From d91c1ab470edd94e52bca738e53b5ad0f0247176 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2023 18:02:43 -0400
Subject: selinux: cleanup the policycap accessor functions

In the process of reverting back to directly accessing the global
selinux_state pointer we left behind some artifacts in the
selinux_policycap_XXX() helper functions.  This patch cleans up
some of that left-behind cruft.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/include/security.h | 35 +++++++++++------------------------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 3b605f39e040..60eb161a0e5a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -148,58 +148,45 @@ static inline bool checkreqprot_get(void)
 
 static inline bool selinux_policycap_netpeer(void)
 {
-	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
-
-	return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NETPEER]);
+	return READ_ONCE(selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NETPEER]);
 }
 
 static inline bool selinux_policycap_openperm(void)
 {
-	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
-
-	return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_OPENPERM]);
+	return READ_ONCE(selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_OPENPERM]);
 }
 
 static inline bool selinux_policycap_extsockclass(void)
 {
-	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
-
-	return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_EXTSOCKCLASS]);
+	return READ_ONCE(selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_EXTSOCKCLASS]);
 }
 
 static inline bool selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork(void)
 {
-	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
-
-	return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_ALWAYSNETWORK]);
+	return READ_ONCE(selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_ALWAYSNETWORK]);
 }
 
 static inline bool selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel(void)
 {
-	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
-
-	return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_CGROUPSECLABEL]);
+	return READ_ONCE(selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_CGROUPSECLABEL]);
 }
 
 static inline bool selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition(void)
 {
-	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
-
-	return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION]);
+	return READ_ONCE(
+		selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION]);
 }
 
 static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void)
 {
-	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
-
-	return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS]);
+	return READ_ONCE(
+		selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS]);
 }
 
 static inline bool selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec(void)
 {
-	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
-
-	return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC]);
+	return READ_ONCE(
+		selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC]);
 }
 
 struct selinux_policy_convert_data;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 5b0eea835d4e9cb5229e696c5763929fc2394f39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2023 15:12:22 +0200
Subject: selinux: introduce an initial SID for early boot processes

Currently, SELinux doesn't allow distinguishing between kernel threads
and userspace processes that are started before the policy is first
loaded - both get the label corresponding to the kernel SID. The only
way a process that persists from early boot can get a meaningful label
is by doing a voluntary dyntransition or re-executing itself.

Reusing the kernel label for userspace processes is problematic for
several reasons:
1. The kernel is considered to be a privileged domain and generally
   needs to have a wide range of permissions allowed to work correctly,
   which prevents the policy writer from effectively hardening against
   early boot processes that might remain running unintentionally after
   the policy is loaded (they represent a potential extra attack surface
   that should be mitigated).
2. Despite the kernel being treated as a privileged domain, the policy
   writer may want to impose certain special limitations on kernel
   threads that may conflict with the requirements of intentional early
   boot processes. For example, it is a good hardening practice to limit
   what executables the kernel can execute as usermode helpers and to
   confine the resulting usermode helper processes. However, a
   (legitimate) process surviving from early boot may need to execute a
   different set of executables.
3. As currently implemented, overlayfs remembers the security context of
   the process that created an overlayfs mount and uses it to bound
   subsequent operations on files using this context. If an overlayfs
   mount is created before the SELinux policy is loaded, these "mounter"
   checks are made against the kernel context, which may clash with
   restrictions on the kernel domain (see 2.).

To resolve this, introduce a new initial SID (reusing the slot of the
former "init" initial SID) that will be assigned to any userspace
process started before the policy is first loaded. This is easy to do,
as we can simply label any process that goes through the
bprm_creds_for_exec LSM hook with the new init-SID instead of
propagating the kernel SID from the parent.

To provide backwards compatibility for existing policies that are
unaware of this new semantic of the "init" initial SID, introduce a new
policy capability "userspace_initial_context" and set the "init" SID to
the same context as the "kernel" SID unless this capability is set by
the policy.

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c                         | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h |  2 +-
 security/selinux/include/policycap.h             |  1 +
 security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h       |  3 ++-
 security/selinux/include/security.h              |  6 +++++
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c                   | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index d06e350fedee..b8a8a4f0f2ad 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2288,6 +2288,19 @@ static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
 	new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
 
+	/*
+	 * Before policy is loaded, label any task outside kernel space
+	 * as SECINITSID_INIT, so that any userspace tasks surviving from
+	 * early boot end up with a label different from SECINITSID_KERNEL
+	 * (if the policy chooses to set SECINITSID_INIT != SECINITSID_KERNEL).
+	 */
+	if (!selinux_initialized()) {
+		new_tsec->sid = SECINITSID_INIT;
+		/* also clear the exec_sid just in case */
+		new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
 		new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
 		/* Reset exec SID on execve. */
@@ -4504,6 +4517,21 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
 	if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
 		return 0;
 
+	/*
+	 * Before POLICYDB_CAP_USERSPACE_INITIAL_CONTEXT, sockets that
+	 * inherited the kernel context from early boot used to be skipped
+	 * here, so preserve that behavior unless the capability is set.
+	 *
+	 * By setting the capability the policy signals that it is ready
+	 * for this quirk to be fixed. Note that sockets created by a kernel
+	 * thread or a usermode helper executed without a transition will
+	 * still be skipped in this check regardless of the policycap
+	 * setting.
+	 */
+	if (!selinux_policycap_userspace_initial_context() &&
+	    sksec->sid == SECINITSID_INIT)
+		return 0;
+
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
 	ad.u.net = &net;
 	ad.u.net->sk = sk;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h
index ecc6e74fa09b..5e5f0993dac2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ static const char *const initial_sid_to_string[] = {
 	NULL,
 	"file",
 	NULL,
-	NULL,
+	"init",
 	"any_socket",
 	"port",
 	"netif",
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h
index f35d3458e71d..c7373e6effe5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ enum {
 	POLICYDB_CAP_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION,
 	POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS,
 	POLICYDB_CAP_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC,
+	POLICYDB_CAP_USERSPACE_INITIAL_CONTEXT,
 	__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX
 };
 #define POLICYDB_CAP_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX - 1)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h
index 2a87fc3702b8..28e4c9ee2399 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h
@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ const char *const selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX] = {
 	"cgroup_seclabel",
 	"nnp_nosuid_transition",
 	"genfs_seclabel_symlinks",
-	"ioctl_skip_cloexec"
+	"ioctl_skip_cloexec",
+	"userspace_initial_context",
 };
 
 #endif /* _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_NAMES_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 60eb161a0e5a..665c4e5bae99 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -189,6 +189,12 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec(void)
 		selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC]);
 }
 
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_userspace_initial_context(void)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(
+		selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_USERSPACE_INITIAL_CONTEXT]);
+}
+
 struct selinux_policy_convert_data;
 
 struct selinux_load_state {
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 31b08b34c722..cfe77ef24ee2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -863,6 +863,8 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
 int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
 {
 	struct ocontext *head, *c;
+	bool isid_init_supported = ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps,
+						   POLICYDB_CAP_USERSPACE_INITIAL_CONTEXT);
 	int rc;
 
 	rc = sidtab_init(s);
@@ -886,6 +888,13 @@ int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
 		if (!name)
 			continue;
 
+		/*
+		 * Also ignore SECINITSID_INIT if the policy doesn't declare
+		 * support for it
+		 */
+		if (sid == SECINITSID_INIT && !isid_init_supported)
+			continue;
+
 		rc = sidtab_set_initial(s, sid, &c->context[0]);
 		if (rc) {
 			pr_err("SELinux:  unable to load initial SID %s.\n",
@@ -893,6 +902,24 @@ int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
 			sidtab_destroy(s);
 			return rc;
 		}
+
+		/*
+		 * If the policy doesn't support the "userspace_initial_context"
+		 * capability, set SECINITSID_INIT to the same context as
+		 * SECINITSID_KERNEL. This ensures the same behavior as before
+		 * the reintroduction of SECINITSID_INIT, where all tasks
+		 * started before policy load would initially get the context
+		 * corresponding to SECINITSID_KERNEL.
+		 */
+		if (sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL && !isid_init_supported) {
+			rc = sidtab_set_initial(s, SECINITSID_INIT, &c->context[0]);
+			if (rc) {
+				pr_err("SELinux:  unable to load initial SID %s.\n",
+				       name);
+				sidtab_destroy(s);
+				return rc;
+			}
+		}
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From bbea03f474850b3bce329aa3b990b1a4853136f0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 15:23:16 +0200
Subject: selinux: check for multiplication overflow in put_entry()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

The function is always inlined and most of the time both relevant
arguments are compile time constants, allowing compilers to elide the
check.  Also the function is part of outputting the policy, which is not
performance critical.

Also convert the type of the third parameter into a size_t, since it
should always be a non-negative number of elements.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.h | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index 74b63ed1173f..6b4ad8e91265 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -366,9 +366,12 @@ static inline int next_entry(void *buf, struct policy_file *fp, size_t bytes)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int put_entry(const void *buf, size_t bytes, int num, struct policy_file *fp)
+static inline int put_entry(const void *buf, size_t bytes, size_t num, struct policy_file *fp)
 {
-	size_t len = bytes * num;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(bytes, num, &len)))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (len > fp->len)
 		return -EINVAL;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From f785c54101e01f8e5f84464f8755671246b13794 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 15:23:18 +0200
Subject: selinux: avoid avtab overflows
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Prevent inserting more than the supported U32_MAX number of entries.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index 6766edc0fe68..7d21de48c28d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, const struct avtab_key *key,
 	struct avtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
 	u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
 
-	if (!h || !h->nslot)
+	if (!h || !h->nslot || h->nel == U32_MAX)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h,
 	struct avtab_node *prev, *cur;
 	u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
 
-	if (!h || !h->nslot)
+	if (!h || !h->nslot || h->nel == U32_MAX)
 		return NULL;
 	hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
 	for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue];
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 1f270f1c34127e5a65ba5aaf574f313f0693fcfa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 15:23:24 +0200
Subject: selinux: consistently use u32 as sequence number type in the status
 code
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Align the type with the one used in selinux_notify_policy_change() and
the sequence member of struct selinux_kernel_status.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/include/security.h | 2 +-
 security/selinux/status.c           | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 665c4e5bae99..08840aa0782d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ struct selinux_kernel_status {
 } __packed;
 
 extern void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing);
-extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(int seqno);
+extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(u32 seqno);
 extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
 extern struct path selinux_null;
 extern void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val);
diff --git a/security/selinux/status.c b/security/selinux/status.c
index 19ef929a075c..e436e4975adc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/status.c
+++ b/security/selinux/status.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing)
  * It updates status of the times of policy reloaded, and current
  * setting of deny_unknown.
  */
-void selinux_status_update_policyload(int seqno)
+void selinux_status_update_policyload(u32 seqno)
 {
 	struct selinux_kernel_status   *status;
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 777ea29c57a078679fdb637919c1794d0d244128 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 15:23:25 +0200
Subject: selinux: avoid implicit conversions in the netif code
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Use the identical type sel_netif_hashfn() returns.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/netif.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/netif.c b/security/selinux/netif.c
index adbe9bea2d26..43a0d3594b72 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netif.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netif.c
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static inline u32 sel_netif_hashfn(const struct net *ns, int ifindex)
 static inline struct sel_netif *sel_netif_find(const struct net *ns,
 					       int ifindex)
 {
-	int idx = sel_netif_hashfn(ns, ifindex);
+	u32 idx = sel_netif_hashfn(ns, ifindex);
 	struct sel_netif *netif;
 
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(netif, &sel_netif_hash[idx], list)
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ static inline struct sel_netif *sel_netif_find(const struct net *ns,
  */
 static int sel_netif_insert(struct sel_netif *netif)
 {
-	int idx;
+	u32 idx;
 
 	if (sel_netif_total >= SEL_NETIF_HASH_MAX)
 		return -ENOSPC;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 5f740953ab2f5dcb638a4c8c5e6128533a5d4077 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 15:23:26 +0200
Subject: selinux: avoid implicit conversions in the AVC code
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Use a consistent type of u32 for sequence numbers.

Use a non-negative and input parameter matching type for the hash
result.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/avc.c | 15 ++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 1074db66e5ff..cd55479cce25 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_data_cachep __ro_after_init;
 static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_decision_cachep __ro_after_init;
 static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_cachep __ro_after_init;
 
-static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
+static inline u32 avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
 {
 	return (ssid ^ (tsid<<2) ^ (tclass<<4)) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1);
 }
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static void avc_node_populate(struct avc_node *node, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tcl
 static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
 {
 	struct avc_node *node, *ret = NULL;
-	int hvalue;
+	u32 hvalue;
 	struct hlist_head *head;
 
 	hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert)
+static int avc_latest_notif_update(u32 seqno, int is_insert)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 	static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(notif_lock);
@@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ static void avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 		       struct av_decision *avd, struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
 {
 	struct avc_node *pos, *node = NULL;
-	int hvalue;
+	u32 hvalue;
 	unsigned long flag;
 	spinlock_t *lock;
 	struct hlist_head *head;
@@ -654,9 +654,9 @@ static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
 	struct selinux_audit_data *sad = ad->selinux_audit_data;
-	u32 av = sad->audited;
+	u32 av = sad->audited, perm;
 	const char *const *perms;
-	int i, perm;
+	u32 i;
 
 	audit_log_format(ab, "avc:  %s ", sad->denied ? "denied" : "granted");
 
@@ -833,7 +833,8 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u8 driver, u8 xperm, u32 ssid,
 			   struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
 			   u32 flags)
 {
-	int hvalue, rc = 0;
+	u32 hvalue;
+	int rc = 0;
 	unsigned long flag;
 	struct avc_node *pos, *node, *orig = NULL;
 	struct hlist_head *head;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From a13479bb3c9d559fceb075986d8e0154a7eabbb1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 15:23:27 +0200
Subject: selinux: avoid implicit conversions in the LSM hooks
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Use the identical types in assignments of local variables for the
destination.

Merge tail calls into return statements.

Avoid using leading underscores for function local variable.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 26 ++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index b8a8a4f0f2ad..fff50604abce 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1125,7 +1125,7 @@ static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
 
 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
 {
-	int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
+	bool extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
 
 	switch (family) {
 	case PF_UNIX:
@@ -5027,15 +5027,13 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 
 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	int err;
+	int err, peerlbl_active, secmark_active;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
 	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
 	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
 	char *addrp;
-	u8 secmark_active;
-	u8 peerlbl_active;
 
 	if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
 		return 0;
@@ -5498,11 +5496,11 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
 {
-	const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
+	const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 	u32 tsid;
 
-	__tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
-	tsid = __tsec->sid;
+	tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
+	tsid = tsec->sid;
 
 	return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
 			    NULL);
@@ -6000,8 +5998,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
 
 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
 {
-	int err;
-	int perms;
+	u32 perms;
 
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case IPC_INFO:
@@ -6024,8 +6021,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	err = ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
-	return err;
+	return ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
 }
 
 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
@@ -6130,8 +6126,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
 {
-	int perms;
-	int err;
+	u32 perms;
 
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case IPC_INFO:
@@ -6158,8 +6153,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	err = ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
-	return err;
+	return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
 }
 
 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
@@ -6928,7 +6922,7 @@ static int selinux_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
  */
 static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
 {
-	int sid = current_sid();
+	u32 sid = current_sid();
 
 	return avc_has_perm(sid, sid,
 			    SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__SQPOLL, NULL);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 7128578c79a73760305f89ff975047c124919dfc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 15:23:29 +0200
Subject: selinux: use consistent type for AV rule specifier
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

The specifier for avtab keys is always supplied with a type of u16,
either as a macro to security_compute_sid() or the member specified of
the struct avtab_key.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.c    | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.h    | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/services.c | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index 7d21de48c28d..8d7c14ca27a2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h,
 }
 
 struct avtab_node*
-avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, int specified)
+avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, u16 specified)
 {
 	struct avtab_node *cur;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index d6742fd9c560..f265e9da18e2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h,
 struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h,
 				     const struct avtab_key *key);
 
-struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, int specified);
+struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, u16 specified);
 
 #define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS 16
 #define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 78946b71c1c1..83b85536cd2b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1694,7 +1694,7 @@ static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *policydb,
 static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 				u32 tsid,
 				u16 orig_tclass,
-				u32 specified,
+				u16 specified,
 				const char *objname,
 				u32 *out_sid,
 				bool kern)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 0e83c9c6fb0d7d2fddd2cd02575d7ad157e12837 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 15:23:31 +0200
Subject: selinux: fix implicit conversions in the symtab
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

hashtab_init() takes an u32 as size parameter type.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/symtab.c | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/symtab.h | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
index c42a6648a07d..7a77571fb275 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static const struct hashtab_key_params symtab_key_params = {
 	.cmp = symcmp,
 };
 
-int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, unsigned int size)
+int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, u32 size)
 {
 	s->nprim = 0;
 	return hashtab_init(&s->table, size);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
index f2614138d0cd..3033c4db6cb6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ struct symtab {
 	u32 nprim;		/* number of primary names in table */
 };
 
-int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, unsigned int size);
+int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, u32 size);
 
 int symtab_insert(struct symtab *s, char *name, void *datum);
 void *symtab_search(struct symtab *s, const char *name);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From c867248cf451964a14c64b4ca232055f117df9c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 15:23:34 +0200
Subject: selinux: avoid implicit conversions regarding enforcing status
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Use the type bool as parameter type in
selinux_status_update_setenforce().  The related function
enforcing_enabled() returns the type bool, while the struct
selinux_kernel_status member enforcing uses an u32.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/include/security.h | 2 +-
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c        | 7 ++++---
 security/selinux/status.c           | 4 ++--
 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 08840aa0782d..6b8b8fc3badd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ struct selinux_kernel_status {
 	 */
 } __packed;
 
-extern void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing);
+extern void selinux_status_update_setenforce(bool enforcing);
 extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(u32 seqno);
 extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
 extern struct path selinux_null;
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index bad1f6b685fd..f79e96f0f221 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -138,7 +138,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 {
 	char *page = NULL;
 	ssize_t length;
-	int old_value, new_value;
+	int scan_value;
+	bool old_value, new_value;
 
 	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -152,10 +153,10 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		return PTR_ERR(page);
 
 	length = -EINVAL;
-	if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
+	if (sscanf(page, "%d", &scan_value) != 1)
 		goto out;
 
-	new_value = !!new_value;
+	new_value = !!scan_value;
 
 	old_value = enforcing_enabled();
 	if (new_value != old_value) {
diff --git a/security/selinux/status.c b/security/selinux/status.c
index e436e4975adc..dffca22ce6f7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/status.c
+++ b/security/selinux/status.c
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(void)
  *
  * It updates status of the current enforcing/permissive mode.
  */
-void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing)
+void selinux_status_update_setenforce(bool enforcing)
 {
 	struct selinux_kernel_status   *status;
 
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing)
 		status->sequence++;
 		smp_wmb();
 
-		status->enforcing = enforcing;
+		status->enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
 
 		smp_wmb();
 		status->sequence++;
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 90aa4f5e92f2797c3c86e05f588ab277b0e0ba39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2023 13:13:35 -0400
Subject: selinux: de-brand SELinux

Change "NSA SELinux" to just "SELinux" in Kconfig help text and
comments. While NSA was the original primary developer and continues to
help maintain SELinux, SELinux has long since transitioned to a wide
community of developers and maintainers. SELinux has been part of the
mainline Linux kernel for nearly 20 years now [1] and has received
contributions from many individuals and organizations.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Pine.LNX.4.44.0308082228470.1852-100000@home.osdl.org/

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/Kconfig          | 16 ++++++++--------
 security/selinux/hooks.c          |  2 +-
 security/selinux/include/objsec.h |  2 +-
 security/selinux/xfrm.c           |  2 +-
 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
index 95a186ec0fcb..c275115b5088 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
 config SECURITY_SELINUX
-	bool "NSA SELinux Support"
+	bool "SELinux Support"
 	depends on SECURITY_NETWORK && AUDIT && NET && INET
 	select NETWORK_SECMARK
 	default n
 	help
-	  This selects NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux).
+	  This selects Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux).
 	  You will also need a policy configuration and a labeled filesystem.
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
 config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
-	bool "NSA SELinux boot parameter"
+	bool "SELinux boot parameter"
 	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
 	default n
 	help
@@ -24,11 +24,11 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
 config SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
-	bool "NSA SELinux Development Support"
+	bool "SELinux Development Support"
 	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
 	default y
 	help
-	  This enables the development support option of NSA SELinux,
+	  This enables the development support option of SELinux,
 	  which is useful for experimenting with SELinux and developing
 	  policies.  If unsure, say Y.  With this option enabled, the
 	  kernel will start in permissive mode (log everything, deny nothing)
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
 	  /sys/fs/selinux/enforce.
 
 config SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
-	bool "NSA SELinux AVC Statistics"
+	bool "SELinux AVC Statistics"
 	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
 	default y
 	help
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
 	  tools such as avcstat.
 
 config SECURITY_SELINUX_SIDTAB_HASH_BITS
-	int "NSA SELinux sidtab hashtable size"
+	int "SELinux sidtab hashtable size"
 	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
 	range 8 13
 	default 9
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_SIDTAB_HASH_BITS
 	  will ensure that lookups times are short and stable.
 
 config SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE
-	int "NSA SELinux SID to context string translation cache size"
+	int "SELinux SID to context string translation cache size"
 	depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
 	default 256
 	help
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index fff50604abce..9aa60ce23209 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
 /*
- *  NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
+ *  Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
  *
  *  This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
  *
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 2953132408bf..8f50e8fe0488 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
 /*
- *  NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
+ *  Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
  *
  *  This file contains the SELinux security data structures for kernel objects.
  *
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 1fca42c4d0ae..95fcd2d3433e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
 /*
- *  NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
+ *  Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
  *
  *  This file contains the SELinux XFRM hook function implementations.
  *
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 08a12b39e289fedf755afbc81de44a5cd1286b4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2023 20:06:27 +0200
Subject: selinux: drop avtab_search()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

avtab_search() shares the same logic with avtab_search_node(), except
that it returns, if found, a pointer to the struct avtab_node member
datum instead of the node itself.  Since the member is an embedded
struct, and not a pointer, the returned value of avtab_search() and
avtab_search_node() will always in unison either be NULL or non-NULL.

Drop avtab_search() and replace its calls by avtab_search_node() to
deduplicate logic and adopt the only caller caring for the type of
the returned value accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.c       | 32 --------------------------------
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.h       |  1 -
 security/selinux/ss/conditional.c |  4 ++--
 security/selinux/ss/services.c    | 13 ++++++-------
 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index 8d7c14ca27a2..5fd439c5b8a4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -180,38 +180,6 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h,
 	return avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, key, datum);
 }
 
-struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, const struct avtab_key *key)
-{
-	int hvalue;
-	struct avtab_node *cur;
-	u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
-
-	if (!h || !h->nslot)
-		return NULL;
-
-	hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
-	for (cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur;
-	     cur = cur->next) {
-		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
-		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
-		    key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
-		    (specified & cur->key.specified))
-			return &cur->datum;
-
-		if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
-			break;
-		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
-		    key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
-			break;
-		if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
-		    key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
-		    key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
-			break;
-	}
-
-	return NULL;
-}
-
 /* This search function returns a node pointer, and can be used in
  * conjunction with avtab_search_next_node()
  */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index f265e9da18e2..c2b88430c916 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -90,7 +90,6 @@ struct avtab {
 void avtab_init(struct avtab *h);
 int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *, u32);
 int avtab_alloc_dup(struct avtab *new, const struct avtab *orig);
-struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, const struct avtab_key *k);
 void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h);
 void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, const char *tag);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index b156c181c3c1..81ff676f209a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
 	 * cond_te_avtab.
 	 */
 	if (k->specified & AVTAB_TYPE) {
-		if (avtab_search(&p->te_avtab, k)) {
+		if (avtab_search_node(&p->te_avtab, k)) {
 			pr_err("SELinux: type rule already exists outside of a conditional.\n");
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
 				}
 			}
 		} else {
-			if (avtab_search(&p->te_cond_avtab, k)) {
+			if (avtab_search_node(&p->te_cond_avtab, k)) {
 				pr_err("SELinux: conflicting type rules when adding type rule for true.\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 83b85536cd2b..fa47e4e38935 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1706,8 +1706,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 	struct context *scontext, *tcontext, newcontext;
 	struct sidtab_entry *sentry, *tentry;
 	struct avtab_key avkey;
-	struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
-	struct avtab_node *node;
+	struct avtab_node *avnode, *node;
 	u16 tclass;
 	int rc = 0;
 	bool sock;
@@ -1815,22 +1814,22 @@ retry:
 	avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
 	avkey.target_class = tclass;
 	avkey.specified = specified;
-	avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb->te_avtab, &avkey);
+	avnode = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab, &avkey);
 
 	/* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
-	if (!avdatum) {
+	if (!avnode) {
 		node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
 		for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
 			if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
-				avdatum = &node->datum;
+				avnode = node;
 				break;
 			}
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (avdatum) {
+	if (avnode) {
 		/* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
-		newcontext.type = avdatum->u.data;
+		newcontext.type = avnode->datum.u.data;
 	}
 
 	/* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From e5faa839c3eee199447573c4e227daeb76d402cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2023 21:00:24 +0200
Subject: selinux: add missing newlines in pr_err() statements
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

The kernel print statements do not append an implicit newline to format
strings.

Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c       | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 6 +++---
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9aa60ce23209..dc51f28815b0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2930,7 +2930,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
 		struct inode_security_struct *context_isec =
 			selinux_inode(context_inode);
 		if (context_isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
-			pr_err("SELinux:  context_inode is not initialized");
+			pr_err("SELinux:  context_inode is not initialized\n");
 			return -EACCES;
 		}
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index cfe77ef24ee2..61e0e5000025 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -1687,7 +1687,7 @@ static int user_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
 
 		if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
 			pr_err("SELinux: user %s: "
-			       "too deep or looped boundary",
+			       "too deep or looped boundary\n",
 			       (char *) key);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
@@ -1766,7 +1766,7 @@ static int type_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
 
 		if (upper->attribute) {
 			pr_err("SELinux: type %s: "
-			       "bounded by attribute %s",
+			       "bounded by attribute %s\n",
 			       (char *) key,
 			       sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, upper->value - 1));
 			return -EINVAL;
@@ -3675,7 +3675,7 @@ int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 	info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
 	if (!info) {
 		pr_err("SELinux: compatibility lookup failed for policy "
-		    "version %d", p->policyvers);
+		    "version %d\n", p->policyvers);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 0fe53224bf5be183d263f262212c06ff00c69ca4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 11:12:50 -0400
Subject: selinux: update my email address

Update my email address; MAINTAINERS was updated some time ago.

Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/avc.c              | 2 +-
 security/selinux/hooks.c            | 2 +-
 security/selinux/include/avc.h      | 2 +-
 security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h   | 2 +-
 security/selinux/include/objsec.h   | 2 +-
 security/selinux/include/security.h | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.c         | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/avtab.h         | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/constraint.h    | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/context.h       | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c       | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h       | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c       | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h       | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/mls.c           | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/mls.h           | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h     | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.c      | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/policydb.h      | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/services.h      | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c        | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h        | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/symtab.c        | 2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/symtab.h        | 2 +-
 25 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index cd55479cce25..32eb67fb3e42 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Implementation of the kernel access vector cache (AVC).
  *
- * Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  *	     James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  *
  * Update:   KaiGai, Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index dc51f28815b0..a85a9f52e0c3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  *  This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
  *
- *  Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ *  Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  *	      Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
  *	      Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
  *	      James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index 9e055f74daf6..8f0aa66ccb13 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Access vector cache interface for object managers.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 #ifndef _SELINUX_AVC_H_
 #define _SELINUX_AVC_H_
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
index b9668be7b443..88b139e086c4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Access vector cache interface for the security server.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 #ifndef _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_
 #define _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 8f50e8fe0488..8159fd53c3de 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  *
  *  This file contains the SELinux security data structures for kernel objects.
  *
- *  Author(s):  Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ *  Author(s):  Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  *		Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
  *		Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
  *		James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 6b8b8fc3badd..668e393a9709 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Security server interface.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  *
  */
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index 5fd439c5b8a4..32f92da00b0e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * Implementation of the access vector table type.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 
 /* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index c2b88430c916..2ef5d1ae2844 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
  * table is used to represent the type enforcement
  * tables.
  *
- *  Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ *  Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 
 /* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
index 4e563be9ef5f..f76eb3128ad5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
  * process from labeling an object with a different user
  * identity.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 #ifndef _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_
 #define _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.h b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
index aed704b8c642..1f59468c0759 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/context.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
  * security server and can be changed without affecting
  * clients of the security server.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 #ifndef _SS_CONTEXT_H_
 #define _SS_CONTEXT_H_
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
index d31b87be9a1e..77875ad355f7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Implementation of the extensible bitmap type.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 /*
  * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
index e5b57dc3fc53..e3c807cfad90 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  * an explicitly specified starting bit position within
  * the total bitmap.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 #ifndef _SS_EBITMAP_H_
 #define _SS_EBITMAP_H_
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
index 3fb8f9026e9b..30532ec319ce 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Implementation of the hash table type.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
index 043a773bf0b7..9dac6da45b98 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
  * functions for hash computation and key comparison are
  * provided by the creator of the table.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 #ifndef _SS_HASHTAB_H_
 #define _SS_HASHTAB_H_
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index 99571b19d4a9..b2c6c846ea03 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Implementation of the multi-level security (MLS) policy.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 /*
  * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
index 15cacde0ff61..107681dd1824 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Multi-level security (MLS) policy operations.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 /*
  * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
index 7d48d5e52233..f492cf148891 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Type definitions for the multi-level security (MLS) policy.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 /*
  * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 61e0e5000025..b903a4dfdce1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Implementation of the policy database.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index 6b4ad8e91265..b97cda489753 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * A policy database (policydb) specifies the
  * configuration data for the security policy.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index fa47e4e38935..2c5be06fbada 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Implementation of the security services.
  *
- * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  *	     James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  *
  * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
index 8a9b85f44b66..ed2ee6600467 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Implementation of the security services.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 #ifndef _SS_SERVICES_H_
 #define _SS_SERVICES_H_
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
index 38d25173aebd..d8ead463b8df 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Implementation of the SID table type.
  *
- * Original author: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Original author: Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  * Author: Ondrej Mosnacek, <omosnacek@gmail.com>
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2018 Red Hat, Inc.
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
index 72810a080e77..22258201cd14 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  * A security identifier table (sidtab) is a lookup table
  * of security context structures indexed by SID value.
  *
- * Original author: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Original author: Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  * Author: Ondrej Mosnacek, <omosnacek@gmail.com>
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2018 Red Hat, Inc.
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
index 7a77571fb275..43d7f0319ccd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 /*
  * Implementation of the symbol table type.
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
index 3033c4db6cb6..0a3b5de79a0f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
  * is arbitrary.  The symbol table type is implemented
  * using the hash table type (hashtab).
  *
- * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
  */
 #ifndef _SS_SYMTAB_H_
 #define _SS_SYMTAB_H_
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From dd51fcd42fd6bf37608f54303b974b47f73c1490 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 13:37:49 +0200
Subject: selinux: introduce and use lsm_ad_net_init*() helpers

Perf traces of network-related workload shows a measurable overhead
inside the network-related selinux hooks while zeroing the
lsm_network_audit struct.

In most cases we can delay the initialization of such structure to the
usage point, avoiding such overhead in a few cases.

Additionally, the audit code accesses the IP address information only
for AF_INET* families, and selinux_parse_skb() will fill-out the
relevant fields in such cases. When the family field is zeroed or the
initialization is followed by the mentioned parsing, the zeroing can be
limited to the sk, family and netif fields.

By factoring out the audit-data initialization to new helpers, this
patch removes some duplicate code and gives small but measurable
performance gain under UDP flood.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)

(limited to 'security')

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index a85a9f52e0c3..6f53fa71fbdb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -224,6 +224,31 @@ static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
 	return tsec->sid;
 }
 
+static void __ad_net_init(struct common_audit_data *ad,
+			  struct lsm_network_audit *net,
+			  int ifindex, struct sock *sk, u16 family)
+{
+	ad->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+	ad->u.net = net;
+	net->netif = ifindex;
+	net->sk = sk;
+	net->family = family;
+}
+
+static void ad_net_init_from_sk(struct common_audit_data *ad,
+				struct lsm_network_audit *net,
+				struct sock *sk)
+{
+	__ad_net_init(ad, net, 0, sk, 0);
+}
+
+static void ad_net_init_from_iif(struct common_audit_data *ad,
+				 struct lsm_network_audit *net,
+				 int ifindex, u16 family)
+{
+	__ad_net_init(ad, net, ifindex, 0, family);
+}
+
 /*
  * get the objective security ID of a task
  */
@@ -4512,7 +4537,7 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
 {
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
 
 	if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
 		return 0;
@@ -4532,9 +4557,7 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
 	    sksec->sid == SECINITSID_INIT)
 		return 0;
 
-	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
-	ad.u.net = &net;
-	ad.u.net->sk = sk;
+	ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, sk);
 
 	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
 			    &ad);
@@ -4927,12 +4950,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
 	int err;
 
-	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
-	ad.u.net = &net;
-	ad.u.net->sk = other;
+	ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, other);
 
 	err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
 			   sksec_other->sclass,
@@ -4959,11 +4980,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
 	struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
 	struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
 
-	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
-	ad.u.net = &net;
-	ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
+	ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, other->sk);
 
 	return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
 			    &ad);
@@ -4999,13 +5018,10 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
 	char *addrp;
 
-	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
-	ad.u.net = &net;
-	ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
-	ad.u.net->family = family;
+	ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, skb->skb_iif, family);
 	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
@@ -5032,7 +5048,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
 	u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
 	char *addrp;
 
 	if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
@@ -5054,10 +5070,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
 		return 0;
 
-	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
-	ad.u.net = &net;
-	ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
-	ad.u.net->family = family;
+	ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, skb->skb_iif, family);
 	err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
@@ -5227,7 +5240,7 @@ static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc,
 	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
 	int err;
 
 	/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
@@ -5263,9 +5276,7 @@ static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc,
 		/* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
 		 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
 		 */
-		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
-		ad.u.net = &net;
-		ad.u.net->sk = asoc->base.sk;
+		ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, asoc->base.sk);
 		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->peer_sid, asoc->peer_secid,
 				   sksec->sclass, SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION,
 				   &ad);
@@ -5610,7 +5621,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	char *addrp;
 	u32 peer_sid;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
 	int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
 
 	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
@@ -5626,10 +5637,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		return NF_DROP;
 
 	ifindex = state->in->ifindex;
-	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
-	ad.u.net = &net;
-	ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
-	ad.u.net->family = family;
+	ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, ifindex, family);
 	if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
 		return NF_DROP;
 
@@ -5709,7 +5717,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	struct sock *sk;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
 	u8 proto = 0;
 
 	sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
@@ -5717,10 +5725,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		return NF_ACCEPT;
 	sksec = sk->sk_security;
 
-	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
-	ad.u.net = &net;
-	ad.u.net->netif = state->out->ifindex;
-	ad.u.net->family = state->pf;
+	ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, state->out->ifindex, state->pf);
 	if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, NULL, 0, &proto))
 		return NF_DROP;
 
@@ -5745,7 +5750,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv,
 	int ifindex;
 	struct sock *sk;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
-	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
 	char *addrp;
 	int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
 
@@ -5842,10 +5847,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv,
 	}
 
 	ifindex = state->out->ifindex;
-	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
-	ad.u.net = &net;
-	ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
-	ad.u.net->family = family;
+	ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, ifindex, family);
 	if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
 		return NF_DROP;
 
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 55a0e73806ec64279ea31d57b2116672631696a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Jul 2023 20:49:19 +0200
Subject: selinux: introduce SECURITY_SELINUX_DEBUG configuration
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

The policy database code contains several debug output statements
related t