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| author | Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> | 2015-11-23 09:04:05 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> | 2015-11-23 09:04:05 +0100 |
| commit | 92907cbbef8625bb3998d1eb385fc88f23c97a3f (patch) | |
| tree | 15626ff9287e37c3cb81c7286d6db5a7fd77c854 /arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_bts.c | |
| parent | 15fbfccfe92c62ae8d1ecc647c44157ed01ac02e (diff) | |
| parent | 1ec218373b8ebda821aec00bb156a9c94fad9cd4 (diff) | |
| download | linux-92907cbbef8625bb3998d1eb385fc88f23c97a3f.tar.gz linux-92907cbbef8625bb3998d1eb385fc88f23c97a3f.tar.bz2 linux-92907cbbef8625bb3998d1eb385fc88f23c97a3f.zip | |
Merge tag 'v4.4-rc2' into drm-intel-next-queued
Linux 4.4-rc2
Backmerge to get at
commit 1b0e3a049efe471c399674fd954500ce97438d30
Author: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com>
Date: Thu Nov 5 23:04:11 2015 +0200
drm/i915/skl: disable display side power well support for now
so that we can proplery re-eanble skl power wells in -next.
Conflicts are just adjacent lines changed, except for intel_fbdev.c
where we need to interleave the changs. Nothing nefarious.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_bts.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_bts.c | 13 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_bts.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_bts.c index d1c0f254afbe..2cad71d1b14c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_bts.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_intel_bts.c @@ -495,6 +495,19 @@ static int bts_event_init(struct perf_event *event) if (x86_add_exclusive(x86_lbr_exclusive_bts)) return -EBUSY; + /* + * BTS leaks kernel addresses even when CPL0 tracing is + * disabled, so disallow intel_bts driver for unprivileged + * users on paranoid systems since it provides trace data + * to the user in a zero-copy fashion. + * + * Note that the default paranoia setting permits unprivileged + * users to profile the kernel. + */ + if (event->attr.exclude_kernel && perf_paranoid_kernel() && + !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EACCES; + ret = x86_reserve_hardware(); if (ret) { x86_del_exclusive(x86_lbr_exclusive_bts); |