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| author | James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> | 2019-02-14 10:55:42 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> | 2019-02-14 10:55:42 -0800 |
| commit | 2e884fc9759d8816630d3c30694721a39b7396e0 (patch) | |
| tree | 83c213634f69eec583f1d4ca7234e78ccf367435 /security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | |
| parent | e7a44cfd639945a0dec749f896adc1d340c2a6aa (diff) | |
| parent | e7fde070f39bc058c356cf366cb17ac2d643abb0 (diff) | |
| download | linux-2e884fc9759d8816630d3c30694721a39b7396e0.tar.gz linux-2e884fc9759d8816630d3c30694721a39b7396e0.tar.bz2 linux-2e884fc9759d8816630d3c30694721a39b7396e0.zip | |
Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next-integrity
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Linux 5.0 introduced the platform keyring to allow verifying the IMA
kexec kernel image signature using the pre-boot keys. This pull
request similarly makes keys on the platform keyring accessible for
verifying the PE kernel image signature.*
Also included in this pull request is a new IMA hook that tags tmp
files, in policy, indicating the file hash needs to be calculated.
The remaining patches are cleanup.
*Upstream commit "993a110319a4 (x86/kexec: Fix a kexec_file_load()
failure)" is required for testing.
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 35 |
1 files changed, 33 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 4ffac4f5c647..357edd140c09 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -397,6 +397,33 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); /** + * ima_post_create_tmpfile - mark newly created tmpfile as new + * @file : newly created tmpfile + * + * No measuring, appraising or auditing of newly created tmpfiles is needed. + * Skip calling process_measurement(), but indicate which newly, created + * tmpfiles are in policy. + */ +void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct inode *inode) +{ + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; + int must_appraise; + + must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK); + if (!must_appraise) + return; + + /* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */ + iint = integrity_inode_get(inode); + if (!iint) + return; + + /* needed for writing the security xattrs */ + set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); + iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; +} + +/** * ima_post_path_mknod - mark as a new inode * @dentry: newly created dentry * @@ -413,9 +440,13 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) if (!must_appraise) return; + /* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */ iint = integrity_inode_get(inode); - if (iint) - iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE; + if (!iint) + return; + + /* needed for re-opening empty files */ + iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE; } /** |
