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2021-08-04netfilter: nft_nat: allow to specify layer 4 protocol NAT onlyPablo Neira Ayuso1-1/+3
[ Upstream commit a33f387ecd5aafae514095c2c4a8c24f7aea7e8b ] nft_nat reports a bogus EAFNOSUPPORT if no layer 3 information is specified. Fixes: d07db9884a5f ("netfilter: nf_tables: introduce nft_validate_register_load()") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-08-04netfilter: conntrack: adjust stop timestamp to real expiry valueFlorian Westphal1-1/+6
[ Upstream commit 30a56a2b881821625f79837d4d968c679852444e ] In case the entry is evicted via garbage collection there is delay between the timeout value and the eviction event. This adjusts the stop value based on how much time has passed. Fixes: b87a2f9199ea82 ("netfilter: conntrack: add gc worker to remove timed-out entries") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-07-20netfilter: nft_exthdr: check for IPv6 packet before further processingPablo Neira Ayuso1-0/+3
[ Upstream commit cdd73cc545c0fb9b1a1f7b209f4f536e7990cff4 ] ipv6_find_hdr() does not validate that this is an IPv6 packet. Add a sanity check for calling ipv6_find_hdr() to make sure an IPv6 packet is passed for parsing. Fixes: 96518518cc41 ("netfilter: add nftables") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-06-30netfilter: synproxy: Fix out of bounds when parsing TCP optionsMaxim Mikityanskiy1-0/+5
[ Upstream commit 5fc177ab759418c9537433e63301096e733fb915 ] The TCP option parser in synproxy (synproxy_parse_options) could read one byte out of bounds. When the length is 1, the execution flow gets into the loop, reads one byte of the opcode, and if the opcode is neither TCPOPT_EOL nor TCPOPT_NOP, it reads one more byte, which exceeds the length of 1. This fix is inspired by commit 9609dad263f8 ("ipv4: tcp_input: fix stack out of bounds when parsing TCP options."). v2 changes: Added an early return when length < 0 to avoid calling skb_header_pointer with negative length. Cc: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com> Fixes: 48b1de4c110a ("netfilter: add SYNPROXY core/target") Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-06-10netfilter: nfnetlink_cthelper: hit EBUSY on updates if size mismatchesPablo Neira Ayuso1-2/+6
[ Upstream commit 8971ee8b087750a23f3cd4dc55bff2d0303fd267 ] The private helper data size cannot be updated. However, updates that contain NFCTH_PRIV_DATA_LEN might bogusly hit EBUSY even if the size is the same. Fixes: 12f7a505331e ("netfilter: add user-space connection tracking helper infrastructure") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-06-10ipvs: ignore IP_VS_SVC_F_HASHED flag when adding serviceJulian Anastasov1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 56e4ee82e850026d71223262c07df7d6af3bd872 ] syzbot reported memory leak [1] when adding service with HASHED flag. We should ignore this flag both from sockopt and netlink provided data, otherwise the service is not hashed and not visible while releasing resources. [1] BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff888115227800 (size 512): comm "syz-executor263", pid 8658, jiffies 4294951882 (age 12.560s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<ffffffff83977188>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:556 [inline] [<ffffffff83977188>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:686 [inline] [<ffffffff83977188>] ip_vs_add_service+0x598/0x7c0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:1343 [<ffffffff8397d770>] do_ip_vs_set_ctl+0x810/0xa40 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2570 [<ffffffff838449a8>] nf_setsockopt+0x68/0xa0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:101 [<ffffffff839ae4e9>] ip_setsockopt+0x259/0x1ff0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1435 [<ffffffff839fa03c>] raw_setsockopt+0x18c/0x1b0 net/ipv4/raw.c:857 [<ffffffff83691f20>] __sys_setsockopt+0x1b0/0x360 net/socket.c:2117 [<ffffffff836920f2>] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2128 [inline] [<ffffffff836920f2>] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2125 [inline] [<ffffffff836920f2>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x22/0x30 net/socket.c:2125 [<ffffffff84350efa>] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 [<ffffffff84400068>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e562383183e4b1766930@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-06-03netfilter: x_tables: Use correct memory barriers.Mark Tomlinson1-0/+3
commit 175e476b8cdf2a4de7432583b49c871345e4f8a1 upstream. When a new table value was assigned, it was followed by a write memory barrier. This ensured that all writes before this point would complete before any writes after this point. However, to determine whether the rules are unused, the sequence counter is read. To ensure that all writes have been done before these reads, a full memory barrier is needed, not just a write memory barrier. The same argument applies when incrementing the counter, before the rules are read. Changing to using smp_mb() instead of smp_wmb() fixes the kernel panic reported in cc00bcaa5899 (which is still present), while still maintaining the same speed of replacing tables. The smb_mb() barriers potentially slow the packet path, however testing has shown no measurable change in performance on a 4-core MIPS64 platform. Fixes: 7f5c6d4f665b ("netfilter: get rid of atomic ops in fast path") Signed-off-by: Mark Tomlinson <mark.tomlinson@alliedtelesis.co.nz> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> [Ported to stable, affected barrier is added by d3d40f237480abf3268956daf18cdc56edd32834 in mainline] Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) <pavel@denx.de> Signed-off-by: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu (CIP) <nobuhiro1.iwamatsu@toshiba.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-05-22netfilter: conntrack: Make global sysctls readonly in non-init netnsJonathon Reinhart1-1/+4
commit 2671fa4dc0109d3fb581bc3078fdf17b5d9080f6 upstream. These sysctls point to global variables: - NF_SYSCTL_CT_MAX (&nf_conntrack_max) - NF_SYSCTL_CT_EXPECT_MAX (&nf_ct_expect_max) - NF_SYSCTL_CT_BUCKETS (&nf_conntrack_htable_size_user) Because their data pointers are not updated to point to per-netns structures, they must be marked read-only in a non-init_net ns. Otherwise, changes in any net namespace are reflected in (leaked into) all other net namespaces. This problem has existed since the introduction of net namespaces. The current logic marks them read-only only if the net namespace is owned by an unprivileged user (other than init_user_ns). Commit d0febd81ae77 ("netfilter: conntrack: re-visit sysctls in unprivileged namespaces") "exposes all sysctls even if the namespace is unpriviliged." Since we need to mark them readonly in any case, we can forego the unprivileged user check altogether. Fixes: d0febd81ae77 ("netfilter: conntrack: re-visit sysctls in unprivileged namespaces") Signed-off-by: Jonathon Reinhart <Jonathon.Reinhart@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-04-16netfilter: x_tables: fix compat match/target pad out-of-bound writeFlorian Westphal1-8/+2
commit b29c457a6511435960115c0f548c4360d5f4801d upstream. xt_compat_match/target_from_user doesn't check that zeroing the area to start of next rule won't write past end of allocated ruleset blob. Remove this code and zero the entire blob beforehand. Reported-by: syzbot+cfc0247ac173f597aaaa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: Andy Nguyen <theflow@google.com> Fixes: 9fa492cdc160c ("[NETFILTER]: x_tables: simplify compat API") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-03-17netfilter: x_tables: gpf inside xt_find_revision()Vasily Averin1-2/+4
commit 8e24edddad152b998b37a7f583175137ed2e04a5 upstream. nested target/match_revfn() calls work with xt[NFPROTO_UNSPEC] lists without taking xt[NFPROTO_UNSPEC].mutex. This can race with module unload and cause host to crash: general protection fault: 0000 [#1] Modules linked in: ... [last unloaded: xt_cluster] CPU: 0 PID: 542455 Comm: iptables RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8ffbd518>] [<ffffffff8ffbd518>] strcmp+0x18/0x40 RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: ffff9a5a5d9abe10 RDI: dead000000000111 R13: ffff9a5a5d9abe10 R14: ffff9a5a5d9abd8c R15: dead000000000100 (VvS: %R15 -- &xt_match, %RDI -- &xt_match.name, xt_cluster unregister match in xt[NFPROTO_UNSPEC].match list) Call Trace: [<ffffffff902ccf44>] match_revfn+0x54/0xc0 [<ffffffff902ccf9f>] match_revfn+0xaf/0xc0 [<ffffffff902cd01e>] xt_find_revision+0x6e/0xf0 [<ffffffffc05a5be0>] do_ipt_get_ctl+0x100/0x420 [ip_tables] [<ffffffff902cc6bf>] nf_getsockopt+0x4f/0x70 [<ffffffff902dd99e>] ip_getsockopt+0xde/0x100 [<ffffffff903039b5>] raw_getsockopt+0x25/0x50 [<ffffffff9026c5da>] sock_common_getsockopt+0x1a/0x20 [<ffffffff9026b89d>] SyS_getsockopt+0x7d/0xf0 [<ffffffff903cbf92>] system_call_fastpath+0x25/0x2a Fixes: 656caff20e1 ("netfilter 04/09: x_tables: fix match/target revision lookup") Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-02-23netfilter: conntrack: skip identical origin tuple in same zone onlyFlorian Westphal1-1/+2
[ Upstream commit 07998281c268592963e1cd623fe6ab0270b65ae4 ] The origin skip check needs to re-test the zone. Else, we might skip a colliding tuple in the reply direction. This only occurs when using 'directional zones' where origin tuples reside in different zones but the reply tuples share the same zone. This causes the new conntrack entry to be dropped at confirmation time because NAT clash resolution was elided. Fixes: 4e35c1cb9460240 ("netfilter: nf_nat: skip nat clash resolution for same-origin entries") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-02-23netfilter: xt_recent: Fix attempt to update deleted entryJozsef Kadlecsik1-2/+10
[ Upstream commit b1bdde33b72366da20d10770ab7a49fe87b5e190 ] When both --reap and --update flag are specified, there's a code path at which the entry to be updated is reaped beforehand, which then leads to kernel crash. Reap only entries which won't be updated. Fixes kernel bugzilla #207773. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=207773 Reported-by: Reindl Harald <h.reindl@thelounge.net> Fixes: 0079c5aee348 ("netfilter: xt_recent: add an entry reaper") Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-02-03netfilter: nft_dynset: add timeout extension to templatePablo Neira Ayuso1-1/+3
commit 0c5b7a501e7400869ee905b4f7af3d6717802bcb upstream. Otherwise, the newly create element shows no timeout when listing the ruleset. If the set definition does not specify a default timeout, then the set element only shows the expiration time, but not the timeout. This is a problem when restoring a stateful ruleset listing since it skips the timeout policy entirely. Fixes: 22fe54d5fefc ("netfilter: nf_tables: add support for dynamic set updates") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-01-23netfilter: conntrack: fix reading nf_conntrack_bucketsJesper Dangaard Brouer1-0/+3
commit f6351c3f1c27c80535d76cac2299aec44c36291e upstream. The old way of changing the conntrack hashsize runtime was through changing the module param via file /sys/module/nf_conntrack/parameters/hashsize. This was extended to sysctl change in commit 3183ab8997a4 ("netfilter: conntrack: allow increasing bucket size via sysctl too"). The commit introduced second "user" variable nf_conntrack_htable_size_user which shadow actual variable nf_conntrack_htable_size. When hashsize is changed via module param this "user" variable isn't updated. This results in sysctl net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_buckets shows the wrong value when users update via the old way. This patch fix the issue by always updating "user" variable when reading the proc file. This will take care of changes to the actual variable without sysctl need to be aware. Fixes: 3183ab8997a4 ("netfilter: conntrack: allow increasing bucket size via sysctl too") Reported-by: Yoel Caspersen <yoel@kviknet.dk> Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-01-12netfilter: xt_RATEEST: reject non-null terminated string from userspaceFlorian Westphal1-0/+3
commit 6cb56218ad9e580e519dcd23bfb3db08d8692e5a upstream. syzbot reports: detected buffer overflow in strlen [..] Call Trace: strlen include/linux/string.h:325 [inline] strlcpy include/linux/string.h:348 [inline] xt_rateest_tg_checkentry+0x2a5/0x6b0 net/netfilter/xt_RATEEST.c:143 strlcpy assumes src is a c-string. Check info->name before its used. Reported-by: syzbot+e86f7c428c8c50db65b4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 5859034d7eb8793 ("[NETFILTER]: x_tables: add RATEEST target") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-01-12netfilter: ipset: fix shift-out-of-bounds in htable_bits()Vasily Averin1-15/+5
commit 5c8193f568ae16f3242abad6518dc2ca6c8eef86 upstream. htable_bits() can call jhash_size(32) and trigger shift-out-of-bounds UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_hash_gen.h:151:6 shift exponent 32 is too large for 32-bit type 'unsigned int' CPU: 0 PID: 8498 Comm: syz-executor519 Not tainted 5.10.0-rc7-next-20201208-syzkaller #0 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline] dump_stack+0x107/0x163 lib/dump_stack.c:120 ubsan_epilogue+0xb/0x5a lib/ubsan.c:148 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0xb1/0x181 lib/ubsan.c:395 htable_bits net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_hash_gen.h:151 [inline] hash_mac_create.cold+0x58/0x9b net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_hash_gen.h:1524 ip_set_create+0x610/0x1380 net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1115 nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0xecc/0x1180 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:252 netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494 nfnetlink_rcv+0x1ac/0x420 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:600 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1304 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1330 netlink_sendmsg+0x907/0xe40 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:672 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2345 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2399 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2432 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 This patch replaces htable_bits() by simple fls(hashsize - 1) call: it alone returns valid nbits both for round and non-round hashsizes. It is normal to set any nbits here because it is validated inside following htable_size() call which returns 0 for nbits>31. Fixes: 1feab10d7e6d("netfilter: ipset: Unified hash type generation") Reported-by: syzbot+d66bfadebca46cf61a2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-10-29ipvs: Fix uninit-value in do_ip_vs_set_ctl()Peilin Ye1-3/+4
[ Upstream commit c5a8a8498eed1c164afc94f50a939c1a10abf8ad ] do_ip_vs_set_ctl() is referencing uninitialized stack value when `len` is zero. Fix it. Reported-by: syzbot+23b5f9e7caf61d9a3898@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=46ebfb92a8a812621a001ef04d90dfa459520fe2 Suggested-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye <yepeilin.cs@gmail.com> Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-10-14netfilter: ctnetlink: add a range check for l3/l4 protonumWill McVicker1-0/+2
commit 1cc5ef91d2ff94d2bf2de3b3585423e8a1051cb6 upstream. The indexes to the nf_nat_l[34]protos arrays come from userspace. So check the tuple's family, e.g. l3num, when creating the conntrack in order to prevent an OOB memory access during setup. Here is an example kernel panic on 4.14.180 when userspace passes in an index greater than NFPROTO_NUMPROTO. Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in:... Process poc (pid: 5614, stack limit = 0x00000000a3933121) CPU: 4 PID: 5614 Comm: poc Tainted: G S W O 4.14.180-g051355490483 Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. SM8150 V2 PM8150 Google Inc. MSM task: 000000002a3dfffe task.stack: 00000000a3933121 pc : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 lr : __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 ... Call trace: __cfi_check_fail+0x1c/0x24 name_to_dev_t+0x0/0x468 nfnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x234/0x258 ctnetlink_parse_nat_setup+0x4c/0x228 ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x590/0xc40 nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x31c/0x4d4 netlink_rcv_skb+0x100/0x184 nfnetlink_rcv+0xf4/0x180 netlink_unicast+0x360/0x770 netlink_sendmsg+0x5a0/0x6a4 ___sys_sendmsg+0x314/0x46c SyS_sendmsg+0xb4/0x108 el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38 This crash is not happening since 5.4+, however, ctnetlink still allows for creating entries with unsupported layer 3 protocol number. Fixes: c1d10adb4a521 ("[NETFILTER]: Add ctnetlink port for nf_conntrack") Signed-off-by: Will McVicker <willmcvicker@google.com> [pablo@netfilter.org: rebased original patch on top of nf.git] Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-09-12netfilter: nf_tables: fix destination register zeroingFlorian Westphal1-1/+3
[ Upstream commit 1e105e6afa6c3d32bfb52c00ffa393894a525c27 ] Following bug was reported via irc: nft list ruleset set knock_candidates_ipv4 { type ipv4_addr . inet_service size 65535 elements = { 127.0.0.1 . 123, 127.0.0.1 . 123 } } .. udp dport 123 add @knock_candidates_ipv4 { ip saddr . 123 } udp dport 123 add @knock_candidates_ipv4 { ip saddr . udp dport } It should not have been possible to add a duplicate set entry. After some debugging it turned out that the problem is the immediate value (123) in the second-to-last rule. Concatenations use 32bit registers, i.e. the elements are 8 bytes each, not 6 and it turns out the kernel inserted inet firewall @knock_candidates_ipv4 element 0100007f ffff7b00 : 0 [end] element 0100007f 00007b00 : 0 [end] Note the non-zero upper bits of the first element. It turns out that nft_immediate doesn't zero the destination register, but this is needed when the length isn't a multiple of 4. Furthermore, the zeroing in nft_payload is broken. We can't use [len / 4] = 0 -- if len is a multiple of 4, index is off by one. Skip zeroing in this case and use a conditional instead of (len -1) / 4. Fixes: 49499c3e6e18 ("netfilter: nf_tables: switch registers to 32 bit addressing") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-09-12netfilter: nf_tables: add NFTA_SET_USERDATA if not nullPablo Neira Ayuso1-1/+2
[ Upstream commit 6f03bf43ee05b31d3822def2a80f11b3591c55b3 ] Kernel sends an empty NFTA_SET_USERDATA attribute with no value if userspace adds a set with no NFTA_SET_USERDATA attribute. Fixes: e6d8ecac9e68 ("netfilter: nf_tables: Add new attributes into nft_set to store user data.") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-07-09netfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: lost .data_len definition for Q.931/ipv6Vasily Averin1-0/+1
Could you please push this patch into stable@? it fixes memory corruption in kernels v3.5 .. v4.10 Lost .data_len definition leads to write beyond end of struct nf_ct_h323_master. Usually it corrupts following struct nf_conn_nat, however if nat is not loaded it corrupts following slab object. In mainline this problem went away in v4.11, after commit 9f0f3ebeda47 ("netfilter: helpers: remove data_len usage for inkernel helpers") however many stable kernels are still affected. Fixes: 1afc56794e03 ("netfilter: nf_ct_helper: implement variable length helper private data") # v3.5 cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-30netfilter: ipset: fix unaligned atomic accessRussell King1-0/+2
[ Upstream commit 715028460082d07a7ec6fcd87b14b46784346a72 ] When using ip_set with counters and comment, traffic causes the kernel to panic on 32-bit ARM: Alignment trap: not handling instruction e1b82f9f at [<bf01b0dc>] Unhandled fault: alignment exception (0x221) at 0xea08133c PC is at ip_set_match_extensions+0xe0/0x224 [ip_set] The problem occurs when we try to update the 64-bit counters - the faulting address above is not 64-bit aligned. The problem occurs due to the way elements are allocated, for example: set->dsize = ip_set_elem_len(set, tb, 0, 0); map = ip_set_alloc(sizeof(*map) + elements * set->dsize); If the element has a requirement for a member to be 64-bit aligned, and set->dsize is not a multiple of 8, but is a multiple of four, then every odd numbered elements will be misaligned - and hitting an atomic64_add() on that element will cause the kernel to panic. ip_set_elem_len() must return a size that is rounded to the maximum alignment of any extension field stored in the element. This change ensures that is the case. Fixes: 95ad1f4a9358 ("netfilter: ipset: Fix extension alignment") Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-20netfilter: nft_nat: return EOPNOTSUPP if type or flags are not supportedPablo Neira Ayuso1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit 0d7c83463fdf7841350f37960a7abadd3e650b41 ] Instead of EINVAL which should be used for malformed netlink messages. Fixes: eb31628e37a0 ("netfilter: nf_tables: Add support for IPv6 NAT") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-06-03netfilter: nf_conntrack_pptp: fix compilation warning with W=1 buildPablo Neira Ayuso1-1/+1
commit 4946ea5c1237036155c3b3a24f049fd5f849f8f6 upstream. >> include/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_pptp.h:13:20: warning: 'const' type qualifier on return type has no effect [-Wignored-qualifiers] extern const char *const pptp_msg_name(u_int16_t msg); ^~~~~~ Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Fixes: 4c559f15efcc ("netfilter: nf_conntrack_pptp: prevent buffer overflows in debug code") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-03netfilter: nf_conntrack_pptp: prevent buffer overflows in debug codePablo Neira Ayuso1-27/+35
commit 4c559f15efcc43b996f4da528cd7f9483aaca36d upstream. Dan Carpenter says: "Smatch complains that the value for "cmd" comes from the network and can't be trusted." Add pptp_msg_name() helper function that checks for the array boundary. Fixes: f09943fefe6b ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack/nf_nat: add PPTP helper port") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-06-03netfilter: ipset: Fix subcounter update skipPhil Sutter1-1/+1
commit a164b95ad6055c50612795882f35e0efda1f1390 upstream. If IPSET_FLAG_SKIP_SUBCOUNTER_UPDATE is set, user requested to not update counters in sub sets. Therefore IPSET_FLAG_SKIP_COUNTER_UPDATE must be set, not unset. Fixes: 6e01781d1c80e ("netfilter: ipset: set match: add support to match the counters") Signed-off-by: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-05-20netfilter: conntrack: avoid gcc-10 zero-length-bounds warningArnd Bergmann1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit 2c407aca64977ede9b9f35158e919773cae2082f ] gcc-10 warns around a suspicious access to an empty struct member: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c: In function '__nf_conntrack_alloc': net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:1522:9: warning: array subscript 0 is outside the bounds of an interior zero-length array 'u8[0]' {aka 'unsigned char[0]'} [-Wzero-length-bounds] 1522 | memset(&ct->__nfct_init_offset[0], 0, | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ In file included from net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c:37: include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h:90:5: note: while referencing '__nfct_init_offset' 90 | u8 __nfct_init_offset[0]; | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The code is correct but a bit unusual. Rework it slightly in a way that does not trigger the warning, using an empty struct instead of an empty array. There are probably more elegant ways to do this, but this is the smallest change. Fixes: c41884ce0562 ("netfilter: conntrack: avoid zeroing timer") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-04-02netfilter: nft_fwd_netdev: validate family and chain typePablo Neira Ayuso1-0/+8
commit 76a109fac206e158eb3c967af98c178cff738e6a upstream. Make sure the forward action is only used from ingress. Fixes: 39e6dea28adc ("netfilter: nf_tables: add forward expression to the netdev family") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-03-20netfilter: cthelper: add missing attribute validation for cthelperJakub Kicinski1-0/+2
commit c049b3450072b8e3998053490e025839fecfef31 upstream. Add missing attribute validation for cthelper to the netlink policy. Fixes: 12f7a505331e ("netfilter: add user-space connection tracking helper infrastructure") Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-02-28netfilter: xt_hashlimit: limit the max size of hashtableCong Wang1-0/+10
commit 8d0015a7ab76b8b1e89a3e5f5710a6e5103f2dd5 upstream. The user-specified hashtable size is unbound, this could easily lead to an OOM or a hung task as we hold the global mutex while allocating and initializing the new hashtable. Add a max value to cap both cfg->size and cfg->max, as suggested by Florian. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+adf6c6c2be1c3a718121@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-02-28netfilter: xt_bpf: add overflow checksJann Horn1-0/+3
[ Upstream commit 6ab405114b0b229151ef06f4e31c7834dd09d0c0 ] Check whether inputs from userspace are too long (explicit length field too big or string not null-terminated) to avoid out-of-bounds reads. As far as I can tell, this can at worst lead to very limited kernel heap memory disclosure or oopses. This bug can be triggered by an unprivileged user even if the xt_bpf module is not loaded: iptables is available in network namespaces, and the xt_bpf module can be autoloaded. Triggering the bug with a classic BPF filter with fake length 0x1000 causes the following KASAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in bpf_prog_create+0x84/0xf0 Read of size 32768 at addr ffff8801eff2c494 by task test/4627 CPU: 0 PID: 4627 Comm: test Not tainted 4.15.0-rc1+ #1 [...] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x5c/0x85 print_address_description+0x6a/0x260 kasan_report+0x254/0x370 ? bpf_prog_create+0x84/0xf0 memcpy+0x1f/0x50 bpf_prog_create+0x84/0xf0 bpf_mt_check+0x90/0xd6 [xt_bpf] [...] Allocated by task 4627: kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0 __kmalloc_node+0x47/0x60 xt_alloc_table_info+0x41/0x70 [x_tables] [...] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801eff2c3c0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2048 of size 2048 The buggy address is located 212 bytes inside of 2048-byte region [ffff8801eff2c3c0, ffff8801eff2cbc0) [...] ================================================================== Fixes: e6f30c731718 ("netfilter: x_tables: add xt_bpf match") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Zubin Mithra <zsm@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2020-01-29netfilter: ipset: use bitmap infrastructure completelyKadlecsik József4-10/+10
commit 32c72165dbd0e246e69d16a3ad348a4851afd415 upstream. The bitmap allocation did not use full unsigned long sizes when calculating the required size and that was triggered by KASAN as slab-out-of-bounds read in several places. The patch fixes all of them. Reported-by: syzbot+fabca5cbf5e54f3fe2de@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+827ced406c9a1d9570ed@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+190d63957b22ef673ea5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+dfccdb2bdb4a12ad425e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+df0d0f5895ef1f41a65b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+b08bd19bb37513357fd4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+53cdd0ec0bbabd53370a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-01-23netfilter: fix a use-after-free in mtype_destroy()Cong Wang1-1/+1
commit c120959387efa51479056fd01dc90adfba7a590c upstream. map->members is freed by ip_set_free() right before using it in mtype_ext_cleanup() again. So we just have to move it down. Reported-by: syzbot+4c3cc6dbe7259dbf9054@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 40cd63bf33b2 ("netfilter: ipset: Support extensions which need a per data destroy function") Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-01-14netfilter: ipset: avoid null deref when IPSET_ATTR_LINENO is presentFlorian Westphal1-1/+2
commit 22dad713b8a5ff488e07b821195270672f486eb2 upstream. The set uadt functions assume lineno is never NULL, but it is in case of ip_set_utest(). syzkaller managed to generate a netlink message that calls this with LINENO attr present: general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN RIP: 0010:hash_mac4_uadt+0x1bc/0x470 net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_hash_mac.c:104 Call Trace: ip_set_utest+0x55b/0x890 net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c:1867 nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0xcf2/0xfb0 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:229 netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477 nfnetlink_rcv+0x1ba/0x460 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:563 pass a dummy lineno storage, its easier than patching all set implementations. This seems to be a day-0 bug. Cc: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu> Reported-by: syzbot+34bd2369d38707f3f4a7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: a7b4f989a6294 ("netfilter: ipset: IP set core support") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-01-12netfilter: ctnetlink: netns exit must wait for callbacksFlorian Westphal1-0/+3
[ Upstream commit 18a110b022a5c02e7dc9f6109d0bd93e58ac6ebb ] Curtis Taylor and Jon Maxwell reported and debugged a crash on 3.10 based kernel. Crash occurs in ctnetlink_conntrack_events because net->nfnl socket is NULL. The nfnl socket was set to NULL by netns destruction running on another cpu. The exiting network namespace calls the relevant destructors in the following order: 1. ctnetlink_net_exit_batch This nulls out the event callback pointer in struct netns. 2. nfnetlink_net_exit_batch This nulls net->nfnl socket and frees it. 3. nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list This removes all remaining conntrack entries. This is order is correct. The only explanation for the crash so ar is: cpu1: conntrack is dying, eviction occurs: -> nf_ct_delete() -> nf_conntrack_event_report \ -> nf_conntrack_eventmask_report -> notify->fcn() (== ctnetlink_conntrack_events). cpu1: a. fetches rcu protected pointer to obtain ctnetlink event callback. b. gets interrupted. cpu2: runs netns exit handlers: a runs ctnetlink destructor, event cb pointer set to NULL. b runs nfnetlink destructor, nfnl socket is closed and set to NULL. cpu1: c. resumes and trips over NULL net->nfnl. Problem appears to be that ctnetlink_net_exit_batch only prevents future callers of nf_conntrack_eventmask_report() from obtaining the callback. It doesn't wait of other cpus that might have already obtained the callbacks address. I don't see anything in upstream kernels that would prevent similar crash: We need to wait for all cpus to have exited the event callback. Fixes: 9592a5c01e79dbc59eb56fa ("netfilter: ctnetlink: netns support") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-11-12ipvs: move old_secure_tcp into struct netns_ipvsEric Dumazet1-8/+7
[ Upstream commit c24b75e0f9239e78105f81c5f03a751641eb07ef ] syzbot reported the following issue : BUG: KCSAN: data-race in update_defense_level / update_defense_level read to 0xffffffff861a6260 of 4 bytes by task 3006 on cpu 1: update_defense_level+0x621/0xb30 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:177 defense_work_handler+0x3d/0xd0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:225 process_one_work+0x3d4/0x890 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0xa0/0x800 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 write to 0xffffffff861a6260 of 4 bytes by task 7333 on cpu 0: update_defense_level+0xa62/0xb30 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:205 defense_work_handler+0x3d/0xd0 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:225 process_one_work+0x3d4/0x890 kernel/workqueue.c:2269 worker_thread+0xa0/0x800 kernel/workqueue.c:2415 kthread+0x1d4/0x200 drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1253 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 7333 Comm: kworker/0:5 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc3+ #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: events defense_work_handler Indeed, old_secure_tcp is currently a static variable, while it needs to be a per netns variable. Fixes: a0840e2e165a ("IPVS: netns, ip_vs_ctl local vars moved to ipvs struct.") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-11-12netfilter: ipset: Fix an error code in ip_set_sockfn_get()Dan Carpenter1-3/+5
commit 30b7244d79651460ff114ba8f7987ed94c86b99a upstream. The copy_to_user() function returns the number of bytes remaining to be copied. In this code, that positive return is checked at the end of the function and we return zero/success. What we should do instead is return -EFAULT. Fixes: a7b4f989a629 ("netfilter: ipset: IP set core support") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-09-21netfilter: nf_conntrack_ftp: Fix debug outputThomas Jarosch1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 3a069024d371125227de3ac8fa74223fcf473520 ] The find_pattern() debug output was printing the 'skip' character. This can be a NULL-byte and messes up further pr_debug() output. Output without the fix: kernel: nf_conntrack_ftp: Pattern matches! kernel: nf_conntrack_ftp: Skipped up to `<7>nf_conntrack_ftp: find_pattern `PORT': dlen = 8 kernel: nf_conntrack_ftp: find_pattern `EPRT': dlen = 8 Output with the fix: kernel: nf_conntrack_ftp: Pattern matches! kernel: nf_conntrack_ftp: Skipped up to 0x0 delimiter! kernel: nf_conntrack_ftp: Match succeeded! kernel: nf_conntrack_ftp: conntrack_ftp: match `172,17,0,100,200,207' (20 bytes at 4150681645) kernel: nf_conntrack_ftp: find_pattern `PORT': dlen = 8 Signed-off-by: Thomas Jarosch <thomas.jarosch@intra2net.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-08-25netfilter: conntrack: Use consistent ct id hash calculationDirk Morris1-8/+8
commit 656c8e9cc1badbc18eefe6ba01d33ebbcae61b9a upstream. Change ct id hash calculation to only use invariants. Currently the ct id hash calculation is based on some fields that can change in the lifetime on a conntrack entry in some corner cases. The current hash uses the whole tuple which contains an hlist pointer which will change when the conntrack is placed on the dying list resulting in a ct id change. This patch also removes the reply-side tuple and extension pointer from the hash calculation so that the ct id will will not change from initialization until confirmation. Fixes: 3c79107631db1f7 ("netfilter: ctnetlink: don't use conntrack/expect object addresses as id") Signed-off-by: Dirk Morris <dmorris@metaloft.com> Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-08-25netfilter: ctnetlink: don't use conntrack/expect object addresses as idFlorian Westphal2-5/+64
commit 3c79107631db1f7fd32cf3f7368e4672004a3010 upstream. else, we leak the addresses to userspace via ctnetlink events and dumps. Compute an ID on demand based on the immutable parts of nf_conn struct. Another advantage compared to using an address is that there is no immediate re-use of the same ID in case the conntrack entry is freed and reallocated again immediately. Fixes: 3583240249ef ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack_expect: kill unique ID") Fixes: 7f85f914721f ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack: kill unique ID") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-08-25netfilter: nfnetlink: avoid deadlock due to synchronous request_moduleFlorian Westphal1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 1b0890cd60829bd51455dc5ad689ed58c4408227 ] Thomas and Juliana report a deadlock when running: (rmmod nf_conntrack_netlink/xfrm_user) conntrack -e NEW -E & modprobe -v xfrm_user They provided following analysis: conntrack -e NEW -E netlink_bind() netlink_lock_table() -> increases "nl_table_users" nfnetlink_bind() # does not unlock the table as it's locked by netlink_bind() __request_module() call_usermodehelper_exec() This triggers "modprobe nf_conntrack_netlink" from kernel, netlink_bind() won't return until modprobe process is done. "modprobe xfrm_user": xfrm_user_init() register_pernet_subsys() -> grab pernet_ops_rwsem .. netlink_table_grab() calls schedule() as "nl_table_users" is non-zero so modprobe is blocked because netlink_bind() increased nl_table_users while also holding pernet_ops_rwsem. "modprobe nf_conntrack_netlink" runs and inits nf_conntrack_netlink: ctnetlink_init() register_pernet_subsys() -> blocks on "pernet_ops_rwsem" thanks to xfrm_user module both modprobe processes wait on one another -- neither can make progress. Switch netlink_bind() to "nowait" modprobe -- this releases the netlink table lock, which then allows both modprobe instances to complete. Reported-by: Thomas Jarosch <thomas.jarosch@intra2net.com> Reported-by: Juliana Rodrigueiro <juliana.rodrigueiro@intra2net.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-05-16ipvs: do not schedule icmp errors from tunnelsJulian Anastasov1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 0261ea1bd1eb0da5c0792a9119b8655cf33c80a3 ] We can receive ICMP errors from client or from tunneling real server. While the former can be scheduled to real server, the latter should not be scheduled, they are decapsulated only when existing connection is found. Fixes: 6044eeffafbe ("ipvs: attempt to schedule icmp packets") Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2019-05-16netfilter: compat: initialize all fields in xt_initFrancesco Ruggeri1-1/+1
commit 8d29d16d21342a0c86405d46de0c4ac5daf1760f upstream If a non zero value happens to be in xt[NFPROTO_BRIDGE].cur at init time, the following panic can be caused by running % ebtables -t broute -F BROUTING from a 32-bit user level on a 64-bit kernel. This patch replaces kmalloc_array with kcalloc when allocating xt. [ 474.680846] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000000009600920 [ 474.687869] PGD 2037006067 P4D 2037006067 PUD 2038938067 PMD 0 [ 474.693838] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 474.697055] CPU: 9 PID: 4662 Comm: ebtables Kdump: loaded Not tainted 4.19.17-11302235.AroraKernelnext.fc18.x86_64 #1 [ 474.707721] Hardware name: Supermicro X9DRT/X9DRT, BIOS 3.0 06/28/2013 [ 474.714313] RIP: 0010:xt_compat_calc_jump+0x2f/0x63 [x_tables] [ 474.720201] Code: 40 0f b6 ff 55 31 c0 48 6b ff 70 48 03 3d dc 45 00 00 48 89 e5 8b 4f 6c 4c 8b 47 60 ff c9 39 c8 7f 2f 8d 14 08 d1 fa 48 63 fa <41> 39 34 f8 4c 8d 0c fd 00 00 00 00 73 05 8d 42 01 eb e1 76 05 8d [ 474.739023] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000943fc58 EFLAGS: 00010207 [ 474.744296] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc90006465000 RCX: 0000000002580