyctl Tainted: G B 4.5.0-rc4-kasan+ #291 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 0000000000000000 000000001b2800b4 ffff880060a179e0 ffffffff81b60491 ffff88006c802900 ffff880060a6f740 ffff880060a17a10 ffffffff815e2969 ffff88006c802900 ffffea0001829b80 ffff880060a6f740 ffff880060a6e650 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81b60491>] dump_stack+0x85/0xc4 [<ffffffff815e2969>] print_trailer+0xf9/0x150 [<ffffffff815e9454>] object_err+0x34/0x40 [<ffffffff815ebe50>] kasan_report_error+0x230/0x550 [<ffffffff819949be>] ? keyring_get_key_chunk+0x13e/0x210 [<ffffffff815ec62d>] __asan_report_load_n_noabort+0x5d/0x70 [<ffffffff81994cc3>] ? keyring_compare_object+0x213/0x240 [<ffffffff81994cc3>] keyring_compare_object+0x213/0x240 [<ffffffff81bc238c>] assoc_array_insert+0x86c/0x3a60 [<ffffffff81bc1b20>] ? assoc_array_cancel_edit+0x70/0x70 [<ffffffff8199797d>] ? __key_link_begin+0x20d/0x270 [<ffffffff8199786c>] __key_link_begin+0xfc/0x270 [<ffffffff81993389>] key_create_or_update+0x459/0xaf0 [<ffffffff8128ce0d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [<ffffffff81992f30>] ? key_type_lookup+0xc0/0xc0 [<ffffffff8199e19d>] ? lookup_user_key+0x13d/0xcd0 [<ffffffff81534763>] ? memdup_user+0x53/0x80 [<ffffffff819983ea>] SyS_add_key+0x1ba/0x350 [<ffffffff81998230>] ? key_get_type_from_user.constprop.6+0xa0/0xa0 [<ffffffff828bcf4e>] ? retint_user+0x18/0x23 [<ffffffff8128cc7e>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x3fe/0x580 [<ffffffff81004017>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x17/0x19 [<ffffffff828bc432>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76 Memory state around the buggy address: ffff880060a6f700: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff880060a6f780: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc >ffff880060a6f800: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff880060a6f880: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff880060a6f900: fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== Signed-off-by: Jerome Marchand <jmarchan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-03lib: sw842: select crc32Arnd Bergmann1-0/+2
commit 5b57167749274961baf15ed1f05a4996b3ab0487 upstream. The sw842 library code was merged in linux-4.1 and causes a very rare randconfig failure when CONFIG_CRC32 is not set: lib/built-in.o: In function `sw842_compress': oid_registry.c:(.text+0x12ddc): undefined reference to `crc32_be' lib/built-in.o: In function `sw842_decompress': oid_registry.c:(.text+0x137e4): undefined reference to `crc32_be' This adds an explict 'select CRC32' statement, similar to what the other users of the crc32 code have. In practice, CRC32 is always enabled anyway because over 100 other symbols select it. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Fixes: 2da572c959dd ("lib: add software 842 compression/decompression") Acked-by: Dan Streetman <ddstreet@ieee.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-03lib/ucs2_string: Correct ucs2 -> utf8 conversionJason Andryuk1-7/+7
commit a68075908a37850918ad96b056acc9ac4ce1bd90 upstream. The comparisons should be >= since 0x800 and 0x80 require an additional bit to store. For the 3 byte case, the existing shift would drop off 2 more bits than intended. For the 2 byte case, there should be 5 bits bits in byte 1, and 6 bits in byte 2. Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@coreos.com> Cc: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-03-03lib/ucs2_string: Add ucs2 -> utf8 helper functionsPeter Jones1-0/+62
commit 73500267c930baadadb0d02284909731baf151f7 upstream. This adds ucs2_utf8size(), which tells us how big our ucs2 string is in bytes, and ucs2_as_utf8, which translates from ucs2 to utf8.. Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> Tested-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com> Acked-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@coreos.com> Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-02-25dump_stack: avoid potential deadlocksEric Dumazet1-3/+4
commit d7ce36924344ace0dbdc855b1206cacc46b36d45 upstream. Some servers experienced fatal deadlocks because of a combination of bugs, leading to multiple cpus calling dump_stack(). The checksumming bug was fixed in commit 34ae6a1aa054 ("ipv6: update skb->csum when CE mark is propagated"). The second problem is a faulty locking in dump_stack() CPU1 runs in process context and calls dump_stack(), grabs dump_lock. CPU2 receives a TCP packet under softirq, grabs socket spinlock, and call dump_stack() from netdev_rx_csum_fault(). dump_stack() spins on atomic_cmpxchg(&dump_lock, -1, 2), since dump_lock is owned by CPU1 While dumping its stack, CPU1 is interrupted by a softirq, and happens to process a packet for the TCP socket locked by CPU2. CPU1 spins forever in spin_lock() : deadlock Stack trace on CPU1 looked like : NMI backtrace for cpu 1 RIP: _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 ... Call Trace: <IRQ> tcp_v6_rcv+0x243/0x620 ip6_input_finish+0x11f/0x330 ip6_input+0x38/0x40 ip6_rcv_finish+0x3c/0x90 ipv6_rcv+0x2a9/0x500 process_backlog+0x461/0xaa0 net_rx_action+0x147/0x430 __do_softirq+0x167/0x2d0 call_softirq+0x1c/0x30 do_softirq+0x3f/0x80 irq_exit+0x6e/0xc0 smp_call_function_single_interrupt+0x35/0x40 call_function_single_interrupt+0x6a/0x70 <EOI> printk+0x4d/0x4f printk_address+0x31/0x33 print_trace_address+0x33/0x3c print_context_stack+0x7f/0x119 dump_trace+0x26b/0x28e show_trace_log_lvl+0x4f/0x5c show_stack_log_lvl+0x104/0x113 show_stack+0x42/0x44 dump_stack+0x46/0x58 netdev_rx_csum_fault+0x38/0x3c __skb_checksum_complete_head+0x6e/0x80 __skb_checksum_complete+0x11/0x20 tcp_rcv_established+0x2bd5/0x2fd0 tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x13c/0x620 sk_backlog_rcv+0x15/0x30 release_sock+0xd2/0x150 tcp_recvmsg+0x1c1/0xfc0 inet_recvmsg+0x7d/0x90 sock_recvmsg+0xaf/0xe0 ___sys_recvmsg+0x111/0x3b0 SyS_recvmsg+0x5c/0xb0 system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Fixes: b58d977432c8 ("dump_stack: serialize the output from dump_stack()") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2016-02-25radix-tree: fix race in gang lookupMatthew Wilcox1-2/+10
commit 46437f9a554fbe3e110580ca08ab703b59f2f95a upstream. If the indirect_ptr bit is set on a slot, that indicates we need to redo the lookup. Introduce a new function radix_tree_iter_retry