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authorPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>2022-08-08 19:30:06 +0200
committerPablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>2022-08-09 20:13:29 +0200
commit341b6941608762d8235f3fd1e45e4d7114ed8c2c (patch)
tree0d691ec705b8b126f5c40f8c60d98676cb8a91f1 /net/netfilter/nft_range.c
parent134941683b89d05b5e5c28c817c95049ba409d01 (diff)
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netfilter: nf_tables: upfront validation of data via nft_data_init()
Instead of parsing the data and then validate that type and length are correct, pass a description of the expected data so it can be validated upfront before parsing it to bail out earlier. This patch adds a new .size field to specify the maximum size of the data area. The .len field is optional and it is used as an input/output field, it provides the specific length of the expected data in the input path. If then .len field is not specified, then obtained length from the netlink attribute is stored. This is required by cmp, bitwise, range and immediate, which provide no netlink attribute that describes the data length. The immediate expression uses the destination register type to infer the expected data type. Relying on opencoded validation of the expected data might lead to subtle bugs as described in 7e6bc1f6cabc ("netfilter: nf_tables: stricter validation of element data"). Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/netfilter/nft_range.c')
-rw-r--r--net/netfilter/nft_range.c27
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 15 deletions
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_range.c b/net/netfilter/nft_range.c
index 66f77484c227..832f0d725a9e 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_range.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_range.c
@@ -51,7 +51,14 @@ static int nft_range_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr
const struct nlattr * const tb[])
{
struct nft_range_expr *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr);
- struct nft_data_desc desc_from, desc_to;
+ struct nft_data_desc desc_from = {
+ .type = NFT_DATA_VALUE,
+ .size = sizeof(priv->data_from),
+ };
+ struct nft_data_desc desc_to = {
+ .type = NFT_DATA_VALUE,
+ .size = sizeof(priv->data_to),
+ };
int err;
u32 op;
@@ -61,26 +68,16 @@ static int nft_range_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr
!tb[NFTA_RANGE_TO_DATA])
return -EINVAL;
- err = nft_data_init(NULL, &priv->data_from, sizeof(priv->data_from),
- &desc_from, tb[NFTA_RANGE_FROM_DATA]);
+ err = nft_data_init(NULL, &priv->data_from, &desc_from,
+ tb[NFTA_RANGE_FROM_DATA]);
if (err < 0)
return err;
- if (desc_from.type != NFT_DATA_VALUE) {
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto err1;
- }
-
- err = nft_data_init(NULL, &priv->data_to, sizeof(priv->data_to),
- &desc_to, tb[NFTA_RANGE_TO_DATA]);
+ err = nft_data_init(NULL, &priv->data_to, &desc_to,
+ tb[NFTA_RANGE_TO_DATA]);
if (err < 0)
goto err1;
- if (desc_to.type != NFT_DATA_VALUE) {
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto err2;
- }
-
if (desc_from.len != desc_to.len) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto err2;