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10 daysima: check return value of crypto_shash_final() in boot aggregateDaniel Hodges1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 870819434c8dfcc3158033b66e7851b81bb17e21 ] The return value of crypto_shash_final() is not checked in ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm(). If the hash finalization fails, the function returns success and a corrupted boot aggregate digest could be used for IMA measurements. Capture the return value and propagate any error to the caller. Fixes: 76bb28f6126f ("ima: use new crypto_shash API instead of old crypto_hash") Signed-off-by: Daniel Hodges <hodgesd@meta.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-04-18apparmor: fix race between freeing data and fs accessing itJohn Johansen7-101/+152
commit 8e135b8aee5a06c52a4347a5a6d51223c6f36ba3 upstream. Backport for conflicts introdued by - conversion from sha1 to sha256 introduced in e44a4dc4b36c ("apparmor: switch SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH from sha1 to sha256 ") - adding of conditioanl that nests the conflicting code inside an if condition d61c57fde819 ("apparmor: make export of raw binary profile to userspace optional") AppArmor was putting the reference to i_private data on its end after removing the original entry from the file system. However the inode can and does live beyond that point and it is possible that some of the fs call back functions will be invoked after the reference has been put, which results in a race between freeing the data and accessing it through the fs. While the rawdata/loaddata is the most likely candidate to fail the race, as it has the fewest references. If properly crafted it might be possible to trigger a race for the other types stored in i_private. Fix this by moving the put of i_private referenced data to the correct place which is during inode eviction. Fixes: c961ee5f21b20 ("apparmor: convert from securityfs to apparmorfs for policy ns files") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Maxime Bélair <maxime.belair@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-18apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereferenceJohn Johansen4-57/+94
commit a0b7091c4de45a7325c8780e6934a894f92ac86b upstream. Backport for conflicts introdued by d61c57fde819 ("apparmor: make export of raw binary profile to userspace optional") which nests the conflicting code inside an if condition There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation: because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile, for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and freed memory is accessed. The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference. However during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile destruction race, resulting in the use after free. Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata are put. Fixes: 5d5182cae401 ("apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Maxime Bélair <maxime.belair@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-18apparmor: fix differential encoding verificationJohn Johansen2-4/+20
commit 39440b137546a3aa383cfdabc605fb73811b6093 upstream. Differential encoding allows loops to be created if it is abused. To prevent this the unpack should verify that a diff-encode chain terminates. Unfortunately the differential encode verification had two bugs. 1. it conflated states that had gone through check and already been marked, with states that were currently being checked and marked. This means that loops in the current chain being verified are treated as a chain that has already been verified. 2. the order bailout on already checked states compared current chain check iterators j,k instead of using the outer loop iterator i. Meaning a step backwards in states in the current chain verification was being mistaken for moving to an already verified state. Move to a double mark scheme where already verified states get a different mark, than the current chain being kept. This enables us to also drop the backwards verification check that was the cause of the second error as any already verified state is already marked. Fixes: 031dcc8f4e84 ("apparmor: dfa add support for state differential encoding") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-18apparmor: fix unprivileged local user can do privileged policy managementJohn Johansen3-11/+52
commit 6601e13e82841879406bf9f369032656f441a425 upstream. Backport for api changes introduced in - 90c436a64a6e ("apparmor: pass cred through to audit info.") - 92de220a7f33 ("apparmor: update policy capable checks to use a label") An unprivileged local user can load, replace, and remove profiles by opening the apparmorfs interfaces, via a confused deputy attack, by passing the opened fd to a privileged process, and getting the privileged process to write to the interface. This does require a privileged target that can be manipulated to do the write for the unprivileged process, but once such access is achieved full policy management is possible and all the possible implications that implies: removing confinement, DoS of system or target applications by denying all execution, by-passing the unprivileged user namespace restriction, to exploiting kernel bugs for a local privilege escalation. The policy management interface can not have its permissions simply changed from 0666 to 0600 because non-root processes need to be able to load policy to different policy namespaces. Instead ensure the task writing the interface has privileges that are a subset of the task that opened the interface. This is already done via policy for confined processes, but unconfined can delegate access to the opened fd, by-passing the usual policy check. Fixes: b7fd2c0340eac ("apparmor: add per policy ns .load, .replace, .remove interface files") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-18apparmor: Fix double free of ns_name in aa_replace_profiles()John Johansen1-0/+1
commit 5df0c44e8f5f619d3beb871207aded7c78414502 upstream. if ns_name is NULL after 1071 error = aa_unpack(udata, &lh, &ns_name); and if ent->ns_name contains an ns_name in 1089 } else if (ent->ns_name) { then ns_name is assigned the ent->ns_name 1095 ns_name = ent->ns_name; however ent->ns_name is freed at 1262 aa_load_ent_free(ent); and then again when freeing ns_name at 1270 kfree(ns_name); Fix this by NULLing out ent->ns_name after it is transferred to ns_name Fixes: 145a0ef21c8e9 ("apparmor: fix blob compression when ns is forced on a policy load ") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-18apparmor: fix missing bounds check on DEFAULT table in verify_dfa()Massimiliano Pellizzer1-2/+3
commit d352873bbefa7eb39995239d0b44ccdf8aaa79a4 upstream. The verify_dfa() function only checks DEFAULT_TABLE bounds when the state is not differentially encoded. When the verification loop traverses the differential encoding chain, it reads k = DEFAULT_TABLE[j] and uses k as an array index without validation. A malformed DFA with DEFAULT_TABLE[j] >= state_count, therefore, causes both out-of-bounds reads and writes. [ 57.179855] ================================================================== [ 57.180549] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660 [ 57.180904] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888100eadec4 by task su/993 [ 57.181554] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 993 Comm: su Not tainted 6.19.0-rc7-next-20260127 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 57.181558] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 57.181563] Call Trace: [ 57.181572] <TASK> [ 57.181577] dump_stack_lvl+0x5e/0x80 [ 57.181596] print_report+0xc8/0x270 [ 57.181605] ? verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660 [ 57.181608] kasan_report+0x118/0x150 [ 57.181620] ? verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660 [ 57.181623] verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660 [ 57.181627] aa_dfa_unpack+0x1610/0x1740 [ 57.181629] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x1d0/0x470 [ 57.181640] unpack_pdb+0x86d/0x46b0 [ 57.181647] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 57.181653] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 57.181656] ? aa_unpack_nameX+0x1a8/0x300 [ 57.181659] aa_unpack+0x20b0/0x4c30 [ 57.181662] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 57.181664] ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x33/0x700 [ 57.181681] ? kasan_save_track+0x4f/0x80 [ 57.181683] ? kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 [ 57.181686] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 [ 57.181688] ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x44a/0x780 [ 57.181693] ? aa_simple_write_to_buffer+0x54/0x130 [ 57.181697] ? policy_update+0x154/0x330 [ 57.181704] aa_replace_profiles+0x15a/0x1dd0 [ 57.181707] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 57.181710] ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x44a/0x780 [ 57.181712] ? aa_loaddata_alloc+0x77/0x140 [ 57.181715] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 57.181717] ? _copy_from_user+0x2a/0x70 [ 57.181730] policy_update+0x17a/0x330 [ 57.181733] profile_replace+0x153/0x1a0 [ 57.181735] ? rw_verify_area+0x93/0x2d0 [ 57.181740] vfs_write+0x235/0xab0 [ 57.181745] ksys_write+0xb0/0x170 [ 57.181748] do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x660 [ 57.181762] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 57.181765] RIP: 0033:0x7f6192792eb2 Remove the MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE condition to validate all DEFAULT_TABLE entries unconditionally. Fixes: 031dcc8f4e84 ("apparmor: dfa add support for state differential encoding") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-18apparmor: fix side-effect bug in match_char() macro usageMassimiliano Pellizzer1-10/+20
commit 8756b68edae37ff546c02091989a4ceab3f20abd upstream. The match_char() macro evaluates its character parameter multiple times when traversing differential encoding chains. When invoked with *str++, the string pointer advances on each iteration of the inner do-while loop, causing the DFA to check different characters at each iteration and therefore skip input characters. This results in out-of-bounds reads when the pointer advances past the input buffer boundary. [ 94.984676] ================================================================== [ 94.985301] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760 [ 94.985655] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888100342000 by task file/976 [ 94.986319] CPU: 7 UID: 1000 PID: 976 Comm: file Not tainted 6.19.0-rc7-next-20260127 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 94.986322] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 94.986329] Call Trace: [ 94.986341] <TASK> [ 94.986347] dump_stack_lvl+0x5e/0x80 [ 94.986374] print_report+0xc8/0x270 [ 94.986384] ? aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760 [ 94.986388] kasan_report+0x118/0x150 [ 94.986401] ? aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760 [ 94.986405] aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760 [ 94.986408] __aa_path_perm+0x131/0x400 [ 94.986418] aa_path_perm+0x219/0x2f0 [ 94.986424] apparmor_file_open+0x345/0x570 [ 94.986431] security_file_open+0x5c/0x140 [ 94.986442] do_dentry_open+0x2f6/0x1120 [ 94.986450] vfs_open+0x38/0x2b0 [ 94.986453] ? may_open+0x1e2/0x2b0 [ 94.986466] path_openat+0x231b/0x2b30 [ 94.986469] ? __x64_sys_openat+0xf8/0x130 [ 94.986477] do_file_open+0x19d/0x360 [ 94.986487] do_sys_openat2+0x98/0x100 [ 94.986491] __x64_sys_openat+0xf8/0x130 [ 94.986499] do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x660 [ 94.986515] ? count_memcg_events+0x15f/0x3c0 [ 94.986526] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 94.986540] ? handle_mm_fault+0x1639/0x1ef0 [ 94.986551] ? vma_start_read+0xf0/0x320 [ 94.986558] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 94.986561] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 94.986563] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x50/0xe0 [ 94.986572] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 94.986574] ? arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x9/0xb0 [ 94.986587] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 94.986588] ? irqentry_exit+0x3c/0x590 [ 94.986595] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 94.986597] RIP: 0033:0x7fda4a79c3ea Fix by extracting the character value before invoking match_char, ensuring single evaluation per outer loop. Fixes: 074c1cd798cb ("apparmor: dfa move character match into a macro") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-18apparmor: fix: limit the number of levels of policy namespacesJohn Johansen2-0/+4
commit 306039414932c80f8420695a24d4fe10c84ccfb2 upstream. Currently the number of policy namespaces is not bounded relying on the user namespace limit. However policy namespaces aren't strictly tied to user namespaces and it is possible to create them and nest them arbitrarily deep which can be used to exhaust system resource. Hard cap policy namespaces to the same depth as user namespaces. Fixes: c88d4c7b049e8 ("AppArmor: core policy routines") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Reviewed-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-18apparmor: replace recursive profile removal with iterative approachMassimiliano Pellizzer1-3/+27
commit ab09264660f9de5d05d1ef4e225aa447c63a8747 upstream. The profile removal code uses recursion when removing nested profiles, which can lead to kernel stack exhaustion and system crashes. Reproducer: $ pf='a'; for ((i=0; i<1024; i++)); do echo -e "profile $pf { \n }" | apparmor_parser -K -a; pf="$pf//x"; done $ echo -n a > /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/.remove Replace the recursive __aa_profile_list_release() approach with an iterative approach in __remove_profile(). The function repeatedly finds and removes leaf profiles until the entire subtree is removed, maintaining the same removal semantic without recursion. Fixes: c88d4c7b049e ("AppArmor: core policy routines") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-18apparmor: fix memory leak in verify_headerMassimiliano Pellizzer1-1/+0
commit e38c55d9f834e5b848bfed0f5c586aaf45acb825 upstream. The function sets `*ns = NULL` on every call, leaking the namespace string allocated in previous iterations when multiple profiles are unpacked. This also breaks namespace consistency checking since *ns is always NULL when the comparison is made. Remove the incorrect assignment. The caller (aa_unpack) initializes *ns to NULL once before the loop, which is sufficient. Fixes: dd51c8485763 ("apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-18apparmor: validate DFA start states are in bounds in unpack_pdbMassimiliano Pellizzer1-2/+19
commit 9063d7e2615f4a7ab321de6b520e23d370e58816 upstream. Backport for conflicts caused by ad596ea74e74 ("apparmor: group dfa policydb unpacking") - rearrange and consolidated the unpack. b11e51dd7094 ("apparmor: test: make static symbols visible during kunit testing") - rename function and make it visible to kunit tests Start states are read from untrusted data and used as indexes into the DFA state tables. The aa_dfa_next() function call in unpack_pdb() will access dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE][start], and if the start state exceeds the number of states in the DFA, this results in an out-of-bound read. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in aa_dfa_next+0x2a1/0x360 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811956fb90 by task su/1097 ... Reject policies with out-of-bounds start states during unpacking to prevent the issue. Fixes: ad5ff3db53c6 ("AppArmor: Add ability to load extended policy") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-04-18xen/privcmd: add boot control for restricted usage in domUJuergen Gross1-0/+1
commit 1613462be621ad5103ec338a7b0ca0746ec4e5f1 upstream. When running in an unprivileged domU under Xen, the privcmd driver is restricted to allow only hypercalls against a target domain, for which the current domU is acting as a device model. Add a boot parameter "unrestricted" to allow all hypercalls (the hypervisor will still refuse destructive hypercalls affecting other guests). Make this new parameter effective only in case the domU wasn't started using secure boot, as otherwise hypercalls targeting the domU itself might result in violating the secure boot functionality. This is achieved by adding another lockdown reason, which can be tested to not being set when applying the "unrestricted" option. This is part of XSA-482 Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-03-04apparmor: fix invalid deref of rawdata when export_binary is unsetGeorgia Garcia1-0/+9
[ Upstream commit df9ac55abd18628bd8cff687ea043660532a3654 ] If the export_binary parameter is disabled on runtime, profiles that were loaded before that will still have their rawdata stored in apparmorfs, with a symbolic link to the rawdata on the policy directory. When one of those profiles are replaced, the rawdata is set to NULL, but when trying to resolve the symbolic links to rawdata for that profile, it will try to dereference profile->rawdata->name when profile->rawdata is now NULL causing an oops. Fix it by checking if rawdata is set. [ 168.653080] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000088 [ 168.657420] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 168.660619] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 168.663613] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 168.665450] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 168.667836] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1729 Comm: ls Not tainted 6.19.0-rc7+ #3 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 168.672308] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 168.679327] RIP: 0010:rawdata_get_link_base.isra.0+0x23/0x330 [ 168.682768] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 83 ec 18 48 89 55 d0 48 85 ff 0f 84 e3 01 00 00 <48> 83 3c 25 88 00 00 00 00 0f 84 d4 01 00 00 49 89 f6 49 89 cc e8 [ 168.689818] RSP: 0018:ffffcdcb8200fb80 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ 168.690871] RAX: ffffffffaee74ec0 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffb0120158 [ 168.692251] RDX: ffffcdcb8200fbe0 RSI: ffff88c187c9fa80 RDI: ffff88c186c98a80 [ 168.693593] RBP: ffffcdcb8200fbc0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 168.694941] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88c186c98a80 [ 168.696289] R13: 00007fff005aaa20 R14: 0000000000000080 R15: ffff88c188f4fce0 [ 168.697637] FS: 0000790e81c58280(0000) GS:ffff88c20a957000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 168.699227] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 168.700349] CR2: 0000000000000088 CR3: 000000012fd3e000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 [ 168.701696] Call Trace: [ 168.702325] <TASK> [ 168.702995] rawdata_get_link_data+0x1c/0x30 [ 168.704145] vfs_readlink+0xd4/0x160 [ 168.705152] do_readlinkat+0x114/0x180 [ 168.706214] __x64_sys_readlink+0x1e/0x30 [ 168.708653] x64_sys_call+0x1d77/0x26b0 [ 168.709525] do_syscall_64+0x81/0x500 [ 168.710348] ? do_statx+0x72/0xb0 [ 168.711109] ? putname+0x3e/0x80 [ 168.711845] ? __x64_sys_statx+0xb7/0x100 [ 168.712711] ? x64_sys_call+0x10fc/0x26b0 [ 168.713577] ? do_syscall_64+0xbf/0x500 [ 168.714412] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x1d2/0x8d0 [ 168.715404] ? irqentry_exit+0xb2/0x740 [ 168.716359] ? exc_page_fault+0x90/0x1b0 [ 168.717307] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Fixes: 1180b4c757aab ("apparmor: fix dangling symlinks to policy rawdata after replacement") Signed-off-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-03-04apparmor: fix rlimit for posix cpu timersJohn Johansen1-0/+5
[ Upstream commit 6ca56813f4a589f536adceb42882855d91fb1125 ] Posix cpu timers requires an additional step beyond setting the rlimit. Refactor the code so its clear when what code is setting the limit and conditionally update the posix cpu timers when appropriate. Fixes: baa73d9e478ff ("posix-timers: Make them configurable") Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-03-04apparmor: fix NULL sock in aa_sock_file_permJohn Johansen1-2/+4
[ Upstream commit 00b67657535dfea56e84d11492f5c0f61d0af297 ] Deal with the potential that sock and sock-sk can be NULL during socket setup or teardown. This could lead to an oops. The fix for NULL pointer dereference in __unix_needs_revalidation shows this is at least possible for af_unix sockets. While the fix for af_unix sockets applies for newer mediation this is still the fall back path for older af_unix mediation and other sockets, so ensure it is covered. Fixes: 56974a6fcfef6 ("apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation") Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-03-04smack: /smack/doi: accept previously used valuesKonstantin Andreev1-26/+45
[ Upstream commit 33d589ed60ae433b483761987b85e0d24e54584e ] Writing to /smack/doi a value that has ever been written there in the past disables networking for non-ambient labels. E.g. # cat /smack/doi 3 # netlabelctl -p cipso list Configured CIPSO mappings (1) DOI value : 3 mapping type : PASS_THROUGH # netlabelctl -p map list Configured NetLabel domain mappings (3) domain: "_" (IPv4) protocol: UNLABELED domain: DEFAULT (IPv4) protocol: CIPSO, DOI = 3 domain: DEFAULT (IPv6) protocol: UNLABELED # cat /smack/ambient _ # cat /proc/$$/attr/smack/current _ # ping -c1 10.1.95.12 64 bytes from 10.1.95.12: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.964 ms # echo foo >/proc/$$/attr/smack/current # ping -c1 10.1.95.12 64 bytes from 10.1.95.12: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.956 ms unknown option 86 # echo 4 >/smack/doi # echo 3 >/smack/doi !> [ 214.050395] smk_cipso_doi:691 cipso add rc = -17 # echo 3 >/smack/doi !> [ 249.402261] smk_cipso_doi:678 remove rc = -2 !> [ 249.402261] smk_cipso_doi:691 cipso add rc = -17 # ping -c1 10.1.95.12 !!> ping: 10.1.95.12: Address family for hostname not supported # echo _ >/proc/$$/attr/smack/current # ping -c1 10.1.95.12 64 bytes from 10.1.95.12: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=0.617 ms This happens because Smack keeps decommissioned DOIs, fails to re-add them, and consequently refuses to add the “default” domain map: # netlabelctl -p cipso list Configured CIPSO mappings (2) DOI value : 3 mapping type : PASS_THROUGH DOI value : 4 mapping type : PASS_THROUGH # netlabelctl -p map list Configured NetLabel domain mappings (2) domain: "_" (IPv4) protocol: UNLABELED !> (no ipv4 map for default domain here) domain: DEFAULT (IPv6) protocol: UNLABELED Fix by clearing decommissioned DOI definitions and serializing concurrent DOI updates with a new lock. Also: - allow /smack/doi to live unconfigured, since adding a map (netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add) may fail. CIPSO_V4_DOI_UNKNOWN(0) indicates the unconfigured DOI - add new DOI before removing the old default map, so the old map remains if the add fails (2008-02-04, Casey Schaufler) Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel") Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-03-04smack: /smack/doi must be > 0Konstantin Andreev1-5/+7
[ Upstream commit 19c013e1551bf51e1493da1270841d60e4fd3f15 ] /smack/doi allows writing and keeping negative doi values. Correct values are 0 < doi <= (max 32-bit positive integer) (2008-02-04, Casey Schaufler) Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel") Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-01-19ima: Handle error code returned by ima_filter_rule_match()Zhao Yipeng1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 738c9738e690f5cea24a3ad6fd2d9a323cf614f6 ] In ima_match_rules(), if ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ENOENT due to the rule being NULL, the function incorrectly skips the 'if (!rc)' check and sets 'result = true'. The LSM rule is considered a match, causing extra files to be measured by IMA. This issue can be reproduced in the following scenario: After unloading the SELinux policy module via 'semodule -d', if an IMA measurement is triggered before ima_lsm_rules is updated, in ima_match_rules(), the first call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ESTALE. This causes the code to enter the 'if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized)' block, perform ima_lsm_copy_rule() and retry. In ima_lsm_copy_rule(), since the SELinux module has been removed, the rule becomes NULL, and the second call to ima_filter_rule_match() returns -ENOENT. This bypasses the 'if (!rc)' check and results in a false match. Call trace: selinux_audit_rule_match+0x310/0x3b8 security_audit_rule_match+0x60/0xa0 ima_match_rules+0x2e4/0x4a0 ima_match_policy+0x9c/0x1e8 ima_get_action+0x48/0x60 process_measurement+0xf8/0xa98 ima_bprm_check+0x98/0xd8 security_bprm_check+0x5c/0x78 search_binary_handler+0x6c/0x318 exec_binprm+0x58/0x1b8 bprm_execve+0xb8/0x130 do_execveat_common.isra.0+0x1a8/0x258 __arm64_sys_execve+0x48/0x68 invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 el0_svc+0x44/0x200 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x100/0x130 el0t_64_sync+0x3c8/0x3d0 Fix this by changing 'if (!rc)' to 'if (rc <= 0)' to ensure that error codes like -ENOENT do not bypass the check and accidentally result in a successful match. Fixes: 4af4662fa4a9d ("integrity: IMA policy") Signed-off-by: Zhao Yipeng <zhaoyipeng5@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2026-01-19smack: fix bug: unprivileged task can create labelsKonstantin Andreev1-14/+27
[ Upstream commit c147e13ea7fe9f118f8c9ba5e96cbd644b00d6b3 ] If an unprivileged task is allowed to relabel itself (/smack/relabel-self is not empty), it can freely create new labels by writing their names into own /proc/PID/attr/smack/current This occurs because do_setattr() imports the provided label in advance, before checking "relabel-self" list. This change ensures that the "relabel-self" list is checked before importing the label. Fixes: 38416e53936e ("Smack: limited capability for changing process label") Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-10-29KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Compare HMAC values in constant timeEric Biggers1-3/+4
[ Upstream commit eed0e3d305530066b4fc5370107cff8ef1a0d229 ] To prevent timing attacks, HMAC value comparison needs to be constant time. Replace the memcmp() with the correct function, crypto_memneq(). [For the Fixes commit I used the commit that introduced the memcmp(). It predates the introduction of crypto_memneq(), but it was still a bug at the time even though a helper function didn't exist yet.] Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> [ replaced crypto/utils.h include with crypto/algapi.h ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-08-28securityfs: don't pin dentries twice, once is enough...Al Viro1-2/+0
[ Upstream commit 27cd1bf1240d482e4f02ca4f9812e748f3106e4f ] incidentally, securityfs_recursive_remove() is broken without that - it leaks dentries, since simple_recursive_removal() does not expect anything of that sort. It could be worked around by dput() in remove_one() callback, but it's easier to just drop that double-get stuff. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-28apparmor: ensure WB_HISTORY_SIZE value is a power of 2Ryan Lee2-1/+3
[ Upstream commit 6c055e62560b958354625604293652753d82bcae ] WB_HISTORY_SIZE was defined to be a value not a power of 2, despite a comment in the declaration of struct match_workbuf stating it is and a modular arithmetic usage in the inc_wb_pos macro assuming that it is. Bump WB_HISTORY_SIZE's value up to 32 and add a BUILD_BUG_ON_NOT_POWER_OF_2 line to ensure that any future changes to the value of WB_HISTORY_SIZE respect this requirement. Fixes: 136db994852a ("apparmor: increase left match history buffer size") Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-06-27selinux: fix selinux_xfrm_alloc_user() to set correct ctx_lenStephen Smalley1-1/+1
commit 86c8db86af43f52f682e53a0f2f0828683be1e52 upstream. We should count the terminating NUL byte as part of the ctx_len. Otherwise, UBSAN logs a warning: UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in security/selinux/xfrm.c:99:14 index 60 is out of range for type 'char [*]' The allocation itself is correct so there is no actual out of bounds indexing, just a warning. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/CAEjxPJ6tA5+LxsGfOJokzdPeRomBHjKLBVR6zbrg+_w3ZZbM3A@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-06-04smack: recognize ipv4 CIPSO w/o categoriesKonstantin Andreev1-0/+4
[ Upstream commit a158a937d864d0034fea14913c1f09c6d5f574b8 ] If SMACK label has CIPSO representation w/o categories, e.g.: | # cat /smack/cipso2 | foo 10 | @ 250/2 | ... then SMACK does not recognize such CIPSO in input ipv4 packets and substitues '*' label instead. Audit records may look like | lsm=SMACK fn=smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb action=denied | subject="*" object="_" requested=w pid=0 comm="swapper/1" ... This happens in two steps: 1) security/smack/smackfs.c`smk_set_cipso does not clear NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT from (struct smack_known *)skp->smk_netlabel.flags on assigning CIPSO w/o categories: | rcu_assign_pointer(skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat, ncats.attr.mls.cat); | skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl = ncats.attr.mls.lvl; 2) security/smack/smack_lsm.c`smack_from_secattr can not match skp->smk_netlabel with input packet's struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap because sap->flags have not NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT (what is correct) but skp->smk_netlabel.flags have (what is incorrect): | if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0) { | if ((skp->smk_netlabel.flags & | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0) | found = 1; | break; | } This commit sets/clears NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT in skp->smk_netlabel.flags according to the presense of CIPSO categories. The update of smk_netlabel is not atomic, so input packets processing still may be incorrect during short time while update proceeds. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-03-13ima: Fix use-after-free on a dentry's dname.nameStefan Berger2-7/+26
commit be84f32bb2c981ca670922e047cdde1488b233de upstream. ->d_name.name can change on rename and the earlier value can be freed; there are conditions sufficient to stabilize it (->d_lock on dentry, ->d_lock on its parent, ->i_rwsem exclusive on the parent's inode, rename_lock), but none of those are met at any of the sites. Take a stable snapshot of the name instead. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240202182732.GE2087318@ZenIV/ Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> [ Samasth: bp to fix CVE-2024-39494; Minor conflict resolved due to code context change ] Signed-off-by: Samasth Norway Ananda <samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-03-13tomoyo: don't emit warning in tomoyo_write_control()Tetsuo Handa1-1/+1
[ Upstream commit 3df7546fc03b8f004eee0b9e3256369f7d096685 ] syzbot is reporting too large allocation warning at tomoyo_write_control(), for one can write a very very long line without new line character. To fix this warning, I use __GFP_NOWARN rather than checking for KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE, for practically a valid line should be always shorter than 32KB where the "too small to fail" memory-allocation rule applies. One might try to write a valid line that is longer than 32KB, but such request will likely fail with -ENOMEM. Therefore, I feel that separately returning -EINVAL when a line is longer than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE is redundant. There is no need to distinguish over-32KB and over-KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. Reported-by: syzbot+7536f77535e5210a5c76@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7536f77535e5210a5c76 Reported-by: Leo Stone <leocstone@gmail.com> Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241216021459.178759-2-leocstone@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-03-13safesetid: check size of policy writesLeo Stone1-0/+3
[ Upstream commit f09ff307c7299392f1c88f763299e24bc99811c7 ] syzbot attempts to write a buffer with a large size to a sysfs entry with writes handled by handle_policy_update(), triggering a warning in kmalloc. Check the size specified for write buffers before allocating. Reported-by: syzbot+4eb7a741b3216020043a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4eb7a741b3216020043a Signed-off-by: Leo Stone <leocstone@gmail.com> [PM: subject tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-01-09selinux: ignore unknown extended permissionsThiébaud Weksteen1-2/+6
commit 900f83cf376bdaf798b6f5dcb2eae0c822e908b6 upstream. When evaluating extended permissions, ignore unknown permissions instead of calling BUG(). This commit ensures that future permissions can be added without interfering with older kernels. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls") Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-12-14apparmor: test: Fix memory leak for aa_unpack_strdup()Jinjie Ruan1-0/+6
commit 7290f59231910ccba427d441a6e8b8c6f6112448 upstream. The string allocated by kmemdup() in aa_unpack_strdup() is not freed and cause following memory leaks, free them to fix it. unreferenced object 0xffffff80c6af8a50 (size 8): comm "kunit_try_catch", pid 225, jiffies 4294894407 hex dump (first 8 bytes): 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 00 testing. backtrace (crc 5eab668b): [<0000000001e3714d>] kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40 [<000000006e6c7776>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x300/0x3e0 [<000000006870467c>] kmemdup_noprof+0x34/0x60 [<000000001176bb03>] aa_unpack_strdup+0xd0/0x18c [<000000008ecde918>] policy_unpack_test_unpack_strdup_with_null_name+0xf8/0x3ec [<0000000032ef8f77>] kunit_try_run_case+0x13c/0x3ac [<00000000f3edea23>] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x80/0xec [<00000000adf936cf>] kthread+0x2e8/0x374 [<0000000041bb1628>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 unreferenced object 0xffffff80c2a29090 (size 8): comm "kunit_try_catch", pid 227, jiffies 4294894409 hex dump (first 8 bytes): 74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 00 testing. backtrace (crc 5eab668b): [<0000000001e3714d>] kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40 [<000000006e6c7776>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x300/0x3e0 [<000000006870467c>] kmemdup_noprof+0x34/0x60 [<000000001176bb03>] aa_unpack_strdup+0xd0/0x18c [<0000000046a45c1a>] policy_unpack_test_unpack_strdup_with_name+0xd0/0x3c4 [<0000000032ef8f77>] kunit_try_run_case+0x13c/0x3ac [<00000000f3edea23>] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x80/0xec [<00000000adf936cf>] kthread+0x2e8/0x374 [<0000000041bb1628>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 4d944bcd4e73 ("apparmor: add AppArmor KUnit tests for policy unpack") Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-12-14apparmor: fix 'Do simple duplicate message elimination'chao liu1-0/+2
[ Upstream commit 9b897132424fe76bf6c61f22f9cf12af7f1d1e6a ] Multiple profiles shared 'ent->caps', so some logs missed. Fixes: 0ed3b28ab8bf ("AppArmor: mediation of non file objects") Signed-off-by: chao liu <liuzgyid@outlook.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-17security/keys: fix slab-out-of-bounds in key_task_permissionChen Ridong1-2/+5
[ Upstream commit 4a74da044ec9ec8679e6beccc4306b936b62873f ] KASAN reports an out of bounds read: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __kuid_val include/linux/uidgid.h:36 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in uid_eq include/linux/uidgid.h:63 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in key_task_permission+0x394/0x410 security/keys/permission.c:54 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88813c3ab618 by task stress-ng/4362 CPU: 2 PID: 4362 Comm: stress-ng Not tainted 5.10.0-14930-gafbffd6c3ede #15 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:82 [inline] dump_stack+0x107/0x167 lib/dump_stack.c:123 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x19/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:400 __kasan_report.cold+0x6c/0x84 mm/kasan/report.c:560 kasan_report+0x3a/0x50 mm/kasan/report.c:585 __kuid_val include/linux/uidgid.h:36 [inline] uid_eq include/linux/uidgid.h:63 [inline] key_task_permission+0x394/0x410 security/keys/permission.c:54 search_nested_keyrings+0x90e/0xe90 security/keys/keyring.c:793 This issue was also reported by syzbot. It can be reproduced by following these steps(more details [1]): 1. Obtain more than 32 inputs that have similar hashes, which ends with the pattern '0xxxxxxxe6'. 2. Reboot and add the keys obtained in step 1. The reproducer demonstrates how this issue happened: 1. In the search_nested_keyrings function, when it iterates through the slots in a node(below tag ascend_to_node), if the slot pointer is meta and node->back_pointer != NULL(it means a root), it will proceed to descend_to_node. However, there is an exception. If node is the root, and one of the slots points to a shortcut, it will be treated as a keyring. 2. Whether the ptr is keyring decided by keyring_ptr_is_keyring function. However, KEYRING_PTR_SUBTYPE is 0x2UL, the same as ASSOC_ARRAY_PTR_SUBTYPE_MASK. 3. When 32 keys with the similar hashes are added to the tree, the ROOT has keys with hashes that are not similar (e.g. slot 0) and it splits NODE A without using a shortcut. When NODE A is filled with keys that all hashes are xxe6, the keys are similar, NODE A will split with a shortcut. Finally, it forms the tree as shown below, where slot 6 points to a shortcut. NODE A +------>+---+ ROOT | | 0 | xxe6 +---+ | +---+ xxxx | 0 | shortcut : : xxe6 +---+ | +---+ xxe6 : : | | | xxe6 +---+ | +---+ | 6 |---+ : : xxe6 +---+ +---+ xxe6 : : | f | xxe6 +---+ +---+ xxe6 | f | +---+ 4. As mentioned above, If a slot(slot 6) of the root points to a shortcut, it may be mistakenly transferred to a key*, leading to a read out-of-bounds read. To fix this issue, one should jump to descend_to_node if the ptr is a shortcut, regardless of whether the node is root or not. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kernel/1cfa878e-8c7b-4570-8606-21daf5e13ce7@huaweicloud.com/ [jarkko: tweaked the commit message a bit to have an appropriate closes tag.] Fixes: b2a4df200d57 ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring") Reported-by: syzbot+5b415c07907a2990d1a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/000000000000cbb7860611f61147@google.com/T/ Signed-off-by: Chen Ridong <chenridong@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-11-08selinux: improve error checking in sel_write_load()Paul Moore1-13/+14
[ Upstream commit 42c773238037c90b3302bf37a57ae3b5c3f6004a ] Move our existing input sanity checking to the top of sel_write_load() and add a check to ensure the buffer size is non-zero. Move a local variable initialization from the declaration to before it is used. Minor style adjustments. Reported-by: Sam Sun <samsun1006219@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> [cascardo: keep fsi initialization at its declaration point as it is used earlier] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@igalia.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2024-10-17tomoyo: fallback to realpath if symlink's pathname does not existTetsuo Handa1-3/+6
commit ada1986d07976d60bed5017aa38b7f7cf27883f7 upstream. Alfred Agrell found that TOMOYO cannot handle execveat(AT_EMPTY_PATH) inside chroot environment where /dev and /proc are not mounted, for commit 51f39a1f0cea ("syscalls: implement execveat() system call") missed that TOMOYO tries to canonicalize argv[0] when the filename fed to the executed program as argv[0] is supplied using potentially nonexistent pathname. Since "/dev/fd/<fd>" already lost symlink information used for obtaining that <fd>, it is too late to reconstruct symlink's pathname. Although <filename> part of "/dev/fd/<fd>/<filename>" might not be canonicalized, TOMOYO cannot use tomoyo_realpath_nofollow() when /dev or /proc is not mounted. Therefore, fallback to tomoyo_realpath_from_path() when tomoyo_realpath_nofollow() failed. Reported-by: Alfred Agrell <blubban@gmail.com> Closes: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1082001 Fixes: 51f39a1f0cea ("syscalls: implement execveat() system call") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.19+ Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2024-10-17