From fc02735b14fff8c6678b521d324ade27b1a3d4cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Josh Poimboeuf Date: Tue, 14 Jun 2022 23:16:13 +0200 Subject: KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS On eIBRS systems, the returns in the vmexit return path from __vmx_vcpu_run() to vmx_vcpu_run() are exposed to RSB poisoning attacks. Fix that by moving the post-vmexit spec_ctrl handling to immediately after the vmexit. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h') diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h index 1b1982448aa4..da654af12ccb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h @@ -405,6 +405,7 @@ void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); struct vmx_uret_msr *vmx_find_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr); void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp); +void vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned int flags); unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx); bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs, unsigned int flags); -- cgit v1.2.3