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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2023-09-22 12:26:42 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2023-09-22 12:26:42 -0700
commite583bffeb8bc3a7b64455b14376afd5fad71d62f (patch)
tree2954bb291b1ee098595c4368549fa65f99979073 /arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
parent5b47b5766b21a59bb247488b374e62c3b72639fb (diff)
parent509ff51ee652c41a277c2b439aea01a8f56a27b9 (diff)
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Merge tag 'x86-urgent-2023-09-22' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull misc x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar: - Fix a kexec bug - Fix an UML build bug - Fix a handful of SRSO related bugs - Fix a shadow stacks handling bug & robustify related code * tag 'x86-urgent-2023-09-22' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/shstk: Add warning for shadow stack double unmap x86/shstk: Remove useless clone error handling x86/shstk: Handle vfork clone failure correctly x86/srso: Fix SBPB enablement for spec_rstack_overflow=off x86/srso: Don't probe microcode in a guest x86/srso: Set CPUID feature bits independently of bug or mitigation status x86/srso: Fix srso_show_state() side effect x86/asm: Fix build of UML with KASAN x86/mm, kexec, ima: Use memblock_free_late() from ima_free_kexec_buffer()
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c17
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index f081d26616ac..10499bcd4e39 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2404,27 +2404,16 @@ early_param("spec_rstack_overflow", srso_parse_cmdline);
static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
{
- bool has_microcode;
+ bool has_microcode = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) || cpu_mitigations_off())
goto pred_cmd;
- /*
- * The first check is for the kernel running as a guest in order
- * for guests to verify whether IBPB is a viable mitigation.
- */
- has_microcode = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE) || cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode();
if (!has_microcode) {
pr_warn("IBPB-extending microcode not applied!\n");
pr_warn(SRSO_NOTICE);
} else {
/*
- * Enable the synthetic (even if in a real CPUID leaf)
- * flags for guests.
- */
- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);
-
- /*
* Zen1/2 with SMT off aren't vulnerable after the right
* IBPB microcode has been applied.
*/
@@ -2444,7 +2433,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
switch (srso_cmd) {
case SRSO_CMD_OFF:
- return;
+ goto pred_cmd;
case SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE:
if (has_microcode) {
@@ -2717,7 +2706,7 @@ static ssize_t srso_show_state(char *buf)
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s%s\n",
srso_strings[srso_mitigation],
- (cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode() ? "" : ", no microcode"));
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE) ? "" : ", no microcode");
}
static ssize_t gds_show_state(char *buf)