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| author | Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> | 2019-04-12 17:50:58 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2019-05-14 19:19:41 +0200 |
| commit | 3645b361be489077bd85458c40e47be791ca318c (patch) | |
| tree | 44c02ef93ebb9219fce21f94eb0e25488359b0c5 /kernel/cpu.c | |
| parent | 450aa01a076d9aa5b459a7a33c74d95eca6a1e37 (diff) | |
| download | linux-3645b361be489077bd85458c40e47be791ca318c.tar.gz linux-3645b361be489077bd85458c40e47be791ca318c.tar.bz2 linux-3645b361be489077bd85458c40e47be791ca318c.zip | |
x86/speculation/mds: Print SMT vulnerable on MSBDS with mitigations off
commit e2c3c94788b08891dcf3dbe608f9880523ecd71b upstream.
This code is only for CPUs which are affected by MSBDS, but are *not*
affected by the other two MDS issues.
For such CPUs, enabling the mds_idle_clear mitigation is enough to
mitigate SMT.
However if user boots with 'mds=off' and still has SMT enabled, we should
not report that SMT is mitigated:
$cat /sys//devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
Vulnerable; SMT mitigated
But rather:
Vulnerable; SMT vulnerable
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190412215118.294906495@localhost.localdomain
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/cpu.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions