diff options
| author | Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> | 2019-11-20 23:06:41 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> | 2019-11-26 22:00:04 +0100 |
| commit | 7d8d8cfdee9a7bd6f9682f253fa98efdd8048a9e (patch) | |
| tree | e84496231e428d837eba299a378e5dafa31e1849 /arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | |
| parent | dc4e0021b00b5a4ecba56fae509217776592b0aa (diff) | |
| download | linux-7d8d8cfdee9a7bd6f9682f253fa98efdd8048a9e.tar.gz linux-7d8d8cfdee9a7bd6f9682f253fa98efdd8048a9e.tar.bz2 linux-7d8d8cfdee9a7bd6f9682f253fa98efdd8048a9e.zip | |
x86/doublefault/32: Rewrite the x86_32 #DF handler and unify with 64-bit
The old x86_32 doublefault_fn() was old and crufty, and it did not
even try to recover. do_double_fault() is much nicer. Rewrite the
32-bit double fault code to sanitize CPU state and call
do_double_fault(). This is mostly an exercise i386 archaeology.
With this patch applied, 32-bit double faults get a real stack trace,
just like 64-bit double faults.
[ mingo: merged the patch to a later kernel base. ]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/traps.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 19 |
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c index 76381b04dc93..a9b16c3a933d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c @@ -306,8 +306,23 @@ __visible void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message, } #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 -/* Runs on IST stack */ +#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) || defined(CONFIG_DOUBLEFAULT) +/* + * Runs on an IST stack for x86_64 and on a special task stack for x86_32. + * + * On x86_64, this is more or less a normal kernel entry. Notwithstanding the + * SDM's warnings about double faults being unrecoverable, returning works as + * expected. Presumably what the SDM actually means is that the CPU may get + * the register state wrong on entry, so returning could be a bad idea. + * + * Various CPU engineers have promised that double faults due to an IRET fault + * while the stack is read-only are, in fact, recoverable. + * + * On x86_32, this is entered through a task gate, and regs are synthesized + * from the TSS. Returning is, in principle, okay, but changes to regs will + * be lost. If, for some reason, we need to return to a context with modified + * regs, the shim code could be adjusted to synchronize the registers. + */ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code, unsigned long cr2) { static const char str[] = "double fault"; |
