Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2022-12-14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor

Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
 "Features:
   - switch to zstd compression for profile raw data

  Cleanups:
   - simplify obtaining the newest label on a cred
   - remove useless static inline functions
   - compute permission conversion on policy unpack
   - refactor code to share common permissins
   - refactor unpack to group policy backwards compatiblity code
   - add __init annotation to aa_{setup/teardown}_dfa_engine()

  Bug Fixes:
   - fix a memleak in
       - multi_transaction_new()
       - free_ruleset()
       - unpack_profile()
       - alloc_ns()
   - fix lockdep warning when removing a namespace
   - fix regression in stacking due to label flags
   - fix loading of child before parent
   - fix kernel-doc comments that differ from fns
   - fix spelling errors in comments
   - store return value of unpack_perms_table() to signed variable"

* tag 'apparmor-pr-2022-12-14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: (64 commits)
  apparmor: Fix uninitialized symbol 'array_size' in policy_unpack_test.c
  apparmor: Add __init annotation to aa_{setup/teardown}_dfa_engine()
  apparmor: Fix memleak in alloc_ns()
  apparmor: Fix memleak issue in unpack_profile()
  apparmor: fix a memleak in free_ruleset()
  apparmor: Fix spelling of function name in comment block
  apparmor: Use pointer to struct aa_label for lbs_cred
  AppArmor: Fix kernel-doc
  LSM: Fix kernel-doc
  AppArmor: Fix kernel-doc
  apparmor: Fix loading of child before parent
  apparmor: refactor code that alloc null profiles
  apparmor: fix obsoleted comments for aa_getprocattr() and audit_resource()
  apparmor: remove useless static inline functions
  apparmor: Fix unpack_profile() warn: passing zero to 'ERR_PTR'
  apparmor: fix uninitialize table variable in error in unpack_trans_table
  apparmor: store return value of unpack_perms_table() to signed variable
  apparmor: Fix kunit test for out of bounds array
  apparmor: Fix decompression of rawdata for read back to userspace
  apparmor: Fix undefined references to zstd_ symbols
  ...

35 files changed, 1632 insertions, 914 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
index f334e7cccf2d..e0d1dd0a192a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig
+++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
@@ -85,8 +85,8 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT
 config SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
 	bool "Allow exporting the raw binary policy"
 	depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR_INTROSPECT_POLICY
-	select ZLIB_INFLATE
-	select ZLIB_DEFLATE
+	select ZSTD_COMPRESS
+	select ZSTD_DECOMPRESS
 	default y
 	help
 	  This option allows reading back binary policy as it was loaded.
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index 065f4e346553..b9c5879dd599 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
 
 apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o task.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
               path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
-              resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o net.o
+              resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o net.o \
+              policy_compat.o
 apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_KUNIT_TEST) += apparmor_policy_unpack_test.o
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index d066ccc219e2..424b2c1e586d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/fs_context.h>
 #include <linux/poll.h>
-#include <linux/zlib.h>
+#include <linux/zstd.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/major.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/magic.h>
 
@@ -611,29 +611,30 @@ static const struct file_operations aa_fs_ns_revision_fops = {
 static void profile_query_cb(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms,
 			     const char *match_str, size_t match_len)
 {
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
+						    typeof(*rules), list);
 	struct aa_perms tmp = { };
-	struct aa_dfa *dfa;
-	unsigned int state = 0;
+	aa_state_t state = DFA_NOMATCH;
 
 	if (profile_unconfined(profile))
 		return;
-	if (profile->file.dfa && *match_str == AA_CLASS_FILE) {
-		dfa = profile->file.dfa;
-		state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, profile->file.start,
+	if (rules->file.dfa && *match_str == AA_CLASS_FILE) {
+		state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file.dfa,
+					 rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE],
 					 match_str + 1, match_len - 1);
 		if (state) {
 			struct path_cond cond = { };
 
-			tmp = aa_compute_fperms(dfa, state, &cond);
+			tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(&(rules->file), state, &cond));
 		}
-	} else if (profile->policy.dfa) {
-		if (!PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, *match_str))
+	} else if (rules->policy.dfa) {
+		if (!RULE_MEDIATES(rules, *match_str))
 			return;	/* no change to current perms */
-		dfa = profile->policy.dfa;
-		state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, profile->policy.start[0],
+		state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy.dfa,
+					 rules->policy.start[0],
 					 match_str, match_len);
 		if (state)
-			aa_compute_perms(dfa, state, &tmp);
+			tmp = *aa_lookup_perms(&rules->policy, state);
 	}
 	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp);
 	aa_perms_accum_raw(perms, &tmp);
@@ -868,8 +869,10 @@ static struct multi_transaction *multi_transaction_new(struct file *file,
 	if (!t)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 	kref_init(&t->count);
-	if (copy_from_user(t->data, buf, size))
+	if (copy_from_user(t->data, buf, size)) {
+		put_multi_transaction(t);
 		return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+	}
 
 	return t;
 }
@@ -1090,9 +1093,9 @@ static int seq_profile_attach_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
 	struct aa_proxy *proxy = seq->private;
 	struct aa_label *label = aa_get_label_rcu(&proxy->label);
 	struct aa_profile *profile = labels_profile(label);
-	if (profile->attach)
-		seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", profile->attach);
-	else if (profile->xmatch)
+	if (profile->attach.xmatch_str)
+		seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", profile->attach.xmatch_str);
+	else if (profile->attach.xmatch.dfa)
 		seq_puts(seq, "<unknown>\n");
 	else
 		seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", profile->base.name);
@@ -1197,10 +1200,24 @@ static int seq_ns_name_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int seq_ns_compress_min_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+	seq_printf(seq, "%d\n", AA_MIN_CLEVEL);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int seq_ns_compress_max_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+	seq_printf(seq, "%d\n", AA_MAX_CLEVEL);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 SEQ_NS_FOPS(stacked);
 SEQ_NS_FOPS(nsstacked);
 SEQ_NS_FOPS(level);
 SEQ_NS_FOPS(name);
+SEQ_NS_FOPS(compress_min);
+SEQ_NS_FOPS(compress_max);
 
 
 /* policy/raw_data/ * file ops */
@@ -1295,42 +1312,34 @@ SEQ_RAWDATA_FOPS(revision);
 SEQ_RAWDATA_FOPS(hash);
 SEQ_RAWDATA_FOPS(compressed_size);
 
-static int deflate_decompress(char *src, size_t slen, char *dst, size_t dlen)
+static int decompress_zstd(char *src, size_t slen, char *dst, size_t dlen)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
-	if (aa_g_rawdata_compression_level != 0) {
-		int error = 0;
-		struct z_stream_s strm;
-
-		memset(&strm, 0, sizeof(strm));
-
-		strm.workspace = kvzalloc(zlib_inflate_workspacesize(), GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!strm.workspace)
-			return -ENOMEM;
-
-		strm.next_in = src;
-		strm.avail_in = slen;
-
-		error = zlib_inflateInit(&strm);
-		if (error != Z_OK) {
-			error = -ENOMEM;
-			goto fail_inflate_init;
+	if (slen < dlen) {
+		const size_t wksp_len = zstd_dctx_workspace_bound();
+		zstd_dctx *ctx;
+		void *wksp;
+		size_t out_len;
+		int ret = 0;
+
+		wksp = kvzalloc(wksp_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!wksp) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto cleanup;
 		}
-
-		strm.next_out = dst;
-		strm.avail_out = dlen;
-
-		error = zlib_inflate(&strm, Z_FINISH);
-		if (error != Z_STREAM_END)
-			error = -EINVAL;
-		else
-			error = 0;
-
-		zlib_inflateEnd(&strm);
-fail_inflate_init:
-		kvfree(strm.workspace);
-
-		return error;
+		ctx = zstd_init_dctx(wksp, wksp_len);
+		if (ctx == NULL) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+		out_len = zstd_decompress_dctx(ctx, dst, dlen, src, slen);
+		if (zstd_is_error(out_len)) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+cleanup:
+		kvfree(wksp);
+		return ret;
 	}
 #endif
 
@@ -1379,9 +1388,9 @@ static int rawdata_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 
 	private->loaddata = loaddata;
 
-	error = deflate_decompress(loaddata->data, loaddata->compressed_size,
-				   RAWDATA_F_DATA_BUF(private),
-				   loaddata->size);
+	error = decompress_zstd(loaddata->data, loaddata->compressed_size,
+				RAWDATA_F_DATA_BUF(private),
+				loaddata->size);
 	if (error)
 		goto fail_decompress;
 
@@ -2392,6 +2401,8 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_apparmor[] = {
 	AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS(".ns_level", 0444, &seq_ns_level_fops),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS(".ns_name", 0444, &seq_ns_name_fops),
 	AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS("profiles", 0444, &aa_sfs_profiles_fops),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS("raw_data_compression_level_min", 0444, &seq_ns_compress_min_fops),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS("raw_data_compression_level_max", 0444, &seq_ns_compress_max_fops),
 	AA_SFS_DIR("features", aa_sfs_entry_features),
 	{ }
 };
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index 704b0c895605..5a7978aa4b19 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -36,6 +36,43 @@ static const char *const aa_audit_type[] = {
 	"AUTO"
 };
 
+static const char *const aa_class_names[] = {
+	"none",
+	"unknown",
+	"file",
+	"cap",
+	"net",
+	"rlimits",
+	"domain",
+	"mount",
+	"unknown",
+	"ptrace",
+	"signal",
+	"xmatch",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"net",
+	"unknown",
+	"label",
+	"posix_mqueue",
+	"io_uring",
+	"module",
+	"lsm",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"unknown",
+	"X",
+	"dbus",
+};
+
+
 /*
  * Currently AppArmor auditing is fed straight into the audit framework.
  *
@@ -46,7 +83,7 @@ static const char *const aa_audit_type[] = {
  */
 
 /**
- * audit_base - core AppArmor function.
+ * audit_pre() - core AppArmor function.
  * @ab: audit buffer to fill (NOT NULL)
  * @ca: audit structure containing data to audit (NOT NULL)
  *
@@ -65,6 +102,12 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca)
 		audit_log_format(ab, " operation=\"%s\"", aad(sa)->op);
 	}
 
+	if (aad(sa)->class)
+		audit_log_format(ab, " class=\"%s\"",
+				 aad(sa)->class <= AA_CLASS_LAST ?
+				 aa_class_names[aad(sa)->class] :
+				 "unknown");
+
 	if (aad(sa)->info) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " info=\"%s\"", aad(sa)->info);
 		if (aad(sa)->error)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c
index deccea8654ad..326a51838ef2 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/capability.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c
@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile,
 		      int cap, int error)
 {
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
+						    typeof(*rules), list);
 	struct audit_cache *ent;
 	int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
 
@@ -72,13 +74,13 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile,
 	if (likely(!error)) {
 		/* test if auditing is being forced */
 		if (likely((AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) &&
-			   !cap_raised(profile->caps.audit, cap)))
+			   !cap_raised(rules->caps.audit, cap)))
 			return 0;
 		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
 	} else if (KILL_MODE(profile) ||
-		   cap_raised(profile->caps.kill, cap)) {
+		   cap_raised(rules->caps.kill, cap)) {
 		type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
-	} else if (cap_raised(profile->caps.quiet, cap) &&
+	} else if (cap_raised(rules->caps.quiet, cap) &&
 		   AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
 		   AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) {
 		/* quiet auditing */
@@ -114,10 +116,12 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile,
 static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
 			   unsigned int opts, struct common_audit_data *sa)
 {
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
+						    typeof(*rules), list);
 	int error;
 
-	if (cap_raised(profile->caps.allow, cap) &&
-	    !cap_raised(profile->caps.denied, cap))
+	if (cap_raised(rules->caps.allow, cap) &&
+	    !cap_raised(rules->caps.denied, cap))
 		error = 0;
 	else
 		error = -EPERM;
@@ -148,7 +152,7 @@ int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
 	int error = 0;
-	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP, OP_CAPABLE);
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP, AA_CLASS_CAP, OP_CAPABLE);
 
 	sa.u.cap = cap;
 	error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 00dc0ec066de..6dd3cc5309bf 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -30,24 +30,6 @@
 #include "include/policy_ns.h"
 
 /**
- * aa_free_domain_entries - free entries in a domain table
- * @domain: the domain table to free  (MAYBE NULL)
- */
-void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain)
-{
-	int i;
-	if (domain) {
-		if (!domain->table)
-			return;
-
-		for (i = 0; i < domain->size; i++)
-			kfree_sensitive(domain->table[i]);
-		kfree_sensitive(domain->table);
-		domain->table = NULL;
-	}
-}
-
-/**
  * may_change_ptraced_domain - check if can change profile on ptraced task
  * @to_label: profile to change to  (NOT NULL)
  * @info: message if there is an error
@@ -95,23 +77,25 @@ out:
  * If a subns profile is not to be matched should be prescreened with
  * visibility test.
  */
-static inline unsigned int match_component(struct aa_profile *profile,
-					   struct aa_profile *tp,
-					   bool stack, unsigned int state)
+static inline aa_state_t match_component(struct aa_profile *profile,
+					 struct aa_profile *tp,
+					 bool stack, aa_state_t state)
 {
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
+						    typeof(*rules), list);
 	const char *ns_name;
 
 	if (stack)
-		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->file.dfa, state, "&");
+		state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, "&");
 	if (profile->ns == tp->ns)
-		return aa_dfa_match(profile->file.dfa, state, tp->base.hname);
+		return aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, tp->base.hname);
 
 	/* try matching with namespace name and then profile */
 	ns_name = aa_ns_name(profile->ns, tp->ns, true);
-	state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->file.dfa, state, ":", 1);
-	state = aa_dfa_match(profile->file.dfa, state, ns_name);
-	state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->file.dfa, state, ":", 1);
-	return aa_dfa_match(profile->file.dfa, state, tp->base.hname);
+	state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file.dfa, state, ":", 1);
+	state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, ns_name);
+	state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file.dfa, state, ":", 1);
+	return aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, tp->base.hname);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -132,9 +116,11 @@ static inline unsigned int match_component(struct aa_profile *profile,
  */
 static int label_compound_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
 				struct aa_label *label, bool stack,
-				unsigned int state, bool subns, u32 request,
+				aa_state_t state, bool subns, u32 request,
 				struct aa_perms *perms)
 {
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
+						    typeof(*rules), list);
 	struct aa_profile *tp;
 	struct label_it i;
 	struct path_cond cond = { };
@@ -157,12 +143,12 @@ next:
 	label_for_each_cont(i, label, tp) {
 		if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, subns))
 			continue;
-		state = aa_dfa_match(profile->file.dfa, state, "//&");
+		state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, "//&");
 		state = match_component(profile, tp, false, state);
 		if (!state)
 			goto fail;
 	}
-	*perms = aa_compute_fperms(profile->file.dfa, state, &cond);
+	*perms = *(aa_lookup_fperms(&(rules->file), state, &cond));
 	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, perms);
 	if ((perms->allow & request) != request)
 		return -EACCES;
@@ -192,14 +178,16 @@ fail:
  */
 static int label_components_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
 				  struct aa_label *label, bool stack,
-				  unsigned int start, bool subns, u32 request,
+				  aa_state_t start, bool subns, u32 request,
 				  struct aa_perms *perms)
 {
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
+						    typeof(*rules), list);
 	struct aa_profile *tp;
 	struct label_it i;
 	struct aa_perms tmp;
 	struct path_cond cond = { };
-	unsigned int state = 0;
+	aa_state_t state = 0;
 
 	/* find first subcomponent to test */
 	label_for_each(i, label, tp) {
@@ -215,7 +203,7 @@ static int label_components_match(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	return 0;
 
 next:
-	tmp = aa_compute_fperms(profile->file.dfa, state, &cond);
+	tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(&(rules->file), state, &cond));
 	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp);
 	aa_perms_accum(perms, &tmp);
 	label_for_each_cont(i, label, tp) {
@@ -224,7 +212,7 @@ next:
 		state = match_component(profile, tp, stack, start);
 		if (!state)
 			goto fail;
-		tmp = aa_compute_fperms(profile->file.dfa, state, &cond);
+		tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(&(rules->file), state, &cond));
 		aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp);
 		aa_perms_accum(perms, &tmp);
 	}
@@ -252,7 +240,7 @@ fail:
  * Returns: the state the match finished in, may be the none matching state
  */
 static int label_match(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *label,
-		       bool stack, unsigned int state, bool subns, u32 request,
+		       bool stack, aa_state_t state, bool subns, u32 request,
 		       struct aa_perms *perms)
 {
 	int error;
@@ -286,7 +274,7 @@ static int label_match(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *label,
  */
 static int change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile,
 				struct aa_label *target, bool stack,
-				u32 request, unsigned int start,
+				u32 request, aa_state_t start,
 				struct aa_perms *perms)
 {
 	if (profile_unconfined(profile)) {
@@ -308,44 +296,47 @@ static int change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile,
  * Returns: number of extended attributes that matched, or < 0 on error
  */
 static int aa_xattrs_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
-			   struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int state)
+			   struct aa_profile *profile, aa_state_t state)
 {
 	int i;
 	struct dentry *d;
 	char *value = NULL;
-	int size, value_size = 0, ret = profile->xattr_count;
+	struct aa_attachment *attach = &profile->attach;
+	int size, value_size = 0, ret = attach->xattr_count;
 
-	if (!bprm || !profile->xattr_count)
+	if (!bprm || !attach->xattr_count)
 		return 0;
 	might_sleep();
 
 	/* transition from exec match to xattr set */
-	state = aa_dfa_outofband_transition(profile->xmatch, state);
+	state = aa_dfa_outofband_transition(attach->xmatch.dfa, state);
 	d = bprm->file->f_path.dentry;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < profile->xattr_count; i++) {
-		size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, d, profile->xattrs[i],
+	for (i = 0; i < attach->xattr_count; i++) {
+		size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, d, attach->xattrs[i],
 					  &value, value_size, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (size >= 0) {
-			u32 perm;
+			u32 index, perm;
 
 			/*
 			 * Check the xattr presence before value. This ensure
 			 * that not present xattr can be distinguished from a 0
 			 * length value or rule that matches any value
 			 */
-			state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->xmatch, state);
+			state = aa_dfa_null_transition(attach->xmatch.dfa,
+						       state);
 			/* Check xattr value */
-			state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->xmatch, state, value,
-						 size);
-			perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state);
+			state = aa_dfa_match_len(attach->xmatch.dfa, state,
+						 value, size);
+			index = ACCEPT_TABLE(attach->xmatch.dfa)[state];
+			perm = attach->xmatch.perms[index].allow;
 			if (!(perm & MAY_EXEC)) {
 				ret = -EINVAL;
 				goto out;
 			}
 		}
 		/* transition to next element */
-		state = aa_dfa_outofband_transition(profile->xmatch, state);
+		state = aa_dfa_outofband_transition(attach->xmatch.dfa, state);
 		if (size < 0) {
 			/*
 			 * No xattr match, so verify if transition to
@@ -397,6 +388,8 @@ static struct aa_label *find_attach(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 	rcu_read_lock();
 restart:
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(profile, head, base.list) {
+		struct aa_attachment *attach = &profile->attach;
+
 		if (profile->label.flags & FLAG_NULL &&
 		    &profile->label == ns_unconfined(profile->ns))
 			continue;
@@ -412,13 +405,16 @@ restart:
 		 * as another profile, signal a conflict and refuse to
 		 * match.
 		 */
-		if (profile->xmatch) {
-			unsigned int state, count;
-			u32 perm;
-
-			state = aa_dfa_leftmatch(profile->xmatch, DFA_START,
-						 name, &count);
-			perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state);
+		if (attach->xmatch.dfa) {
+			unsigned int count;
+			aa_state_t state;
+			u32 index, perm;
+
+			state = aa_dfa_leftmatch(attach->xmatch.dfa,
+					attach->xmatch.start[AA_CLASS_XMATCH],
+					name, &count);
+			index = ACCEPT_TABLE(attach->xmatch.dfa)[state];
+			perm = attach->xmatch.perms[index].allow;
 			/* any accepting state means a valid match. */
 			if (perm & MAY_EXEC) {
 				int ret = 0;
@@ -426,7 +422,7 @@ restart:
 				if (count < candidate_len)
 					continue;
 
-				if (bprm && profile->xattr_count) {
+				if (bprm && attach->xattr_count) {
 					long rev = READ_ONCE(ns->revision);
 
 					if (!aa_get_profile_not0(profile))
@@ -465,7 +461,7 @@ restart:
 				 * xattrs, or a longer match
 				 */
 				candidate = profile;
-				candidate_len = max(count, profile->xmatch_len);
+				candidate_len = max(count, attach->xmatch_len);
 				candidate_xattrs = ret;
 				conflict = false;
 			}
@@ -509,6 +505,8 @@ static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name)
 struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex,
 				const char **name)
 {
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
+						    typeof(*rules), list);
 	struct aa_label *label = NULL;
 	u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
 	int index = xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK;
@@ -519,7 +517,7 @@ struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex,
 	/* TODO: move lookup parsing to unpack time so this is a straight
 	 *       index into the resultant label
 	 */
-	for (*name = profile->file.trans.table[index]; !label && *name;
+	for (*name = rules->file.trans.table[index]; !label && *name;
 	     *name = next_name(xtype, *name)) {
 		if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) {
 			struct aa_profile *new_profile;
@@ -558,6 +556,8 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
 				   const char **lookupname,
 				   const char **info)
 {
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
+						    typeof(*rules), list);
 	struct aa_label *new = NULL;
 	struct aa_ns *ns = profile->ns;
 	u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
@@ -570,7 +570,7 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile,
 		break;
 	case AA_X_TABLE:
 		/* TODO: fix when perm mapping done at unload */
-		stack = profile->file.trans.table[xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK];
+		stack = rules->file.trans.table[xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK];
 		if (*stack != '&') {
 			/* released by caller */
 			new = x_table_lookup(profile, xindex, lookupname);
@@ -624,9 +624,11 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
 					   char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond,
 					   bool *secure_exec)
 {
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
+						    typeof(*rules), list);
 	struct aa_label *new = NULL;
 	const char *info = NULL, *name = NULL, *target = NULL;
-	unsigned int state = profile->file.start;
+	aa_state_t state = rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE];
 	struct aa_perms perms = {};
 	bool nonewprivs = false;
 	int error = 0;
@@ -660,7 +662,7 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	}
 
 	/* find exec permissions for name */
-	state = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, name, cond, &perms);
+	state = aa_str_perms(&(rules->file), state, name, cond, &perms);
 	if (perms.allow & MAY_EXEC) {
 		/* exec permission determine how to transition */
 		new = x_to_label(profile, bprm, name, perms.xindex, &target,
@@ -678,8 +680,8 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile,
 		/* no exec permission - learning mode */
 		struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
 
-		new_profile = aa_new_null_profile(profile, false, name,
-						  GFP_KERNEL);
+		new_profile = aa_new_learning_profile(profile, false, name,
+						      GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!new_profile) {
 			error = -ENOMEM;
 			info = "could not create null profile";
@@ -722,7 +724,9 @@ static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec,
 			  char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond,
 			  bool *secure_exec)
 {
-	unsigned int state = profile->file.start;
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
+						    typeof(*rules), list);
+	aa_state_t state = rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE];
 	struct aa_perms perms = {};
 	const char *xname = NULL, *info = "change_profile onexec";
 	int error = -EACCES;
@@ -755,7 +759,7 @@ static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec,
 	}
 
 	/* find exec permissions for name */
-	state = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, xname, cond, &perms);
+	state = aa_str_perms(&(rules->file), state, xname, cond, &perms);
 	if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC)) {
 		info = "no change_onexec valid for executable";
 		goto audit;
@@ -764,7 +768,7 @@ static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec,
 	 * onexec permission is linked to exec with a standard pairing
 	 * exec\0change_profile
 	 */
-	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file.dfa, state);
+	state = aa_dfa_null_transition(rules->file.dfa, state);
 	error = change_profile_perms(profile, onexec, stack, AA_MAY_ONEXEC,
 				     state, &perms);
 	if (error) {
@@ -1004,8 +1008,8 @@ static struct aa_label *build_change_hat(struct aa_profile *profile,
 	if (!hat) {
 		error = -ENOE