diff options
46 files changed, 539 insertions, 449 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/dontdiff b/Documentation/dontdiff index 910b30a2a7d9..352ff53a2306 100644 --- a/Documentation/dontdiff +++ b/Documentation/dontdiff @@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ r200_reg_safe.h r300_reg_safe.h r420_reg_safe.h r600_reg_safe.h +randstruct.seed randomize_layout_hash.h randomize_layout_seed.h recordmcount diff --git a/Documentation/kbuild/reproducible-builds.rst b/Documentation/kbuild/reproducible-builds.rst index 3b25655e441b..071f0151a7a4 100644 --- a/Documentation/kbuild/reproducible-builds.rst +++ b/Documentation/kbuild/reproducible-builds.rst @@ -99,10 +99,10 @@ unreproducible parts can be treated as sources: Structure randomisation ----------------------- -If you enable ``CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT``, you will need to -pre-generate the random seed in -``scripts/gcc-plugins/randomize_layout_seed.h`` so the same value -is used in rebuilds. +If you enable ``CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT``, you will need to pre-generate +the random seed in ``scripts/basic/randstruct.seed`` so the same +value is used by each build. See ``scripts/gen-randstruct-seed.sh`` +for details. Debug info conflicts -------------------- @@ -1011,6 +1011,7 @@ include-$(CONFIG_KASAN) += scripts/Makefile.kasan include-$(CONFIG_KCSAN) += scripts/Makefile.kcsan include-$(CONFIG_UBSAN) += scripts/Makefile.ubsan include-$(CONFIG_KCOV) += scripts/Makefile.kcov +include-$(CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT) += scripts/Makefile.randstruct include-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGINS) += scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins include $(addprefix $(srctree)/, $(include-y)) diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index c903f9508eea..763b1b5e4f41 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -732,10 +732,7 @@ config ARCH_SUPPORTS_CFI_CLANG config CFI_CLANG bool "Use Clang's Control Flow Integrity (CFI)" depends on LTO_CLANG && ARCH_SUPPORTS_CFI_CLANG - # Clang >= 12: - # - https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=46258 - # - https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=47479 - depends on CLANG_VERSION >= 120000 + depends on CLANG_VERSION >= 140000 select KALLSYMS help This option enables Clang’s forward-edge Control Flow Integrity diff --git a/arch/arm/vdso/Makefile b/arch/arm/vdso/Makefile index ec52b776f926..8ca1c9f262a2 100644 --- a/arch/arm/vdso/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm/vdso/Makefile @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ CPPFLAGS_vdso.lds += -P -C -U$(ARCH) CFLAGS_REMOVE_vdso.o = -pg # Force -O2 to avoid libgcc dependencies -CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgettimeofday.o = -pg -Os $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) +CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgettimeofday.o = -pg -Os $(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS) $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) ifeq ($(c-gettimeofday-y),) CFLAGS_vgettimeofday.o = -O2 else diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h index dc3ea4080e2e..6fb2e6bcc392 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/compiler.h @@ -23,20 +23,4 @@ #define __builtin_return_address(val) \ (void *)(ptrauth_clear_pac((unsigned long)__builtin_return_address(val))) -#ifdef CONFIG_CFI_CLANG -/* - * With CONFIG_CFI_CLANG, the compiler replaces function address - * references with the address of the function's CFI jump table - * entry. The function_nocfi macro always returns the address of the - * actual function instead. - */ -#define function_nocfi(x) ({ \ - void *addr; \ - asm("adrp %0, " __stringify(x) "\n\t" \ - "add %0, %0, :lo12:" __stringify(x) \ - : "=r" (addr)); \ - addr; \ -}) -#endif - #endif /* __ASM_COMPILER_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h index 8de5a4fc06e3..bf8aafee1eac 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h @@ -405,12 +405,10 @@ long get_tagged_addr_ctrl(struct task_struct *task); * of header definitions for the use of task_stack_page. */ -#define current_top_of_stack() \ -({ \ - struct stack_info _info; \ - BUG_ON(!on_accessible_stack(current, current_stack_pointer, 1, &_info)); \ - _info.high; \ -}) +/* + * The top of the current task's task stack + */ +#define current_top_of_stack() ((unsigned long)current->stack + THREAD_SIZE) #define on_thread_stack() (on_task_stack(current, current_stack_pointer, 1, NULL)) #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S index ede028dee81b..5b82b9292400 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S @@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(ret_to_user) ldr x19, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS] // re-check for single-step enable_step_tsk x19, x2 #ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK - bl stackleak_erase + bl stackleak_erase_on_task_stack #endif kernel_exit 0 SYM_CODE_END(ret_to_user) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile index ac1964ebed1e..f6e25d7c346a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/Makefile @@ -32,7 +32,8 @@ ccflags-y += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING -DBUILD_VDSO # -Wmissing-prototypes and -Wmissing-declarations are removed from # the CFLAGS of vgettimeofday.c to make possible to build the # kernel with CONFIG_WERROR enabled. -CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgettimeofday.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) -Os $(CC_FLAGS_SCS) $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) \ +CFLAGS_REMOVE_vgettimeofday.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) -Os $(CC_FLAGS_SCS) \ + $(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS) $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) \ $(CC_FLAGS_LTO) -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations KASAN_SANITIZE := n KCSAN_SANITIZE := n diff --git a/arch/riscv/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/Kconfig index 00fd9c548f26..3ac2a81a55eb 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/Kconfig +++ b/arch/riscv/Kconfig @@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ config CC_HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR_TLS config STACKPROTECTOR_PER_TASK def_bool y - depends on !GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT + depends on !RANDSTRUCT depends on STACKPROTECTOR && CC_HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR_TLS config PHYS_RAM_BASE_FIXED diff --git a/arch/sparc/vdso/Makefile b/arch/sparc/vdso/Makefile index c5e1545bc5cf..77d7b9032158 100644 --- a/arch/sparc/vdso/Makefile +++ b/arch/sparc/vdso/Makefile @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ CFL := $(PROFILING) -mcmodel=medlow -fPIC -O2 -fasynchronous-unwind-tables -m64 SPARC_REG_CFLAGS = -ffixed-g4 -ffixed-g5 -fcall-used-g5 -fcall-used-g7 -$(vobjs): KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) $(SPARC_REG_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) $(CFL) +$(vobjs): KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS) $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) $(SPARC_REG_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) $(CFL) # # vDSO code runs in userspace and -pg doesn't help with profiling anyway. @@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ $(obj)/vdso32.so.dbg: asflags-$(CONFIG_SPARC64) += -m32 KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out -m64,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out -mcmodel=medlow,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32)) KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out -fno-pic,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32)) +KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out $(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32)) KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32)) KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out $(SPARC_REG_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32)) KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 += -m32 -msoft-float -fpic diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile index 693f8b9031fb..c2a8b76ae0bc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS),) endif endif -$(vobjs): KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(CC_FLAGS_LTO) $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) $(CFL) +$(vobjs): KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(CC_FLAGS_LTO) $(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS) $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) $(CFL) # # vDSO code runs in userspace and -pg doesn't help with profiling anyway. @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out -m64,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out -mcmodel=kernel,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32)) KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out -fno-pic,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32)) KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out -mfentry,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32)) +KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out $(RANDSTRUCT_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32)) KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32)) KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32)) KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 := $(filter-out $(CC_FLAGS_LTO),$(KBUILD_CFLAGS_32)) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/highmem.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/highmem.h index 032e020853aa..731ee7cc40a5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/highmem.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/highmem.h @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ #include <asm/tlbflush.h> #include <asm/paravirt.h> #include <asm/fixmap.h> +#include <asm/pgtable_areas.h> /* declarations for highmem.c */ extern unsigned long highstart_pfn, highend_pfn; diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c index 5d5c7bb50ce9..ffe3b3a087fe 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c @@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ static inline bool pti_kernel_image_global_ok(void) * cases where RANDSTRUCT is in use to help keep the layout a * secret. */ - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT)) + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT)) return false; return true; diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c index 00db21ff115e..82369c6f889e 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c +++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c @@ -11,72 +11,125 @@ #include "lkdtm.h" #include <linux/stackleak.h> -void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING(void) +#if defined(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) +/* + * Check that stackleak tracks the lowest stack pointer and erases the stack + * below this as expected. + * + * To prevent the lowest stack pointer changing during the test, IRQs are + * masked and instrumentation of this function is disabled. We assume that the + * compiler will create a fixed-size stack frame for this function. + * + * Any non-inlined function may make further use of the stack, altering the + * lowest stack pointer and/or clobbering poison values. To avoid spurious + * failures we must avoid printing until the end of the test or have already + * encountered a failure condition. + */ +static void noinstr check_stackleak_irqoff(void) { - unsigned long *sp, left, found, i; - const unsigned long check_depth = - STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long); + const unsigned long task_stack_base = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(current); + const unsigned long task_stack_low = stackleak_task_low_bound(current); + const unsigned long task_stack_high = stackleak_task_high_bound(current); + const unsigned long current_sp = current_stack_pointer; + const unsigned long lowest_sp = current->lowest_stack; + unsigned long untracked_high; + unsigned long poison_high, poison_low; bool test_failed = false; /* - * For the details about the alignment of the poison values, see - * the comment in stackleak_track_stack(). + * Check that the current and lowest recorded stack pointer values fall + * within the expected task stack boundaries. These tests should never + * fail unless the boundaries are incorrect or we're clobbering the + * STACK_END_MAGIC, and in either casee something is seriously wrong. */ - sp = PTR_ALIGN(&i, sizeof(unsigned long)); - - left = ((unsigned long)sp & (THREAD_SIZE - 1)) / sizeof(unsigned long); - sp--; + if (current_sp < task_stack_low || current_sp >= task_stack_high) { + pr_err("FAIL: current_stack_pointer (0x%lx) outside of task stack bounds [0x%lx..0x%lx]\n", + current_sp, task_stack_low, task_stack_high - 1); + test_failed = true; + goto out; + } + if (lowest_sp < task_stack_low || lowest_sp >= task_stack_high) { + pr_err("FAIL: current->lowest_stack (0x%lx) outside of task stack bounds [0x%lx..0x%lx]\n", + lowest_sp, task_stack_low, task_stack_high - 1); + test_failed = true; + goto out; + } /* - * One 'long int' at the bottom of the thread stack is reserved - * and not poisoned. + * Depending on what has run prior to this test, the lowest recorded + * stack pointer could be above or below the current stack pointer. + * Start from the lowest of the two. + * + * Poison values are naturally-aligned unsigned longs. As the current + * stack pointer might not be sufficiently aligned, we must align + * downwards to find the lowest known stack pointer value. This is the + * high boundary for a portion of the stack which may have been used + * without being tracked, and has to be scanned for poison. */ - if (left > 1) { - left--; - } else { - pr_err("FAIL: not enough stack space for the test\n"); - test_failed = true; - goto end; - } + untracked_high = min(current_sp, lowest_sp); + untracked_high = ALIGN_DOWN(untracked_high, sizeof(unsigned long)); - pr_info("checking unused part of the thread stack (%lu bytes)...\n", - left * sizeof(unsigned long)); + /* + * Find the top of the poison in the same way as the erasing code. + */ + poison_high = stackleak_find_top_of_poison(task_stack_low, untracked_high); /* - * Search for 'check_depth' poison values in a row (just like - * stackleak_erase() does). + * Check whether the poisoned portion of the stack (if any) consists + * entirely of poison. This verifies the entries that + * stackleak_find_top_of_poison() should have checked. */ - for (i = 0, found = 0; i < left && found <= check_depth; i++) { - if (*(sp - i) == STACKLEAK_POISON) - found++; - else - found = 0; - } + poison_low = poison_high; + while (poison_low > task_stack_low) { + poison_low -= sizeof(unsigned long); + + if (*(unsigned long *)poison_low == STACKLEAK_POISON) + continue; - if (found <= check_depth) { - pr_err("FAIL: the erased part is not found (checked %lu bytes)\n", - i * sizeof(unsigned long)); + pr_err("FAIL: non-poison value %lu bytes below poison boundary: 0x%lx\n", + poison_high - poison_low, *(unsigned long *)poison_low); test_failed = true; - goto end; } - pr_info("the erased part begins after %lu not poisoned bytes\n", - (i - found) * sizeof(unsigned long)); - - /* The rest of thread stack should be erased */ - for (; i < left; i++) { - if (*(sp - i) != STACKLEAK_POISON) { - pr_err("FAIL: bad value number %lu in the erased part: 0x%lx\n", - i, *(sp - i)); - test_failed = true; - } - } + pr_info("stackleak stack usage:\n" + " high offset: %lu bytes\n" + " current: %lu bytes\n" + " lowest: %lu bytes\n" + " tracked: %lu bytes\n" + " untracked: %lu bytes\n" + " poisoned: %lu bytes\n" + " low offset: %lu bytes\n", + task_stack_base + THREAD_SIZE - task_stack_high, + task_stack_high - current_sp, + task_stack_high - lowest_sp, + task_stack_high - untracked_high, + untracked_high - poison_high, + poison_high - task_stack_low, + task_stack_low - task_stack_base); -end: +out: if (test_failed) { pr_err("FAIL: the thread stack is NOT properly erased!\n"); - pr_expected_config(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK); } else { pr_info("OK: the rest of the thread stack is properly erased\n"); } } + +void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING(void) +{ + unsigned long flags; + + local_irq_save(flags); + check_stackleak_irqoff(); + local_irq_restore(flags); +} +#else /* defined(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) */ +void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING(void) +{ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK)) { + pr_err("XFAIL: stackleak is not enabled (CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=n)\n"); + } else { + pr_err("XFAIL: stackleak is not supported on this arch (HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK=n)\n"); + } +} +#endif /* defined(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) */ diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c index 42460c0885fc..df70df29deea 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c @@ -35,6 +35,25 @@ #include "niu.h" +/* This driver wants to store a link to a "next page" within the + * page struct itself by overloading the content of the "mapping" + * member. This is not expected by the page API, but does currently + * work. However, the randstruct plugin gets very bothered by this + * case because "mapping" (struct address_space) is randomized, so + * casts to/from it trigger warnings. Hide this by way of a union, + * to create a typed alias of "mapping", since that's how it is + * actually being used here. + */ +union niu_page { + struct page page; + struct { + unsigned long __flags; /* unused alias of "flags" */ + struct list_head __lru; /* unused alias of "lru" */ + struct page *next; /* alias of "mapping" */ + }; +}; +#define niu_next_page(p) container_of(p, union niu_page, page)->next + #define DRV_MODULE_NAME "niu" #define DRV_MODULE_VERSION "1.1" #define DRV_MODULE_RELDATE "Apr 22, 2010" @@ -3283,7 +3302,7 @@ static struct page *niu_find_rxpage(struct rx_ring_info *rp, u64 addr, addr &= PAGE_MASK; pp = &rp->rxhash[h]; - for (; (p = *pp) != NULL; pp = (struct page **) &p->mapping) { + for (; (p = *pp) != NULL; pp = &niu_next_page(p)) { if (p->index == addr) { *link = pp; goto found; @@ -3300,7 +3319,7 @@ static void niu_hash_page(struct rx_ring_info *rp, struct page *page, u64 base) unsigned int h = niu_hash_rxaddr(rp, base); page->index = base; - page->mapping = (struct address_space *) rp->rxhash[h]; + niu_next_page(page) = rp->rxhash[h]; rp->rxhash[h] = page; } @@ -3382,11 +3401,11 @@ static int niu_rx_pkt_ignore(struct niu *np, struct rx_ring_info *rp) rcr_size = rp->rbr_sizes[(val & RCR_ENTRY_PKTBUFSZ) >> RCR_ENTRY_PKTBUFSZ_SHIFT]; if ((page->index + PAGE_SIZE) - rcr_size == addr) { - *link = (struct page *) page->mapping; + *link = niu_next_page(page); np->ops->unmap_page(np->device, page->index, PAGE_SIZE, DMA_FROM_DEVICE); page->index = 0; - page->mapping = NULL; + niu_next_page(page) = NULL; __free_page(page); rp->rbr_refill_pending++; } @@ -3451,11 +3470,11 @@ static int niu_process_rx_pkt(struct napi_struct *napi, struct niu *np, niu_rx_skb_append(skb, page, off, append_size, rcr_size); if ((page->index + rp->rbr_block_size) - rcr_size == addr) { - *link = (struct page *) page->mapping; + *link = niu_next_page(page); np->ops->unmap_page(np->device, page->index, PAGE_SIZE, DMA_FROM_DEVICE); page->index = 0; - page->mapping = NULL; + niu_next_page(page) = NULL; rp->rbr_refill_pending++; } else get_page(page); @@ -3518,13 +3537,13 @@ static void niu_rbr_free(struct niu *np, struct rx_ring_info *rp) page = rp->rxhash[i]; while (page) { - struct page *next = (struct page *) page->mapping; + struct page *next = niu_next_page(page); u64 base = page->index; np->ops->unmap_page(np->device, base, PAGE_SIZE, DMA_FROM_DEVICE); page->index = 0; - page->mapping = NULL; + niu_next_page(page) = NULL; __free_page(page); @@ -6440,8 +6459,7 @@ static void niu_reset_buffers(struct niu *np) page = rp->rxhash[j]; while (page) { - struct page *next = - (struct page *) page->mapping; + struct page *next = niu_next_page(page); u64 base = page->index; base = base >> RBR_DESCR_ADDR_SHIFT; rp->rbr[k++] = cpu_to_le32(base); @@ -10176,6 +10194,9 @@ static int __init niu_init(void) BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE < 4 * 1024); + BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct page, mapping) != + offsetof(union niu_page, next)); + niu_debug = netif_msg_init(debug, NIU_MSG_DEFAULT); #ifdef CONFIG_SPARC64 diff --git a/include/linux/compiler-clang.h b/include/linux/compiler-clang.h index babb1347148c..c84fec767445 100644 --- a/include/linux/compiler-clang.h +++ b/include/linux/compiler-clang.h @@ -69,6 +69,16 @@ #define __nocfi __attribute__((__no_sanitize__("cfi"))) #define __cficanonical __attribute__((__cfi_canonical_jump_table__)) +#if defined(CONFIG_CFI_CLANG) +/* + * With CONFIG_CFI_CLANG, the compiler replaces function address + * references with the address of the function's CFI jump table + * entry. The function_nocfi macro always returns the address of the + * actual function instead. + */ +#define function_nocfi(x) __builtin_function_start(x) +#endif + /* * Turn individual warnings and errors on and off locally, depending * on version. diff --git a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h index 52299c957c98..a0c55eeaeaf1 100644 --- a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h +++ b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h @@ -66,14 +66,6 @@ __builtin_unreachable(); \ } while (0) -#if defined(RANDSTRUCT_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__) -#define __randomize_layout __attribute__((randomize_layout)) -#define __no_randomize_layout __attribute__((no_randomize_layout)) -/* This anon struct can add padding, so only enable it under randstruct. */ -#define randomized_struct_fields_start struct { -#define randomized_struct_fields_end } __randomize_layout; -#endif - /* * GCC 'asm goto' miscompiles certain code sequences: * diff --git a/include/linux/compiler_types.h b/include/linux/compiler_types.h index 1c2c33ae1b37..d08dfcb0ac68 100644 --- a/include/linux/compiler_types.h +++ b/include/linux/compiler_types.h @@ -242,15 +242,15 @@ struct ftrace_likely_data { # define __latent_entropy #endif -#ifndef __randomize_layout +#if defined(RANDSTRUCT) && !defined(__CHECKER__) +# define __randomize_layout __designated_init __attribute__((randomize_layout)) +# define __no_randomize_layout __attribute__((no_randomize_layout)) +/* This anon struct can add padding, so only enable it under randstruct. */ +# define randomized_struct_fields_start struct { +# define randomized_struct_fields_end } __randomize_layout; +#else # define __randomize_layout __designated_init -#endif - -#ifndef __no_randomize_layout # define __no_randomize_layout -#endif - -#ifndef randomized_struct_fields_start # define randomized_struct_fields_start # define randomized_struct_fields_end #endif diff --git a/include/linux/highmem-internal.h b/include/linux/highmem-internal.h index a77be5630209..337bd9f32921 100644 --- a/include/linux/highmem-internal.h +++ b/include/linux/highmem-internal.h @@ -149,6 +149,11 @@ static inline void totalhigh_pages_add(long count) atomic_long_add(count, &_totalhigh_pages); } +static inline bool is_kmap_addr(const void *x) +{ + unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)x; + return addr >= PKMAP_ADDR(0) && addr < PKMAP_ADDR(LAST_PKMAP); +} #else /* CONFIG_HIGHMEM */ static inline struct page *kmap_to_page(void *addr) @@ -234,6 +239,11 @@ static inline void __kunmap_atomic(void *addr) static inline unsigned int nr_free_highpages(void) { return 0; } static inline unsigned long totalhigh_pages(void) { return 0UL; } +static inline bool is_kmap_addr(const void *x) +{ + return false; +} + #endif /* CONFIG_HIGHMEM */ /* diff --git a/include/linux/netfs.h b/include/linux/netfs.h index c7bf1eaf51d5..0c33b715cbfd 100644 --- a/include/linux/netfs.h +++ b/include/linux/netfs.h @@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ extern void netfs_stats_show(struct seq_file *); */ static inline struct netfs_i_context *netfs_i_context(struct inode *inode) { - return (struct netfs_i_context *)(inode + 1); + return (void *)inode + sizeof(*inode); } /** @@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ static inline struct netfs_i_context *netfs_i_context(struct inode *inode) */ static inline struct inode *netfs_inode(struct netfs_i_context *ctx) { - return ((struct inode *)ctx) - 1; + return (void *)ctx - sizeof(struct inode); } /** diff --git a/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h b/include/linux/randomize_kstack.h index 1468caf001c0..5d868505a94e 100644 --- a/include/linux |