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Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Apr 27 14:14:22 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
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Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
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Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
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Don't duplicate what's already there.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
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Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
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Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
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Only used in the static artifical session creation
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
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gensec_set_credentials() can fail
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
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The structures we unlinked have been talloc_reference()ed in gensec
and thus don't need the second talloc parent anymore. But this
talloc_unlink isn't necessary because tmp_ctx is free()ed a few lines
down.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
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Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
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add_sid_to_array_unique() only fails for ENOMEM, and other parts of
the auth stack would probably crash under ENOMEM anyway. But this is
authorization-related code that should be as clean as possible.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
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Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
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Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
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First set up "server_info" in a local variable and once it's fully set
up, assign it to the out parameter "pserver_info".
Pointer dereferencing obfuscates the code for me.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
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Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
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(find the missing TALLOC_FREE() in the - part of the patch...)
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
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More recent coding style, avoid ambiguities about ownership
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
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Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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Avoid using "uchar" in source3/auth/proto.h, this is #defined in includes.h
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
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Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
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Under the following conditions a user from an ignored domain might be able to
authenticate:
- using Kerberos
- successfully previous authentication so the idmap and name caches are filled
- winbind not running (fwiw, winbindd is mandatory on a domain member)
- nscd running with a cached getpwnam for the ignored user (otherwise auth fails
because getpwnam fails)
- lookup_name() function being modified to look into the name cache before
contacting winbindd. Currently it talks directly to winbindd and that will
check the cache.
Currently, authentication will only fail because creating the local token for
the user fails because an LSA lookupname RPC call fails (because winbindd is not
running).
All of this makes a successfull authentication unlikelly, but that is more by
accident then by design.
To ensures that if winbindd is not running and as such winbindd itself can not
enforce the restriction, also implement the ignored domains check in the auth
system as a last line of defense.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14602
RN: "winbind:ignore domains" doesn't prevent user login from trusted domain
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
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It's a bit shocking how many references we have to global
contexts. Make this a bit more obvious.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
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When Samba is used as a part of FreeIPA domain controller, Windows
clients for a trusted AD forest may try to authenticate (perform logon
operation) as a REALM\name user account.
Fix auth_sam plugins to accept DNS forest name if we are running on a DC
with PASSDB module providing domain information (e.g. pdb_get_domain_info()
returning non-NULL structure). Right now, only FreeIPA or Samba AD DC
PASSDB backends return this information but Samba AD DC configuration is
explicitly ignored by the two auth_sam (strict and netlogon3) modules.
Detailed logs below:
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.281296, 1, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=rpc_parse] ../../librpc/ndr/ndr.c:482(ndr_print_function_debug)
netr_LogonSamLogonWithFlags: struct netr_LogonSamLogonWithFlags
in: struct netr_LogonSamLogonWithFlags
server_name : *
server_name : '\\master.ipa.test'
computer_name : *
computer_name : 'AD1'
credential : *
credential: struct netr_Authenticator
cred: struct netr_Credential
data : 529f4b087c5f6546
timestamp : Wed Nov 11 09:23:55 AM 2020 UTC
return_authenticator : *
return_authenticator: struct netr_Authenticator
cred: struct netr_Credential
data : 204f28f622010000
timestamp : Fri May 2 06:37:50 AM 1986 UTC
logon_level : NetlogonNetworkTransitiveInformation (6)
logon : *
logon : union netr_LogonLevel(case 6)
network : *
network: struct netr_NetworkInfo
identity_info: struct netr_IdentityInfo
domain_name: struct lsa_String
length : 0x0010 (16)
size : 0x01fe (510)
string : *
string : 'IPA.TEST'
parameter_control : 0x00002ae0 (10976)
0: MSV1_0_CLEARTEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED
0: MSV1_0_UPDATE_LOGON_STATISTICS
0: MSV1_0_RETURN_USER_PARAMETERS
0: MSV1_0_DONT_TRY_GUEST_ACCOUNT
1: MSV1_0_ALLOW_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT
1: MSV1_0_RETURN_PASSWORD_EXPIRY
1: MSV1_0_USE_CLIENT_CHALLENGE
0: MSV1_0_TRY_GUEST_ACCOUNT_ONLY
1: MSV1_0_RETURN_PROFILE_PATH
0: MSV1_0_TRY_SPECIFIED_DOMAIN_ONLY
1: MSV1_0_ALLOW_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT
0: MSV1_0_DISABLE_PERSONAL_FALLBACK
1: MSV1_0_ALLOW_FORCE_GUEST
0: MSV1_0_CLEARTEXT_PASSWORD_SUPPLIED
0: MSV1_0_USE_DOMAIN_FOR_ROUTING_ONLY
0: MSV1_0_ALLOW_MSVCHAPV2
0: MSV1_0_S4U2SELF
0: MSV1_0_CHECK_LOGONHOURS_FOR_S4U
0: MSV1_0_SUBAUTHENTICATION_DLL_EX
logon_id : 0x0000000000884ef2 (8933106)
account_name: struct lsa_String
length : 0x000e (14)
size : 0x000e (14)
string : *
string : 'idmuser'
workstation: struct lsa_String
length : 0x0000 (0)
size : 0x0000 (0)
string : *
string : ''
challenge : 417207867bd33c74
nt: struct netr_ChallengeResponse
length : 0x00c0 (192)
size : 0x00c0 (192)
data : *
data: ARRAY(192)
[0000] A5 24 62 6E 31 DF 69 66 9E DC 54 D6 63 4C D6 2F .$bn1.if ..T.cL./
[0010] 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 50 37 D7 60 0C B8 D6 01 ........ P7.`....
[0020] 15 1B 38 4F 47 95 4D 62 00 00 00 00 02 00 0E 00 ..8OG.Mb ........
[0030] 57 00 49 00 4E 00 32 00 30 00 31 00 36 00 01 00 W.I.N.2. 0.1.6...
[0040] 06 00 41 00 44 00 31 00 04 00 18 00 77 00 69 00 ..A.D.1. ....w.i.
[0050] 6E 00 32 00 30 00 31 00 36 00 2E 00 74 00 65 00 n.2.0.1. 6...t.e.
[0060] 73 00 74 00 03 00 20 00 61 00 64 00 31 00 2E 00 s.t... . a.d.1...
[0070] 77 00 69 00 6E 00 32 00 30 00 31 00 36 00 2E 00 w.i.n.2. 0.1.6...
[0080] 74 00 65 00 73 00 74 00 05 00 18 00 77 00 69 00 t.e.s.t. ....w.i.
[0090] 6E 00 32 00 30 00 31 00 36 00 2E 00 74 00 65 00 n.2.0.1. 6...t.e.
[00A0] 73 00 74 00 07 00 08 00 50 37 D7 60 0C B8 D6 01 s.t..... P7.`....
[00B0] 06 00 04 00 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........ ........
lm: struct netr_ChallengeResponse
length : 0x0018 (24)
size : 0x0018 (24)
data : *
data : 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
validation_level : 0x0006 (6)
flags : *
flags : 0x00000000 (0)
0: NETLOGON_SAMLOGON_FLAG_PASS_TO_FOREST_ROOT
0: NETLOGON_SAMLOGON_FLAG_PASS_CROSS_FOREST_HOP
0: NETLOGON_SAMLOGON_FLAG_RODC_TO_OTHER_DOMAIN
0: NETLOGON_SAMLOGON_FLAG_RODC_NTLM_REQUEST
In such case checks for a workgroup name will not match the DNS forest
name used in the username specification:
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283055, 3, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth.c:200(auth_check_ntlm_password)
check_ntlm_password: Checking password for unmapped user [IPA.TEST]\[idmuser]@[] with the new password interface
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283073, 3, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth.c:203(auth_check_ntlm_password)
check_ntlm_password: mapped user is: [IPA.TEST]\[idmuser]@[]
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283082, 10, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth.c:213(auth_check_ntlm_password)
check_ntlm_password: auth_context challenge created by fixed
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283091, 10, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth.c:216(auth_check_ntlm_password)
challenge is:
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283099, 5, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0)] ../../lib/util/util.c:678(dump_data)
[0000] 41 72 07 86 7B D3 3C 74 Ar..{.<t
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283113, 10, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth_sam.c:209(auth_sam_netlogon3_auth)
auth_sam_netlogon3_auth: Check auth for: [IPA.TEST]\[idmuser]
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283123, 5, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth_sam.c:234(auth_sam_netlogon3_auth)
auth_sam_netlogon3_auth: IPA.TEST is not our domain name (DC for IPA)
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283131, 10, pid=42677, effective(65534, 65534), real(65534, 0), class=auth] ../../source3/auth/auth.c:249(auth_check_ntlm_password)
auth_check_ntlm_password: sam_netlogon3 had nothing to say
and overall authentication attempt will fail: auth_winbind will complain
that this domain is not a trusted one and refuse operating on it:
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283784, 10, pid=42663, effective(0, 0), real(0, 0), class=winbind] ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd.c:742(process_request_send)
process_request_send: process_request: Handling async request smbd(42677):PAM_AUTH_CRAP
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283796, 3, pid=42663, effective(0, 0), real(0, 0), class=winbind] ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd_pam_auth_crap.c:110(winbindd_pam_auth_crap_send)
[42677]: pam auth crap domain: [IPA.TEST] user: idmuser
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283810, 3, pid=42663, effective(0, 0), real(0, 0), class=winbind] ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd_pam.c:409(find_auth_domain)
Authentication for domain [IPA.TEST] refused as it is not a trusted domain
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283825, 10, pid=42663, effective(0, 0), real(0, 0), class=winbind] ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd.c:810(process_request_done)
process_request_done: [smbd(42677):PAM_AUTH_CRAP]: NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER
[2020/11/11 09:23:53.283844, 10, pid=42663, effective(0, 0), real(0, 0), class=winbind] ../../source3/winbindd/winbindd.c:855(process_request_written)
process_request_written: [smbd(42677):PAM_AUTH_CRAP]: delivered response to client
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
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Signed-off-by: Bjoern Jacke <bjacke@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
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Rather than have safe_string.h #include string_wrappers.h, make users of
string_wrappers.h include it explicitly.
includes.h now no longer includes string_wrappers.h transitively. Still
allow includes.h to #include safe_string.h for now so that as many
modules as possible get the safety checks in it.
Signed-off-by: Matthew DeVore <matvore@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Mulder <dmulder@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
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This is needed for make_session_info_from_username() to fill in the domain
name. The callchain goes like this:
make_session_info_from_username()
-> make_server_info_pw()
-> passwd_to_SamInfo3()
Other callers of passwd_to_SamInfo3() are also affected. A subsequent change
will let set_conn_force_user_group() user the domainname from the session_info
returned from make_session_info_from_username() to create substitution
context. Without this fix domain name would be NULL.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
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BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14247
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
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BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14247
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
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This delays reloading config slightly, but I don't see how could affect
observable behaviour other then log messages coming from the functions in
between the different locations for lp_load_with_shares() like
make_user_info_map() are sent to a different logfile if "log file" uses %U.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
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This delays reloading config slightly, but I don't see how could affect
observable behaviour other then log messages coming from the functions in
between the different locations for lp_load_with_shares() like
make_session_info_krb5() are sent to a different logfile if "log file" uses %U.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
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Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
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Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
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When a domain member gets an empty domain name or '.', it should
not forward the authentication to domain controllers of
the primary domain.
But we need to keep passing UPN account names with
an empty domain to the DCs as a domain member.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14247
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
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BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14247
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
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BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14247
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
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BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14247
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
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There's no real logic change here, but is makes it easier to
understand.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14247
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
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Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
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The fake async code has been pushed down into the 3 users, remove the sync
callback. Overall it's more lines of code, but the central interface is
simplified.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Jan 6 23:34:00 UTC 2020 on sn-devel-184
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This is just fake async, but it avoids one use of a sync function
pointer in auth4_context
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
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Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
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Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
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Use generate_random_buffer() directly on the talloc'ed buffer
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
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Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
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Signed-off-by: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
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Did this ever really work?
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Dec 2 22:47:24 UTC 2019 on sn-devel-184
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Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
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