diff options
32 files changed, 1336 insertions, 848 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c index 53a0070ff5df..38650e52ef57 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c @@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ static ssize_t policy_update(u32 mask, const char __user *buf, size_t size, /* high level check about policy management - fine grained in * below after unpack */ - error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, ns, mask); + error = aa_may_manage_policy(current_cred(), label, ns, mask); if (error) goto end_section; @@ -486,7 +486,8 @@ static ssize_t profile_remove(struct file *f, const char __user *buf, /* high level check about policy management - fine grained in * below after unpack */ - error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, ns, AA_MAY_REMOVE_POLICY); + error = aa_may_manage_policy(current_cred(), label, ns, + AA_MAY_REMOVE_POLICY); if (error) goto out; @@ -618,23 +619,23 @@ static void profile_query_cb(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, if (profile_unconfined(profile)) return; - if (rules->file.dfa && *match_str == AA_CLASS_FILE) { - state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file.dfa, - rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE], + if (rules->file->dfa && *match_str == AA_CLASS_FILE) { + state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file->dfa, + rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE], match_str + 1, match_len - 1); if (state) { struct path_cond cond = { }; - tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(&(rules->file), state, &cond)); + tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(rules->file, state, &cond)); } - } else if (rules->policy.dfa) { + } else if (rules->policy->dfa) { if (!RULE_MEDIATES(rules, *match_str)) return; /* no change to current perms */ - state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy.dfa, - rules->policy.start[0], + state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, + rules->policy->start[0], match_str, match_len); if (state) - tmp = *aa_lookup_perms(&rules->policy, state); + tmp = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state); } aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp); aa_perms_accum_raw(perms, &tmp); @@ -1095,7 +1096,7 @@ static int seq_profile_attach_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) struct aa_profile *profile = labels_profile(label); if (profile->attach.xmatch_str) seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", profile->attach.xmatch_str); - else if (profile->attach.xmatch.dfa) + else if (profile->attach.xmatch->dfa) seq_puts(seq, "<unknown>\n"); else seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", profile->base.name); @@ -1314,7 +1315,6 @@ SEQ_RAWDATA_FOPS(compressed_size); static int decompress_zstd(char *src, size_t slen, char *dst, size_t dlen) { -#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY if (slen < dlen) { const size_t wksp_len = zstd_dctx_workspace_bound(); zstd_dctx *ctx; @@ -1341,7 +1341,6 @@ cleanup: kvfree(wksp); return ret; } -#endif if (dlen < slen) return -EINVAL; @@ -1806,7 +1805,8 @@ static int ns_mkdir_op(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir, int error; label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); - error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, NULL, AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY); + error = aa_may_manage_policy(current_cred(), label, NULL, + AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY); end_current_label_crit_section(label); if (error) return error; @@ -1855,7 +1855,8 @@ static int ns_rmdir_op(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) int error; label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); - error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, NULL, AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY); + error = aa_may_manage_policy(current_cred(), label, NULL, + AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY); end_current_label_crit_section(label); if (error) return error; @@ -2339,10 +2340,16 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_domain[] = { AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("post_nnp_subset", 1), AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("computed_longest_left", 1), AA_SFS_DIR("attach_conditions", aa_sfs_entry_attach), + AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("disconnected.path", 1), AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("version", "1.2"), { } }; +static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_unconfined[] = { + AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_profile", 1), + { } +}; + static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_versions[] = { AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v5", 1), AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("v6", 1), @@ -2352,11 +2359,15 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_versions[] = { { } }; +#define PERMS32STR "allow deny subtree cond kill complain prompt audit quiet hide xindex tag label" static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_policy[] = { AA_SFS_DIR("versions", aa_sfs_entry_versions), AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("set_load", 1), /* number of out of band transitions supported */ AA_SFS_FILE_U64("outofband", MAX_OOB_SUPPORTED), + AA_SFS_FILE_U64("permstable32_version", 1), + AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("permstable32", PERMS32STR), + AA_SFS_DIR("unconfined_restrictions", aa_sfs_entry_unconfined), { } }; @@ -2368,6 +2379,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_mount[] = { static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_ns[] = { AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("profile", 1), AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("pivot_root", 0), + AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", "userns_create"), { } }; @@ -2382,6 +2394,12 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_query[] = { AA_SFS_DIR("label", aa_sfs_entry_query_label), { } }; + +static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_io_uring[] = { + AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", "sqpoll override_creds"), + { } +}; + static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_features[] = { AA_SFS_DIR("policy", aa_sfs_entry_policy), AA_SFS_DIR("domain", aa_sfs_entry_domain), @@ -2395,6 +2413,7 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_features[] = { AA_SFS_DIR("ptrace", aa_sfs_entry_ptrace), AA_SFS_DIR("signal", aa_sfs_entry_signal), AA_SFS_DIR("query", aa_sfs_entry_query), + AA_SFS_DIR("io_uring", aa_sfs_entry_io_uring), { } }; diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c index 5a7978aa4b19..45beb1c5f747 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c @@ -58,8 +58,8 @@ static const char *const aa_class_names[] = { "io_uring", "module", "lsm", - "unknown", - "unknown", + "namespace", + "io_uring", "unknown", "unknown", "unknown", @@ -85,37 +85,36 @@ static const char *const aa_class_names[] = { /** * audit_pre() - core AppArmor function. * @ab: audit buffer to fill (NOT NULL) - * @ca: audit structure containing data to audit (NOT NULL) + * @va: audit structure containing data to audit (NOT NULL) * - * Record common AppArmor audit data from @sa + * Record common AppArmor audit data from @va */ -static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca) +static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { - struct common_audit_data *sa = ca; + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad_of_va(va); if (aa_g_audit_header) { audit_log_format(ab, "apparmor=\"%s\"", - aa_audit_type[aad(sa)->type]); + aa_audit_type[ad->type]); } - if (aad(sa)->op) { - audit_log_format(ab, " operation=\"%s\"", aad(sa)->op); - } + if (ad->op) + audit_log_format(ab, " operation=\"%s\"", ad->op); - if (aad(sa)->class) + if (ad->class) audit_log_format(ab, " class=\"%s\"", - aad(sa)->class <= AA_CLASS_LAST ? - aa_class_names[aad(sa)->class] : + ad->class <= AA_CLASS_LAST ? + aa_class_names[ad->class] : "unknown"); - if (aad(sa)->info) { - audit_log_format(ab, " info=\"%s\"", aad(sa)->info); - if (aad(sa)->error) - audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", aad(sa)->error); + if (ad->info) { + audit_log_format(ab, " info=\"%s\"", ad->info); + if (ad->error) + audit_log_format(ab, " error=%d", ad->error); } - if (aad(sa)->label) { - struct aa_label *label = aad(sa)->label; + if (ad->subj_label) { + struct aa_label *label = ad->subj_label; if (label_isprofile(label)) { struct aa_profile *profile = labels_profile(label); @@ -134,42 +133,44 @@ static void audit_pre(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *ca) } } - if (aad(sa)->name) { + if (ad->name) { audit_log_format(ab, " name="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->name); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, ad->name); } } /** * aa_audit_msg - Log a message to the audit subsystem - * @sa: audit event structure (NOT NULL) + * @type: audit type for the message + * @ad: audit event structure (NOT NULL) * @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL) */ -void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct common_audit_data *sa, +void aa_audit_msg(int type, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *)) { - aad(sa)->type = type; - common_lsm_audit(sa, audit_pre, cb); + ad->type = type; + common_lsm_audit(&ad->common, audit_pre, cb); } /** * aa_audit - Log a profile based audit event to the audit subsystem * @type: audit type for the message * @profile: profile to check against (NOT NULL) - * @sa: audit event (NOT NULL) + * @ad: audit event (NOT NULL) * @cb: optional callback fn for type specific fields (MAYBE NULL) * * Handle default message switching based off of audit mode flags * * Returns: error on failure */ -int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa, +int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, + struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, void (*cb) (struct audit_buffer *, void *)) { AA_BUG(!profile); if (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO) { - if (likely(!aad(sa)->error)) { + if (likely(!ad->error)) { if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) return 0; type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT; @@ -181,24 +182,24 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa, if (AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET || (type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED && AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_QUIET_DENIED)) - return aad(sa)->error; + return ad->error; if (KILL_MODE(profile) && type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED) type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL; - aad(sa)->label = &profile->label; + ad->subj_label = &profile->label; - aa_audit_msg(type, sa, cb); + aa_audit_msg(type, ad, cb); - if (aad(sa)->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL) + if (ad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL) (void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL, - sa->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK && sa->u.tsk ? - sa->u.tsk : current); + ad->common.type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK && + ad->common.u.tsk ? ad->common.u.tsk : current); - if (aad(sa)->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED) - return complain_error(aad(sa)->error); + if (ad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED) + return complain_error(ad->error); - return aad(sa)->error; + return ad->error; } struct aa_audit_rule { diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c index 326a51838ef2..9934df16c843 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/capability.c +++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c @@ -38,8 +38,8 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct audit_cache, audit_cache); /** * audit_cb - call back for capability components of audit struct - * @ab - audit buffer (NOT NULL) - * @va - audit struct to audit data from (NOT NULL) + * @ab: audit buffer (NOT NULL) + * @va: audit struct to audit data from (NOT NULL) */ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) { @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) /** * audit_caps - audit a capability - * @sa: audit data + * @ad: audit data * @profile: profile being tested for confinement (NOT NULL) * @cap: capability tested * @error: error code returned by test @@ -59,9 +59,9 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) * Do auditing of capability and handle, audit/complain/kill modes switching * and duplicate message elimination. * - * Returns: 0 or sa->error on success, error code on failure + * Returns: 0 or ad->error on success, error code on failure */ -static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile, +static int audit_caps(struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, int error) { struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile, struct audit_cache *ent; int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO; - aad(sa)->error = error; + ad->error = error; if (likely(!error)) { /* test if auditing is being forced */ @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile, } put_cpu_var(audit_cache); - return aa_audit(type, profile, sa, audit_cb); + return aa_audit(type, profile, ad, audit_cb); } /** @@ -109,12 +109,12 @@ static int audit_caps(struct common_audit_data *sa, struct aa_profile *profile, * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL, NOT unconfined) * @cap: capability to test if allowed * @opts: CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated - * @sa: audit data (MAY BE NULL indicating no auditing) + * @ad: audit data (MAY BE NULL indicating no auditing) * * Returns: 0 if allowed else -EPERM */ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, - unsigned int opts, struct common_audit_data *sa) + unsigned int opts, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad) { struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, typeof(*rules), list); @@ -132,14 +132,15 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, /* audit the cap request in complain mode but note that it * should be optional. */ - aad(sa)->info = "optional: no audit"; + ad->info = "optional: no audit"; } - return audit_caps(sa, profile, cap, error); + return audit_caps(ad, profile, cap, error); } /** * aa_capable - test permission to use capability + * @subj_cred: cred we are testing capability against * @label: label being tested for capability (NOT NULL) * @cap: capability to be tested * @opts: CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT bit determines whether audit record is generated @@ -148,15 +149,17 @@ static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap, * * Returns: 0 on success, or else an error code. */ -int aa_capable(struct aa_label *label, int cap, unsigned int opts) +int aa_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label, + int cap, unsigned int opts) { struct aa_profile *profile; int error = 0; - DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP, AA_CLASS_CAP, OP_CAPABLE); + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(ad, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP, AA_CLASS_CAP, OP_CAPABLE); - sa.u.cap = cap; + ad.subj_cred = subj_cred; + ad.common.u.cap = cap; error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, - profile_capable(profile, cap, opts, &sa)); + profile_capable(profile, cap, opts, &ad)); return error; } diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index f3715cda59c5..89fbeab4b33b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ /** * may_change_ptraced_domain - check if can change profile on ptraced task + * @to_cred: cred of task changing domain * @to_label: profile to change to (NOT NULL) * @info: message if there is an error * @@ -39,28 +40,34 @@ * * Returns: %0 or error if change not allowed */ -static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct aa_label *to_label, +static int may_change_ptraced_domain(const struct cred *to_cred, + struct aa_label *to_label, const char **info) { struct task_struct *tracer; struct aa_label *tracerl = NULL; + const struct cred *tracer_cred = NULL; + int error = 0; rcu_read_lock(); tracer = ptrace_parent(current); - if (tracer) + if (tracer) { /* released below */ tracerl = aa_get_task_label(tracer); - + tracer_cred = get_task_cred(tracer); + } /* not ptraced */ if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerl)) goto out; - error = aa_may_ptrace(tracerl, to_label, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH); + error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer_cred, tracerl, to_cred, to_label, + PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH); out: rcu_read_unlock(); aa_put_label(tracerl); + put_cred(tracer_cred); if (error) *info = "ptrace prevents transition"; @@ -70,7 +77,7 @@ out: /**** TODO: dedup to aa_label_match - needs perm and dfa, merging * specifically this is an exact copy of aa_label_match except * aa_compute_perms is replaced with aa_compute_fperms - * and policy.dfa with file.dfa + * and policy->dfa with file->dfa ****/ /* match a profile and its associated ns component if needed * Assumes visibility test has already been done. @@ -86,16 +93,16 @@ static inline aa_state_t match_component(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *ns_name; if (stack) - state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, "&"); + state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file->dfa, state, "&"); if (profile->ns == tp->ns) - return aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, tp->base.hname); + return aa_dfa_match(rules->file->dfa, state, tp->base.hname); /* try matching with namespace name and then profile */ ns_name = aa_ns_name(profile->ns, tp->ns, true); - state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file.dfa, state, ":", 1); - state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, ns_name); - state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file.dfa, state, ":", 1); - return aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, tp->base.hname); + state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file->dfa, state, ":", 1); + state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file->dfa, state, ns_name); + state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->file->dfa, state, ":", 1); + return aa_dfa_match(rules->file->dfa, state, tp->base.hname); } /** @@ -143,12 +150,12 @@ next: label_for_each_cont(i, label, tp) { if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, subns)) continue; - state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file.dfa, state, "//&"); + state = aa_dfa_match(rules->file->dfa, state, "//&"); state = match_component(profile, tp, false, state); if (!state) goto fail; } - *perms = *(aa_lookup_fperms(&(rules->file), state, &cond)); + *perms = *(aa_lookup_fperms(rules->file, state, &cond)); aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, perms); if ((perms->allow & request) != request) return -EACCES; @@ -203,7 +210,7 @@ static int label_components_match(struct aa_profile *profile, return 0; next: - tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(&(rules->file), state, &cond)); + tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(rules->file, state, &cond)); aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp); aa_perms_accum(perms, &tmp); label_for_each_cont(i, label, tp) { @@ -212,7 +219,7 @@ next: state = match_component(profile, tp, stack, start); if (!state) goto fail; - tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(&(rules->file), state, &cond)); + tmp = *(aa_lookup_fperms(rules->file, state, &cond)); aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp); aa_perms_accum(perms, &tmp); } @@ -265,6 +272,7 @@ static int label_match(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *label, * @stack: whether this is a stacking request * @request: requested perms * @start: state to start matching in + * @perms: Returns computed perms (NOT NULL) * * * Returns: permission set @@ -309,7 +317,7 @@ static int aa_xattrs_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, might_sleep(); /* transition from exec match to xattr set */ - state = aa_dfa_outofband_transition(attach->xmatch.dfa, state); + state = aa_dfa_outofband_transition(attach->xmatch->dfa, state); d = bprm->file->f_path.dentry; for (i = 0; i < attach->xattr_count; i++) { @@ -323,20 +331,20 @@ static int aa_xattrs_match(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, * that not present xattr can be distinguished from a 0 * length value or rule that matches any value */ - state = aa_dfa_null_transition(attach->xmatch.dfa, + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(attach->xmatch->dfa, state); /* Check xattr value */ - state = aa_dfa_match_len(attach->xmatch.dfa, state, + state = aa_dfa_match_len(attach->xmatch->dfa, state, value, size); - index = ACCEPT_TABLE(attach->xmatch.dfa)[state]; - perm = attach->xmatch.perms[index].allow; + index = ACCEPT_TABLE(attach->xmatch->dfa)[state]; + perm = attach->xmatch->perms[index].allow; if (!(perm & MAY_EXEC)) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } } /* transition to next element */ - state = aa_dfa_outofband_transition(attach->xmatch.dfa, state); + state = aa_dfa_outofband_transition(attach->xmatch->dfa, state); if (size < 0) { /* * No xattr match, so verify if transition to @@ -359,11 +367,11 @@ out: /** * find_attach - do attachment search for unconfined processes - * @bprm - binprm structure of transitioning task + * @bprm: binprm structure of transitioning task * @ns: the current namespace (NOT NULL) - * @head - profile list to walk (NOT NULL) - * @name - to match against (NOT NULL) - * @info - info message if there was an error (NOT NULL) + * @head: profile list to walk (NOT NULL) + * @name: to match against (NOT NULL) + * @info: info message if there was an error (NOT NULL) * * Do a linear search on the profiles in the list. There is a matching * preference where an exact match is preferred over a name which uses @@ -405,16 +413,16 @@ restart: * as another profile, signal a conflict and refuse to * match. */ - if (attach->xmatch.dfa) { + if (attach->xmatch->dfa) { unsigned int count; aa_state_t state; u32 index, perm; - state = aa_dfa_leftmatch(attach->xmatch.dfa, - attach->xmatch.start[AA_CLASS_XMATCH], + state = aa_dfa_leftmatch(attach->xmatch->dfa, + attach->xmatch->start[AA_CLASS_XMATCH], name, &count); - index = ACCEPT_TABLE(attach->xmatch.dfa)[state]; - perm = attach->xmatch.perms[index].allow; + index = ACCEPT_TABLE(attach->xmatch->dfa)[state]; + perm = attach->xmatch->perms[index].allow; /* any accepting state means a valid match. */ if (perm & MAY_EXEC) { int ret = 0; @@ -517,7 +525,7 @@ struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex, /* TODO: move lookup parsing to unpack time so this is a straight * index into the resultant label */ - for (*name = rules->file.trans.table[index]; !label && *name; + for (*name = rules->file->trans.table[index]; !label && *name; *name = next_name(xtype, *name)) { if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) { struct aa_profile *new_profile; @@ -545,6 +553,7 @@ struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex, * @name: name to lookup (NOT NULL) * @xindex: index into x transition table * @lookupname: returns: name used in lookup if one was specified (NOT NULL) + * @info: info message if there was an error (NOT NULL) * * find label for a transition index * @@ -570,7 +579,7 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile, break; case AA_X_TABLE: /* TODO: fix when perm mapping done at unload */ - stack = rules->file.trans.table[xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK]; + stack = rules->file->trans.table[xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK]; if (*stack != '&') { /* released by caller */ new = x_table_lookup(profile, xindex, lookupname); @@ -619,7 +628,8 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile, return new; } -static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile, +static struct aa_label *profile_transition(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_profile *profile, const struct linux_binprm *bprm, char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond, bool *secure_exec) @@ -628,7 +638,7 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile, typeof(*rules), list); struct aa_label *new = NULL; const char *info = NULL, *name = NULL, *target = NULL; - aa_state_t state = rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE]; + aa_state_t state = rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE]; struct aa_perms perms = {}; bool nonewprivs = false; int error = 0; @@ -662,7 +672,7 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile, } /* find exec permissions for name */ - state = aa_str_perms(&(rules->file), state, name, cond, &perms); + state = aa_str_perms(rules->file, state, name, cond, &perms); if (perms.allow & MAY_EXEC) { /* exec permission determine how to transition */ new = x_to_label(profile, bprm, name, perms.xindex, &target, @@ -709,7 +719,8 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile, } audit: - aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, name, target, new, + aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &perms, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, name, + target, new, cond->uid, info, error); if (!new || nonewprivs) { aa_put_label(new); @@ -719,14 +730,15 @@ audit: return new; } -static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec, +static int profile_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec, bool stack, const struct linux_binprm *bprm, char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond, bool *secure_exec) { struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules, typeof(*rules), list); - aa_state_t state = rules->file.start[AA_CLASS_FILE]; + aa_state_t state = rules->file->start[AA_CLASS_FILE]; struct aa_perms perms = {}; const char *xname = NULL, *info = "change_profile onexec"; int error = -EACCES; @@ -759,7 +771,7 @@ static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec, } /* find exec permissions for name */ - state = aa_str_perms(&(rules->file), state, xname, cond, &perms); + state = aa_str_perms(rules->file, state, xname, cond, &perms); if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC)) { info = "no change_onexec valid for executable"; goto audit; @@ -768,7 +780,7 @@ static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec, * onexec permission is linked to exec with a standard pairing * exec\0change_profile */ - state = aa_dfa_null_transition(rules->file.dfa, state); + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(rules->file->dfa, state); error = change_profile_perms(profile, onexec, stack, AA_MAY_ONEXEC, state, &perms); if (error) { @@ -787,13 +799,15 @@ static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec, } audit: - return aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, OP_EXEC, AA_MAY_ONEXEC, xname, + return aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &perms, OP_EXEC, + AA_MAY_ONEXEC, xname, NULL, onexec, cond->uid, info, error); } /* ensure none ns domain transitions are correctly applied with onexec */ -static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(struct aa_label *label, +static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred, + struct aa_label *label, struct aa_label *onexec, bool stack, const struct linux_binprm *bprm, char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond, @@ -810,26 +824,28 @@ static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(struct aa_label *label, if (!stack) { error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile, - profile_onexec(profile, onexec, stack, + profile_onexec(subj_cred, profile, onexec, stack, bprm, buffer, cond, unsafe)); if (error) return ERR_PTR(error); new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL, aa_get_newest_label(onexec), - profile_transition(profile, bprm, buffer, + profile_transition(subj_cred, profile, bprm, + buffer, cond, unsafe)); } else { /* TODO: determine how much we want to loosen this */ error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile, - profile_onexec(profile, onexec, stack, bprm, + profile_onexec(subj_cred, profile, onexec, stack, bprm, buffer, cond, unsafe)); if (error) return ERR_PTR(error); new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL, aa_label_merge(&profile->label, onexec, GFP_KERNEL), - profile_transition(profile, bprm, buffer, + profile_transition(subj_cred, profile, bprm, + buffer, cond, unsafe)); } @@ -838,7 +854,8 @@ static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(struct aa_label *label, /* TODO: get rid of GLOBAL_ROOT_UID */ error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile, - aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC, + aa_audit_file(subj_cred, profile, &nullperms, + OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC, AA_MAY_ONEXEC, bprm->filename, NULL, onexec, GLOB |