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2022-02-16ima: Do not print policy rule with inactive LSM labelsStefan Berger1-0/+8
commit 89677197ae709eb1ab3646952c44f6a171c9e74c upstream. Before printing a policy rule scan for inactive LSM labels in the policy rule. Inactive LSM labels are identified by args_p != NULL and rule == NULL. Fixes: 483ec26eed42 ("ima: ima/lsm policy rule loading logic bug fixes") Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.6+ Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> [zohar@linux.ibm.com: Updated "Fixes" tag] Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-02-16ima: Allow template selection with ima_template[_fmt]= after ima_hash=Roberto Sassu1-3/+7
commit bb8e52e4906f148c2faf6656b5106cf7233e9301 upstream. Commit c2426d2ad5027 ("ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt") introduced an additional check on the ima_template variable to avoid multiple template selection. Unfortunately, ima_template could be also set by the setup function of the ima_hash= parameter, when it calls ima_template_desc_current(). This causes attempts to choose a new template with ima_template= or with ima_template_fmt=, after ima_hash=, to be ignored. Achieve the goal of the commit mentioned with the new static variable template_setup_done, so that template selection requests after ima_hash= are not ignored. Finally, call ima_init_template_list(), if not already done, to initialize the list of templates before lookup_template_desc() is called. Reported-by: Guo Zihua <guozihua@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c2426d2ad5027 ("ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-02-16ima: Remove ima_policy file before directoryStefan Berger1-1/+1
commit f7333b9572d0559e00352a926c92f29f061b4569 upstream. The removal of ima_dir currently fails since ima_policy still exists, so remove the ima_policy file before removing the directory. Fixes: 4af4662fa4a9 ("integrity: IMA policy") Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-02-16integrity: check the return value of audit_log_start()Xiaoke Wang1-0/+2
commit 83230351c523b04ff8a029a4bdf97d881ecb96fc upstream. audit_log_start() returns audit_buffer pointer on success or NULL on error, so it is better to check the return value of it. Fixes: 3323eec921ef ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider") Signed-off-by: Xiaoke Wang <xkernel.wang@foxmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-02-08selinux: fix double free of cond_list on error pathsVratislav Bendel1-1/+2
commit 186edf7e368c40d06cf727a1ad14698ea67b74ad upstream. On error path from cond_read_list() and duplicate_policydb_cond_list() the cond_list_destroy() gets called a second time in caller functions, resulting in NULL pointer deref. Fix this by resetting the cond_list_len to 0 in cond_list_destroy(), making subsequent calls a noop. Also consistently reset the cond_list pointer to NULL after freeing. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vratislav Bendel <vbendel@redhat.com> [PM: fix line lengths in the description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-01-27selinux: fix potential memleak in selinux_add_opt()Bernard Zhao1-2/+10
[ Upstream commit 2e08df3c7c4e4e74e3dd5104c100f0bf6288aaa8 ] This patch try to fix potential memleak in error branch. Fixes: ba6418623385 ("selinux: new helper - selinux_add_opt()") Signed-off-by: Bernard Zhao <bernard@vivo.com> [PM: tweak the subject line, add Fixes tag] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-01-05selinux: initialize proto variable in selinux_ip_postroute_compat()Tom Rix1-1/+1
commit 732bc2ff080c447f8524f40c970c481f5da6eed3 upstream. Clang static analysis reports this warning hooks.c:5765:6: warning: 4th function call argument is an uninitialized value if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto)) ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ selinux_parse_skb() can return ok without setting proto. The later call to selinux_xfrm_postroute_last() does an early check of proto and can return ok if the garbage proto value matches. So initialize proto. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: eef9b41622f2 ("selinux: cleanup selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb() and selinux_xfrm_postroute_last()") Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> [PM: typo/spelling and checkpatch.pl description fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2022-01-05tomoyo: use hwight16() in tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok()Tetsuo Handa1-10/+7
[ Upstream commit f702e1107601230eec707739038a89018ea3468d ] hwight16() is much faster. While we are at it, no need to include "perm =" part into data_race() macro, for perm is a local variable that cannot be accessed by other threads. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2022-01-05tomoyo: Check exceeded quota early in tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok().Dmitry Vyukov1-7/+7
[ Upstream commit 04e57a2d952bbd34bc45744e72be3eecdc344294 ] If tomoyo is used in a testing/fuzzing environment in learning mode, for lots of domains the quota will be exceeded and stay exceeded for prolonged periods of time. In such cases it's pointless (and slow) to walk the whole acl list again and again just to rediscover that the quota is exceeded. We already have the TOMOYO_DIF_QUOTA_WARNED flag that notes the overflow condition. Check it early to avoid the slowdown. [penguin-kernel] This patch causes a user visible change that the learning mode will not be automatically resumed after the quota is increased. To resume the learning mode, administrator will need to explicitly clear TOMOYO_DIF_QUOTA_WARNED flag after increasing the quota. But I think that this change is generally preferable, for administrator likely wants to optimize the acl list for that domain before increasing the quota, or that domain likely hits the quota again. Therefore, don't try to care to clear TOMOYO_DIF_QUOTA_WARNED flag automatically when the quota for that domain changed. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-26selinux: fix NULL-pointer dereference when hashtab allocation failsOndrej Mosnacek1-5/+12
commit dc27f3c5d10c58069672215787a96b4fae01818b upstream. When the hash table slot array allocation fails in hashtab_init(), h->size is left initialized with a non-zero value, but the h->htable pointer is NULL. This may then cause a NULL pointer dereference, since the policydb code relies on the assumption that even after a failed hashtab_init(), hashtab_map() and hashtab_destroy() can be safely called on it. Yet, these detect an empty hashtab only by looking at the size. Fix this by making sure that hashtab_init() always leaves behind a valid empty hashtab when the allocation fails. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 03414a49ad5f ("selinux: do not allocate hashtabs dynamically") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-11-21fortify: Explicitly disable Clang supportKees Cook1-0/+3
commit a52f8a59aef46b59753e583bf4b28fccb069ce64 upstream. Clang has never correctly compiled the FORTIFY_SOURCE defenses due to a couple bugs: Eliding inlines with matching __builtin_* names https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=50322 Incorrect __builtin_constant_p() of some globals https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=41459 In the process of making improvements to the FORTIFY_SOURCE defenses, the first (silent) bug (coincidentally) becomes worked around, but exposes the latter which breaks the build. As such, Clang must not be used with CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE until at least latter bug is fixed (in Clang 13), and the fortify routines have been rearranged. Update the Kconfig to reflect the reality of the current situation. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAKwvOd=A+ueGV2ihdy5GtgR2fQbcXjjAtVxv3=cPjffpebZB7A@mail.gmail.com Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-11-18apparmor: fix error checkTom Rix1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit d108370c644b153382632b3e5511ade575c91c86 ] clang static analysis reports this representative problem: label.c:1463:16: warning: Assigned value is garbage or undefined label->hname = name; ^ ~~~~ In aa_update_label_name(), this the problem block of code if (aa_label_acntsxprint(&name, ...) == -1) return res; On failure, aa_label_acntsxprint() has a more complicated return that just -1. So check for a negative return. It was also noted that the aa_label_acntsxprint() main comment refers to a nonexistent parameter, so clean up the comment. Fixes: f1bd904175e8 ("apparmor: add the base fns() for domain labels") Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-18smackfs: use netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_del() for deleting cipso_v4_doiTetsuo Handa1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 0934ad42bb2c5df90a1b9de690f93de735b622fe ] syzbot is reporting UAF at cipso_v4_doi_search() [1], for smk_cipso_doi() is calling kfree() without removing from the cipso_v4_doi_list list after netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add() returned an error. We need to use netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_del() in order to remove from the list and wait for RCU grace period before kfree(). Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=93dba5b91f0fed312cbd [1] Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+93dba5b91f0fed312cbd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Fixes: 6c2e8ac0953fccdd ("netlabel: Update kernel configuration API") Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-18smackfs: use __GFP_NOFAIL for smk_cipso_doi()Tetsuo Handa1-3/+1
[ Upstream commit f91488ee15bd3cac467e2d6a361fc2d34d1052ae ] syzbot is reporting kernel panic at smk_cipso_doi() due to memory allocation fault injection [1]. The reason for need to use panic() was not explained. But since no fix was proposed for 18 months, for now let's use __GFP_NOFAIL for utilizing syzbot resource on other bugs. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=89731ccb6fec15ce1c22 [1] Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+89731ccb6fec15ce1c22@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-18smackfs: Fix use-after-free in netlbl_catmap_walk()Pawan Gupta1-1/+4
[ Upstream commit 0817534ff9ea809fac1322c5c8c574be8483ea57 ] Syzkaller reported use-after-free bug as described in [1]. The bug is triggered when smk_set_cipso() tries to free stale category bitmaps while there are concurrent reader(s) using the same bitmaps. Wait for RCU grace period to finish before freeing the category bitmaps in smk_set_cipso(). This makes sure that there are no more readers using the stale bitmaps and freeing them should be safe. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/000000000000a814c505ca657a4e@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+3f91de0b813cc3d19a80@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-11-18evm: mark evm_fixmode as __ro_after_initAustin Kim1-1/+1
commit 32ba540f3c2a7ef61ed5a577ce25069a3d714fc9 upstream. The evm_fixmode is only configurable by command-line option and it is never modified outside initcalls, so declaring it with __ro_after_init is better. Signed-off-by: Austin Kim <austin.kim@lge.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-11-18selinux: fix race condition when computing ocontext SIDsOndrej Mosnacek1-85/+77
commit cbfcd13be5cb2a07868afe67520ed181956579a7 upstream. Current code contains a lot of racy patterns when converting an ocontext's context structure to an SID. This is being done in a "lazy" fashion, such that the SID is looked up in the SID table only when it's first needed and then cached in the "sid" field of the ocontext structure. However, this is done without any locking or memory barriers and is thus unsafe. Between commits 24ed7fdae669 ("selinux: use separate table for initial SID lookup") and 66f8e2f03c02 ("selinux: sidtab reverse lookup hash table"), this race condition lead to an actual observable bug, because a pointer to the shared sid field was passed directly to sidtab_context_to_sid(), which was using this location to also store an intermediate value, which could have been read by other threads and interpreted as an SID. In practice this caused e.g. new mounts to get a wrong (seemingly random) filesystem context, leading to strange denials. This bug has been spotted in the wild at least twice, see [1] and [2]. Fix the race condition by making all the racy functions use a common helper that ensures the ocontext::sid accesses are made safely using the appropriate SMP constructs. Note that security_netif_sid() was populating the sid field of both contexts stored in the ocontext, but only the first one was actually used. The SELinux wiki's documentation on the "netifcon" policy statement [3] suggests that using only the first context is intentional. I kept only the handling of the first context here, as there is really no point in doing the SID lookup for the unused one. I wasn't able to reproduce the bug mentioned above on any kernel that includes commit 66f8e2f03c02, even though it has been reported that the issue occurs with that commit, too, just less frequently. Thus, I wasn't able to verify that this patch fixes the issue, but it makes sense to avoid the race condition regardless. [1] https://github.com/containers/container-selinux/issues/89 [2] https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/selinux@lists.fedoraproject.org/thread/6DMTAMHIOAOEMUAVTULJD45JZU7IBAFM/ [3] https://selinuxproject.org/page/NetworkStatements#netifcon Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Xinjie Zheng <xinjie@google.com> Reported-by: Sujithra Periasamy <sujithra@google.com> Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-11-18binder: use cred instead of task for selinux checksTodd Kjos2-28/+22
commit 52f88693378a58094c538662ba652aff0253c4fe upstream. Since binder was integrated with selinux, it has passed 'struct task_struct' associated with the binder_proc to represent the source and target of transactions. The conversion of task to SID was then done in the hook implementations. It turns out that there are race conditions which can result in an incorrect security context being used. Fix by using the 'struct cred' saved during binder_open and pass it to the selinux subsystem. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.14 (need backport for earlier stables) Fixes: 79af73079d75 ("Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.") Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-18Smack: Fix wrong semantics in smk_access_entry()Tianjia Zhang1-9/+8
[ Upstream commit 6d14f5c7028eea70760df284057fe198ce7778dd ] In the smk_access_entry() function, if no matching rule is found in the rust_list, a negative error code will be used to perform bit operations with the MAY_ enumeration value. This is semantically wrong. This patch fixes this issue. Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-09-15IMA: remove the dependency on CRYPTO_MD5THOBY Simon1-1/+0
commit 8510505d55e194d3f6c9644c9f9d12c4f6b0395a upstream. MD5 is a weak digest algorithm that shouldn't be used for cryptographic operation. It hinders the efficiency of a patch set that aims to limit the digests allowed for the extended file attribute namely security.ima. MD5 is no longer a requirement for IMA, nor should it be used there. The sole place where we still use the MD5 algorithm inside IMA is setting the ima_hash algorithm to MD5, if the user supplies 'ima_hash=md5' parameter on the command line. With commit ab60368ab6a4 ("ima: Fallback to the builtin hash algorithm"), setting "ima_hash=md5" fails gracefully when CRYPTO_MD5 is not set: ima: Can not allocate md5 (reason: -2) ima: Allocating md5 failed, going to use default hash algorithm sha256 Remove the CRYPTO_MD5 dependency for IMA. Signed-off-by: THOBY Simon <Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr> Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> [zohar@linux.ibm.com: include commit number in patch description for stable.] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.17 Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-09-15IMA: remove -Wmissing-prototypes warningAustin Kim1-1/+1
commit a32ad90426a9c8eb3915eed26e08ce133bd9e0da upstream. With W=1 build, the compiler throws warning message as below: security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c:24:12: warning: no previous prototype for ‘ima_mok_init’ [-Wmissing-prototypes] __init int ima_mok_init(void) Silence the warning by adding static keyword to ima_mok_init(). Signed-off-by: Austin Kim <austin.kim@lge.com> Fixes: 41c89b64d718 ("IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyrings") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-08-15bpf: Add lockdown check for probe_write_user helperDaniel Borkmann1-0/+1
commit 51e1bb9eeaf7868db56e58f47848e364ab4c4129 upstream. Back then, commit 96ae52279594 ("bpf: Add bpf_probe_write_user BPF helper to be called in tracers") added the bpf_probe_write_user() helper in order to allow to override user space memory. Its original goal was to have a facility to "debug, divert, and manipulate execution of semi-cooperative processes" under CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Write to kernel was explicitly disallowed since it would otherwise tamper with its integrity. One use case was shown in cf9b1199de27 ("samples/bpf: Add test/example of using bpf_probe_write_user bpf helper") where the program DNATs traffic at the time of connect(2) syscall, meaning, it rewrites the arguments to a syscall while they're still in userspace, and before the syscall has a chance to copy the argument into kernel space. These days we have better mechanisms in BPF for achieving the same (e.g. for load-balancers), but without having to write to userspace memory. Of course the bpf_probe_write_user() helper can also be used to abuse many other things for both good or bad purpose. Outside of BPF, there is a similar mechanism for ptrace(2) such as PTRACE_PEEK{TEXT,DATA} and PTRACE_POKE{TEXT,DATA}, but would likely require some more effort. Commit 96ae52279594 explicitly dedicated the helper for experimentation purpose only. Thus, move the helper's availability behind a newly added LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER lockdown knob so that the helper is disabled under the "integrity" mode. More fine-grained control can be implemented also from LSM side with this change. Fixes: 96ae52279594 ("bpf: Add bpf_probe_write_user BPF helper to be called in tracers") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-08-12selinux: correct the return value when loads initial sidsXiu Jianfeng1-6/+4
commit 4c156084daa8ee70978e4b150b5eb5fc7b1f15be upstream. It should not return 0 when SID 0 is assigned to isids. This patch fixes it. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: e3e0b582c321a ("selinux: remove unused initial SIDs and improve handling") Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> [PM: remove changelog from description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-07-19smackfs: restrict bytes count in smk_set_cipso()Tetsuo Handa1-0/+2
commit 49ec114a6e62d8d320037ce71c1aaf9650b3cafd upstream. Oops, I failed to update subject line. From 07571157c91b98ce1a4aa70967531e64b78e8346 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2021 22:25:06 +0900 Subject: smackfs: restrict bytes count in smk_set_cipso() Commit 7ef4c19d245f3dc2 ("smackfs: restrict bytes count in smackfs write functions") missed that count > SMK_CIPSOMAX check applies to only format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT case. Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+77c53db50c9fff774e8e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-07-19selinux: use __GFP_NOWARN with GFP_NOWAIT in the AVCMinchan Kim1-6/+7
[ Upstream commit 648f2c6100cfa18e7dfe43bc0b9c3b73560d623c ] In the field, we have seen lots of allocation failure from the call path below. 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W Binder : 31542_2: page allocation failure: order:0, mode:0x800(GFP_NOWAIT), nodemask=(null),cpuset=background,mems_allowed=0 ... ... 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W Call trace: 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : dump_backtrace.cfi_jt+0x0/0x8 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : dump_stack+0xc8/0x14c 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : warn_alloc+0x158/0x1c8 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x9d8/0xb80 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x1c4/0x430 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : allocate_slab+0xb4/0x390 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : ___slab_alloc+0x12c/0x3a4 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : kmem_cache_alloc+0x358/0x5e4 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : avc_alloc_node+0x30/0x184 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : avc_update_node+0x54/0x4f0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : avc_has_extended_perms+0x1a4/0x460 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : selinux_file_ioctl+0x320/0x3d0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xec/0x1fc 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : el0_svc_common+0xc0/0x24c 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : el0_svc+0x28/0x88 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : el0_sync_handler+0x8c/0xf0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : el0_sync+0x1a4/0x1c0 .. .. 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 Based on [1], selinux is tolerate for failure of memory allocation. Then, use __GFP_NOWARN together. [1] 476accbe2f6e ("selinux: use GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC kmem_caches") Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> [PM: subj fix, line wraps, normalized commit refs] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-07-14evm: fix writing <securityfs>/evm overflowMimi Zohar1-2/+3
[ Upstream commit 49219d9b8785ba712575c40e48ce0f7461254626 ] EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE is defined as 0x80000000, which is larger than INT_MAX. The "-fno-strict-overflow" compiler option properly prevents signaling EVM that the EVM policy setup is complete. Define and read an unsigned int. Fixes: f00d79750712 ("EVM: Allow userspace to signal an RSA key has been loaded") Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-07-14evm: Refuse EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES only if an HMAC key is loadedRoberto Sassu1-4/+4
commit 9acc89d31f0c94c8e573ed61f3e4340bbd526d0c upstream. EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES is an EVM initialization flag that can be set to temporarily disable metadata verification until all xattrs/attrs necessary to verify an EVM portable signature are copied to the file. This flag is cleared when EVM is initialized with an HMAC key, to avoid that the HMAC is calculated on unverified xattrs/attrs. Currently EVM unnecessarily denies setting this flag if EVM is initialized with a public key, which is not a concern as it cannot be used to trust xattrs/attrs updates. This patch removes this limitation. Fixes: ae1ba1676b88e ("EVM: Allow userland to permit modification of EVM-protected metadata") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16.x Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-07-14evm: Execute evm_inode_init_security() only when an HMAC key is loadedRoberto Sassu1-2/+3
commit 9eea2904292c2d8fa98df141d3bf7c41ec9dc1b5 upstream. evm_inode_init_security() requires an HMAC key to calculate the HMAC on initial xattrs provided by LSMs. However, it checks generically whether a key has been loaded, including also public keys, which is not correct as public keys are not suitable to calculate the HMAC. Originally, support for signature verification was introduced to verify a possibly immutable initial ram disk, when no new files are created, and to switch to HMAC for the root filesystem. By that time, an HMAC key should have been loaded and usable to calculate HMACs for new files. More recently support for requiring an HMAC key was removed from the kernel, so that signature verification can be used alone. Since this is a legitimate use case, evm_inode_init_security() should not return an error when no HMAC key has been loaded. This patch fixes this problem by replacing the evm_key_loaded() check with a check of the EVM_INIT_HMAC flag in evm_initialized. Fixes: 26ddabfe96b ("evm: enable EVM when X509 certificate is loaded") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.5.x Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-06-30integrity: Load mokx variables into the blacklist keyringEric Snowberg1-2/+18
[ Upstream commit ebd9c2ae369a45bdd9f8615484db09be58fc242b ] During boot the Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database, dbx, is loaded into the blacklist keyring. Systems booted with shim have an equivalent Forbidden Signature Database called mokx. Currently mokx is only used by shim and grub, the contents are ignored by the kernel. Add the ability to load mokx into the blacklist keyring during boot. Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Suggested-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c33c8e3839a41e9654f41cc92c7231104931b1d7.camel@HansenPartnership.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-5-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v5 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161428674320.677100.12637282414018170743.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161433313205.902181.2502803393898221637.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161529607422.163428.13530426573612578854.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3 Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-06-30certs: Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx entriesEric Snowberg1-0/+11
[ Upstream commit 56c5812623f95313f6a46fbf0beee7fa17c68bbf ] This fixes CVE-2020-26541. The Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database, dbx, contains a list of now revoked signatures and keys previously approved to boot with UEFI Secure Boot enabled. The dbx is capable of containing any number of EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, and EFI_CERT_X509_GUID entries. Currently when EFI_CERT_X509_GUID are contained in the dbx, the entries are skipped. Add support for EFI_CERT_X509_GUID dbx entries. When a EFI_CERT_X509_GUID is found, it is added as an asymmetrical key to the .blacklist keyring. Anytime the .platform keyring is used, the keys in the .blacklist keyring are referenced, if a matching key is found, the key will be rejected. [DH: Made the following changes: - Added to have a config option to enable the facility. This allows a Kconfig solution to make sure that pkcs7_validate_trust() is enabled.[1][2] - Moved the functions out from the middle of the blacklist functions. - Added kerneldoc comments.] Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org> cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200901165143.10295-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # rfc Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200909172736.73003-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200911182230.62266-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200916004927.64276-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v4 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-2-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v5 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161428672051.677100.11064981943343605138.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161433310942.902181.4901864302675874242.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161529605075.163428.14625520893961300757.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bc2c24e3-ed68-2521-0bf4-a1f6be4a895d@infradead.org/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210225125638.1841436-1-arnd@kernel.org/ [2] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-05-19KEYS: trusted: Fix memory leak on object tdColin Ian King1-3/+5
commit 83a775d5f9bfda95b1c295f95a3a041a40c7f321 upstream. Two error return paths are neglecting to free allocated object td, causing a memory leak. Fix this by returning via the error return path that securely kfree's td. Fixes clang scan-build warning: security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c:496:10: warning: Potential memory leak [unix.Malloc] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5df16caada3f ("KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random()") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-05-14ima: Fix the error code for restoring the PCR valueLi Huafei1-2/+2
[ Upstream commit 7990ccafaa37dc6d8bb095d4d7cd997e8903fd10 ] In ima_restore_measurement_list(), hdr[HDR_PCR].data is pointing to a buffer of type u8, which contains the dumped 32-bit pcr value. Currently, only the least significant byte is used to restore the pcr value. We should convert hdr[HDR_PCR].data to a pointer of type u32 before fetching the value to restore the correct pcr value. Fixes: 47fdee60b47f ("ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse measurements headers") Signed-off-by: Li Huafei <lihuafei1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-05-14security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizationsJames Bottomley2-10/+32
[ Upstream commit de66514d934d70ce73c302ce0644b54970fc7196 ] In TPM 1.2 an authorization was a 20 byte number. The spec actually recommended you to hash variable length passwords and use the sha1 hash as the authorization. Because the spec doesn't require this hashing, the current authorization for trusted keys is a 40 digit hex number. For TPM 2.0 the spec allows the passing in of variable length passwords and passphrases directly, so we should allow that in trusted keys for ease of use. Update the 'blobauth' parameter to take this into account, so we can now use plain text passwords for the keys. so before keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=f572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258fkeyhandle=81000001" @u after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a new directly supplied password: keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle=81000001" @u Since a sha1 hex code must be exactly 40 bytes long and a direct password must be 20 or less, we use the length as the discriminator for which form is input. Note this is both and enhancement and a potential bug fix. The TPM 2.0 spec requires us to strip leading zeros, meaning empyty authorization is a zero length HMAC whereas we're currently passing in 20 bytes of zeros. A lot of TPMs simply accept this as OK, but the Microsoft TPM emulator rejects it with TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH, so this patch makes the Microsoft TPM emulator work with trusted keys. Fixes: 0fe5480303a1 ("keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chips") Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-05-14selinux: add proper NULL termination to the secclass_map permissionsPaul Moore1-2/+3
commit e4c82eafb609c2badc56f4e11bc50fcf44b8e9eb upstream. This patch adds the missing NULL termination to the "bpf" and "perf_event" object class permission lists. This missing NULL termination should really only affect the tools under scripts/selinux, with the most important being genheaders.c, although in practice this has not been an issue on any of my dev/test systems. If the problem were to manifest itself it would likely result in bogus permissions added to the end of the object class; thankfully with no access control checks using these bogus permissions and no policies defining these permissions the impact would likely be limited to some noise about undefined permissions during policy load. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: ec27c3568a34 ("selinux: bpf: Add selinux check for eBPF syscall operations") Fixes: da97e18458fb ("perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks") Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-05-11security: commoncap: fix -Wstringop-overread warningArnd Bergmann1-1/+1
commit 82e5d8cc768b0c7b03c551a9ab1f8f3f68d5f83f upstream. gcc-11 introdces a harmless warning for cap_inode_getsecurity: security/commoncap.c: In function ‘cap_inode_getsecurity’: security/commoncap.c:440:33: error: ‘memcpy’ reading 16 bytes from a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overread] 440 | memcpy(&nscap->data, &cap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The problem here is that tmpbuf is initialized to NULL, so gcc assumes it is not accessible unless it gets set by vfs_getxattr_alloc(). This is a legitimate warning as far as I can tell, but the code is correct since it correctly handles the error when that function fails. Add a separate NULL check to tell gcc about it as well. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Cc: Andrey Zhizhikin <andrey.z@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-04-28KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM reservation for seal/unsealJames Bottomley1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 9d5171eab462a63e2fbebfccf6026e92be018f20 ] The original patch 8c657a0590de ("KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations") was correct on the mailing list: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20210128235621.127925-4-jarkko@kernel.org/ But somehow got rebased so that the tpm_try_get_ops() in tpm2_seal_trusted() got lost. This causes an imbalanced put of the TPM ops and causes oopses on TIS based hardware. This fix puts back the lost tpm_try_get_ops() Fixes: 8c657a0590de ("KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations") Reported-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2021-04-14selinux: fix race between old and new sidtabOndrej Mosnacek3-37/+145
commit 9ad6e9cb39c66366bf7b9aece114aca277981a1f upstream. Since commit 1b8b31a2e612 ("selinux: convert policy read-write lock to RCU"), there is a small window during policy load where the new policy pointer has already been installed, but some threads may still be holding the old policy pointer in their read-side RCU critical sections. This means that there may be conflicting attempts to add a new SID entry to both tables via sidtab_context_to_sid(). See also (and the rest of the thread): https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/CAFqZXNvfux46_f8gnvVvRYMKoes24nwm2n3sPbMjrB8vKTW00g@mail.gmail.com/ Fix this by installing the new policy pointer under the old sidtab's spinlock along with marking the old sidtab as "frozen". Then, if an attempt to add new entry to a "frozen" sidtab is detected, make sidtab_context_to_sid() return -ESTALE to indicate that a new policy has been installed and that the caller will have to abort the policy transaction and try again after re-taking the policy pointer (which is guaranteed to be a newer policy). This requires adding a retry-on-ESTALE logic to all callers of sidtab_context_to_sid(), but fortunately these are easy to determine and aren't that many. This seems to be the simplest solution for this problem, even if it looks somewhat ugly. Note that other places in the kernel (e.g. do_mknodat() in fs/namei.c) use similar stale-retry patterns, so I think it's reasonable. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 1b8b31a2e612 ("selinux: convert policy read-write lock to RCU") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-04-14selinux: fix cond_list corruption when changing booleansOndrej Mosnacek3-69/+33
commit d8f5f0ea5b86300390b026b6c6e7836b7150814a upstream. Currently, duplicate_policydb_cond_list() first copies the whole conditional avtab and then tries to link to the correct entries in cond_dup_av_list() using avtab_search(). However, since the conditional avtab may contain multiple entries with the same key, this approach often fails to find the right entry, potentially leading to wrong rules being activated/deactivated when booleans are changed. To fix this, instead start with an empty conditional avtab and add the individual entries one-by-one while building the new av_lists. This approach leads to the correct result, since each entry is present in the av_lists exactly once. The issue can be reproduced with Fedora policy as follows: # sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True allow ftpd_t public_content_rw_t:dir { add_name create link remove_name rename reparent rmdir setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_anon_write ]:True # setsebool ftpd_anon_write=off ftpd_connect_all_unreserved=off ftpd_connect_db=off ftpd_full_access=off On fixed kernels, the sesearch output is the same after the setsebool command: # sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True allow ftpd_t public_content_rw_t:dir { add_name create link remove_name rename reparent rmdir setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_anon_write ]:True While on the broken kernels, it will be different: # sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True While there, also simplify the computation of nslots. This changes the nslots values for nrules 2 or 3 to just two slots instead of 4, which makes the sequence more consistent. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c7c556f1e81b ("selinux: refactor changing booleans") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2021-04-14selinux: make nslot handling in avtab more robustOndrej Mosnacek1-10/+11
commit 442dc00f82a9727dc0c48c44f792c168f593c6df upstream. 1. Make sure all fileds are initialized in avtab_init(). 2. Slightly refactor avtab_alloc() to use the above fact. 3. Use h->nslot == 0 as a sentinel in the access functions to prevent dereferencing h->htable when it's not allocated. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>