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author | Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> | 2023-06-13 15:14:27 -0700 |
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committer | Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> | 2023-06-13 15:15:30 -0700 |
commit | c03531e087b550d975bc1eb32f56f9da47aaa77e (patch) | |
tree | b54adfd56be610fc6423c01aaf05b1364fb91a23 /kernel/bpf | |
parent | 25085b4e9251c77758964a8e8651338972353642 (diff) | |
parent | 18b89265572b5c899522b6c1f8698e87edfad369 (diff) | |
download | linux-c03531e087b550d975bc1eb32f56f9da47aaa77e.tar.gz linux-c03531e087b550d975bc1eb32f56f9da47aaa77e.tar.bz2 linux-c03531e087b550d975bc1eb32f56f9da47aaa77e.zip |
Merge branch 'verify scalar ids mapping in regsafe()'
Eduard Zingerman says:
====================
Update regsafe() to use check_ids() for scalar values.
Otherwise the following unsafe pattern is accepted by verifier:
1: r9 = ... some pointer with range X ...
2: r6 = ... unbound scalar ID=a ...
3: r7 = ... unbound scalar ID=b ...
4: if (r6 > r7) goto +1
5: r6 = r7
6: if (r6 > X) goto ...
--- checkpoint ---
7: r9 += r7
8: *(u64 *)r9 = Y
This example is unsafe because not all execution paths verify r7 range.
Because of the jump at (4) the verifier would arrive at (6) in two states:
I. r6{.id=b}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-6;
II. r6{.id=a}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-4, 6.
Currently regsafe() does not call check_ids() for scalar registers,
thus from POV of regsafe() states (I) and (II) are identical.
The change is split in two parts:
- patches #1,2: update for mark_chain_precision() to propagate
precision marks through scalar IDs.
- patches #3,4: update for regsafe() to use a special version of
check_ids() for precise scalar values.
Changelog:
- V5 -> V6:
- check_ids() is modified to disallow mapping different 'old_id' to
the same 'cur_id', check_scalar_ids() simplified (Andrii);
- idset_push() updated to return -EFAULT instead of -1 (Andrii);
- comments fixed in check_ids_in_regsafe() test case
(Maxim Mikityanskiy);
- fixed memset warning in states_equal() reported in [4].
- V4 -> V5 (all changes are based on feedback for V4 from Andrii):
- mark_precise_scalar_ids() error code is updated to EFAULT;
- bpf_verifier_env::idmap_scratch field type is changed to struct
bpf_idmap to encapsulate temporary ID generation counter;
- regsafe() is updated to call scalar_regs_exact() only for
env->explore_alu_limits case (this had no measurable impact on
verification duration when tested using veristat).
- V3 -> V4:
- check_ids() in regsafe() is replaced by check_scalar_ids(),
as discussed with Andrii in [3],
Note: I did not transfer Andrii's ack for patch #3 from V3 because
of the changes to the algorithm.
- reg_id_scratch is renamed to idset_scratch;
- mark_precise_scalar_ids() is modified to propagate error from
idset_push();
- test cases adjusted according to feedback from Andrii for V3.
- V2 -> V3:
- u32_hashset for IDs used for range transfer is removed;
- mark_chain_precision() is updated as discussed with Andrii in [2].
- V1 -> v2:
- 'rold->precise' and 'rold->id' checks are dropped as unsafe
(thanks to discussion with Yonghong);
- patches #3,4 adding tracking of ids used for range transfer in
order to mitigate performance impact.
- RFC -> V1:
- Function verifier.c:mark_equal_scalars_as_read() is dropped,
as it was an incorrect fix for problem solved by commit [3].
- check_ids() is called only for precise scalar values.
- Test case updated to use inline assembly.
[V1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230526184126.3104040-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/
[V2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230530172739.447290-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/
[V3] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230606222411.1820404-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/
[V4] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230609210143.2625430-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/
[V5] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230612160801.2804666-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/
[RFC] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221128163442.280187-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/
[1] https://gist.github.com/eddyz87/a32ea7e62a27d3c201117c9a39ab4286
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230530172739.447290-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/T/#mc21009dcd8574b195c1860a98014bb037f16f450
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230606222411.1820404-1-eddyz87@gmail.com/T/#m89da8eeb2fa8c9ca1202c5d0b6660e1f72e45e04
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202306131550.U3M9AJGm-lkp@intel.com/
====================
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 206 |
1 files changed, 183 insertions, 23 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 1e38584d497c..fa43dc8e85b9 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -3779,6 +3779,96 @@ static void mark_all_scalars_imprecise(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_ } } +static bool idset_contains(struct bpf_idset *s, u32 id) +{ + u32 i; + + for (i = 0; i < s->count; ++i) + if (s->ids[i] == id) + return true; + + return false; +} + +static int idset_push(struct bpf_idset *s, u32 id) +{ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(s->count >= ARRAY_SIZE(s->ids))) + return -EFAULT; + s->ids[s->count++] = id; + return 0; +} + +static void idset_reset(struct bpf_idset *s) +{ + s->count = 0; +} + +/* Collect a set of IDs for all registers currently marked as precise in env->bt. + * Mark all registers with these IDs as precise. + */ +static int mark_precise_scalar_ids(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *st) +{ + struct bpf_idset *precise_ids = &env->idset_scratch; + struct backtrack_state *bt = &env->bt; + struct bpf_func_state *func; + struct bpf_reg_state *reg; + DECLARE_BITMAP(mask, 64); + int i, fr; + + idset_reset(precise_ids); + + for (fr = bt->frame; fr >= 0; fr--) { + func = st->frame[fr]; + + bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_reg_mask(bt, fr)); + for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 32) { + reg = &func->regs[i]; + if (!reg->id || reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) + continue; + if (idset_push(precise_ids, reg->id)) + return -EFAULT; + } + + bitmap_from_u64(mask, bt_frame_stack_mask(bt, fr)); + for_each_set_bit(i, mask, 64) { + if (i >= func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE) + break; + if (!is_spilled_scalar_reg(&func->stack[i])) + continue; + reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr; + if (!reg->id) + continue; + if (idset_push(precise_ids, reg->id)) + return -EFAULT; + } + } + + for (fr = 0; fr <= st->curframe; ++fr) { + func = st->frame[fr]; + + for (i = BPF_REG_0; i < BPF_REG_10; ++i) { + reg = &func->regs[i]; + if (!reg->id) + continue; + if (!idset_contains(precise_ids, reg->id)) + continue; + bt_set_frame_reg(bt, fr, i); + } + for (i = 0; i < func->allocated_stack / BPF_REG_SIZE; ++i) { + if (!is_spilled_scalar_reg(&func->stack[i])) + continue; + reg = &func->stack[i].spilled_ptr; + if (!reg->id) + continue; + if (!idset_contains(precise_ids, reg->id)) + continue; + bt_set_frame_slot(bt, fr, i); + } + } + + return 0; +} + /* * __mark_chain_precision() backtracks BPF program instruction sequence and * chain of verifier states making sure that register *regno* (if regno >= 0) @@ -3910,6 +4000,31 @@ static int __mark_chain_precision(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) bt->frame, last_idx, first_idx, subseq_idx); } + /* If some register with scalar ID is marked as precise, + * make sure that all registers sharing this ID are also precise. + * This is needed to estimate effect of find_equal_scalars(). + * Do this at the last instruction of each state, + * bpf_reg_state::id fields are valid for these instructions. + * + * Allows to track precision in situation like below: + * + * r2 = unknown value + * ... + * --- state #0 --- + * ... + * r1 = r2 // r1 and r2 now share the same ID + * ... + * --- state #1 {r1.id = A, r2.id = A} --- + * ... + * if (r2 > 10) goto exit; // find_equal_scalars() assigns range to r1 + * ... + * --- state #2 {r1.id = A, r2.id = A} --- + * r3 = r10 + * r3 += r1 // need to mark both r1 and r2 + */ + if (mark_precise_scalar_ids(env, st)) + return -EFAULT; + if (last_idx < 0) { /* we are at the entry into subprog, which * is expected for global funcs, but only if @@ -12819,12 +12934,14 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) { struct bpf_reg_state *src_reg = regs + insn->src_reg; struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg = regs + insn->dst_reg; + bool need_id = src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !src_reg->id && + !tnum_is_const(src_reg->var_off); if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) { /* case: R1 = R2 * copy register state to dest reg */ - if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && !src_reg->id) + if (need_id) /* Assign src and dst registers the same ID * that will be used by find_equal_scalars() * to propagate min/max range. @@ -12843,7 +12960,7 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) } else if (src_reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE) { bool is_src_reg_u32 = src_reg->umax_value <= U32_MAX; - if (is_src_reg_u32 && !src_reg->id) + if (is_src_reg_u32 && need_id) src_reg->id = ++env->id_gen; copy_register_state(dst_reg, src_reg); /* Make sure ID is cleared if src_reg is not in u32 range otherwise @@ -14999,8 +15116,9 @@ static bool range_within(struct bpf_reg_state *old, * So we look through our idmap to see if this old id has been seen before. If * so, we require the new id to match; otherwise, we add the id pair to the map. */ -static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) +static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_idmap *idmap) { + struct bpf_id_pair *map = idmap->map; unsigned int i; /* either both IDs should be set or both should be zero */ @@ -15011,20 +15129,34 @@ static bool check_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) return true; for (i = 0; i < BPF_ID_MAP_SIZE; i++) { - if (!idmap[i].old) { + if (!map[i].old) { /* Reached an empty slot; haven't seen this id before */ - idmap[i].old = old_id; - idmap[i].cur = cur_id; + map[i].old = old_id; + map[i].cur = cur_id; return true; } - if (idmap[i].old == old_id) - return idmap[i].cur == cur_id; + if (map[i].old == old_id) + return map[i].cur == cur_id; + if (map[i].cur == cur_id) + return false; } /* We ran out of idmap slots, which should be impossible */ WARN_ON_ONCE(1); return false; } +/* Similar to check_ids(), but allocate a unique temporary ID + * for 'old_id' or 'cur_id' of zero. + * This makes pairs like '0 vs unique ID', 'unique ID vs 0' valid. + */ +static bool check_scalar_ids(u32 old_id, u32 cur_id, struct bpf_idmap *idmap) +{ + old_id = old_id ? old_id : ++idmap->tmp_id_gen; + cur_id = cur_id ? cur_id : ++idmap->tmp_id_gen; + + return check_ids(old_id, cur_id, idmap); +} + static void clean_func_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *st) { @@ -15123,7 +15255,7 @@ next: static bool regs_exact(const struct bpf_reg_state *rold, const struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, - struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) + struct bpf_idmap *idmap) { return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 && check_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap) && @@ -15132,7 +15264,7 @@ static bool regs_exact(const struct bpf_reg_state *rold, /* Returns true if (rold safe implies rcur safe) */ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, - struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) + struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, struct bpf_idmap *idmap) { if (!(rold->live & REG_LIVE_READ)) /* explored state didn't use this */ @@ -15169,15 +15301,42 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, switch (base_type(rold->type)) { case SCALAR_VALUE: - if (regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap)) - return true; - if (env->explore_alu_limits) - return false; + if (env->explore_alu_limits) { + /* explore_alu_limits disables tnum_in() and range_within() + * logic and requires everything to be strict + */ + return memcmp(rold, rcur, offsetof(struct bpf_reg_state, id)) == 0 && + check_scalar_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap); + } if (!rold->precise) return true; - /* new val must satisfy old val knowledge */ + /* Why check_ids() for scalar registers? + * + * Consider the following BPF code: + * 1: r6 = ... unbound scalar, ID=a ... + * 2: r7 = ... unbound scalar, ID=b ... + * 3: if (r6 > r7) goto +1 + * 4: r6 = r7 + * 5: if (r6 > X) goto ... + * 6: ... memory operation using r7 ... + * + * First verification path is [1-6]: + * - at (4) same bpf_reg_state::id (b) would be assigned to r6 and r7; + * - at (5) r6 would be marked <= X, find_equal_scalars() would also mark + * r7 <= X, because r6 and r7 share same id. + * Next verification path is [1-4, 6]. + * + * Instruction (6) would be reached in two states: + * I. r6{.id=b}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-6; + * II. r6{.id=a}, r7{.id=b} via path 1-4, 6. + * + * Use check_ids() to distinguish these states. + * --- + * Also verify that new value satisfies old value range knowledge. + */ return range_within(rold, rcur) && - tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off); + tnum_in(rold->var_off, rcur->var_off) && + check_scalar_ids(rold->id, rcur->id, idmap); case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY: case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE: case PTR_TO_MEM: @@ -15223,7 +15382,7 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold, } static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, - struct bpf_func_state *cur, struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) + struct bpf_func_state *cur, struct bpf_idmap *idmap) { int i, spi; @@ -15326,7 +15485,7 @@ static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, } static bool refsafe(struct bpf_func_state *old, struct bpf_func_state *cur, - struct bpf_id_pair *idmap) + struct bpf_idmap *idmap) { int i; @@ -15374,13 +15533,13 @@ static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_stat for (i = 0; i < MAX_BPF_REG; i++) if (!regsafe(env, &old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i], - env->idmap_scratch)) + &env->idmap_scratch)) return false; - if (!stacksafe(env, old, cur, env->idmap_scratch)) + if (!stacksafe(env, old, cur, &env->idmap_scratch)) return false; - if (!refsafe(old, cur, env->idmap_scratch)) + if (!refsafe(old, cur, &env->idmap_scratch)) return false; return true; @@ -15395,7 +15554,8 @@ static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (old->curframe != cur->curframe) return false; - memset(env->idmap_scratch, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch)); + env->idmap_scratch.tmp_id_gen = env->id_gen; + memset(&env->idmap_scratch.map, 0, sizeof(env->idmap_scratch.map)); /* Verification state from speculative execution simulation * must never prune a non-speculative execution one. @@ -15413,7 +15573,7 @@ static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, return false; if (old->active_lock.id && - !check_ids(old->active_lock.id, cur->active_lock.id, env->idmap_scratch)) + !check_ids(old->active_lock.id, cur->active_lock.id, &env->idmap_scratch)) return false; if (old->active_rcu_lock != cur->active_rcu_lock) |