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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2024-10-23 18:17:46 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2024-10-25 09:53:03 -0700 |
| commit | 86e6b1547b3d013bc392adf775b89318441403c2 (patch) | |
| tree | aaf70f929fe68d0940ae53dd1ff489967356006d /arch/x86/kernel | |
| parent | ae90f6a6170d7a7a1aa4fddf664fbd093e3023bc (diff) | |
| download | linux-86e6b1547b3d013bc392adf775b89318441403c2.tar.gz linux-86e6b1547b3d013bc392adf775b89318441403c2.tar.bz2 linux-86e6b1547b3d013bc392adf775b89318441403c2.zip | |
x86: fix user address masking non-canonical speculation issue
It turns out that AMD has a "Meltdown Lite(tm)" issue with non-canonical
accesses in kernel space. And so using just the high bit to decide
whether an access is in user space or kernel space ends up with the good
old "leak speculative data" if you have the right gadget using the
result:
CVE-2020-12965 “Transient Execution of Non-Canonical Accesses“
Now, the kernel surrounds the access with a STAC/CLAC pair, and those
instructions end up serializing execution on older Zen architectures,
which closes the speculation window.
But that was true only up until Zen 5, which renames the AC bit [1].
That improves performance of STAC/CLAC a lot, but also means that the
speculation window is now open.
Note that this affects not just the new address masking, but also the
regular valid_user_address() check used by access_ok(), and the asm
version of the sign bit check in the get_user() helpers.
It does not affect put_user() or clear_user() variants, since there's no
speculative result to be used in a gadget for those operations.
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/80d94591-1297-4afb-b510-c665efd37f10@citrix.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241023094448.GAZxjFkEOOF_DM83TQ@fat_crate.local/ [1]
Link: https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1010.html
Link: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.10771
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com> # LAM case
Fixes: 2865baf54077 ("x86: support user address masking instead of non-speculative conditional")
Fixes: 6014bc27561f ("x86-64: make access_ok() independent of LAM")
Fixes: b19b74bc99b1 ("x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user()")
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 1 |
2 files changed, 11 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index f1040cb64841..a5f221ea5688 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ #include <asm/sev.h> #include <asm/tdx.h> #include <asm/posted_intr.h> +#include <asm/runtime-const.h> #include "cpu.h" @@ -2389,6 +2390,15 @@ void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) alternative_instructions(); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) { + unsigned long USER_PTR_MAX = TASK_SIZE_MAX-1; + + /* + * Enable this when LAM is gated on LASS support + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LAM)) + USER_PTR_MAX = (1ul << 63) - PAGE_SIZE - 1; + */ + runtime_const_init(ptr, USER_PTR_MAX); + /* * Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages * There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S index 6726be89b7a6..b8c5741d2fb4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -358,6 +358,7 @@ SECTIONS #endif RUNTIME_CONST_VARIABLES + RUNTIME_CONST(ptr, USER_PTR_MAX) . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); |