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| author | Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> | 2007-10-12 21:27:47 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> | 2007-10-12 21:27:47 -0400 |
| commit | b981d8b3f5e008ff10d993be633ad00564fc22cd (patch) | |
| tree | e292dc07b22308912cf6a58354a608b9e5e8e1fd /kernel | |
| parent | b11d2127c4893a7315d1e16273bc8560049fa3ca (diff) | |
| parent | 2b9e0aae1d50e880c58d46788e5e3ebd89d75d62 (diff) | |
| download | linux-b981d8b3f5e008ff10d993be633ad00564fc22cd.tar.gz linux-b981d8b3f5e008ff10d993be633ad00564fc22cd.tar.bz2 linux-b981d8b3f5e008ff10d993be633ad00564fc22cd.zip | |
Merge master.kernel.org:/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6
Conflicts:
drivers/macintosh/adbhid.c
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
71 files changed, 3643 insertions, 2175 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/Kconfig.preempt b/kernel/Kconfig.preempt index c64ce9c14207..6b066632e40c 100644 --- a/kernel/Kconfig.preempt +++ b/kernel/Kconfig.preempt @@ -63,3 +63,6 @@ config PREEMPT_BKL Say Y here if you are building a kernel for a desktop system. Say N if you are unsure. +config PREEMPT_NOTIFIERS + bool + diff --git a/kernel/acct.c b/kernel/acct.c index 70d0d88e5554..24f0f8b2ba72 100644 --- a/kernel/acct.c +++ b/kernel/acct.c @@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ static void do_acct_process(struct file *file) } #endif do_div(elapsed, AHZ); - ac.ac_btime = xtime.tv_sec - elapsed; + ac.ac_btime = get_seconds() - elapsed; /* we really need to bite the bullet and change layout */ ac.ac_uid = current->uid; ac.ac_gid = current->gid; diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index eb0f9165b401..2924251a6547 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -847,18 +847,10 @@ static void audit_receive_skb(struct sk_buff *skb) } /* Receive messages from netlink socket. */ -static void audit_receive(struct sock *sk, int length) +static void audit_receive(struct sk_buff *skb) { - struct sk_buff *skb; - unsigned int qlen; - mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex); - - for (qlen = skb_queue_len(&sk->sk_receive_queue); qlen; qlen--) { - skb = skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_receive_queue); - audit_receive_skb(skb); - kfree_skb(skb); - } + audit_receive_skb(skb); mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex); } @@ -876,8 +868,8 @@ static int __init audit_init(void) printk(KERN_INFO "audit: initializing netlink socket (%s)\n", audit_default ? "enabled" : "disabled"); - audit_sock = netlink_kernel_create(NETLINK_AUDIT, 0, audit_receive, - NULL, THIS_MODULE); + audit_sock = netlink_kernel_create(&init_net, NETLINK_AUDIT, 0, + audit_receive, NULL, THIS_MODULE); if (!audit_sock) audit_panic("cannot initialize netlink socket"); else diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 1bf093dcffe0..359645cff5b2 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ int __init audit_register_class(int class, unsigned *list) int audit_match_class(int class, unsigned syscall) { - if (unlikely(syscall >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * sizeof(__u32))) + if (unlikely(syscall >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32)) return 0; if (unlikely(class >= AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES || !classes[class])) return 0; @@ -456,6 +456,13 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_rule_to_entry(struct audit_rule *rule) case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: case AUDIT_EXIT: case AUDIT_SUCCESS: + /* bit ops are only useful on syscall args */ + if (f->op == AUDIT_BIT_MASK || + f->op == AUDIT_BIT_TEST) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto exit_free; + } + break; case AUDIT_ARG0: case AUDIT_ARG1: case AUDIT_ARG2: @@ -1566,6 +1573,10 @@ int audit_comparator(const u32 left, const u32 op, const u32 right) return (left > right); case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL: return (left >= right); + case AUDIT_BIT_MASK: + return (left & right); + case AUDIT_BIT_TEST: + return ((left & right) == right); } BUG(); return 0; diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index b7640a5f382a..04f3ffb8d9d4 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_execve { struct audit_aux_data d; int argc; int envc; - char mem[0]; + struct mm_struct *mm; }; struct audit_aux_data_socketcall { @@ -173,12 +173,6 @@ struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair { int fd[2]; }; -struct audit_aux_data_path { - struct audit_aux_data d; - struct dentry *dentry; - struct vfsmount *mnt; -}; - struct audit_aux_data_pids { struct audit_aux_data d; pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; @@ -654,12 +648,6 @@ static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context) struct audit_aux_data *aux; while ((aux = context->aux)) { - if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) { - struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux; - dput(axi->dentry); - mntput(axi->mnt); - } - context->aux = aux->next; kfree(aux); } @@ -831,6 +819,57 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, return rc; } +static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, + struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi) +{ + int i; + long len, ret; + const char __user *p; + char *buf; + + if (axi->mm != current->mm) + return; /* execve failed, no additional info */ + + p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start; + + for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++, p += len) { + len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN); + /* + * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings + * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar + * for strings that are too long, we should not have created + * any. + */ + if (!len || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN) { + WARN_ON(1); + send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); + } + + buf = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) { + audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n"); + break; + } + + ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, len); + /* + * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just + * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user- + * space yet. + */ + if (ret) { + WARN_ON(1); + send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); + } + + audit_log_format(ab, "a%d=", i); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, buf); + audit_log_format(ab, "\n"); + + kfree(buf); + } +} + static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk) { int i, call_panic = 0; @@ -946,7 +985,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts case AUDIT_IPC: { struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux; audit_log_format(ab, - "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%x", + "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o", axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode); if (axi->osid != 0) { char *ctx = NULL; @@ -965,19 +1004,13 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts case AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM: { struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux; audit_log_format(ab, - "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%x", + "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#o", axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode); break; } case AUDIT_EXECVE: { struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux; - int i; - const char *p; - for (i = 0, p = axi->mem; i < axi->argc; i++) { - audit_log_format(ab, "a%d=", i); - p = audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p); - audit_log_format(ab, "\n"); - } + audit_log_execve_info(ab, axi); break; } case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: { @@ -995,11 +1028,6 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len); break; } - case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: { - struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux; - audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt); - break; } - case AUDIT_FD_PAIR: { struct audit_aux_data_fd_pair *axs = (void *)aux; audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", axs->fd[0], axs->fd[1]); @@ -1821,32 +1849,31 @@ int __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode return 0; } +int audit_argv_kb = 32; + int audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax; struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; - unsigned long p, next; - void *to; if (likely(!audit_enabled || !context || context->dummy)) return 0; - ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - bprm->p, - GFP_KERNEL); + /* + * Even though the stack code doesn't limit the arg+env size any more, + * the audit code requires that _all_ arguments be logged in a single + * netlink skb. Hence cap it :-( + */ + if (bprm->argv_len > (audit_argv_kb << 10)) + return -E2BIG; + + ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); if (!ax) return -ENOMEM; ax->argc = bprm->argc; ax->envc = bprm->envc; - for (p = bprm->p, to = ax->mem; p < MAX_ARG_PAGES*PAGE_SIZE; p = next) { - struct page *page = bprm->page[p / PAGE_SIZE]; - void *kaddr = kmap(page); - next = (p + PAGE_SIZE) & ~(PAGE_SIZE - 1); - memcpy(to, kaddr + (p & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)), next - p); - to += next - p; - kunmap(page); - } - + ax->mm = bprm->mm; ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE; ax->d.next = context->aux; context->aux = (void *)ax; @@ -1949,36 +1976,6 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) } /** - * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions - * @dentry: dentry to record - * @mnt: mnt to record - * - * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. - * - * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit() - */ -int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt) -{ - struct audit_aux_data_path *ax; - struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; - - if (likely(!context)) - return 0; - - ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC); - if (!ax) - return -ENOMEM; - - ax->dentry = dget(dentry); - ax->mnt = mntget(mnt); - - ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH; - ax->d.next = context->aux; - context->aux = (void *)ax; - return 0; -} - -/** * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem * @sig: signal value * @t: task being signaled @@ -1995,19 +1992,19 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) extern uid_t audit_sig_uid; extern u32 audit_sig_sid; - if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid && - (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1)) { - audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid; - if (ctx) - audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid; - else - audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid; - selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid); + if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) { + if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1) { + audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid; + if (ctx) + audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid; + else + audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid; + selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid); + } + if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) + return 0; } - if (!audit_signals) /* audit_context checked in wrapper */ - return 0; - /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly * in audit_context */ if (!ctx->target_pid) { @@ -2026,7 +2023,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids; ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp; } - BUG_ON(axp->pid_count > AUDIT_AUX_PIDS); + BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS); axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid; selinux_get_task_sid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c index 181ae7086029..38033db8d8ec 100644 --- a/kernel/cpu.c +++ b/kernel/cpu.c @@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ int __cpuinit cpu_up(unsigned int cpu) return err; } -#ifdef CONFIG_SUSPEND_SMP +#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP_SMP static cpumask_t frozen_cpus; int disable_nonboot_cpus(void) @@ -334,4 +334,4 @@ void enable_nonboot_cpus(void) out: mutex_unlock(&cpu_add_remove_lock); } -#endif +#endif /* CONFIG_PM_SLEEP_SMP */ diff --git a/kernel/cpuset.c b/kernel/cpuset.c index b4796d850140..57e6448b171e 100644 --- a/kernel/cpuset.c +++ b/kernel/cpuset.c @@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ static void cpuset_release_agent(const char *pathbuf) envp[i++] = "PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin"; envp[i] = NULL; - call_usermodehelper(argv[0], argv, envp, 0); + call_usermodehelper(argv[0], argv, envp, UMH_WAIT_EXEC); kfree(pathbuf); } diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c index e8af8d0c2483..993369ee94d1 100644 --- a/kernel/exit.c +++ b/kernel/exit.c @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ #include <linux/pid_namespace.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> #include <linux/profile.h> -#include <linux/signalfd.h> #include <linux/mount.h> #include <linux/proc_fs.h> #include <linux/kthread.h> @@ -45,6 +44,7 @@ #include <linux/resource.h> #include <linux/blkdev.h> #include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h> +#include <linux/freezer.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <asm/unistd.h> @@ -85,14 +85,6 @@ static void __exit_signal(struct task_struct *tsk) sighand = rcu_dereference(tsk->sighand); spin_lock(&sighand->siglock); - /* - * Notify that this sighand has been detached. This must - * be called with the tsk->sighand lock held. Also, this - * access tsk->sighand internally, so it must be called - * before tsk->sighand is reset. - */ - signalfd_detach_locked(tsk); - posix_cpu_timers_exit(tsk); if (atomic_dec_and_test(&sig->count)) posix_cpu_timers_exit_group(tsk); @@ -594,6 +586,8 @@ static void exit_mm(struct task_struct * tsk) tsk->mm = NULL; up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); enter_lazy_tlb(mm, current); + /* We don't want this task to be frozen prematurely */ + clear_freeze_flag(tsk); task_unlock(tsk); mmput(mm); } @@ -810,7 +804,7 @@ static void exit_notify(struct task_struct *tsk) __kill_pgrp_info(SIGCONT, SEND_SIG_PRIV, pgrp); } - /* Let father know we died + /* Let father know we died * * Thread signals are configurable, but you aren't going to use * that to send signals to arbitary processes. @@ -823,9 +817,7 @@ static void exit_notify(struct task_struct *tsk) * If our self_exec id doesn't match our parent_exec_id then * we have changed execution domain as these two values started * the same after a fork. - * */ - if (tsk->exit_signal != SIGCHLD && tsk->exit_signal != -1 && ( tsk->parent_exec_id != t->self_exec_id || tsk->self_exec_id != tsk->parent_exec_id) @@ -845,9 +837,7 @@ static void exit_notify(struct task_struct *tsk) } state = EXIT_ZOMBIE; - if (tsk->exit_signal == -1 && - (likely(tsk->ptrace == 0) || - unlikely(tsk->parent->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT))) + if (tsk->exit_signal == -1 && likely(!tsk->ptrace)) state = EXIT_DEAD; tsk->exit_state = state; @@ -976,6 +966,7 @@ fastcall NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code) if (unlikely(tsk->audit_context)) audit_free(tsk); + tsk->exit_code = code; taskstats_exit(tsk, group_dead); exit_mm(tsk); @@ -997,7 +988,6 @@ fastcall NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code) if (tsk->binfmt) module_put(tsk->binfmt->module); - tsk->exit_code = code; proc_exit_connector(tsk); exit_task_namespaces(tsk); exit_notify(tsk); diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index ba39bdb2a7b8..5e67f90a1694 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ void __init fork_init(unsigned long mempages) /* create a slab on which task_structs can be allocated */ task_struct_cachep = kmem_cache_create("task_struct", sizeof(struct task_struct), - ARCH_MIN_TASKALIGN, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL); + ARCH_MIN_TASKALIGN, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); #endif /* @@ -334,6 +334,8 @@ static struct mm_struct * mm_init(struct mm_struct * mm) atomic_set(&mm->mm_count, 1); init_rwsem(&mm->mmap_sem); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mm->mmlist); + mm->flags = (current->mm) ? current->mm->flags + : MMF_DUMP_FILTER_DEFAULT; mm->core_waiters = 0; mm->nr_ptes = 0; set_mm_counter(mm, file_rss, 0); @@ -1436,7 +1438,7 @@ static void sighand_ctor(void *data, struct kmem_cache *cachep, struct sighand_struct *sighand = data; spin_lock_init(&sighand->siglock); - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sighand->signalfd_list); + init_waitqueue_head(&sighand->signalfd_wqh); } void __init proc_caches_init(void) @@ -1444,22 +1446,22 @@ void __init proc_caches_init(void) sighand_cachep = kmem_cache_create("sighand_cache", sizeof(struct sighand_struct), 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU, - sighand_ctor, NULL); + sighand_ctor); signal_cachep = kmem_cache_create("signal_cache", sizeof(struct signal_struct), 0, - SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL); - files_cachep = kmem_cache_create("files_cache", + SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL); + files_cachep = kmem_cache_create("files_cache", sizeof(struct files_struct), 0, - SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL); - fs_cachep = kmem_cac |
