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<title>samba.git/client, branch v3-5-test</title>
<subtitle>Unnamed repository; edit this file 'description' to name the repository.</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/samba.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>mount.cifs: check for NULL addr pointer before handling scopeid</title>
<updated>2010-05-17T07:20:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-05-12T11:05:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/samba.git/commit/?id=78a6eb582d28d92db5ffab6ded40785be54cf540'/>
<id>78a6eb582d28d92db5ffab6ded40785be54cf540</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;

Fix bug #7315 (mount.cifs segfaults after upgrade to 2.6.33).
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<pre>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;

Fix bug #7315 (mount.cifs segfaults after upgrade to 2.6.33).
</pre>
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</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mount.cifs: don't allow it to be run as setuid root program</title>
<updated>2010-03-08T09:05:57+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-01-26T13:36:11+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/samba.git/commit/?id=e6c856ac84ee18a192edc3e8a6547e2e9387a1b5'/>
<id>e6c856ac84ee18a192edc3e8a6547e2e9387a1b5</id>
<content type='text'>
mount.cifs has been the subject of several "security" fire drills due to
distributions installing it as a setuid root program. This program has
not been properly audited for security and the Samba team highly
recommends that it not be installed as a setuid root program at this
time.

To make that abundantly clear, this patch forcibly disables the ability
for mount.cifs to run as a setuid root program. People are welcome to
trivially patch this out, but they do so at their own peril.

A security audit and redesign of this program is in progress and we hope
that we'll be able to remove this in the near future.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;

The last 3 patches address bug #6853 (mount.cifs race that allows user to
replace mountpoint with a symlink).
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<pre>
mount.cifs has been the subject of several "security" fire drills due to
distributions installing it as a setuid root program. This program has
not been properly audited for security and the Samba team highly
recommends that it not be installed as a setuid root program at this
time.

To make that abundantly clear, this patch forcibly disables the ability
for mount.cifs to run as a setuid root program. People are welcome to
trivially patch this out, but they do so at their own peril.

A security audit and redesign of this program is in progress and we hope
that we'll be able to remove this in the near future.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;

The last 3 patches address bug #6853 (mount.cifs race that allows user to
replace mountpoint with a symlink).
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mount.cifs: check for invalid characters in device name and mountpoint</title>
<updated>2010-03-08T09:05:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-01-26T13:36:03+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/samba.git/commit/?id=ae24005a5a2c165dfd9b859bf1c02b5f7e967be5'/>
<id>ae24005a5a2c165dfd9b859bf1c02b5f7e967be5</id>
<content type='text'>
It's apparently possible to corrupt the mtab if you pass embedded
newlines to addmntent. Apparently tabs are also a problem with certain
earlier glibc versions. Backslashes are also a minor issue apparently,
but we can't reasonably filter those.

Make sure that neither the devname or mountpoint contain any problematic
characters before allowing the mount to proceed.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
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<pre>
It's apparently possible to corrupt the mtab if you pass embedded
newlines to addmntent. Apparently tabs are also a problem with certain
earlier glibc versions. Backslashes are also a minor issue apparently,
but we can't reasonably filter those.

Make sure that neither the devname or mountpoint contain any problematic
characters before allowing the mount to proceed.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mount.cifs: take extra care that mountpoint isn't changed during mount</title>
<updated>2010-03-08T09:05:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-01-26T13:35:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/samba.git/commit/?id=a60afceaa71c0c9b53b2ec1014db5d09d777803d'/>
<id>a60afceaa71c0c9b53b2ec1014db5d09d777803d</id>
<content type='text'>
It's possible to trick mount.cifs into mounting onto the wrong directory
by replacing the mountpoint with a symlink to a directory. mount.cifs
attempts to check the validity of the mountpoint, but there's still a
possible race between those checks and the mount(2) syscall.

To guard against this, chdir to the mountpoint very early, and only deal
with it as "." from then on out.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
It's possible to trick mount.cifs into mounting onto the wrong directory
by replacing the mountpoint with a symlink to a directory. mount.cifs
attempts to check the validity of the mountpoint, but there's still a
possible race between those checks and the mount(2) syscall.

To guard against this, chdir to the mountpoint very early, and only deal
with it as "." from then on out.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cifs.upcall: allocate a talloc context for smb_krb5_unparse_name</title>
<updated>2010-02-17T13:46:13+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2010-02-16T14:16:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/samba.git/commit/?id=01750852c1e9983b9d59a73d412101b4e0eb81a1'/>
<id>01750852c1e9983b9d59a73d412101b4e0eb81a1</id>
<content type='text'>
cifs.upcall calls smb_krb5_unparse_name with a NULL talloc context.
Older versions of this function though will conditionally use
SMB_REALLOC instead of TALLOC_REALLOC when a NULL context is passed
in. To make it more consistent, just spawn a talloc context that
we can pass into this function.

Resolves:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=565446
https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=6868

Reported-by: Ludek Finstrle &lt;luf@seznam.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner &lt;gd@samba.org&gt;
(cherry picked from commit a8cc2fa09ed43a167f62711bef363a5ac335dc78)

Fix bug #6868 (make bin/cifs.upcall fails).
</content>
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<pre>
cifs.upcall calls smb_krb5_unparse_name with a NULL talloc context.
Older versions of this function though will conditionally use
SMB_REALLOC instead of TALLOC_REALLOC when a NULL context is passed
in. To make it more consistent, just spawn a talloc context that
we can pass into this function.

Resolves:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=565446
https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=6868

Reported-by: Ludek Finstrle &lt;luf@seznam.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner &lt;gd@samba.org&gt;
(cherry picked from commit a8cc2fa09ed43a167f62711bef363a5ac335dc78)

Fix bug #6868 (make bin/cifs.upcall fails).
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s3-kerberos: only use krb5 headers where required.</title>
<updated>2009-11-30T11:22:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Günther Deschner</name>
<email>gd@samba.org</email>
</author>
<published>2009-11-27T14:52:57+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/samba.git/commit/?id=da926c1249705b95344730539c64111876955151'/>
<id>da926c1249705b95344730539c64111876955151</id>
<content type='text'>
This seems to be the only way to deal with mixed heimdal/MIT setups during
merged build.

Guenther
(cherry picked from commit 04f8c229de7ffad5f4ec1a0bb68c2c8b4ccf4e15)
</content>
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<pre>
This seems to be the only way to deal with mixed heimdal/MIT setups during
merged build.

Guenther
(cherry picked from commit 04f8c229de7ffad5f4ec1a0bb68c2c8b4ccf4e15)
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cifs.upcall: 2nd part of fix for Bug #6868: support building with Heimdal we well as with MIT.</title>
<updated>2009-11-25T20:43:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Günther Deschner</name>
<email>gd@samba.org</email>
</author>
<published>2009-11-25T14:06:19+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/samba.git/commit/?id=9e2f7070cf0eaf74297d565892edf5089756b124'/>
<id>9e2f7070cf0eaf74297d565892edf5089756b124</id>
<content type='text'>
Guenther
(cherry picked from commit 660ee2e74523194e5f6b2b6428d76628beb74717)
</content>
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<pre>
Guenther
(cherry picked from commit 660ee2e74523194e5f6b2b6428d76628beb74717)
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cifs.upcall: Fix Bug #6868: support building with Heimdal we well as with MIT.</title>
<updated>2009-11-12T09:25:27+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Günther Deschner</name>
<email>gd@samba.org</email>
</author>
<published>2009-11-11T23:52:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/samba.git/commit/?id=1230faabf8d836b900cdb9848de9fc12a79155f3'/>
<id>1230faabf8d836b900cdb9848de9fc12a79155f3</id>
<content type='text'>
Guenther
(cherry picked from commit b29eed492f1c056adb0b53510be10e738276ca11)
</content>
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<pre>
Guenther
(cherry picked from commit b29eed492f1c056adb0b53510be10e738276ca11)
</pre>
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</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s3-kerberos: modify cli_krb5_get_ticket to take a new impersonate_princ_s arg.</title>
<updated>2009-11-06T12:38:55+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Günther Deschner</name>
<email>gd@samba.org</email>
</author>
<published>2008-10-13T15:29:22+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/samba.git/commit/?id=ae4175e8a13e88fe7495af745d384b48f4f02784'/>
<id>ae4175e8a13e88fe7495af745d384b48f4f02784</id>
<content type='text'>
Guenther
(cherry picked from commit 60bf0eb60788a5d4dc5de24997c5efda64f2bd73)
</content>
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<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Guenther
(cherry picked from commit 60bf0eb60788a5d4dc5de24997c5efda64f2bd73)
</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mount.cifs: don't leak passwords with verbose option</title>
<updated>2009-10-01T12:30:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2009-09-25T11:07:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.exis.tech/samba.git/commit/?id=54de6ac85eb81aecc8b44a500f374edb95bf6a3d'/>
<id>54de6ac85eb81aecc8b44a500f374edb95bf6a3d</id>
<content type='text'>
When running mount.cifs with the --verbose option, it'll print out the
option string that it passes to the kernel...including the mount
password if there is one. Print a placeholder string instead to help
ensure that this info can't be used for nefarious purposes.

Also, the --verbose option printed the option string before it was
completely assembled anyway. This patch should also make sure that
the complete option string is printed out.

Finally, strndup passwords passed in on the command line to ensure that
they aren't shown by --verbose as well. Passwords used this way can
never be truly kept private from other users on the machine of course,
but it's simple enough to do it this way for completeness sake.

Reported-by: Ronald Volgers &lt;r.c.volgers@student.utwente.nl&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Steve French &lt;sfrench@us.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
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<pre>
When running mount.cifs with the --verbose option, it'll print out the
option string that it passes to the kernel...including the mount
password if there is one. Print a placeholder string instead to help
ensure that this info can't be used for nefarious purposes.

Also, the --verbose option printed the option string before it was
completely assembled anyway. This patch should also make sure that
the complete option string is printed out.

Finally, strndup passwords passed in on the command line to ensure that
they aren't shown by --verbose as well. Passwords used this way can
never be truly kept private from other users on the machine of course,
but it's simple enough to do it this way for completeness sake.

Reported-by: Ronald Volgers &lt;r.c.volgers@student.utwente.nl&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Steve French &lt;sfrench@us.ibm.com&gt;
</pre>
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</content>
</entry>
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