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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-12-17 14:06:53 -0600
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-12-17 14:06:53 -0600
commit4f292c4de4f6fb83776c0ff22674121eb6ddfa2f (patch)
tree7625005ed153dbc8341867bfc0076aae5adf93f9 /arch/x86/kernel
parent03d84bd6d43269df2dc63b2945dfed6610fac526 (diff)
parent3e844d842d49cdbe61a4b338bdd512654179488a (diff)
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Merge tag 'x86_mm_for_6.2_v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 mm updates from Dave Hansen: "New Feature: - Randomize the per-cpu entry areas Cleanups: - Have CR3_ADDR_MASK use PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK instead of open coding it - Move to "native" set_memory_rox() helper - Clean up pmd_get_atomic() and i386-PAE - Remove some unused page table size macros" * tag 'x86_mm_for_6.2_v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (35 commits) x86/mm: Ensure forced page table splitting x86/kasan: Populate shadow for shared chunk of the CPU entry area x86/kasan: Add helpers to align shadow addresses up and down x86/kasan: Rename local CPU_ENTRY_AREA variables to shorten names x86/mm: Populate KASAN shadow for entire per-CPU range of CPU entry area x86/mm: Recompute physical address for every page of per-CPU CEA mapping x86/mm: Rename __change_page_attr_set_clr(.checkalias) x86/mm: Inhibit _PAGE_NX changes from cpa_process_alias() x86/mm: Untangle __change_page_attr_set_clr(.checkalias) x86/mm: Add a few comments x86/mm: Fix CR3_ADDR_MASK x86/mm: Remove P*D_PAGE_MASK and P*D_PAGE_SIZE macros mm: Convert __HAVE_ARCH_P..P_GET to the new style mm: Remove pointless barrier() after pmdp_get_lockless() x86/mm/pae: Get rid of set_64bit() x86_64: Remove pointless set_64bit() usage x86/mm/pae: Be consistent with pXXp_get_and_clear() x86/mm/pae: Use WRITE_ONCE() x86/mm/pae: Don't (ab)use atomic64 mm/gup: Fix the lockless PMD access ...
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c10
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/amd_gart_64.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/head64.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c10
6 files changed, 7 insertions, 25 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index 23cbfa8d34c5..7d8c3cbde368 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -2142,11 +2142,6 @@ void __ref text_poke_queue(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len, const voi
{
struct text_poke_loc *tp;
- if (unlikely(system_state == SYSTEM_BOOTING)) {
- text_poke_early(addr, opcode, len);
- return;
- }
-
text_poke_flush(addr);
tp = &tp_vec[tp_vec_nr++];
@@ -2168,11 +2163,6 @@ void __ref text_poke_bp(void *addr, const void *opcode, size_t len, const void *
{
struct text_poke_loc tp;
- if (unlikely(system_state == SYSTEM_BOOTING)) {
- text_poke_early(addr, opcode, len);
- return;
- }
-
text_poke_loc_init(&tp, addr, opcode, len, emulate);
text_poke_bp_batch(&tp, 1);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/amd_gart_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/amd_gart_64.c
index 19a0207e529f..56a917df410d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/amd_gart_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/amd_gart_64.c
@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ static __init unsigned long check_iommu_size(unsigned long aper, u64 aper_size)
}
a = aper + iommu_size;
- iommu_size -= round_up(a, PMD_PAGE_SIZE) - a;
+ iommu_size -= round_up(a, PMD_SIZE) - a;
if (iommu_size < 64*1024*1024) {
pr_warn("PCI-DMA: Warning: Small IOMMU %luMB."
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
index ae0a8e515e20..5e7ead52cfdb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -24,10 +24,10 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/memory.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/set_memory.h>
#include <trace/syscall.h>
-#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#include <asm/kprobes.h>
#include <asm/ftrace.h>
#include <asm/nops.h>
@@ -423,9 +423,7 @@ create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned int *tramp_size)
/* ALLOC_TRAMP flags lets us know we created it */
ops->flags |= FTRACE_OPS_FL_ALLOC_TRAMP;
- if (likely(system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING))
- set_memory_ro((unsigned long)trampoline, npages);
- set_memory_x((unsigned long)trampoline, npages);
+ set_memory_rox((unsigned long)trampoline, npages);
return (unsigned long)trampoline;
fail:
tramp_free(trampoline);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 6a3cfaf6b72a..387e4b12e823 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr,
load_delta = physaddr - (unsigned long)(_text - __START_KERNEL_map);
/* Is the address not 2M aligned? */
- if (load_delta & ~PMD_PAGE_MASK)
+ if (load_delta & ~PMD_MASK)
for (;;);
/* Include the SME encryption mask in the fixup value */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c b/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
index 668a4a6533d9..bbb0f737aab1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ static inline bool within_cpu_entry(unsigned long addr, unsigned long end)
/* CPU entry erea is always used for CPU entry */
if (within_area(addr, end, CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE,
- CPU_ENTRY_AREA_TOTAL_SIZE))
+ CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE))
return true;
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
index 01b8d956aa76..66299682b6b7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
#include <linux/objtool.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/pgtable.h>
+#include <linux/set_memory.h>
#include <asm/text-patching.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
@@ -51,7 +52,6 @@
#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/insn.h>
#include <asm/debugreg.h>
-#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#include <asm/ibt.h>
#include "common.h"
@@ -415,16 +415,10 @@ void *alloc_insn_page(void)
return NULL;
/*
- * First make the page read-only, and only then make it executable to
- * prevent it from being W+X in between.
- */
- set_memory_ro((unsigned long)page, 1);
-
- /*
* TODO: Once additional kernel code protection mechanisms are set, ensure
* that the page was not maliciously altered and it is still zeroed.
*/
- set_memory_x((unsigned long)page, 1);
+ set_memory_rox((unsigned long)page, 1);
return page;
}