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authorQasim Ijaz <qasdev00@gmail.com>2025-02-13 21:05:53 +0000
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2025-04-10 14:29:43 +0200
commit3d6fd5b9c6acbc005e53d0211c7381f566babec1 (patch)
treeaa23bb29f6752f38c59804b54add7dc14dd21f75
parent42561fe62c3628ea3bc9623f64f047605e98857f (diff)
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jfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ea_get()
commit fdf480da5837c23b146c4743c18de97202fcab37 upstream. During the "size_check" label in ea_get(), the code checks if the extended attribute list (xattr) size matches ea_size. If not, it logs "ea_get: invalid extended attribute" and calls print_hex_dump(). Here, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) returns 4110417968, which exceeds INT_MAX (2,147,483,647). Then ea_size is clamped: int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr)); Although clamp_t aims to bound ea_size between 0 and 4110417968, the upper limit is treated as an int, causing an overflow above 2^31 - 1. This leads "size" to wrap around and become negative (-184549328). The "size" is then passed to print_hex_dump() (called "len" in print_hex_dump()), it is passed as type size_t (an unsigned type), this is then stored inside a variable called "int remaining", which is then assigned to "int linelen" which is then passed to hex_dump_to_buffer(). In print_hex_dump() the for loop, iterates through 0 to len-1, where len is 18446744073525002176, calling hex_dump_to_buffer() on each iteration: for (i = 0; i < len; i += rowsize) { linelen = min(remaining, rowsize); remaining -= rowsize; hex_dump_to_buffer(ptr + i, linelen, rowsize, groupsize, linebuf, sizeof(linebuf), ascii); ... } The expected stopping condition (i < len) is effectively broken since len is corrupted and very large. This eventually leads to the "ptr+i" being passed to hex_dump_to_buffer() to get closer to the end of the actual bounds of "ptr", eventually an out of bounds access is done in hex_dump_to_buffer() in the following for loop: for (j = 0; j < len; j++) { if (linebuflen < lx + 2) goto overflow2; ch = ptr[j]; ... } To fix this we should validate "EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr)" before it is utilised. Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+4e6e7e4279d046613bc5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Tested-by: syzbot <syzbot+4e6e7e4279d046613bc5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4e6e7e4279d046613bc5 Fixes: d9f9d96136cb ("jfs: xattr: check invalid xattr size more strictly") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Qasim Ijaz <qasdev00@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-rw-r--r--fs/jfs/xattr.c15
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/fs/jfs/xattr.c b/fs/jfs/xattr.c
index 28e89af8eef6..d7141472123d 100644
--- a/fs/jfs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/jfs/xattr.c
@@ -559,11 +559,16 @@ static int ea_get(struct inode *inode, struct ea_buffer *ea_buf, int min_size)
size_check:
if (EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) != ea_size) {
- int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));
-
- printk(KERN_ERR "ea_get: invalid extended attribute\n");
- print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1,
- ea_buf->xattr, size, 1);
+ if (unlikely(EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) > INT_MAX)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "ea_get: extended attribute size too large: %u > INT_MAX\n",
+ EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));
+ } else {
+ int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));
+
+ printk(KERN_ERR "ea_get: invalid extended attribute\n");
+ print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1,
+ ea_buf->xattr, size, 1);
+ }
ea_release(inode, ea_buf);
rc = -EIO;
goto clean_up;